DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 152 067 FL 009 282

TITLE Extension of Indochina Refugee Assistance Program. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session, on H.R. 9133, H.R. 9134, and H.R. 9110.

INSTITUTION Congress of the U.S., Washington, D.C. House Committee on the Judiciary.

PUB DATE 77

NOTE 240p.; Some pages may be difficult to read because of small type size

EDRS PRICE MF-$0.83 Plus Postage. HC Not Available from EDRS.

DESCRIPTORS Cambodian; *Federal Legislation; *Federal Programs; *Government Role; *Hearings; *Indochinese; *Refugees; Vietnamese

IDENTIFIERS *Congress 95th; Refugee Resettlement

ABSTRACT

The text of the hearings referred to in the title, held on September 23 and 27, 1977, is provided here. The bills under discussion called for the extension of the Indochina Refugee Assistance Program, established in 1975. During the first hearing the respective roles and responsibilities of the federal, state and local governments and the voluntary agencies in the resettlement process were discussed. The second hearing was a continuation of the subcommittee's consideration of the various proposals to extend the program. The texts of the four bills are included. (CFM)

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# EXTENSION OF INDOCHINA REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

## HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

## SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

OF THE

## COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

**H.R. 9133, H.R. 9134, and H.R. 9110**

EXTENSION OF INDOCHINA REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

SEPTEMBER 23 AND 27, 1977

**Serial No. 24**

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

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96-725 O WASHINGTON : 1977

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# EXTENSION OF INDOCHINA REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

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**FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1977**

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP,
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
*Washington, D.C.*

The subcommittee met at 9:35 a.m., Hon. Joshua Eilberg [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Eilberg, Harris, Fish, and Sawyer.

Also present: Garner J. Cline and Arthur P. Endres, Jr., counsel; Mark R. Zecca, assistant counsel; and Alexander B. Cook, associate counsel.

Mr. EILBERG. The subcommittee will come to order.

The Chair recognizes Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. SAWYER. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent of the subcommittee to permit coverage of this hearing by television broadcast, radio broadcast, still photography, in accordance with committee rule 5.

Mr. EILBERG. Without objection permission is granted.

Today's hearing has been called to consider identical proposals which have been introduced by Chairman Rodino—H.R. 9133—and myself—H.R. 9134—on behalf of the administration to extend the Indochina refugee assistance program.

That program is currently due to expire on the last day of this month, and it is for this reason that urgent action is required by the Congress if this program is to be extended.

It is recalled that the congressional intent surrounding the initial program which was authorized by the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 was that it was to be one of limited duration. In fact, the legislative history surrounding both the authorization and appropriation legislation makes this intent quite clear. It should be noted that the legislative history reflected recognition of the fact that the Cuban refugee program has yet to be terminated, and has involved expenditures of over $1 billion to date. I am, therefore, gratified, that the legislation before us today does not call for an indefinite extension of the program.

During the course of today's hearing we will attempt to discuss the respective roles and responsibilities of the Federal, State, and local governments and the voluntary agencies in the resettlement process.

In particular, I am anxious to learn what types of assistance have been provided which have been the most successful; and what long-term responsibilities have been accepted by the voluntary agencies. In my judgment, based upon my close scrutiny of this massive resettlement program, the roles of these various parties must be more carefully defined, and there must be greater accountability concerning the expenditure of resettlement funds.

My general views on U.S. refugee policies and procedures are well known, and in fact some are embodied in my refugee bill, H.R. 7175, which has been favorably reported by my subcommittee. My position has been that the various agencies in our Government have consistently responded in an unobjective and haphazard fashion whenever refugee situations develop around the world. It is also evident that there is little, if any, coordination between those who decide whether to assist a particular group of refugees and those who are charged with the responsibility of resettling such refugees after their arrival.

H.R. 7175 would tend to rectify some of the ad hoc nature of this influx of refugees.

[The bills referred to follow, together with H.R. 9110, which is an alternative proposed to H.R. 9133 and H.R. 9134:]

95TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

# H. R. 9110

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 14, 1977

Mr. STARK (for himself, Mr. AKAKA, Mr. PHILLIP BURTON, Mr. EDWARDS of California, Mr. HARRINGTON, Mr. MCCORMACK, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. PATTISON of New York, Mr. STEIGER, Mr. BOB WILSON, Mr. WINN, and Mr. ULLMAN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

# A BILL

To amend the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 to extend the period during which refugee assistance may be provided.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That section 2 of the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 is amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 2. (a) (1) Subject to subsection (b), there are authorized to be appropriated, in addition to amounts otherwise available, such sums as may be necessary for carrying out paragraphs (3), (4), (5), and (6) of section 2(b) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 with

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respect to aliens who have fled from Cambodia, Vietnam, or Laos.

"(2) Funds appropriated under this Act shall be made available to State or local public agencies to reimburse them for the non-Federal share of costs under titles IV and XIX of the Social Security Act for the provision of cash or medical assistance to aliens who have fled from Cambodia, Vietnam, or Laos.

"(b) (1) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) shall be available for obligation after September 30, 1980.

"(2) The amount of assistance (including the amount of reimbursement as described in subsection (a) (2)) provided to a State or local public agency under section 2 (b) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 for the purpose of providing cash or medical assistance to aliens who have fled from Cambodia, Vietnam, or Laos and who entered the United States prior to August 11, 1977, may not exceed—

"(A) for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1979, 75 per centum, and

"(B) for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1980, 50 per centum,

of the cost (including the non-Federal share of costs as described in subsection (a) (2)) of the State or agency in

providing such assistance for such purpose for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1978.

"(3) Assistance provided to a State or local public agency under section 2(b) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 for the purpose of providing cash assistance, medical assistance, and social services, including administrative costs, to aliens who have fled from Cambodia, Vietnam, or Laos and who entered the United States on or after August 11, 1977, may be used to pay the full amount of the cost of the State or agency in providing such assistance for such purpose for the period from August 11, 1977, through September 30, 1980.".

SEC. 2. (a) Section 4(b) of the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 is amended by striking out paragraph (1) and redesignating paragraphs (2) and (3) as paragraphs (1) and (2), respectively.

(b) Section 4(c) of such Act is amended—

(1) by striking out "September 30, 1977" and inserting in lieu thereof "September 30, 1980"; and

(2) by striking out "December 31, 1977" and inserting in lieu thereof "December 31, 1980".

95TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

# H. R. 9133

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 15, 1977

Mr. RODINO (by request) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

# A BILL

To amend the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 to extend the period during which refugee assistance may be provided, and for other purposes.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That section 2 of the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 is amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 2. (a) Subject to subsection (b), there are authorized to be appropriated, in addition to amounts otherwise available for the purposes of this Act, not to exceed $160,000,000 for the performance of the functions set forth in paragraphs (3), (4), (5), and (6) of section 2(b) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 (76 Stat.

I

121), with respect to aliens who have fled from Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos.

"(b) (1) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) shall be available for obligation after September 30, 1980, for expenditures authorized by paragraph (2) of this subsection and none of those funds shall be available after September 30, 1982, for expenditures authorized by paragraph (3) of this subsection.

"(2) Funds provided to States and other jurisdictions under this Act for assistance to aliens who have fled from Cambodia, Vietnam, or Laos and who entered the United States prior to August 11, 1977—

"(A) shall be available only for the cost, including related administrative costs, of providing (i) cash assistance for individuals who are not eligible under the program of aid to families with dependent children or the supplemental security income program under titles IV and XVI of the Social Security Act, and (ii) medical assistance for individuals who are not eligible for such assistance under a State plan approved under title XIX of the Social Security Act; and

"(B) shall not exceed, for fiscal year 1978, 75 per centum of the amount required, as determined by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, for assistance to individuals described in clause (A); 50 per

centum of such amount for fiscal year 1979; and 25 per centum of such amount for fiscal year 1980.

"(3) Funds provided to States and other jurisdictions under this Act for assistance to aliens who have fled from Cambodia, Vietnam, or Laos and who entered the United States on or after August 11, 1977—

"(A) may be used, to the extent such funds are available, to pay the full amount required for providing cash assistance, medical assistance, and social services (including administrative costs related thereto) to such individuals for the period from August 11, 1977, through March 31, 1979;

"(B) shall be available, after March 31, 1979, only for the cost, including related administrative costs, of providing (i) cash assistance for individuals who are not eligible under the program of aid to families with dependent children or the supplemental security income program under titles IV and XVI of the Social Security Act, or (ii) medical assistance for individuals who are not eligible for such assistance under a State plan approved under title XIX of the Social Security Act;

"(C) shall not exceed, for the period from April 1, 1979, through March 31, 1980, 75 per centum of the amount required, as determined by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, for assistance to indi-

viduals described in clause (B); 50 per centum of such amount for the period from April 1, 1980, through March 31, 1981; and 25 per centum of such amount for the period from April 1, 1981, through March 31, 1982; and

"(D) shall not be available for use after March 31, 1982, other than for such administrative costs as may be necessary to terminate activities under this Act, and shall not be available for any purpose after September 30, 1982.

"(c) No payment may be made under this Act to any State with respect to any expenditure made in fiscal years beginning after September 30, 1976, unless the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare receives a claim from the State for Federal reimbursement for such expenditure on or before the last day of the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the expenditure was made. The Secretary shall promulgate standards for determining when an expenditure shall be considered to have been made for the purposes of this subsection, and such standards may, at the request of any State, be modified to comport with the accounting or other fiscal practices of the State.".

SEC. 2. (a) Section 4(b) of the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 is amended to read as follows:

"(b) Not later than December 31 of each year ending prior to January 1, 1983, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare shall transmit to such Committees a report describing fully and completely the status of refugees from Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos.".

(b) Section 4( ) of that Act is repealed.

95TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

# H. R. 9134

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 15, 1977

Mr. EILBERG introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

# A BILL

To amend the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 to extend the period during which refugee assistance may be provided, and for other purposes.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That section 2 of the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 is amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 2. (a) Subject to subsection (b), there are authorized to be appropriated, in addition to amounts otherwise available for the purposes of this Act, not to exceed $160,000,000 for the performance of the functions set forth in paragraphs (3), (4), (5), and (6) of section 2(b) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 (76

Stat. 121), with respect to aliens who have fled from Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos.

"(b) (1) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) shall be available for obligation after September 30, 1980, for expenditures authorized by paragraph (2) of this subsection and none of those funds shall be available after September 30, 1982, for expenditures authorized by paragraph (3) of this subsection.

"(2) Funds provided to States and other jurisdictions under this Act for assistance to aliens who have fled from Cambodia, Vietnam, or Laos, and who entered the United States prior to August 11, 1977—

"(A) shall be available only for the cost, including related administrative costs, of providing (i) cash assistance for individuals who are not eligible under the program of aid to families with dependent children or the supplemental security income program under titles IV and XVI of the Social Security Act, and (ii) medical assistance for individuals who are not eligible for such assistance under a State plan approved under title XIX of the Social Security Act; and

"(B) shall not exceed, for fiscal year 1978, 75 per centum of the amount required, as determined by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, for assistance to individuals described in clause (A); 50 per

centum of such amount for fiscal year 1979; and 25 per centum of such amount for fiscal year 1980.

"(3) Funds provided to States and other jurisdictions under this Act for assistance to aliens who have fled from Cambodia, Vietnam, or Laos and who entered the United States on or after August 11, 1977—

"(A) may be used, to the extent such funds are available, to pay the full amount required for providing cash assistance, medical assistance, and social services (including administrative costs related thereto) to such individuals for the period from August 11, 1977, through March 31, 1979;

"(B) shall be available, after March 31, 1979, only for the cost, including related administrative costs, of providing (i) cash assistance for individuals who are not eligible under the program of aid to families with dependent children or the supplemental security income program under titles IV and XVI of the Social Security Act, or (ii) medical assistance for individuals who are not eligible for such assistance under a State plan approved under title XIX of the Social Security Act;

"(C) shall not exceed, for the period from April 1, 1979, through March 31, 1980, 75 per centum of the amount required, as determined by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, for assistance to in-

dividuals described in clause (B); 50 per centum of such amount for the period from April 1, 1980, through March 31, 1981; and 25 per centum of such amount for the period from April 1, 1981, through March 31, 1982; and

"(D) shall not be available for use after March 31, 1982, other than for such administrative costs as may be necessary to terminate activities under this Act, and shall not be available for any purpose after September 30, 1982.

"(c) No payment may be made under this Act to any State with respect to any expenditure made in fiscal years beginning after September 30, 1976, unless the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare receives a claim from the State for Federal reimbursement for such expenditure on or before the last day of the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the expenditure was made. The Secretary shall promulgate standards for determining when an expenditure shall be considered to have been made for the purposes of this subsection, and such standards may, at the request of any State, be modified to comport with the accounting or other fiscal practices of the State.".

SEC. 2. (a) Section 4(b) of the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 is amended to read as follows:

"(b) Not later than December 31 of each year ending prior to January 1, 1983, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare shall transmit to such committees a report describing fully and completely the status of refugees from Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos.".

(b) Section 4 (c) of that Act is repealed.

95TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

# H. R. 7175

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 13, 1977

Mr. EILBERG (for himself, Mr. EVANS of Georgia, Mr. FISH, and Mr. SAWYER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

# A BILL

To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to revise the procedures for the admission of refugees, and for other purposes.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That this Act may be cited as the "Refugee Act of 1977".

ADMISSION OF REFUGEES

SEC. 2. (a) Section 101 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 (a)) (hereinafter in this Act referred to as "the Act") is amended by adding after paragraph (41) the following new paragraph:

"(42) The term 'refugee' means (except for purposes of section 212 (d) (5)) any person who is out-

side any country of his nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside the country in which he last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.".

(b) Chapter 1 of title II of the Act is amended by adding after section 206 (8 U.S.C. 1156) the following new section:

"ADMISSION OF REFUGEES

"SEC. 207. (a) (1) The Attorney General may in his discretion admit into the United States conditionally, pursuant to such regulations as he may prescribe and in a number not in excess of twenty thousand in any fiscal year, aliens who satisfy an immigration officer, based on an examination in a foreign country, that they are refugees (within the meaning of section 101 (a) (42)).

"(2). Not more than five thousand of the admissions authorized under paragraph (1) in any fiscal year may be made available by the Attorney General, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to adjust to permanent residence the status of aliens who—

"(A) were inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States;

"(B) make application for such adjustment:

"(C) have been physically present in the United States for a period of at least two years prior to application for such adjustment; and

"(D) satisfy an immigration officer that they are refugees (within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)) and that they are admissible as immigrants under this Act at the time of their inspection and examination under this paragraph (except for the fact that they were not and are not in possession of the documents required by section 212(a)(20) or that they do not have the determination by the Secretary of Labor required by section 212(a)(14)).

"(3) The Attorney General may not admit, or adjust the status of, an alien under this subsection if he determines, based on the examination or inquiry conducted under this subsection, that—

"(A) the alien is firmly resettled in any foreign country; or

"(B) the alien's primary motivation for seeking admission under this subsection is improvement of his economic condition.

"(b) (1) (A) After the President—

"(i) has received an appeal, from an international refugee migration organization of which the United States is a member, requesting the United States to admit aliens whom the organization considers to be refugees because of an emergent refugee situation;

"(ii) has determined that other countries will accept for resettlement their fair share of such aliens; and

"(iii) has submitted to the Congress a determination, made after consultation with the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, that the admission to the United States of such aliens—

"(I) is not possible under subsection (a),

"(II) will significantly promote the national interest, and

"(III) is justified by grave humanitarian concerns;

the President may admit into the United States conditionally, pursuant to such regulations as he may prescribe and in a number not in excess of the number specified in subparagraph (B), aliens who satisfy an immigration officer, based on an examination in a foreign country, that they are refugees (within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)) because of the emergent refugee situation.

"(B) The number referred to in subparagraph (A), with respect to any single emergent refugee situation, is the lesser of—

"(i) five thousand, or

"(ii) 15 per centum of the total caseload of aliens who are considered to be refugees because of the emergent refugee situation (hereinafter in this paragraph referred to as the 'total caseload of refugees'), as determined under subparagraph (C).

"(C) If the Secretary of State determines, after discussions with international refugee migration organizations of which the United States is a member, that a specification, contained in an appeal described in subparagraph (A) (i), of a total caseload of refugees—

"(i) is reasonable, the total caseload of refugees for purposes of subparagraph (B) (ii) is such specification; or

"(ii) is not reasonable or if such a specification has not been submitted in such an appeal, the total caseload of refugees for the purposes of subparagraph (B) (ii) shall be determined by the Secretary of State after discussions with such international refugee migration organizations.

"(2) (A) After the President—

"(i) has determined that an emergent refugee situation is of special concern to the United States; and

"(ii) has submitted to the Congress a determination, made after consultation with the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, that the admission to the United States of aliens who are refugees because of the situation—

"(I) is not possible under subsection (a) or paragraph (1) of this subsection,

"(II) will significantly promote the national interest, and

"(III) is justified by grave humanitarian concerns;

the President may admit into the United States conditionally, pursuant to such regulations as he may prescribe and in a number not in excess of twenty thousand for any single emergent refugee situation, aliens who satisfy an immigration officer, based on an examination in a foreign country, that they are refugees (within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)) because of the emergent refugee situation.

"(B) Upon exercising his authority under this paragraph with respect to an emergent refugee situation, the President shall promptly solicit the cooperation of the inter-

national community in the resettlement of aliens who have become refugees because of the situation.

"(3) The President may not admit a particular group or class of aliens into the United States under this subsection with respect to an emergent refugee situation after either House of the Congress has adopted a resolution the substance of which disapproves the admission of such group or class of aliens into the United States under this subsection with respect to that emergent refugee situation.

"(4) For purposes of this subsection the term 'consultation' means personal contact with appropriate members of the committees to review the emergent refugee situation, to project the extent of possible United States participation therein, and to provide such members with the following information:

"(A) a description of the emergency nature of the refugee situation;

"(B) a description of the refugees who may be admitted, including the proposed plans for their resettlement, the estimated cost of their resettlement, and an analysis of their resettleability within the United States;

"(C) an analysis of the anticipated social, economic, and demographic impact of their admission to the United States;

"(D) a description of the extent to which other countries will admit and assist in the resettlement of such refugees;

"(E) an analysis of the impact of the United States' participation in the resettlement of such refugees on the United States' foreign policy interests; and

"(F) such additional information as may be appropriate or requested by such members.

"(c) A spouse or child (as defined in section 101(b)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), or (E)) of an alien who qualifies for admission under subsection (a)(1) or (b) shall, if not otherwise entitled to admission under such subsection, be entitled to the same admission status as such alien if accompanying, or following to join, such alien, and upon the spouse's or child's admission into the United States shall be charged against the numerical limitation set forth in the subsection under which the alien qualifies for admission.

"(d) The President shall submit to the Congress a complete and detailed report concerning the exercise of the authority under subsections (a) and (b), including in such report an analysis of the funds expended for transporting and resettling aliens thereunder and a detailed statement of the facts in the case of each alien admitted to the United States thereunder during the period for which the report is sub-

mitted, no later than ten days after the last day of each month in which such authority is exercised.

"(e) (1) Notwithstanding any numerical limitation specified in this Act, any alien who has been admitted into the United States under subsection (a) (1) or (b)—

"(A) whose admission has not been terminated by the Attorney General pursuant to such regulations as he may prescribe,

"(B) who has not acquired permanent residence status, and

"(C) who has been physically present in the United States for at least two years,

shall, at the end of such two years, return or be returned to the custody of the Service for inspection and examination for admission into the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the provisions of sections 235, 236, and 237.

"(2) Any alien who, pursuant to paragraph (1), is found, upon inspection by an immigration officer or after hearings before a special inquiry officer, to be admissible as an immigrant under this Act at the time of his inspection and examination, except for the fact that he was not and is not in possession of the documents required by section 212(a) (20) or that he does not have the determination

by the Secretary of Labor required by section 212(a)(14), shall be regarded as lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence as of the date of his arrival.".

EXCLUSION OF ALIENS WHO HAVE ENGAGED IN PERSECUTION

SEC. 3. Section 212(a) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)) is amended (1) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (32) and inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon, and (2) by inserting after paragraph (32) the following new paragraph:

"(33) Aliens who have engaged in the persecution of individuals on account of the individuals' race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular group, or political opinion.".

RESTRICTION OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PAROLE AUTHORITY

SEC. 4. Section 212(d)(5) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)) is amended—

(1) by inserting "(A)" after "(5)";

(2) by inserting ", except as provided in subparagraph (B)," after "Attorney General may"; and

(3) by adding at the end thereof the following new subparagraph:

"(B) The Attorney General may not parole into the United States an alien who is a refugee unless he determines

that compelling reasons in the public interest related to that particular alien require that the particular alien be paroled into the United States, rather than be admitted into the United States as a refugee in accordance with section 207 of this Act."

SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY

SEC. 5. (a) There is established a Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Commission") which shall be composed of—

(1) four members appointed by the President, one of whom shall be designated by the President as Chairman;

(2) the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Labor, and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare;

(3) four members appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives from the membership of the House Committee on the Judiciary; and

(4) four members appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate from the membership of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

(b) (1) A majority of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of its business, but the Com-

mission may provide for the taking of testimony and the reception of evidence at meetings at which there are present not less than four members of the Commission.

(2) Each member of the Commission who is not otherwise in the service of the Government of the United States shall receive the sum of $100 for each day spent in the work of the Commission, shall be paid actual travel expenses, and per diem in lieu of subsistence expenses, when away from his usual place of residence, in accordance with chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code. Each member of the Commission who is otherwise in the service of the Government of the United States shall serve without compensation in addition to that received for such other service, but while engaged in the work of the Commission shall be paid actual travel expenses, when away from his usual place of residence, in accordance with chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code.

(c) It shall be the duty of the Commission to study and evaluate, in accordance with subsection (d), existing laws, policies, and procedures governing the admission of immigrants and refugees to the United States and to make such administrative and legislative recommendations to the President and to the Congress as are appropriate.

(d) In particular, the Commission shall—

(1) conduct a study and analysis of the effect of

the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (and administrative interpretations thereof) on (A) social, economic, and political conditions in the United States; (B) demographic trends; (C) present and projected unemployment in the United States; and (D) the conduct of foreign policy;

(2) conduct a study and analysis of whether and to what extent the Immigration and Nationality Act should apply to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the other territories and possessions of the United States;

(3) review, and make recommendations with respect to the numerical limitations (and exemptions therefrom) of the Immigration and Nationality Act on the admission of permanent resident aliens;

(4) assess the social, economic, political, and demographic impact of previous refugee programs and review the criteria for, and numerical limitations on, the admission of refugees to the United States;

(5) conduct a comprehensive review of the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act and make legislative recommendations to simplify and clarify such provisions;

(6) make seminannual reports to each House of

Congress during the period before publication of its final report (described in paragraph (7)); and

(7) make a final report of its findings and recommendations to the President and each House of Congress, which report shall be published not later than September 30, 1980.

(e) (1) The Commission is authorized to appoint and fix the compensation of a staff director and such other additional personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its functions without regard to the civil service laws, rules, and regulations. Any Federal employee subject to those laws, rules, and regulations may be detailed to the Commission, and such detail shall be without interruption or loss of civil service status or privilege.

(2) Staff members of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate or of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives may be detailed to serve on the staff of the Commission by the chairman of the respective committee. Staff members so detailed shall serve on the staff of the Commission without additional compensation except that they may receive such reimbursement of expenses incurred by them as the Commission may authorize.

(f) The Commission may call upon the head of any Federal department or agency to furnish information and assistance which the Commission deems necessary for the



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performance of its functions, and the heads of such departments and agencies shall furnish such assistance and information, unless prohibited under law, without reimbursement.

(g) The Commission is authorized to make grants and enter into contracts for the conduct of research and studies which will assist it in performing its duties under this section.

(h) The Commission shall cease to exist upon the filing of its final report, except that the Commission may continue to function for up to sixty days thereafter for the purpose of winding up its affairs.

(i) There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this section.

CONFORMING AMENDMENTS

SEC. 6. (a) Section 201 (a) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1151 (a)) is amended—

(1) by striking out ", or who may, pursuant to section 203 (a) (7), enter conditionally," and ", or who may, pursuant to section 203 (a) (7), enter conditionally";

(2) by striking out "45,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "42,000";

(3) by striking out "170,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "158,000";

(4) by striking out "32,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "30,000"; and

(5) by striking out "120,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "112,000".

(b) Section 202 of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1152) is amended—

(1) by striking out "and the number of conditional entries" in subsection (a);

(2) by striking out "(8)" in subsection (a) and inserting in lieu thereof "(7)";

(3) by striking out "or conditional entries" and "and conditional entries" in subsection (e);

(4) by striking out "20 per centum" in subsection (e) (2) and inserting in lieu thereof "26 per centum";

(5) by striking out paragraph (7) of subsection (e).;

(6) by striking out "(7)" in paragraph (8) of subsection (e) and inserting in lieu thereof "(6)"; and

(7) by redesignating paragraph (8) of subsection (e) as paragraph (7).

(c) Section 203 of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1153) is amended—

(1) by striking out "or their conditional entry authorized, as the case may be," in subsection (a);

(2) by striking out "20 per centum" in subsection (a) (2) and inserting in lieu thereof "26 per centum";

(3) by striking out paragraph (7) of subsection (a);

(4) by striking out "and less the number of conditional entries and visas made available pursuant to paragraph (7)" in subsection (a) (8);

(5) by striking out "or to conditional entry under paragraphs (1) through (8)" in subsection (a) (9) and inserting in lieu thereof "under paragraphs (1) through (7)";

(6) by redesignating paragraphs (8) and (9) of subsection (a) as paragraphs (7) and (8);

(7) by striking out "(7)" in subsection (d) and inserting in lieu thereof "(6)"; and

(8) by striking out subsections (f), (g), and (h).

(d) Sections 212 (a) (14), 212 (a) (32), and 244 (d) of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1182 (a) (14), 1182 (a) (32), 1254 (d)) are amended by striking out "section 203 (a) (8)" and inserting in lieu thereof "section 203 (a) (7)".

(e) Subsection (h) of section 243 of the Act (8 U.S.C. 1253) is amended to read as follows:

"(h) (1) The Attorney General is authorized to withhold the deportation or return of any alien, subject to such terms and conditions as he may prescribe, to any country where such alien's life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

"(2) This subsection shall not apply to—

"(A) aliens who have entered the United States in violation of this Act, unless they present themselves without delay to an immigration officer and can show good cause for such illegal entry;

"(B) aliens who have engaged in the persecution of individuals on account of the individuals' race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion; and

"(C) aliens, who in the opinion of the Attorney General, constitute a danger to the community or to the security of the United States.".

(f) Any reference in any law to section 203 (a) (7) of the Act shall be deemed a reference to section 207.

EFFECTIVE DATE

SEC. 7. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the amendments made by this title shall take effect on October 1, 1977.

(b) The repeal of subsections (g) and (h) of section 203 of the Act, made by section 6 (c) (8) of this Act, shall not apply with respect to any individual who before October 1, 1977, was granted a conditional entry under section 203 (a) (7) of the Act (and under section 202 (e) (7) of the Act, if applicable) as in effect immediately before such date.

(c) Section 5 of this Act shall become effective on October 1, 1978.

We have this morning the Honorable Philip Habib, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department of State, Donald Wortman—to your left?

Mr. HABIB. I presume he is arriving later.

Mr. EILBERG. I see. All right. I recognize three of your four associates; I wonder if you would identify all of them for the record.

**TESTIMONY OF HON. PHILIP HABIB, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY JAMES L. CARLIN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS; ROBERT OAKLEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIA; JOHN DEWITT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CONSULAR AFFAIRS; AND SHEPARD LOWMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS**

Mr. HABIB. I identify Jim Carlin, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Humanitarian Affairs, State Department; Mr. Robert Oakley, on my left, who is Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia; Mr. John DeWitt, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs; Mr. Shepard Lowman, who works in the Office of Assistant Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs.

Mr. EILBERG. All right, Mr. Habib, do you have a statement?

Mr. HABIB. Mr. Chairman, I have a very brief statement, then we'll place ourselves at the disposal of the committee.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today to support the administration's recommendation for a continuation of Federal funding to reimburse the States for welfare expenditures incurred as a result of the resettlement in the United States of the Indochinese refugees.

We have worked together on various matters relating to the Indochinese refugees from the beginning, following the fall of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to the Communist armies in 1975. Since my last appearance before the subcommittee, I have watched with interest and gratitude as you and the members of your committee continued to grapple with this difficult and grave humanitarian problem. It is a problem which has continued longer than any of us expected and, indeed, which has grown in severity as desperate refugees seek escape from the rigors of Communist rule across the open sea in small boats.

H.R. 9133—and your own identical bill, H.R. 9134—provides for continued reimbursement on a declining scale to the States for expenses incurred in the resettlement of Indochinese refugees now in the United States. While deferring to my colleague from HEW who has a more detailed justification for the proposal, this appears to me an eminently sensible proposition. Our experience clearly indicates that Indochinese refugees have made very substantial progress in the past 2½ years. Some continued assistance by the Federal Government over the next few years would help complete the process of resettlement

Additionally, H.R. 9133 and H.R. 9134 provide for reimbursement to the States for welfare expenditures incurred in connection with newly arriving Indochinese refugees. As you know, following consultations with your committee, the Attorney General authorized parole for an additional 15,000 Indochinese refugees on August 11, 1977.

These refugees will be brought into the United States over about the the next 10 months, the first group of 100 boat case refugees arrived this week.

With respect to the 15,000 additional refugees to be paroled into the United States and such other Indochinese refugees as may enter under the conditional entry provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, they will be coming to this country with problems very similar to those experienced by their fellow refugees already here. Therefore, an extension of these benefits to assist in their resettlement as well would also appear fully justified.

Mr. Chairman, in closing I want to reiterate my appreciation, officially, and on a personal basis, for the humane attention you and the members of this committee have given to the problems of the refugees from Indochina.

Mr. EILBERG. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Philip Habib follows:]

STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE PHILIP HABIB, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today to support the Administration's recommendation for a continuation of Federal funding to reimburse the States for welfare expenditures incurred as a result of the resettlement in the United States of the Indochinese refugees.

We have worked together on various matters relating to the Indochinese refugees from the beginning, following the fall of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos to the Communist armies in 1975. Since my last appearance before the Subcommittee, I have watched with interest and gratitude as you and the members of your Committee continued to grapple with this difficult and grave humanitarian problem. It is a problem which has continued longer than any of us expected and, indeed, which has grown in severity as desperate refugees seek escape from the rigors of Communist rule across the open sea in small boats.

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Additionally, H.R. 9133 provides for reimbursement to the States for welfare expenditures incurred in connection with newly arriving Indochinese refugees. As you know, following consultations with your Committee, the Attorney General authorized parole for an additional 15,000 Indochinese refugees on August 11, 1977. These refugees will be brought into the United States over about the next 10 months—the first group of 100 boat case refugees arrived this week.

With respect to the 15,000 additional refugees to be paroled into the United States and such other Indochinese refugees as may enter under the Conditional Entry provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, they will be coming to this country with problems very similar to those experienced by their fellow refugees already here. Therefore an extension of these benefits to assist in their resettlement as well would also appear fully justified.

Mr. Chairman, in closing I want to reiterate my appreciation, officially and on a personal basis, for the humane attention you and the members of this committee have given to the problems of the refugeees from Indochina.

Mr. EILBERG. Your statement, of course, invites this question, and that is: What does the future look like as far as the admission of refugees into the United States?

Mr. Secretary, I have long advocated the internationalization of the Indochinese refugee situation. I have called for an international conference to discuss this problem so long-range solutions can be devised in the international community. I would like to introduce into the record a letter I wrote to President Carter on July 12, 1977, expressing my concern with the rapidly worsening problems confronting Indochinese refugees in Thailand, as well as the boat cases in other countries in Eastern Asia. [See app. 7 at p. 235 for text of letter.]

I proposed that he take the lead in commiting the nations of the world to an international conference on the Indochinese refugees. I know that you know about this proposal because you and I have briefly discussed that concept.

My only response from the White House was a letter from Frank Moore, assistant to the President for congressional liaison, dated July 15, 1977, informing me the President had asked the National Security Council to look into the matter. No further response was forthcoming. [See app. 7 at p. 236 for text of letter. Subsequent to this hearing, another response was received which is reproduced in app. 7 at p. 236.]

Yet, we continue to read the newspapers as recently as yesterday that we can expect continued numbers of flows of refugees in the months to come. Thus far no one has acted to make such a conference a realization.

I know that you as head of the task force, Department of State, present to the President the views of your Department on the options open to resolve this continuing problem. It is my understanding that this report will be available within the next few days; and I am personally glad you are handling it because you are so knowledgeable in the field.

I appreciate your ability to come here this morning with so many other duties and obligations of which I am quite well aware. Without going into detail, could you outline the general provisions and recommendations the Department of State will be making to confront this continuing problem in Thailand and Indochina?

Mr. HABIB. Mr. Chairman, the task force, of course, is not purely a Department of State affair. What we tried to do is bring together every appropriate agency in Government in consideration of the problems we are likely to face in the future. The task force report has not yet gone forward to the President. It will this week, within the next day, I expect.

The positions, the problems it outlines to the President are well known and I will try to sketch them briefly. I would like to propose, Mr. Chairman, that you let the executive branch sort out its own views; and then return to the committee, making available our studies, our conclusions, and discuss and consult with the committee, before we reach any definite answers to the problems we expect to face.

So, rather than outline for you today what we propose, I would suggest that you let us do what is normal, that is, report to the President before we report publicly.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Secretary, I have little doubt that because this legislation has been submitted at this very late date, that both you and I know that its progress is highly speculative, particularly considering how late in this session of Congress it is that we are moving with this legislation, although not due to our fault. I think the members

of this subcommittee and full committee, as well as the House, would want to know as rapidly as possible what those options are.

Now, I am not asking you at this moment to outline with precision or tell us exactly what you are going to tell the President; I think that would be rude on our part. But I think we are entitled to some idea of the scope of your study, some idea what the areas or provisions might be, so we can begin to enlighten ourselves.

Mr. HABIB. That is exactly what I propose to do. Let us see if I can satisfy the committee.

As you know, I am here to assist the committee, not to resist it.

What we see is a continuing flow of refugees out of Indochina. The numbers—one can speculate. Let's take a look at what the current figures are. I think that will give the committee some idea of what kind of a problem we can anticipate.

At the present time we have about 1,800 a month, 1,700–1,800 a month, coming from Laos and Cambodia into Thailand; those are mostly from Laos. We are running into about 400 or 500 a month coming out by boat from Vietnam. There is no reason for us to expect those figures to fall off in the immediate future. Their character may change a little, but there is no reason for them to change or fall off.

So if one presumes future estimates at, say, 400 a month for boat cases, 1,200 a month for refugees from Laos and Cambodia, which is slightly below the recent level, you would come to a figure of anywhere between 53,000 to 68,000 over the next 2½ years.

For planning purposes we ran our estimates through 1980, 3½ years; if you figure about 53,000 to 68,000 in the next 3½ years, you get some idea of what it might be in total.

Now, of course, we started from that figure and then worked backward as to how many of them could we possibly expect might become eligible under criteria that have been established in the past and which presumably would be followed in the future, to come to the United States.

Now, we do not have a planning figure for the number that would come to the United States. What the task force tried to do is to state certain criteria which we believe would govern or should govern these people coming to the U.S.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Secretary, may I interrupt?

You have projected figures; now, based on the projection of the figures which you have mentioned, what is your projection of the number of refugees we will have to admit on that basis for the next 3 years?

Mr. HABIB. Well, unfortunately, there have been some inaccurate figures quoted to the press. We don't have a firm planning figure. Now, you are asking the same question that others have asked: what do we think it will be?

Well, it could be somewhere between 25,000 and 30,000 over the next 3½ years.

I want to make it clear: that is not a planned figure. That is within the criteria which we have established.

Mr. EILBERG. Repeat those figures?

Mr. HABIB. Between 25,000 and 30,000 over the next 3½ years. That is exclusive of—let me say, that is exclusive of the numbers who are coming in under the present parole, which would have to be added to that.

You will recall the present parole figure that was decided in August, those people will be coming in over the next 8 months of the new year.

Mr. EILBERG. Let me put it this way, in this morning's Washington Post, Friday, September 23—without objection I shall make it a part of the record—there appears a statement on the subject:

> In a hearing on the proposals held yesterday before the Senate Committee on Human Resources, Under Secretary of State, Philip Habib, said it was likely that an additional 15,000 refugees a year would seek to enter the United States over the next 3 or 4 years.

Mr. HABIB. "Seek to"—the phrase was "seek to." That is very likely.

Mr. EILBERG. Is it not also very likely that it will be your recommendation when you come to it?

Mr. HABIB. No, sir, we will operate under the criteria which I was just about to state: This is something that we will want to consult with the committee on, and of course have always consulted with the committee about.

We would hope to operate under the criteria that the boat cases that are not provided for within a reasonable period of time by the international mechanism, we would feel some obligation to provide entry into the United States. Even within the boat cases we would operate within the criteria in terms of timing of their movement; that is those with family ties in the United States; second, those who worked for the United States during the period of the Indochina war; third, those whose associations with the United States would be such as to create—in our minds—a legitimate residual obligation.

Mr. EILBERG. Association with the United States?

Mr. HABIB. There are many people who worked very closely with us who have fled the Indochinese countries because they have suffered by virtue of that association. We feel that we have some moral obligation toward them.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Fish?

Mr. FISH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome back, Mr. Secretary.

If I understand you correctly, the 1,800 a month going to Thailand, 500 boat cases a month, are figures outside the scope of the 15,000 that we were consulted on with respect to parole 2 months ago?

Mr. HABIB. No, sir. That figure is—has been the recent experience; therefore, those 400 to 500 a month is what has been coming in. About 7,500 or so of them will be covered under the recent parole actions.

Mr. EILBERG. So if we were given a figure of 7,500 boat cases back in July, that wasn't a 7,000-headcount at that time? It was an estimate of future boat cases?

Mr. HABIB. No, sir, that was 7,000 headcount at that time. In other words, that is the figure of what has recently been coming out.

Mr. EILBERG. 400 to 500 boat cases a month would not be included in that figure?

Mr. HABIB. That is correct. That would be additional to that figure.

Mr. EILBERG. OK, I understand you. We are talking about new cases.

Now, you might recall there is a sense of emergency about boat cases as a distinct add-on to the thousands of such cases which we already have in Thailand. If you recall when the news hit of these boat cases

back in the early summer, it resulted in some unfavorable publicity to this committee, in which the interest, the diligence of this committee, was questioned—I think very unfairly.

And if there are indeed now 500 boat cases added on each month which are not encompassed within the agreed parole, I would certainly like to know what steps are being taken. If I understood you correctly, you will be applying a criteria to these boat cases which you did not do to the boat cases included in the 15,000?

Mr. HABIB. Yes, sir.

Let me say two things: First of all, any criticism of the committee does not reflect my opinion or that of the Department of State. I have the highest regard for this committee and I so stated in my opening statement, and I meant that: I have worked with this committee over the years, and I have watched it. And I must say, anybody who doesn't understand the care and the attention which this committee has taken, the humane approach they have taken, just doesn't know what he is talking about.

Second, about the 400 to 500, I said we would apply the criteria in terms of picking them as we take them out. The idea of doing that is to take those first, those boat cases first, to whom we have an obligation. Hopefully, then, the others will be picked up by the international mechanism.

In other words, what I am saying is in the future our planning would be such that we would not feel—we do not plan to take all of them. We think that ought to be shared internationally. And we would hope it would be.

Mr. EILBERG. Under what authority do we pick up any of these boat cases?

Mr. HABIB. At the present time the future boat cases could only be picked up under the conditional entry provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, which exists. I think we would take 100 to 150 a month under the conditional entry provisions.

Mr. EILBERG. Does that mean to say, Mr. Secretary, you will not seek to have some of these refugees enter through the nonpreference category?

Mr. HABIB. No, sir, it does not; and I would not want to mislead the committee. But nonpreference numbers are not currently available.

One of the reasons the boat cases are being better treated now as they are discovered at sea, as they wash up on the shores of other countries, is because there is an understanding that they may not have to stay in some of those countries indefinitely. This is particularly true, say, in Singapore, Malaysia, places like that where they can expect by virtue, if nothing else, of the flow of current and tide that these boat cases will land. Ships at sea most recently—and to a certain extent this has happened—just reject any assistance to these people so as to avoid any obligation to them; a most unfortunate practice.

Now, since it became clear that there were first of all a willingness to provide at least temporary refuge by the countries in the area, that has been changed. Singapore, Malaysia, Japan, other countries, have been prepared to provide temporary refuge at least, and since it has become known that we are prepared to play a role, and that the UNHCR is taking seriously its responsibilities with respect to these people, we

have had a decline in this kind of callous treatment of these people, sitting out on these cockleshell boats in the middle of the ocean.

I would like to at least sustain that humane behavior.

Mr. EILBERG. Will the gentleman further yield?

Mr. FISH. Yes.

Mr. EILBERG. Does that mean to say you will ask for authorized additional nonpreference entry for some of these refugees? Does that mean to say there will be no further parole requests?

Mr. HABIB. I would not want to promise that to the committee. I once did that to this committee, and I had to in effect come back to you and plead an ignorance before the fact; and I am ready to say I pleaded ignorance before the fact.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Secretary, we understand your former promise and inability to keep it.

Mr. HABIB. Yes, sir.

Mr. EILBERG. The Chair does not feel that way; we simply are not going to do business on the basis of your pleading each time.

Mr. HABIB. That's why I am not doing it this time.

Mr. EILBERG. We have legislation in the hopper, as you well know, a bill, H.R. 7175, which would seek to provide some outline of how the numbers might be admitted, and we would like to have your active support on that.

Mr. HABIB. We will, when we get a firm administration position, or at least current administration position, come to the committee with our views. We will of course be prepared to testify on that bill.

I think that the committee is approaching it in a manner which we would find consistent with our own views, that is, we ought to look at this thing as a longer term thing. In the earlier days nobody realized that it was going to be the kind of problem that has now developed. So I am fully sympathetic with what the committee is trying to do. although I don't think I can at this point commit the administration to a particular formula.

Mr. EILBERG. I would like to say, the administration so far in its statements has indicated full support for the bill. I take it you wish or may wish to express an additional opinion. I am not certain we are going to have additional hearings. If you have an opinion at any time, we would like that in writing.

Mr. HABIB. Yes. [See app. 3 at p. 156 for response.]

Mr. EILBERG. One more item before we go to vote: In your last comment a few moments ago you said, you said you expected—as I understood it—additional support from the UNHCR in relocation of some of these refugees.

Mr. FISH. Most of them.

Mr. EILBERG. Most of them; I am corrected by Congressman Fish.

Now, Mr. Habib, we have been around this subject of the UNHCR, it seems to me, from time immemorial. Now, it appears to me, that the UNHCR receives a great deal more credit than he is entitled to. To me, he is believed to have a great deal more power than he actually has. And you and I know—and I ask you to contradict this—he hasn't any influence at all over the States in that area. He has no pressure or authority or any ability to insist or to provide for the placement of refugees. In general he has been unsuccessful.

Why do you insist upon going back to an institution which is so weak? Why can't we go directly to an international conference and try to remind the nations of what their obligations are?

Mr. HABIB. Mr. Chairman, I would say two things: First of all, I think you have been harder on them than they currently deserve. I use that word very carefully.

Second, we understand the Government of Thailand is bringing this matter to the U.N. General Assembly.

Mr. EILBERG. Who is?

Mr. HABIB. The Government of Thailand, is bringing the matter to the U.N. General Assembly; and I think that operates in the general direction in which your interest lies; and that is, getting an organized international effort—better organized than it has been. Although I must say that what the UNHCR has done with respect to the care—I didn't say the "resettlement"—I said the care of refugees, is a substantial effort.

They have been involved to a certain degree in resettlement operations, also; but the 80,000 to 90,000 refugees in Thailand, are generally cared for by a combination of the Thai Government and the UNHCR. And without the UNHCR I regret to say I don't think those people would have been as well cared for, even though their present care leaves much to be desired.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Secretary, I would simply like to observe, it seems to me—and I say it quite clearly, quite deliberately—that an anticipation of Thailand making an appeal to the U.N. just makes me laugh in terms of its possible influence in getting anything done. And on that basis I am quite confident that once again the UNHCR will be asked to do what it is not able to do now.

I say, again, Mr. Secretary, do you contemplate, or is there anything in your recommendations or conclusions whereby the United States, who is taking the lion's role in the care of these refugees, will show any initiative in requesting an international conference on this subject?

Mr. HABIB. Obviously the long-term solution lies in more international effort, and an international conference could be a very useful step. We have said that to you before.

On the other hand, as you know, Mr. Chairman, some of the countries that are involved and who have been taking substantial numbers of these refugees, do not particularly want to get involved in a publicly visible manner which imposes upon them obligations which they have been exercising. I am just stating a fact: Our interests are the same in getting these people resettled, and there are different ways of doing it.

Mr. EILBERG. One more comment on this subject, and we can belabor it indefinitely: A great deal has been said about the concept of linkage in the last several months and years. It seems to me that the United States is quite remiss if it does not use linkage in terms of expecting other countries to do their share; and I suggest to you, Mr. Secretary, you start thinking about that concept, because we certainly feel it should be done.

We will take a recess at this time, and be right back.

[Recess.]

Mr. EILBERG. The subcommittee will resume.

Mr. Secretary, taking up I think generally where we left off, can you comment whether my specific proposal for an international conference has been actively considered by your task force and have any conclusions been reached on that proposal?

Mr. HABIB. Yes, sir, we not only did consider it, and consider it to be a useful step—we think one thing: that it ought to be held under international, not U.S. auspices; it not ought to be under a U.S. aegis.

We think, as you pointed out, we have got to make these agencies fulfill their functions; so we have been discussing with UNHCR their views of a means of attaining greater international assistance on the problem. We have also been discussing it with certain other countries to get a feel for their reaction.

As I said earlier, some of them are more reluctant to act in a visible manner; but we will pursue your suggestion, I can assure you.

Mr. EILBERG. I asked you at the very outset what the general concepts and outlines of the general recommendations might be; had you completed your answer on that? You were interrupted several times by me.

Mr. HABIB. I think interruptions are for clarification, Mr. Chairman; I don't mind them.

I think generally speaking, yes. What I was trying to give you is some idea of the way we are looking at the flow, and how it might impact upon us, and how we might develop a program for the longer term, and not just come to you every 6 months for another parole request. I think that is wrong.

Remember, I did not say we wouldn't do it, because there are certain overriding considerations; but that is not the way to deal with the problem. And I am hopeful when we next come to the committee either informally or in session we will be able to lay out to you our ideas, take your ideas, and then produce a coherent program for the longer run.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Secretary, I understand you have a limited time.

Mr. HABIB. If I can get away by quarter to 11, Mr. Chairman—I regret it, but, as you know, this week is a busy week.

Mr. EILBERG. I understand.

Mr. HABIB. I have to get out to Dulles Airport.

Mr. EILBERG. We will cooperate with you; if we are in the midlde of a sentence, you will be free to go.

Mr. HABIB. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I think when you go into your next witness from HEW whose bill this basically is, in terms of responsibility, I will leave behind some of my colleagues; and if technical questions come up for which we have competence to answer, they will be available to the committee.

Mr. EILBERG. Thank you.

Mr. HABIB. Thank you.

Mr. EILBERG. We have heard from certain quarters that in terms of the percentage of refugees taken in relation to the size of the U.S. population, that the United States is not the biggest settler of Indochinese refugees. The figures I have indicate that out of 197,000 refugees resettled, the United States has taken 146,000; France, 36,000; Canada, 7,000; Australia, 3,000; which means all other members of the world community have taken 5,000.

Does this appear to you that the problem has indeed been internationalized?

Mr. HABIB. With the exception of a few countries which I think it is apparent from the figures you have used, the problem has not been internationalized. I must say that the French have done what I would consider to be their share, especially if you take the figures post-1975, post the first big influx into the United States and the current plans. It is our understanding that the French will continue to operate in this area. At more or less the general level that they have been taking refugees.

I think that one can say that they have done their share. I think the Canadians have done well. We are expecting—if I may just finish—we have gone back to each of these countries, and others, and we have gone to the international agencies like ICEM, and have reopened the matter, and were able to get their attention again by virtue of the attention that was given to the problem of the boat cases last summer.

And once again we are on the road with the UNHCR trying to influence, persuade people, to accept the responsibility which is not ours alone.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Secretary, with regard to our bill, H.R. 7175 the proposed refugee bill whereby we lay out a procedure for formalizing the consultative process and so on, as far as we are concerned our hearings are concluded on that. I gathered from earlier comment that you are looking at that—do you want to respond to that?

Mr. HABIB. Yes, I understand. And I am not an expert on this.

We have certain reservations with respect to certain aspects of the bill. That's why I felt I could not commit myself.

You have had witnesses from State Department that have supported the general thrust of what you are trying to do. And I think that whatever reservations we have had have been in part expressed in the hearings; and if we have anything further to say I think we ought to put it in writing to the committee. [See app. 3 at p. 156 for written response.]

Mr. EILBERG. All right, that was my next question.

Mr. HABIB. Yes, sir.

Mr. EILBERG. Please do it as soon as you can because we are going to bring it to the full committee as soon as we can.

And I now yield to Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. SAWYER. Mr. Secretary, I have been listening rather carefully. The numbers, I recognize they are only to some degree what you think or what you guess, but would it be fair to say there's 25,000 to 30,000 over the next 3½ years, and that's in addition to the 15,000 we are immediately concerned with? Do I understand that correctly?

Mr. HABIB. Yes, sir.

Mr. SAWYER. So we might be talking, oh, something approaching 50,000, that would be a reasonable guess, anyway?

Mr. HABIB. Yes, sir, 45,000 to 50,000.

Mr. SAWYER. Now, you say that the French are doing their part, France is; but, after all, this was a former French Colony; was it not?

Mr. HABIB. That's one of the reasons, of course, they have this association, and therefore, in many respects they follow some of the

same criteria that we follow. For example, family relationships, previous associations, are taken into account in the French program.

Mr. SAWYER. One thing I'm curious about, and perhaps you can answer, is why these people continuing to leave at this rather late date? Is it because of persecution? Or because they don't like the economy of the country, or what?

Is there any overriding or pervasive reason for this?

Mr. HABIB. I think that from our conversations some of the overriding reasons are that they just don't want to live under the conditions in which they are being forced to live. I would say that generally speaking the strong urge to get away, by virtue of the nature of the society and the government under which they are forced to live; these are people who knew something different. These are also people, many of whom by virtue of their previous association, have suffered under the present system. Some of them either have been or fear to be put into the so-called reeducation centers which are in effect concentration camps.

Mr. SAWYER. But, as I understand it, at least from your answer, rather than specific persecution they are just unhappy living under the conditions of their government?

Mr. HABIB. No, sir, in addition, people with previous association with us suffer. It is not easy for them. They don't get employment easily. They are forced to do things they don't want to do. They pay a price for having previously been associated with us.

Mr. SAWYER. Of course if you take the whole Southeast Asian area, even extending down through Burma and India, and so forth probably that whole region of the world are not happy in the conditions in which they are living economically and otherwise, as near as I can tell from my reading.

Mr. HABIB. Not in this respect, sir, we are not getting the refugees out of those areas. This is a fact: You are getting people out of Indochina.

It is interesting, and I didn't put it there, an article in the front page of the Washington Post this morning; and in that article are interviews with some of the most recent refugees, the boat cases, in which they state not only the ordeal they went through but the reasons why they went through that ordeal. And I think it reflects something more than the degree of normal dissatisfaction with their life.

Mr. SAWYER. How long does the administration and Department of State or applicable administration executive agency feel we should extend this mea culpa philosophy that is very pervasive on this whole Vietnamese situation?

Mr. HABIB. I don't know that I look upon it as mea culpa. I look upon it as a degree of obligation, moral obligation, and a humanitarian program.

Mr. Congressman, our country has always had a humane policy toward refugees. I don't know how long this is going to go on.

I suspect, if you asked me to estimate, and as a result of the analyses we have made in the task force, that in the next few years we are going to see some kind of a flow. How it trickles off, what happens afterward, I can't judge that far in advance.

It is quite clear that it is very difficult for the people to get out of Vietnam. The controls, the kind of system they live under, make it difficult to get away; and yet, they still try.

One of the stories this morning is where people planned months ahead, and they positioned themselves; they gathered things. It is a very difficult task. I expect, if I were to be asked, that it will trickle off.

Mr. SAWYER. You know, we can debate whether its obligation or mea culpa philosophy, but I don't really see a sharp distinction between the two.

But it seems to me at some point in time, as opposed to being sympathetic with a refugee situation—which I guess we all are—there is a distinction between our taking over the whole world burden because we feel it is either our fault or we have an obligation. At some point in time it would seem to me that the term of that obligation should run out to where we share participation with the rest of the world in trying to solve these problems, and not doing it all ourselves.

Mr. HABIB. I would agree we should be part of a world effort and in many respects we are.

You will recall, I am sure, Mr. Congressman, that there still is a flow of refugees from Eastern Europe. There is a general trend of refugees from communism all over the world. The flow is not the other way. There are very few refugees from the West into the Communist world; very few people flee in that direction.

And we and the rest of the countries of the world have to deal with it. Now, I don't accept that it is our obligation alone. I am sure you would not want us to. All I am saying is that, in the case of the Indochinese refugees, we have established certain criteria which we think do describe some degree of obligation on our part. I expect those numbers will tail off; I don't know how much.

Mr. SAWYER. I was interested in Chairman Eilberg's comment or question as to why we don't employ a little linkage in getting cooperation from, oh, say, West Germany, England, South American countries, various other countries, many of whom we subsidize pretty heavily in a lot of other instances; South Korea, for example.

Why don't we put a little pressure on them to get into the act and take their share of this situation?

Mr. HABIB. Well, we have been——

Mr. SAWYER. We do it on our own States. When they don't integrate their schools, we tell them we are going to cut off the school funds; or if they don't enforce the 55-mile-an-hour limit, we cut off their highway funds.

Why can't we get a little tougher internationally like that?

Mr. HABIB. Well, as I mentioned—I think while you were away voting, Mr. Congressman—we have over these past several months put the arm on countries in various places to do more than they are doing with respect to these refugees.

Mr. SAWYER. Not too successfully.

Mr. HABIB. It is a little early to say how successfully.

One thing we have managed to do. We have gotten a little money out of some of them—a little more money, I should say, out of some

of them. We have gotten promises of willingness to take more refugees from some of them. This is an ongoing effort which we will continue.

And I couldn't agree with you more, I would like to persuade them with whatever means available; but I am not so sure I would necessarily threaten to stop something that for other reasons we may wish to continue.

Mr. SAWYER. We do it to our own States. Why would we employ a different philosophy with different countries?

Mr. HABIB. It is a kind of balance that I think we just have to take into account. Your intention, with which I agree, must be weighed against the other relationships which we have with these countries which have a certain value to them. But I am not going to argue with the necessity of getting this thing shared internationally. I agree with you completely. I think we should do everything we can. I don't want to simply say flatly, if country X does not take 5,000 refugees, we'll cut off all their economic aid.

Mr. SAWYER. Even though we do it with our own States?

Mr. HABIB. Well, I didn't realize we did that.

Mr. SAWYER. Well, we do it on school integration. We threaten to cut off their school aid. We do it on the highway speed limit enforcement; and it is pretty effective.

Mr. HABIB. It's a good thought.

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Secretary, I recognize that you do not wish to go into the technicalities of the bill before us.

Mr. HABIB. You are going to have a witness who can do that better than I can.

Mr. EILBERG. That may or may not be. I want to ask you a very pertinent question. I find this situation very questionable to say the least, of getting this request from the administration at virtually the last minute, with very little time to put this legislation through the Congress, while other committees and subcommittees are acting on the same thing, thus making it less and less possible for us to do what the administration now wants us to do.

I ask you this, upon which I think your opinion would be at least as good as anybody else's: In the event we cannot process the legislation in full, what do you think of the concept of perhaps having a limited extension, say, 6 months, during which we would look at this? We and you would be looking at this whole problem again; and then moving on some 2 or 3 or 4-year term for a windup of the problem?

What would you say to that?

Mr. HABIB. Mr. Chairman, as you know, I really shouldn't comment on another department's budgetary problems; but I would say offhand I would hope the committee would take care of this aspect of the problem.

Let me say this: It's not my fault. I apologize for the lateness. I would say as a matter of fact it's not only not my fault, but when I found out the delay that was going on, I can assure you I moved very quickly. As you will recall, I think we had a conversation at a dinner when you yourself called the problem to my attention.

Mr. EILBERG. Yes.

Mr. HABIB. And I will let the responsible department make its own excuses.

Mr. EILBERG. At this moment I am not asking you or anyone else to make an excuse, because I think a lot of people can make excuses. We don't need an expert like you here for that purpose.

I would like to know as a Secretary what your opinion is on a temporary extension of the program so we can act perhaps early in the next session, if time runs out, what do you think of a temporary extension of the existing program?

Mr. HABIB. Obviously, it is second best. But we would also want to call the committee's attention to our own request for a $6.3 million supplemental to our own program to bring the 15,000 in, that we need at this time.

Mr. EILBERG. In this connection, recognizing the imminent expiration of the program, I wish that overnight, or over the weekend—if it is physically possible to do so, that you tell us what kind of limited program you could live with on a temporary basis, recognizing the practical difficulties we have with the early closing of this first session of Congress.

Mr. HABIB. If the Congress has that degree of difficulty I think we will consult with HEW and give you an opinion.

Mr. EILBERG. You will undertake to do that?

Mr. HABIB. If the strictures of time are going to be such that that's the way you have to do it; yes. Again. I don't want to speak for somebody else's budget.

Mr. EILBERG. The alternative, Mr. Secretary, may be we will have no legislation, in which case people will be coming in to me and blaming me and our subcommittee; and I will say Secretary Habib was unwilling to consider that possibility.

You don't want that to happen, do you? [Laughter.]

Mr. HABIB. That is a heavy arm. [Laughter.]

You can have a continuing resolution and maintain the program at the previous level, you can do that; I mean, there are lots of ways to do it.

Mr. EILBERG. I think I have made my point.

Mr. HABIB. Yes, I understand.

Mr. EILBERG. We only have a few minutes left here. Concerning now the 15,000 we agreed to parole this summer, and apparently some of them are already arriving in the United States; I think your testimony was they would arrive over the next 10 months?

Mr HABIB. Yes, sir.

Mr. FISH. It is my understanding the administration bill with respect to coverage of AFDC and medicaid cases, and social services, has a formula of 100 percent for 18 months and not covered thereafter. Now, when do the 18 months start running?

Mr. HABIB. That would be from the time of their arrival, but that is really an HEW question. You are going to have a witness who can answer that.

Mr. FISH. I don't want time to run out while these people are still arriving.

Mr. HABIB. It is my understanding it's from the time of arrival.

Mr. FISH. I want to go back to where I started off discussing with you specifically the boat cases, 400 to 500 a month new cases outside of the 15,000, all that we agreed on.

Then you said you were optimistic to bringing in under conditional entry approximately 150 of these per month into the United States, which leaves if you average between 400 and 500, at least 300 for other countries under the auspices of the UNHCR.

Now, what I am interested in is the public record this hearing establishes from you that we are not facing a critical period right now where there are lots of little boats out there with people running out of water, and we are all sitting here doing nothing about it. You did indicate there was a much more hospitable——

Mr. HABIB. A temporary haven.

Mr. FISH. A temporary haven?

Mr. HABIB. Yes.

Mr. FISH. Would you elaborate for the record so that somebody can't come back 2 or 3 months from now and say that we should have done something differently today?

Mr. HABIB. I think in fact, Mr. Congressman, that the attitude of this committee and actions we have taken have produced a good effect.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Secretary, may I make the question more specific: Mr. Secretary, the question, I think, should be refined in this way:

You say a generally better attitude is shown by these people; what evidence do you have that these boat cases are now being readily accepted, that ship captains are in fact stopping to pick these people up; and that more countries are accepting these refugees than previously.

Mr. HABIB. Well, our reports indicate, for example, I know of a couple of cases myself where boats that arrived on the shore, which 9 months or 1 year ago would have been fended off, have been taken and the people given temporary aid.

Mr. EILBERG. Can you put those cases on the record?

Mr. HABIB. There's one in the newspaper this morning, where two boat cases landed and went into the camps and were allowed to stay.

I will ask Mr. Oakley to provide you with whatever reports we can to verify our general understanding of the greater willingness to provide temporary haven.

Will you do that?

Mr. OAKLEY. Yes. [See app. 3 at p. 151.]

Mr. EILBERG. Will that include the item of more countries accepting refugees than previously?

Mr. HABIB. More countries than previously? I don't think we have stated that. I think what we have said is that we have received certain assurances from certain countries who have previously taken refugees that they will take more; but that we have actually increased the number of countries that would be taking them, I don't think we have evidence of that as yet. [See further response in app. 3 at p. 152.]

Mr. FISH. My interest and I am sure the chairman's is in the humanitarian aspect; if you came here and said you wanted to bring 200 or this month's 500 right away, I'd give you a sympathetic hearing. You have not done that. I really would like to know and be assured that September's 400 to 500 boat cases are in fact not coming right

off the South China Sea, but are in temporary admission status in some country, or being looked after; that 150 of them are being processed for entry to the United States, and that agencies under U.N. auspices are looking after the others.

Mr. HABIB. Any of them on shore have been or are receiving proper care and attention; they will be processed in due course. Normally the conditional entry procedure we have applied has been what, to the 150 level, am I right? Yes. It was 100 cases a month, then I think INS raised it to 150.

Mr. LOWMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. HABIB. That is correct.

As you know, the conditional entry is a worldwide operation; it does not just apply to the Indochinese refugees. This is their portion of the worldwide authorization under the Immigration and Naturalization Act that is available for use. Right at the moment we are concentrating on getting the boat case backlog in, because those people have been out the longest; they have been in the camps the longest. There is a debilitating effect of being in the camps, and it is being approached in that manner.

We have got teams out there right now processing these people. So I cannot tell you that the 150 to come off the boat this month are going to be processed this month.

Mr. FISH. I understand that.

Do you have figures as to how many boats are in the South China Seas at this time?

Mr. HABIB. No, I don't.

Do we have any idea, Bob?

Mr. OAKLEY. No.

Mr. HABIB. We don't know; no, sir.

We do not know. All we are doing is projecting on the basis of what we have known has taken place and the attitudes of the people who come out as an illustration of the attitudes of those that we might expect still to come out.

Mr. FISH. So surely there is a mechanism in place you are satisfied with as to the suffering of people who do escape from South Vietnam in boats?

Mr. HABIB. I don't know if it has ameliorated suffering but for the moment we seem to have this thing in much better condition than it was; and we take a certain degree of satisfaction in that.

Mr. FISH. There is nothing further immediately you would need from this committee?

Mr. HABIB. At this stage, no, sir. I think the fact the committee approved the 15,000 to get rid of that backlog was a tremendous help to us.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Secretary, just two more questions and then we will let you go.

One, do you not think that with Uncle Sam being so generous in taking all these boat cases that we tend to discourage some of the other countries of temporary asylum from taking any of these people, since we are being so generous as we are? How are we encouraging other countries?

Mr. HABIB. It's really the other way around in terms of temporary asylum; it has helped.

Mr. EILBERG. Do you have some specific evidence of that?

Mr. HABIB. As I said, we are just beginning to get——

Mr. EILBERG. Could you get us some of that for the record?

Mr. HABIB. I hope we can give you one for the record that I just read yesterday; it is not in hand yet; but we are going to follow up on it.

Mr. EILBERG. This will be in our hands for movement next week.

Mr. HABIB. It's been a long run on this one and I can't tell you by next week, but I'll tell you what we hope to do in the next couple of years.

Mr. EILBERG. We are talking about what evidence you presently have as to your persuasive powers with other countries, if you do have anything, I am saying we should have it for our markup and full committee and debate on the floor.

Mr. HABIB. We'll give you two or three good examples. We won't give you the shady ones. [See app. 3 at pp. 151 and 152.]

Mr. EILBERG. Give us the answer, if you can, to this question.

I am afraid the possibility exists that some of the people who are fleeing whom you are describing as refugees are not indeed refugees in the sense we have customarily used that term in the past; that is, fleeing political persecution; but rather, economic refugees.

Now, what about that?

Mr. HABIB. Well, I would say certainly some of the people coming down from Laos into Thailand would fall into that category. I think the people coming out of Vietnam, the hardships they have to go through are directly related to their position in the society, by virtue of their previous association. That appears to be the theme that runs through the interviews we have had with these people.

In the case of the ones coming across the Mekong I would say that is not as apparent in all cases that they are fleeing for political reasons. In some of those cases it's true; in others, it isn't—economic pressures, consequences of reorganization of life in the area that they don't particularly like.

Mr. EILBERG. Let me say, Mr. Secretary, under our bill, the refugee bill, where the primary motive is seeking economic conditions, he would not be a refugee.

Mr. HABIB. That is correct.

And in fact one of the major programs we have underway right now is to arrange the resettlement of those people through the Thais and cooperation of the UNHCR; that's probably what is going to be the only solution to that problem.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much, and if we have been a little too rapid or too hasty, or perhaps even rude, we apologize.

Mr. HABIB. You have not been rude; that is the kind of exchange we ought to have—open and frank. I have always been well-treated by this committee; and I appreciate the chance to appear before you today.

Mr. EILBERG. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. HABIB. I will leave some people by to help HEW out if they get into a real bind.

Mr. EILBERG. Thank you, sir.

[See app. 3 at p. 151 for additional questions to and information from the State Department.]

[Recess.]

Mr. EILBERG. The subcommittee will resume.

We would like to welcome Donald Wortman, Deputy Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

Would you introduce your colleagues, please, sir?

**TESTIMONY OF DONALD WORTMAN, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE; ACCOMPANIED BY PHILIP A. HOLMAN, DIRECTOR, REFUGEE ASSISTANCE TASK FORCE; AND KEN LEVINE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, LEGISLATIVE LIAISON**

Mr. WORTMAN. I would be happy to. This is Ken Levine, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Legislative Liaison, and Phil Holman, Director, Refugee Assistance Task Force.

Mr. EILBERG. Please proceed, Mr. Wortman.

Mr. WORTMAN. I am very pleased to have the opportunity to present the President's proposal for an extension of the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act. This proposal has been introduced by Chairman Rodino as H.R. 9133—and by you, Mr. Chairman, as H.R. 9134—and we urge its prompt enactment.

We are most appreciative of the committee's willingness to consider this proposal for congressional action in the short time remaining before the present law on September 30.

The purpose of the President's proposal is twofold: First, to avoid the full impact which would otherwise fall upon States and localities on October 1 if the present special Federal aid on behalf of the 146,000 Indochinese refugees now in the United States terminates completely; and, second, to provide for special Federal aid to the States on behalf of the 15,000 new Indochinese refugees who will enter the United States during the next several months.

When the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act was enacted in the spring of 1975, it was hoped that special Federal funding could terminate this September without an undue burden on States or localities. This has not proved to be the case. We estimate that the cost to the States for cash assistance, medical assistance, social services, and administrative costs on behalf of the refugees already in the United States would be approximately $105 million in fiscal year 1978 if the legislation expires. To this would be added an estimated $10 million cost to State and local funds on behalf of the new refugees in fiscal year 1978.

About 35 percent of the refugee population are receiving cash assistance. This amounts to approximately 51,000 persons who are eligible for both cash and medical assistance. An additional 17,000 persons are eligible for medical assistance only; these are persons whose incomes are slightly above the level of eligibility for cash assistance.

Mr. Chairman, the refugees have established a good employment record in this country. Studies have shown them to have a very high employment rate. But, at the same time, most of their employment

is in low-paying jobs, usually at the minimum wage or a little above it. This has reflected, for many refugees, a lack of fluency in English and often a lack of skills marketable in the American labor market; it has also reflected the difficult employment situation which was being experienced generally in the United States when the refugees arrived.

Although 35 percent of the refugees are receiving cash assistance, it is most often only partial assistance which serves to supplement low wages. The most recent national sample survey of Vietnamese refugees, conducted in March and April 1977, showed that over 86 percent of the refugee households were receiving wage or salary income and only 14 percent were entirely dependent on refugee cash assistance or other aid.

Improvements have been occurring in the income of refugees, and we are confident that further advances will continue. As this occurs, we recommend that a phased reduction take place in special Federal funding to the States rather than a sudden cutoff of such funding on September 30.

The President's proposal addresses separately the two groups of Indochinese refugees—those who arrived in the United States prior to August 11 of this year, the date of approval of the parole authority for the 15,000 new refugees who are expected, and the new refugees who will arrive under that parole authority.

The vast majority of the refugees who are now in this country arrived here over 2 years ago. With regard to this group, we are recommending the extension of Federal funding at a reduced level for a 3-year period, with step-by-step reductions during that period.

Specifically, these recommendations contemplate providing to States during fiscal 1978 the funding of 75 percent of the cost for those refugees requiring cash assistance or medical assistance, who would not be eligible under the regular programs of aid to families with dependent children (AFDC), supplementary security income (SSI), or medicaid.

For those refugees who are eligible under the regular AFDC, SSI, and medicaid programs—and that is about 12,500—we believe that the regular Federal funding should prevail and that it is appropriate for States to undertake their regular share of such costs as they do with regard to citizens and permanent resident aliens. Similarly, we are not proposing additional special funding for social services or educational or training activities for the refugees already in the United States through this legislation.

In many instances, services to the refugees have been provided through the ongoing programs which exist in the United States—the public employment service, CETA training and employment programs, adult English and vocational training programs—and under the regular funding for these programs. We believe that the special Federal funding which has already been provided for AFDC-type assistance, social services, and educational activities has fulfilled the national obligation during the immediate period of refugee arrival and resettlement. Now it is appropriate for the refugees to be further integrated, as coequals, into the ongoing programs which can assist the refugees as well as other residents of the United States.

During the 2 and 3 years of the recommended phasedown, fiscal years 1979 and 1980, the special Federal funding level for cash and medical assistance and related State-local administrative costs would decrease from 75 percent in 1978 to 50 percent in 1979, and then to 25 percent in 1980.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Fish.

Mr. FISH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Commissioner. I am interrupting because I may not be able to be here throughout the full time of your Department's testimony.

But we have here a comparison bill, and you just mentioned or referred to medical assistance, social services, and such administrative costs add up to approximately $105 million; yet, from this comparison it would appear coverage of the non-Federal share of refugee AFDC and medicaid cases and coverage of social services are not included in the administration bill. If that is the case, whatever we pass is not going to get the full $105 million you refer to here.

Mr. WORTMAN. That is correct. The administration bill does start to phase down Federal assistance in fiscal 1978. It will cover about $72 million in fiscal 1978.

Mr. FISH. So that will be the difference between $105 million and $72 million in the administration bill, a new burden would fall on the States; is that correct?

Mr. WORTMAN. That is correct.

Mr. FISH. Thank you.

Mr. EILBERG. Please proceed.

Mr. WORTMAN. If I may find my place here.

Mr. EILBERG. Yield just for a moment.

What was the rationale in arriving at those percentages?

Mr. WORTMAN. It was judgment as to what might be an appropriate phasedown, so the States would have some opportunity to adjust their budgets accordingly.

Mr. EILBERG. Why not 85 or 65 or some other figure? What is the particular significance of the figures used?

Mr. WORTMAN. I would not plead that there is any particular wisdom about this set of figures. They are geared somewhat to total dollar commitments that this program would entail; and that is why this set of figures.

Mr. EILBERG. They are tied into the dollar figure, but as for the figures, themselves, they are arbitrary, more or less?

Mr. WORTMAN. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Mr. EILBERG. Please proceed.

Mr. WORTMAN. We do not believe, however, that it would be appropriate to have this phasedown apply to the 15,000 new refugees immediately upon their arrival. Therefore, we are recommending a period of 18 months of full Federal funding to the States for cash and medical assistance, social services, and State and local administrative costs.

Mr. EILBERG. Let me interrupt you just a moment.

Mr. Fish?

Mr. FISH. Yes, this appropriately follows what you just said.

How many—going back to your reimbursement to States, 75, 50, 25, how many States have in place a general assistance program that could pick up the difference between your percentages and 100 percent?

Mr. WORTMAN. Well, the States, the State that has the largest number of refugees, 35,000 based on our latest count—California—does have a general assistance program that would pick up many of these.

It is our general estimate, Mr. Congressman, that about 20,000 of the 50,000 number I gave you would not be covered by existing general assistance programs in the States.

Mr. FISH. So there are some States that don't have any general assistance program; and you come in and drop it from 100 to 75, there would be no—nothing in place to take up the difference; is that correct?

Mr. WORTMAN. The only thing, the way we constructed our bill——

Mr. FISH. Excuse me. They wouldn't get the 75, would they?

Mr. WORTMAN. Yes, they would.

The way we have constructed our bill is even for those general assistance cases, States could continue those people as long as the amount of money they invested in them did not exceed the 75-percent ratio; in other words, they could keep them on the rolls for perhaps 6 months of the year.

Mr. FISH. Well, still, what about a State that doesn't have a general assistance program, and the State legislature doesn't meet this year?

Mr. WORTMAN. I am sorry?

Mr. FISH. What if the State legislature doesn't meet annually, as it does in some States? In other words, are there States where these percentages simply aren't going to work? There won't be the funding there for the refugees?

Mr. WORTMAN. It would undoubtedly create a situation where some of the refugees and some of those States would have to fall back on the resources of their sponsors, if still available; and would be treated like other citizens in those States who are in similar situations.

Mr. FISH. But they are not citizens?

Mr. WORTMAN. Or residents in those States. Most States have some form of public health activity, some form of private institutional support. It varies throughout the country. There are not too many States that have what we would call adequate general assistance programs.

Mr. FISH. Yet we are expecting—and this goes into effect in a week—that State governments would fund the other 25 percent; or it has to come from somewhere else if they don't have that funding mechanism?

Mr. WORTMAN. That is correct.

Mr. FISH. Thank you very much.

Mr. EILBERG. Please proceed.

Mr. WORTMAN. Following this initial period, we recommend that there be a 3-year phasedown of special Federal aid with respect to the 15,000 new refugees. This would be the same type of phasedown as we are recommending to begin now with respect to the refugees who are already in the United States.

Altogether, the President's proposal recommends an additional 4½-year period of continuing, but decreasing, special Federal assistance to the States on behalf of the Indochinese refugees. We estimate that the funding required will total approximately $146 million for the whole period, of which $139 million would be for grants to the States and $7 million for special services and for administration.

The $139 million would, of course, be supplemented by the regular Federal funding for those refugees who are eligible under the AFDC and medicaid programs. We estimate this amount to be about $59 million.

Mr. Chairman, we recognize that a number of States have expressed the view that special Federal aid should be continued to the States on behalf of the Indochinese refugees.

The proposal which we are supporting today represents the administration's conclusion on this question. We believe that there should be an extension in order to avoid an immediate undue impact on the States. We also believe that a distinction should be made—in terms of the level of Federal funding—between the refugees who have previously reached the United States, the majority of whom were resettled some 2 years ago, and those who will be arriving in the next several months. That is, we feel that it is appropriate to provide full Federal funding to the States on behalf of the new refugees for a reasonable period to offset the initial impact which would otherwise be felt in the area of cash assistance, medical assistance, social services, and related administrative costs, until these refugees begin to participate in the national economy.

The phasedown in funding, we believe, will encourage a more rapid and complete integration of the refugees into the regular activities of life in this country and not continue to leave them as a separate group indefinitely.

Mr. Chairman, we commend this proposal for the consideration of the committee and the Congress, with the hope that action may be completed by September 30 so that there will be not a gap in the assistance to needy refugees or aid to the States.

I indicated at the beginning that we recognize that this is a very short timespan, and I want again to express my appreciation to the committee for your consideration of this proposal.

That ends my statement, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wortman follows:]

STATEMENT BY DONALD WORTMAN, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE

Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to have the opportunity to present the President's proposal for an extension of the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act. This proposal has been introduced by Chairman Rodino as H.R. 9133 and we urge its prompt enactment.

We are most appreciative of the Committee's willingness to consider this proposal for Congressional action in the short time remaining before the expiration of the present law on September 30.

The purpose of the President's proposal is twofold: First, to avoid the full impact which would otherwise fall upon States and localities on October 1 if the present special Federal aid on behalf of the 146,000 Indochinese refugees now in the United States terminates completely; and, second, to provide for special Federal aid to the States on behalf of the 15,000 new Indochinese refugees who will enter the United States during the next several months.

When the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act was enacted in the spring of 1975, it was hoped that special Federal funding could terminate this September without an undue burden on States or localities. This has not proved to be the case. We estimate that the cost to States for cash assistance, medical assistance, social services, and administrative costs on behalf of the refugees already in the United States would be approximately $105 million in fiscal year 1978 if the legislation expires. To this would be added an estimated

$10 million cost to State and local funds on behalf of the new refugees in fiscal 1978.

About 35 percent of the refugee population are receiving cash assistance. This amounts to approximately 51,000 persons who are eligible for both cash and medical assistance. An additional 17,000 persons are eligible for medical assistance only; these are persons whose incomes are slightly above the level of eligibility for cash assistance.

Mr. Chairman, the refugees have established a good employment record in this country. Studies have shown them to have a very high employment rate. But, at the same time, most of their employment is in low-paying jobs, usually at the minimum wage or a little above it. This has reflected, for many refugees, a lack of fluency in English and often a lack of skills marketable in the American labor market; it has also reflected the difficult employment situation which was being experienced generally in the United States when the refugees arrived.

Although 35 percent of the refugees are receiving cash assistance, it is most often only partial assistance which serves to supplement low wages. The most recent national sample survey of Vietnamese refugees, conducted in March and April 1977, showed that over 86 percent of the refugee households were receiving wage or salary income and only 14 percent were entirely dependent on refugee cash assistance or other aid.

Improvements have been occurring in the income of refugees, and we are confident that further advances will continue. As this occurs, we recommend that a phased reduction take place in special Federal funding to the States rather than a sudden cutoff of such funding on September 30.

The President's proposal addresses separately the two groups of Indochinese refugees—those who arrived in the United States prior to August 11 of this year, the date of approval of the parole authority for the 15,000 new refugees who are expected, and the new refugees who will arrive under that parole authority.

The vast majority of the refugees who are now in this country arrived here over 2 years ago. With regard to this group, we are recommending the extension of Federal funding at a reduced level for a 3-year period, with step-by-step reductions during that period.

Specifically, this recommendation contemplates providing to States, during fiscal 1978, the funding of 75 percent of the costs for those refugees requiring cash assistance or medical assistance who would not be eligible under the regular programs of aid to families with dependent children (AFDC), supplemental security income (SSI), or Medicaid.

For those refugees who are eligible under the regular AFDC, SSI, and Medicaid programs, we believe that the regular Federal funding should prevail and that it is appropriate for States to undertake their regular share of such costs as they do with regard to citizens and permanent resident aliens. Similarly, we are not proposing additional special funding for social services or educational or training activities for the refugees already in the United States through this legislation.

In many instances, services to the refugees have been provided through the on-going programs which exist in the United States—the public employment service, the CETA training and employment programs, adult English and vocational training programs—and under the regular funding for these programs. We believe that the special Federal funding which has already been provided for AFDC-type assistance, social services, and educational activities has fulfilled the national obligation during the immediate period of refugee arrival and resettlement. Now it is appropriate for the refugees to be further integrated, as co-equals, into the on-going programs which can assist the refugees as well as other residents of the United States.

During the second and third years of the recommended phasedown, fiscal years 1979 and 1980, the special Federal funding level for cash and medical assistance and related State/local administrative costs would decrease from 75 percent to 50 percent and then to 25 percent.

We do not believe, however, that it would be appropriate to have this phasedown apply to the 15,000 new refugees immediately upon their arrival. Therefore we are recommending a period of 18 months of full Federal funding to the States for cash and medical assistance, social services, and State/local administrative costs.

Following this initial period, we recommend that there be a 3-year phase down of special Federal aid with respect to the $15,000 new refugees. This would be

the same type of phasedown as we are recommending to begin now with respect to the refugees who are already in the United States.

Altogether, the President's proposal recommends an additional 4½-year period of continuing, but decreasing, special Federal assistance to the States on behalf of the Indochinese refugees. We estimate that the funding required will total approximately $146 million for the whole period, of which $139 million would be for grants to the States and $7 million for special services and for administration.

The $139 million would of course be supplemented by the regular Federal funding, for those refugees who are eligible under the AFDC and Medicaid programs. We estimate this amount to be about $59 million.

Mr. Chairman, we recognize that a number of States have expressed their view that special Federal aid should be continued to the States on behalf of the Indochinese refugees.

The proposal which we are supporting today represents the Administration's conclusion on this question. We believe that there should be an extension in order to avoid an immediate undue impact on the States. We also believe that a distinction should be made—in terms of the level of Federal funding—between the refugees who have previously reached the United States, the vast majority of whom were resettled some 2 years ago, and those who will be arriving in the next several months. That is, we feel that it is appropriate to provide a full Federal funding to the States on behalf of the new refugees for a reasonable period to offset the initial impact which would otherwise be felt in the area of cash assistance, medical assistance, social services, and related administrative costs, until these refugees begin to participate in the national economy.

The phasedown in funding, we believe, will encourage a more rapid and complete integration of the refugees into the regular activities of life in this country and not continue to leave them as a separate group indefinitely.

Mr. Chairman, we commend this proposal for the consideration of the Committee and the Congress, with the hope that action may be completed by September 30 so that there will not be a gap in the assistance to needy refugees or aid to the States.

I indicated at the beginning that we recognize that this is a very short timespan, and I want again to express my appreciation to the Committee for your consideration of this proposal.

Mr. EILBERG. Thank you very much, Mr. Wortman.

Because we do have three members present, I think we ought to stick to the 5-minute rule so we try to utilize the time available to us. I will ask questions for about 5 minutes and then ask the others for as long as we can go.

The 1975 act has been in effect for over 2 years with an expiration date of September 30, 1977; why didn't we receive the administration's proposed extension until September 7?

You talk about our enacting the law in a week. Now, you had 2 years to think about this, your Department; and you do not give us the legislation to work on until—scarcely 2 weeks ago—much of which was taken up with holidays, congressional holidays.

Mr. WORTMAN. The proposal this summer as it was being developed in HEW and then proceeded towards the White House got delayed primarily because of the desire on our part to have our position on the 15,000 new refugees thought out at the same time as we presented the extension. I can only apologize for this lateness; but that is one factor that did come in during our deliberations, and delayed us somewhat in our presentation of the bill to Congress.

Mr. EILBERG. It was very clear from the inception of this program that it was to be limited in duration—with the Cuban experience in mind.

To your knowledge, have the States made any preparations for the termination of the program, or have they merely proceeded on the assumption that Congress would extend the program?

Mr. WORTMAN. I think so far as I know many of the States have already issued instructions about phasing down the staff associated with this program, and transferring some of the people from one type of eligibility roll to another. Mr. Holman may have additional information on that.

Mr. HOLMAN. Yes.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Holman?

Mr. HOLMAN. Mr. Chairman, our impression is that the actions by the States have varied. As Mr. Wortman has indicated, some have followed that precisely in moving toward the transfer of eligible cases to other programs; whereas other States, having known that there was to be, or was expected to be, a favorable administration position on extension, have not taken such action as yet.

Mr. EILBERG. Did HEW request the States to provide transition plans, or did you attempt in any way to prepare the States for the expiration of Federal funding?

Mr. WORTMAN. I think if we could submit this for the record you would find that all of our policy statements since the important one—I think it was June ——

Mr. HOLMAN. 1975.

Mr. WORTMAN [continuing.] June of 1975, which set forth policies to the States for these kinds of public assistance, were very explicit that this program expires in September 1977. Of course, it was our hope, and I think everybody's at State government levels and private voluntary agencies—all worked hard so we would not have as many on cash assistance as it now appears that we do have.

[The following was submitted for the record:]

POLICY INSTRUCTION TO STATES

HEW has provided for the record the basic Policy Instruction to the States on the refugee assistance program, issued June 9, 1975. References to the expiration date of the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act (Public Law 94-23) appear on the first and last pages. (Certain of the aspects of this Instruction were superseded by later Instructions to the States.)

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20201

POLICY INSTRUCTION

ACTION TRANSMITTAL
SRS-AT-75-27
June 9, 1975

TO: STATE ADMINISTRATORS AND OTHER INTERESTED ORGANIZATIONS AND AGENCIES

SUBJECT: VIETNAMESE AND CAMBODIAN REFUGEES

BACKGROUND: This supersedes Action Transmittal SRS-AT-75-8 (April 29, 1975) with regard to Vietnamese refugees. (A further notice regarding the Repatriate Program will be transmitted when pending legislation is enacted.)

NEW LEGISLATION: The following legislation has been enacted, providing for asistance to Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees in the United States:

The Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 (Public Law 94-23).

Special Appropriations for Assistance to Refugees from Cambodia and Vietnam (Public Law 94-24).

CONTENT: Under the authority of the cited legislation, the Social and Rehabilitation Service will provide reimbursement to States on a 100 percent basis for financial assistance, medical assistance, and social services to Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees in the United States. This will also include reimbursement on a 100 percent basis for administrative costs incurred in the provision of such assistance and services.

Funds for this purpose have been appropriated for the period ending June 30, 1976. The authorizing legislation for this purpose expires September 30, 1977.

States may claim reimbursement of costs, as defined by this Policy Instruction, incurred on behalf of Cambodian or Vietnamese refugees on or after April 8, 1975 (the date on which the President designated Vietnamese and Cambodians to be refugees under the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act).

...

The Congressional intent that this be a temporary program has been made clear. The House Appropriations Committee stated in its report (No. 94-204, May 13, 1975): "The Committee is concerned that this program could develop into a permanent Federal undertaking similar to the present Cuban refugee program. The Committee wants to state categorically that this is not its intent nor should the Executive Branch or the various States interpret the appropriation of these funds as starting a permanent Federal program. With this in mind, the Committee directs that the Executive Branch place these refugees in existing federal programs as soon as possible so that this part of the operation [the special funds for welfare, medical assistance, education, and public health] can be promptly phased out."

Waiver of Categorical Relatedness

Requirements of categorical relatedness for financial assistance, medical assistance, and social services are waived. This enables assistance and services to be provided on the basis of need, without regard to family composition or the presence of children. The provision of assistance on this basis is designed to avoid a needy refugee's becoming a burden on State or local public or voluntary resources if the resettlement plan has broken down.

Verification with Sponsors of Refugees

Most of the refugees who reach a community will have been resettled by one of the national voluntary agencies or a State or local government working with the Federal Government and will have a local sponsor. The sponsor may be an individual, a church, a civic organization, a State or local government, or other local group or organization. The responsibilities of the sponsor remain the same regardless of which of these categories a sponsor falls into.

In resettling a refugee, the resettlement agency and the sponsor undertake certain responsibilities as a moral commitment. These include receiving the refugee and his family, providing shelter and food until the refugee becomes self-sufficient; providing clothing and pocket money; providing assistance in finding employment and in school enrollment for children; and covering ordinary medical costs. Once employment is obtained, the sponsor will assist the refugee to locate permanent housing, acquire minimal furniture, and arrange for utilities. Sponsors are also expected to

help the refugees with some of the less tangible aspects of adjustment to a new culture.

If a sponsor no longer provides for a refugee -- as may occur when a substantial period of unemployment is experienced or when major medical needs arise -- then the refugee may have to turn to the public welfare agency for assistance.

As part of the regular verification process, the State agency, prior to accepting a refugee for assistance, should contact the sponsor, verify that the sponsorship has broken down, and assure itself that the sponsor has done the best he can.

The State agency should also confirm that the resettlement agency has been notified of the breakdown in the sponsorship so that the resettlement agency can endeavor to develop another sponsorship; meanwhile assistance may need to be provided. In cases in which the State acts as the resettlement agency, the State agency will notify responsible State officials of the breakdown. States that act as a resettlement agency have the same responsibilities as the voluntary resettlement agency.

Isolated instances of breakdowns in resettlement planning are expected to occur in any refugee resettlement program. However, if the welfare agency should find that refugees in a community are applying for assistance within a few days after arrival or that a substantial portion of the resettlements are breaking down, this information should be communicated immediately to the office of the SRS Regional Commissioner, including the names of the voluntary resettlement agencies responsible for the resettlements. This will provide a basis for corrective action and future resettlement planning.



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Financial Assistance to Refugees

1. Financial assistance to all types of refugee cases, regardless of family composition, will be based upon the State's AFDC needs standard with income and resources taken into consideration on the same basis as in the AFDC program and payments made in accordance with the State's AFDC payment levels. In determining need and the amount of assistance for the large extended family group it may be necessary and more practical to set up more than one budget unit. The State's standard for an assistance unit of one in AFDC may be used for single individuals and the two-person standard for a husband and wife. The Associate Regional Commissioner for Assistance Payments should be contacted if questions arise in the budgeting for refugee families and individuals.

2. Where there is an urgent need for assistance, the agency should make such provisions as are necessary to cope with the emergency by speeding up the application process and by issuing the initial grant to the refugee on an emergency basis.

3. No financial resources which are in fact not available to the refugee, including resources remaining in Vietnam or Cambodia owned by a refugee or a responsible relative, shall be considered in determining eligibility for financial assistance.

4. The income and resources of sponsors shall not be considered in determining eligibility for financial assistance.

(Reimbursement claims for assistance to adult cases based on the SSI standards in accordance with SRS-AT-75-8, prior to the implementation of this Action Transmittal, will be accepted.)

Relationship to SSI

1. All refugee recipients who are 65 years of age or older or who are blind or disabled will be referred immediately to the Social Security Administration to apply for SSI benefits. Such refugee will be included in the assistance benefit using the AFDC standard until SSI benefits are begun.

2. When the State agency learns that SSI has made a payment to a refugee for the same month as the refugee assistance program, the State agency should attempt to recover the assistance payment.

3. States may claim reimbursement, through the refugee assistance program, for State supplementary payments to refugee SSI recipients.

Medical Assistance

The provision of medical assistance to refugees will be designed: (a) To avoid a refugee's becoming a burden on State or local resources if the resettlement plan has broken down; and (b) to avoid a complete breakdown in the resettlement plan in cases in which the sponsor can continue to meet the basic needs of the refugee but is unable to meet the cost of major medical services.

State eligibility standards for title XIX will apply for medical assistance eligibility of refugees, with the following exceptions:

1. Requirements for categorical relatedness for medical assistance may not be imposed. Actual receipt of, or application for, financial assistance for living expenses may not be required as a condition of eligibility for medical assistance.

2. The State's AFDC-related financial eligibility standards adjusted for family size (including the standards used for the medically needy in States covering that group) shall constitute the medical assistance financial standard. In States without a medically needy program, medical assistance must be provided to refugees who "spend-down" to the AFDC financial eligibility standard in accordance with provisions for considering income and resources and deducting incurred medical expenses under 45 CFR 248.3(c)(2).

3. No financial resources which are in fact not available to the refugee, including resources remaining in Vietnam or Cambodia owned by a refugee or a responsible relative, shall be considered in determining eligibility for medical assistance.

4. The income and resources of sponsors, and the in-kind services and shelter provided to refugees by their sponsors, shall not be considered in determining eligibility for medical assistance.

Medical services will be provided in the same manner and to the same extent as under the State's title XIX program. However, where additional services are required -- and where such services would be available to destitute U.S. citizens through public facilities such as county hospitals -- the State agency may purchase services for refugees from such facilities in order to avoid the refugee's becoming a burden on publicly funded local facilities.

Social Services

Social services will be provided in accordance with the State's approved plan for service programs, except that requirements of categorical relatedness are waived.

Definition of a Refugee

For the purpose of the refugee assistance program, a refugee is defined as: A Cambodian or Vietnamese national who owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country and has been paroled into the United States by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) as a refugee or has been granted voluntary departure by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) as a refugee. Parole is granted only prior to or at entry into the United States. Voluntary departure is granted only when a refugee had entered as a non-immigrant or entered without inspection.

Excluded from this definition of refugees are those persons who are dependents of repatriated U.S. citizens and would be included under the Repatriate Program. Such persons are those who are actually dependent on the U.S. citizen and meet one of the following categories of relationship to such citizen: Spouse; parents; grandparents; unmarried minor (as defined by State law) children, including adopted children and stepchildren; unmarried adult children who are dependent because they are handicapped, including adopted children and stepchildren; spouse's parents; spouse's grandparents; and minor siblings of the repatriate and spouse. *

In order to be eligible under the refugee assistance program, the refugee must possess a Form I-94 issued by INS indicating that the person either has been paroled into the United States or has been granted "voluntary departure" status.

Since a dependent of a U.S. citizen may also possess a Form I-94, the State agency must inquire whether the person entered the U.S. as a dependent of a U.S. citizen and whether the relationship to the U.S. citizen is such that the person would be included under the Repatriate Program rather than the refugee assistance program.

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* Following the first 90 days after their arrival in the United States (the period of eligibility under the pending legislation on the Repatriate Program), those dependents of U.S. citizens who qualify as refugees, in accordance with the definition contained in this section, would be eligible to apply under the refugee assistance program.

Administrative Costs

Reimbursement may be claimed for identifiable costs incurred by State and local agencies in providing financial assistance, medical assistance, and social services to Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees. However, reimbursable administrative expenses may not exceed 10 percent of the financial assistance payments or 5 percent of the medical assistance costs for each quarterly period beginning July 1, 1975. Claims for local agency professional staff time incurred in the provision of social services shall be on the basis of actual time devoted to this function, but for each 60 refugee service cases handled statewide, there shall be no more than the equivalent of one professional employee claimed on the State's monthly claim.

In order to be claimed under the refugee assistance program, staff time and other expenses must be identified in State records, and regular procedures followed for allocation of joint expenses.

Records

States must maintain separate records on costs incurred on behalf of Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees.

State records must include the number which appears in the block "Passport or Alien Registration Number" on the Form I-94 issued by INS.

Records should also include the name of the national voluntary resettlement agency which resettled the refugee and the name and address of the sponsor. (Some early arrivals may not have been resettled by such an agency, but most future arrivals will be.)

Claims for Reimbursement

Claims for reimbursement should be submitted, until further notice, on Form 2040, striking the word "Cuban" where it appears and substituting "Indochinese."

Instructions to be issued at a later date are expected to call for a statement indicating your agency's agreement to participate in the program. States requiring advances should contact Regional Offices to obtain information on an interim agreement that must accompany the Form 2040 before the first funds request can be paid.

Claims must be submitted monthly and should be submitted not later than 30 days after the close of the month. (Retroactive claims for costs incurred during the period April 8 - May 31, 1975, may be submitted on or before June 30, 1975.)

No claim under this program will be accepted for any expenditures made more than seven months prior to the receipt of the claim.

A State may submit separate monthly claims for medical assistance if desired. Each monthly claim should be complete for the entire State, if possible.

The present appropriation for this program expires June 30, 1976, and the authorizing legislation for this purpose expires September 30, 1977. Additional instructions will be provided on the steps necessary to assure that all necessary fiscal data are provided on a timely basis to observe both of these expiration dates.

Address claims to the SRS Regional Commissioner.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: Additional information and materials will be provided as soon as possible. These will include more detailed instructions covering program, administrative, fiscal, and reporting requirements. The temporary nature of the program, the dollar limitation specified in the authorizing legislation in terms of funds that may be appropriated, and the high degree of Congressional interest as reflected in reporting requirements in the law will necessitate early information on applications for financial and medical assistance and expenditures incurred and anticipated.

INQUIRIES TO: SRS Regional Commissioners

Acting Administrator

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Wortman, I understand California, which is the most impacted State, has a county welfare system tied to the property tax rate, and that there is no way that these counties can adjust to your 75 percent phasedown at this date in the fiscal year.

Did you consider this?

Mr. WORTMAN. As far as their legislative cycle? I cannot say we specifically considered that. It has generally been our position, and I have testified before this committee on this before, that in contrast to the Cuban situation, where one county in America was heavily impacted, the distribution of the Indochinese refugees is still such that it is not a traumatic change in the planning that goes on normally in localities where they have ups and downs in their unemployment situations and have to adjust to that.

Mr. EILBERG. So I understand you did not consider the individual legislative situations in the States?

Mr. WORTMAN. I did not consider that, although, as I told you earlier, we have been very clear in all of our instructions to the States, and in all of the appearances that Mr. Holman, who has been on this program since its inception, has made—and I have been in and out of it—that this program does expire on September 30, 1977; that has been very clear.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Fish?

Mr. FISH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Commissioner, I note the administration proposal omits additional special funding for social services or educational or training activities for both the refugees who have been here for the past few years, and the 15,000. You say in your testimony that with respect to their posture in this country, a lack of fluency in English and often a lack of skills marketable in the American labor market has many of these in low-paying jobs.

In addition, the latest HEW task force report indicates it is presently funding 62 English and vocational training programs. Now the administration bill as I understand it makes no provision for further employment training, language training, mental health, and so-called special projects for either of these two categories of refugees.

My question is: If funding is continued for these special projects—isn't there a need; and if so, how can these programs be continued?

Mr. WORTMAN. I think it is clear these recent immigrants to our Nation continue to have a need for language and other skill training. It is our posture and our resource priority consideration that these refugees should, you might say, compete or be treated equally within existing Federal programs that are already provided, like comprehensive employment training, like adult basic education.

It was not too long ago—and Mr. Holman can speak to this—that we just added funds appropriated by the Congress on adult education. I don't know the exact amount on that; perhaps, Phil, you could speak to that?

Mr. FISH. It comes out of one pocket or the other; it's the same taxpayer.

Mr. WORTMAN. Yes; I agree with you, sir.

Mr. FISH. It has to be done. It would seem to me that we are sort of wasting time by shifting it over to some other congressional program. You and I know what we are talking about. There is a gradual movement of refugees into limited numbers of areas in the United States.

and it seems to me that it is only justice to those States, plus the concentration of refugees in those States, to have—to undertake responsibility for very important role in bringing them into full society participation in terms of job skills and in terms of language.

And can you tell me right now how much it has cost us in the last 2 years under the heading of special projects, the millions spent in this program in the last 2½ years, how much was for special projects?

Mr. WORTMAN. I would like to ask Mr. Holman to answer—if I could just comment.

We just recently put out additional funds for adult education for refugees as a result of specific action by the Congress. So it is fairly recent. Some of those are flowing through State departments of education.

Mr. HOLMAN. Mr. Fish, we have awarded a total of $7 million in employment training programs.

Mr. FISH. How much for language training?

Mr. HOLMAN. Well, the projects were comprehensive ones which have both language and vocational training; in addition, there were earlier grants through the State education agencies, to local education agencies, of $5 million for use in the adult English programs.

The other figure which Mr. Wortman referred to relates to $10.25 million which was appropriated under the Indochina Refugee Children Assistance Act, which the Office of Education is going to award this month to State and local education agencies for adult English and occupational training projects. Those projects will be in operation during the coming fiscal year.

Mr. FISH. Would you say the $7 million and $5 million that came out of the original legislation, $12 million came out of this special children's legislation—these are complementary programs? They aren't competing programs?

Mr. HOLMAN. No; they are not competing programs.

Mr. FISH. So the total bill over the last 2 years including this has been $24 million we are talking about?

Mr. HOLMAN. Yes; approximately, sir.

Mr. FISH. And would it be fair to say that if that was on a scaled-down basis for the existing refugees and provision made for the new 15,000, we are talking a figure considerably less than $24 million over the next 2 years?

Mr. HOLMAN. I am sorry. I really don't understand the latter point.

Mr. WORTMAN. You mean we should continue that level of activity or phase it down?

Mr. FISH. The same phasedown you are contemplating for general services.

Mr. HOLMAN. That would be correct.

Mr. FISH. You are talking about a lot less than $24 million for job training, vocational training and language training in the future?

Mr. HOLMAN. In terms of remaining need?

Mr. FISH. Yes.

Mr. HOLMAN. Yes; that would be correct.

Mr. FISH. Now, Commissioner, the question I asked you earlier about this general assistance, you said, if I understood your testimony, there would be maybe 20,000 refugees who would not be covered under your phasedown; it is my understanding that 33 States do

not have general assistance programs. Is that your understanding?

Mr. HOLMAN. I don't know the actual count on that, Mr. Fish; however, we do have estimates now from almost all of the States as to the number of refugees currently receiving cash assistance whose assistance would be terminated with the termination of the program. And that number is approximately 20,000.

Mr. FISH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Harris?

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Some of my colleagues and I are especially concerned with the administration's proposal, which does not provide funding for special services for existing refugees. Am I correct in that interpretation?

Mr. WORTMAN. Yes, sir, you are.

It's a judgment, Mr. Congressman, but to some extent our view would be that this is the time to have them treated like other residents in our society, and to be treated under existing service programs.

Mr. HARRIS. Are you fearful that cutting out these funds will simply mean we will have more refugees on welfare?

Mr. WORTMAN. Well, we made an initial investment in that, and, as you heard from Mr. Holman, some of that investment is being made now as far as adult literacy training. The question is the amount. It could be that additional funds would be beneficial; but already we are investing some $20 million in these special efforts.

Mr. HARRIS. It seems kind of strange to me because frankly, I feel that it would be a lot better to have programs to train these people for jobs rather than just putting them on welfare. I am surprised that your program for existing refugees emphasizes welfare rather than language and job training.

Mr. WORTMAN. Of course, we share your philosophy to the extent we made these investments during the preceding 3 years with the special projects we funded.

Mr. HARRIS. You say you will continue cash assistance and medical programs, but you are not going to continue any of the vocational and language training?

Mr. WORTMAN. That is correct.

Mr. HARRIS. It is my understanding that many States—including my own State—do not feel ready to take on the immediate phasedown of the cash and medical benefits for the existing refugees. What will become of the refugees if they don't get adequate help from the States?

Mr. WORTMAN. Well——

Mr. HARRIS. For example, you mentioned that 20,000 might be directly affected this way?

Mr. WORTMAN. They would have to rely on their sponsors and the voluntary agencies to volunteer; they would have to be treated like other citizens with whatever that State may have in the way of public support.

Mr. HARRIS. I am going to suggest here there isn't any question about the national character of this program, and I think we have to deal with the reality here. If in fact we are going to cut out the training program and put this large a group of residents on charity for survival, when they have other hardships to overcome at the same time, then I hardly think that we are meeting our national obligation. I just doubt the wisdom of that suggestion.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. SAWYER. Yes, Mr. Commissioner, following up a little bit on what Mr. Harris said, it seems to me that cutting out the retraining, job training, educational programs, is darned poor economics. Do you disagree with that?

Mr. WORTMAN. I certainly think this population of new residents in our country do need additional education and training and opportunities to make it in terms of their skills. We recognize that in some of the investments we have made.

It's a judgment and it's timing, really. There are fairly major efforts this country has funded for comprehensive employment training, in every city and every county. There are adult basic education programs ongoing in addition to the numbers that we gave that have been allocated. And it was our feeling that it was time at this point for the Indochinese to become participants in those existing programs.

Mr. SAWYER. Mr. Commissioner, perhaps my quick reaction favorably to Mr. Harris' comments stems from some action from your Department in my county in Michigan, where we had a State department of social services program. Just recently that required—and it has been very successful—it required able-bodied people on welfare and without young children as a condition to continuing getting their payment to attend job training courses. That has just been stopped because HEW has denied Federal funds and have required them to voluntarily attend job training programs.

Now, is that generally the attitude of your Department?

Mr. WORTMAN. No; our attitude in administering AFDC is that if their work experience is voluntary, a matter of a voluntary nature, and if it in no way effects the benefit level, then that is permissible under the law of the United States. It is only when that work requirement is mandatory, and it is in a sense working off the benefit directly, that we have trouble approving that, given our understanding of the Social Security Act.

Mr. SAWYER. What about job training? It's not working, it's job training, to be able to get employment when they are able-bodied and have no young children; what is the philosophy of objecting to that kind of thing?

Mr. WORTMAN. I would have to get into the particulars of that, but we run—with the Department of Labor—an incentive program called WIN, which has that as a requirement—that what we call the employable persons on welfare are actually required to job search and have job training; and I would have to go back home and understand the circumstances in your locality.

I would be glad to do that and find out where the difference is between what I am telling you and what actually happened out there.

[HEW has responded that it is reviewing the details of this project, which does not relate to refugees, and will advise Representative Sawyer of its findings.]

Mr. SAWYER. I would appreciate that because there is quite an uproar in our part of the State over this, in fact, quite severe.

But I just wondered if that philosophy is not what you are applying to the immediate situation we are discussing here, the continuing of direct cash payments and so forth, but discontinuing or not further funding the educational and job training aspects that would tend to help these people to get off these rolls.

Mr. WORTMAN. I understand your point, and I do not disagree.

It is just that we feel there are existing activities out there that they could participate in.

Mr. SAWYER. Well, I have reservations about your priorities.

Thank you, Mr. Commissioner; that's all I have.

Mr. WORTMAN. I might just add, as far as the incentive to work, for this particular population—I think all of us who have worked with this program over the last 3 years are very impressed with the labor force participation rate and the employment rate of the Vietnamese population.

Mr. SAWYER. Yes; again in Grand Rapids, Michigan, we have some 700 Vietnamese; and their employment rate is exceedingly better than of our general population. They have considerably less than 7-percent unemployment.

Mr. WORTMAN. I understand your community has done a superb job on this.

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Wortman, one of the primary responsibilities of the voluntary agencies, and those sponsors located by the voluntary agencies, was the situation concerning refugees obtaining employment and generally becoming self-sufficient. In your judgment would this legislation be needed if voluntary agencies and sponsors themselves had adequately discharged their respective responsibilities?

Mr. WORTMAN. My view, sir, is that this combined Federal, private voluntary agency, State, and county government activity has been a resounding success. I think the cooperation, the attitudes during this period of high unemployment in our country, have been impressive I think the fact that 86.4 percent of the refugee households are receiving wage and salary income, even though many still have to have some additional public assistance, is impressive.

So I think that in terms of helping them get jobs the record looks pretty clear that the voluntary agencies have done a good job.

Mr. EILBERG. And no better job could have been done?

Mr. WORTMAN. Given the suddenness with which this large number of people came, given the unemployment rate, I still confirm, as a person in Government for 25 years, that this was a superb job.

Mr. EILBERG. How can we be sure the Indochina refugee program will ever terminate, and that we are not developing a State dependency on the Federal Government? Why will States be any more able to assume total responsibility in the future than they are at present? Obviously they paid no attention to you in the last year or so when you told them this program was expiring?

Mr. WORTMAN. Well, I think one of the changing patterns—to be fair to the States—is when Congress passed this legislation and when Julia Taft and others were up here testifying before you, you were pressing them that we all work very hard to distribute this population as evenly as possible across the country.

The nature of the private voluntary agencies—Lutherans, Catholics, Jewish organizations, and so on—didn't necessarily always fit that objective, in that they have concentrations of strength across the country; and the natural inclinations of this population have indicated that some maybe are concentrated in areas where the burden is greater that we would have anticipated when we testified up here 3 years ago.

Mr. EILBERG. As you know, as I referred to it in my opening statement, we have had an unfortunate experience with the Cuban refugee assistance program. What is the current status of that program?

Mr. WORTMAN. The current status of that—I will let Mr. Holman discuss that; but we have I think gotten something close to a phasedown, even though it's been a little bit longer than the administration recommended.

Mr. HOLMAN. The administration recommended a 4-year phasedown; the conferees on the HEW appropriation bill have agreed on a 6-year phasedown.

Mr. EILBERG. What is the present status of that legislation?

Mr. HOLMAN. It is pending——

Mr. WORTMAN. The HEW appropriation is tied up in an impasse between House and Senate.

Mr. EILBERG. Do you think it is equitable to terminate assistance to the Indochinese and continue to provide assistance for Cuban refugees?

[Pause.]

I don't find it funny; you know, perhaps I take the job more seriously from this end.

Mr. WORTMAN. No; I didn't mean that. You just caught me on a good question. My smile in no way diminishes the importance of it, Mr. Chairman.

I think various administrations, regardless of party, have been attempting to phasedown the Cuban program for some time; and hopefully finally we have reached the point where we'll do that, even if it's longer than we had hoped for.

Mr. EILBERG. Is the administration supporting phasedown of the Cuban program?

Mr. WORTMAN. Yes; we would support a more vigorous phasedown, like 4 years, rather than what is now coming out of the appropriation bill.

Mr. EILBERG. In March 1976 the HEW task force established program strategy which placed primary emphasis on job development assistance, particularly vocational and occupational training, and English language training. In fact, the HEW regional offices, as you no doubt know, were asked to develop plans along with the State governments and the voluntary agencies for the purpose of decreasing the number of persons receiving cash assistance.

What was the result of these efforts?

Mr. WORTMAN. I will let Mr. Holman talk to that.

Mr. HOLMAN. Major aspects of that were addressed in the $7 million that was awarded in project grants for the 62 employment training projects. Most of these projects got underway about the first of this year, at the beginning of January. Through June 30 there have been 5,088 job placements resulting from those projects.

There have of course been a number of independent efforts carried on by the voluntary agencies—and, although we don't have actual figures on it, refugees involved in regular ongoing programs in the communities in which they live.

Mr. EILBERG. Despite these efforts current information presented to the subcommittee states that the number of persons receiving cash assistance increased from 19 percent in December 1975 to over 30 percent in December 1976, and approximately 35 percent as of September 1977.

Can you comment on this situation?

Mr. HOLMAN. Yes, sir, that is correct, Mr. Chairman. There has been an increase in the cash assistance rolls. At the same time there has been a steady increase in the employment rate. And I think this reflects the situation which Mr. Wortman referred to earlier, that many of the refuges, although fully employed, are employed in low paying jobs and are receiving supplementary assistance.

There was a slight decrease in the number of refugees receiving cash assistance between May and August of this year, for the first time since the program began. I think that reflects in part the training efforts that have been carried out. I also think that it reflects a seasonal increase in job opportunities so that I do not expect to see a steady decline from this point on. I would, rather expect we might have a slight increase.

Mr. EILBERG. You expect the number of persons receiving cash assistance to be going up again?

Mr. HOLMAN. I would expect a slight increase as summer jobs fall off and winter approaches.

Mr. EILBERG. You consider this to be progress?

Mr. HOLMAN. I would consider it to be a reflection of seasonal factors that do take place in the economy, and that do affect certainly a population employed generally in low paying jobs, who are very susceptible to seasonal variations.

Mr. FISH. You referred to 62 English and vocational training projects. I understood the Commissioner's testimony earlier was they would continue in operation because of the $12 million just allocated under the children's assistance program.

Mr. HOLMAN. I certainly didn't mean to imply in what I said that the same projects would continue.

The exact amount is $10.25 million, and the Office of Education has received applications and will make project grant awards based on a competitive consideration of applications.

There is one difference between the projects which are about to be funded under the Indochina Refugee Children Assistance Act and those previously funded under the basic Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act: and that is that the projects which the Office of Education is now about to fund are limited by the provisions of that law to being awarded to State and local public education agencies, whereas among the 62 projects that were previously funded, some were carried out by public agencies and some were also awarded to private nonprofit agencies.

Mr. FISH. What you are saying is a year and a half after enactment of this legislation in January 1977, 62 projects in language training were started; and now how many months later are they going to fold?

Mr. HOLMAN. Each project will have been in operation for at least 1 year. The awards were made approximately 1 year ago, and they were 1-year project grant awards. Some of the projects experienced a startup period which took them until January, and as a result they find that as of now they continue to have funds in their project grants which remain unexpended. Therefore, most of the 62 projects are actually being extended at least through December 31 with the present funding they already have.

Mr. FISH. The philosophy we have been discussing does not ask for further funds for this type of training, and it flies in the face, it seems to me, of what we are hearing. What we are hearing is an excellent rate of employment, 94.6 percent among Indochinese refugees, male; 84.4 females; and yet as the chairman mentioned 35—I notice 36 percent of this working refugee population still is in need of cash assistance in addition to what they are getting, if I understood your testimony in response to the chairman just a few minutes ago, you thought this would be on the increase.

How can we have it both ways? How can we have a greater need for cash assistance, which I think we all agree is what we are talking about here, yet—you can't answer that, obviously.

Let me put it this way to you: Were the voluntary agencies and sponsors put on notice 2 years ago, that when this program terminated at the end of this fiscal year, and if the States didn't pick up the slack, that they would be responsible personally for the public welfare responsibilities toward these people?

Were they told that at the time?

Mr. WORTMAN. I don't know if explicitly they were told that. The nature of sponsorship of refugees I take it is an implied relationship that has no definite termination date to it. I do think they took it on in good faith that all of us were a little uncertain about what the future held, and as the people gained independence they moved away in some cases, moved away from their initial sponsor. Thus it gets even more difficult to track.

Mr. FISH. Would you say the very fact the voluntary agencies were given $500 or $600 under this program for each refugee to transport him and settle him at his final destination would indicate that we weren't just passing the whole burden on to them for the future?

Mr. WORTMAN. Oh, yes. I never in my responses this morning implied that the full burden of refugees who go off cash assistance falls on them. I said the refugee would have to rely on them for further help; that involves in any particular locality how to get the particular services that are already there to help fellow Americans who are in dire circumstances. These differ from American locality to American locality.

Mr. FISH. OK, thank you.

Mr. EILBERG. We will take a brief recess to vote, and we will resume on our return.

[Recess.]

Mr. EILBERG. The subcommittee will come to order.

Commissioner Wortman, what effort has been made by the States to intensify their job development efforts? What has the Department of Labor done in this regard?

Mr. WORTMAN. I will ask Mr. Holman to respond to that.

Mr. HOLMAN. The States, of course, are required to have recipients register for employment, and we also provided an authority to the welfare agencies where it was lacking to actually pay for positions that would be devoted specifically to job development and to the placing of refugees in jobs.

Mr. EILBERG. Have the States intensified their job development efforts?

Mr. HOLMAN. Yes, they have, although there are no statistics that I have in relation to that. These efforts were also tied in with the employment training projects which we funded, in which priority for enrollment—first priority—was given to persons receiving cash assistance.

Mr. EILBERG. Has the Department ever thought of imploring the States to intensify their efforts?

Mr. HOLMAN. The Labor Department has been very helpful from the beginning of the refugee program at the camps. I think the ability of the local employment service offices to be helpful—and the extent of their helpfulness—has varied, based on their total caseloads and so on.

But in general we have found all of these efforts to be helpful.

Mr. EILBERG. In your opinion, Commissioner Wortman, or anyone, in your opinion what have the voluntary agencies done to assist the refugees in obtaining jobs commensurate with their skills and background?

Mr. WORTMAN. Well, I think that has been the biggest problem, and there I think we come back to the earlier point Congressman Fish made about English fluency and the fact that in our culture some skilled occupations are not open at the State level unless you are a citizen or permanent resident. There are certain areas we have been trying to work on.

But generally our evidence would be that when you compare the data on the skills of the people when they come into the country as to what they are now doing, as your question implies, many are working below the skill level that they had in Vietnam.

Mr. EILBERG. My question is in your opinion what have the voluntary agencies done?

Mr. WORTMAN. I will let Mr. Holman talk to that.

Mr. HOLMAN. I think they have been a major factor throughout—first, in the sense of the sponsors finding the initial employment. And there are voluntary agency efforts in quite a number of different places, the purpose of which is to be helpful to the refugees.

Mr. EILBERG. Do you intend to determine what the VOLAGS efforts have been and the degree of success their efforts have had in obtaining jobs commensurate with the refugees' skills and background? How do you know what kind of job the VOLAGS are doing?

Mr. HOLMAN. No, sir. We do not make an effort, Mr. Chairman, to require a specific report on that subject from the voluntary agencies. It is not required. The basic reports which we receive from them in HEW are the reports which are included in our quarterly report to the Congress.

Mr. EILBERG. I suggest you do do that in future reporting.

Mr. HOLMAN. I would be glad to discuss it with the State Depart-

ment, which has the contracts with the voluntary agencies, and also with the voluntary agencies themselves.

Mr. EILBERG. Would you do that?

Is it not essential to create incentives for refugees not to migrate to areas of high unemployment?

Mr. WORTMAN. I am not sure I follow that.

Mr. EILBERG. If you know that there is high unemployment in California, and yet if refugees are going to California in droves—now, the point is very simple: should we or should we not create incentives to have them to go other places than California?

Mr. WORTMAN. I think our initial attempts to locate them throughout the country were generally done well.

To control directly that phenomenon—once they are here—is a little difficult. I believe they tend to want to reinforce their culture to some extent, and where they do that is a little hard to predict.

Mr. EILBERG. You do not think it is possible to create incentives as other nations employ to cause these people to stay where they are and not to go to places of high unemployment?

Mr. WORTMAN. I think the best thing we can do is continue to provide their moral and financial support to the extent that they need it where they initially were settled, so they won't feel the compulsion to move elsewhere.

Many speculate weather has a lot to do with it. I am not sure of that. There have never been any studies. Many feel they will seek warmer climates.

Mr. EILBERG. Did you have a comment, Mr. Holman?

Mr. HOLMAN. No, sir, I do not know, either, of any type of incentive that might be offered.

Mr. EILBERG. Commissioner Wortman, I suggest to you other nations have incentive programs, and I would ask you, if you would, to look into that subject for us to assist us with that if you can.

Mr. WORTMAN. Yes, sir, I would be glad to do that.

[HEW has advised that it will explore the question of possible resettlement incentives and will report to the Committee on its review.]

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me ask you a very broad question going to this whole subject that I, as a Congressman, get asked all the time by the people of my district.

And that is, how do we justify the whole immigration of these special groups and large expenditures on education and all this sort of thing when we have tremendous rates of unemployment among our minority youth, and need of job training?

If you read the article in Time magazine a week or two ago about the underclass so-called in the United States, just philosophically, how do we handle that? What is the philosphy of that that I can explain to people in my district?

Mr. WORTMAN. Well, I think the country is making a one-time effort with this population. It does not mean that they are going to be continuing wards of the State. In fact, the evidence is that their value

system fits very highly with our American ideals; and their work rate is such, and their family togetherness is such, that this one-time investment will pay off for us over the long term.

Now, we do make the same argument as far as our investment in our youth and in our young adults, as far as their education but structurally there is no question about it especially in urban centers where we are not doing a good job. In some cases we probably are admitting that educationally we don't exactly know what to do about that.

Mr. SAWYER. In the inner city—which most cities have—we have the same tremendous unemployment impact going on, impacting on the youth of the inner city which I read about at least in that microcosm—if you read the underclass article in Time magazine, which was a very disturbing article to me. How do you excuse that we're doing such a poor job there, and yet we are taking in refugees and embarking on $100 million programs to do something for them?

How do you explain that to constituents? This is a problem to me; I would like to know if there is a good philosophical answer for it. If there is I would like to know what it is, because I have had trouble with the question myself?

Mr. WORTMAN. Well, I think it is very troubling given the data we now have known before and at various times in our country we have moved up and down. But I can remember in my days in the Office of Economic Opportunity we did invest—the Congress and the society invested—heavily—in summer programs for inner city youth. And we did that for quite a number of years and over time it might have been the conclusion these were not all that effective.

But it is not that the country has not tried to turn some of those bad statistics around. I am not here today to say I know enough about how to do that; but, by the same token, because we have not done as well as we would like to, even though we made these investments on some of those populations that are citizens of our country, born and raised here; it does not mean that we should not invest $100 million or so in a smaller number. And by the time we're through it will probably be more than that.

But we have certain obligations, I think, because of the war, and because they are now new residents, to at least make this one-time attempt to give them a shot at being in the middle class, in the mainstream. And I think there is every evidence that these people will make it.

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.

Mr. EILBERG. May I ask to what extent the amount of cash assistance which is provided in a particular State influences the movement of Indochinese refugees within the United States.

Mr. WORTMAN. I'll have to answer that broadly. There has been speculation in the welfare reform proposals we are testifying on as to that. There has been a lot of belief over a number of decades now that the higher AFDC rates in New York and California have been part of the reason for migration to those areas, from, say, the South and other regions of the country.

Studies—and I would have to get you the citations of those, because I do not know them offhand—from our analysts tell me that that has not been a determining factor.

Mr. EILBERG. Can you provide that information?

Mr. WORTMAN. Yes, sir, I would be glad to give you those citations. [See app. 4 at p. 164.]

Mr. EILBERG. Can you say what will happen in terms of internal migration in the event this legislation you are testifying about this morning is not enacted and the Indochina refugee program terminates?

Mr. WORTMAN. Consistent with my earlier view, and I may want to amend that a little bit after I go back in search of the answer to your first question more accurately, it would be my view that factors more important than the rendering of cash assistance will determine eventual migration of this population.

Mr. EILBERG. I am sorry, I didn't hear?

Mr. WORTMAN. I said factors other than whether or not cash assistance is available will determine the eventual settlement of this population.

Mr. EILBERG. You really don't think that the amount of cash received would be a consideration?

Mr. WORTMAN. I do not think that the fact that California has a strong welfare system is indicative of why people are tending to move there, because they are also moving to Texas; and if our evidence is correct, in Texas there is one of the lower cash assistance programs in the Nation.

Mr. EILBERG. Now it is evident that the vast majority of refugees have settled in a small number of States; why?

Mr. WORTMAN. Well, there are many reasons for that, and I will ask Phil Holman to step in with some.

But our original views were that some of the earlier refugees who were associated with the U.S. effort in their nation in Vietnam came to where military or civilian or contract friends were who had sponsored them. That dictated heavy concentrations in the areas where the Federal enterprise was larger, with the military and civilian.

It was also dictated by where the voluntary agencies have their strength, like Minnesota for the Lutherans.

Mr. EILBERG. May I interrupt by saying you know of course it was the legislative intent that there be a geographic distribution of the Indochinese refugees?

Mr. WORTMAN. Yes, and I can recall at the admonition of you, sir, after one hearing—I don't remember the date—that Julia Taft changed even some of the current practices of the voluntary agencies to increase their exchange of people and further maximize distribution. So that intent was strong throughout my association with this effort.

Mr. EILBERG. I interrupted your answer on why they were gravitating to just a few States?

Mr. WORTMAN. Other than the location of the sponsors and where the voluntary agencies were in strength, I think it is probably that factor that we haven't got a figure on too well, and that is climate.

Mr. HOLMAN. I think climate and also—particularly for, say, a refugee family that felt isolated in a local community—to wish to be in more of a milieu with their fellow countrymen.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Commissioner, the thought occurred to me that perhaps we can build into this legislation an incentive program to try to stop that trend or to try to more equally balance refugees, including those entering our country. If we do not, the situation which is aggravated will become more aggravated.

I would ask you to think about what incentives we might build in; and we would appreciate very much any ideas on your part whereby we could help stop this trend. Would you undertake to do that, sir?

Mr. WORTMAN. Yes, we would be glad to do that. [See p. 77.]

Mr. EILBERG. We have yet to receive HEW's views on various bills introduced by Congressman Stark despite the fact we did request them several months ago; and we asked that your testimony here include a comment on Mr. Stark's bill.

I am disturbed by the failure of HEW to address the Stark proposals, and I now ask you to do that, please comment on the basic approach embodied in his bill?

Mr. WORTMAN. I apologize for that, sir, and I would like to submit that to you at this time.

Mr. EILBERG. Are you in a position to deal with it?

Mr. WORTMAN. Yes, I am.

Mr. EILBERG. We will take that and make it part of the record.

[The document referred to follows:]

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
*September 23, 1977.*

Hon. PETER W. RODINO, Jr.,
*Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your request for a report on H.R. 9110, a bill "To amend the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 to extend the period during which refugee assistance may be provided." This bill supersedes H.R. 7221 and H.R. 6513 on which reports were previously requested.

In summary, we believe the Administration's bill, with its more limited scope of coverage and lower levels of special Federal funding, provides a more appropriate phasedown of the assistance program for Indochinese refugees than H.R. 9110, and we therefore support enactment of the Administration's bill, H.R. 9133, rather than H.R. 9110.

The bill would provide for a 3-year period of reimbursements to the States for cash assistance, medical assistance, social services, and State administrative costs related to Indochinese refugees. For those refugees who entered the United States prior to August 11, 1977, reimbursements to the States for cash and medical assistance and State administrative costs would be at the 100 percent level in fiscal year 1978. This would decrease to 75 percent in 1979 and 50 percent in 1980. For the 15,000 new refugees expected to enter the United States on or after August 11, reimbursements would be at the 100 percent level during all 3 years. With regard to social services, the bill does not specify reduced funding levels during the latter 2 years and contemplates full funding for social services during the 3-year period for both groups of refugees.

H.R. 9110 is similar to the Administration bill (H.R. 9133 and H.R 9134) in that it proposes a 3-year extension and phasedown of reimbursements to the States for assistance to Indochinese refugees. The differences between our bill and H.R. 9110 relate to the levels and scope of funding. The Administration bill does not propose additional funding for social services for the original group of refugees who reached the United States prior to August 11, nor does it propose funding to meet all or part of the non-Federal share of costs for those refugees who are eligible for the regular aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) and Medicaid programs; both of these proposals are included in H.R. 9110.

With respect to the new refugees, the Administration bill proposes an 18-month period of full reimbursement to the States for cash and medical assistance, social services, and State administrative costs, as compared with the 3-year period during which this would be covered under H.R. 9116. The Administration bill also proposes a 3-year phasedown period for the new refugees following the 18 months of full coverage; H.R. 9110 does not include such a phasedown period for the new refugees.

Taking into account the differences in scope of funding cited above, the two bills also differ in the levels of funding to the States during the phasedown periods, as follows:

| | *Percent* |
|---|---|
| 1978: | |
| H.R. 9110 | 100 |
| Administration bill | 75 |
| 1979: | |
| H.R. 9110 | 75 |
| Administration bill | 50 |
| 1980: | |
| H.R. 9110 | 50 |
| Administration bill | 25 |

Finally, we have been advised that H.R. 9110 contemplates the funding of additional special projects for Indochinese refugees, such as employment/training projects and mental health projects; the Administration proposal does not contemplate special project funding.

The estimated cost of H.R. 9110 for the 3-year period which it covers is $267.4 million, to which would be added any funding for special projects. The estimated cost of the Administration bill during the 4½-year period covered (which includes the 3-year phasedown for the new refugees) is $145.6 million.

A number of proposals have been advanced with regard to the continuation of special Federal funding on behalf of the Indochinese refugees in the United States, with varying levels of Federal support recommended. The Administration bill represents our view of the best approach to this question.

We believe that there should be an extension of the program in order to avoid an immediate undue impact on the States. We also believe that a distinction should be made—in terms of the level of Federal funding—between the refugees who have previously reached the United States, the vast majority of whom were resettled some 2 years ago, and those who will be arriving in the next several months. That is, we feel that it is appropriate to provide full Federal funding to the States on behalf of the new refugees for an 18-month period to offset the initial impact which would otherwise be felt in the area of cash assistance, medical assistance, social services, and related administrative costs, until these refugees begin to participate in the national economy. The phasedown in funding, we believe, will encourage a more rapid and complete integration of the refugees into the regular activities of life in this country and not continue to treat them as a separate group.

In many instances, services to the refugees have been provided through the on-going programs which exist in the United States—the public employment service, the CETA training and employment programs, adult English and vocational training programs—and under the regular funding for these programs. We believe that the special Federal funding which has already been provided for the AFDC-type assistance, social services, and educational activities has fulfilled the national obligation during the immediate period of refugee arrival and resettlement. Now it is appropriate for the refugees to be further integrated, as co-equals, into the on-going programs which can assist the refugees as well as other residents of the United States.

We are advised by the Office of Management and Budget that they have no objection to the submission of this report and that enactment of the Administration's bill would be in accord with the program of the President.

Sincerely,

JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, Jr.,
*Secretary.*

Mr. EILBERG. Can you summarize it here so we would have it in context at this point?

Mr. WORTMAN. Yes, sir, I will.

In terms of a summary I can compare the Stark bill to the administration's but I can also highlight at this time the Stark bill as compared to the recent Senate bill by Senators Kennedy and Cranston.

Mr. EILBERG. We are familiar with the bills. We have the bills just as you have, we are aware of the differences, and we have the staff to compare the provisions. What we would like to know is your attitude on the differences in these bills, the principal differences, so we can form some impression at this time of the major arguments for each.

Mr. WORTMAN. I would say there are two primary differences. First, the Stark bill starts out with 100 percent Federal coverage in the first year and then reduces to 75 and 50. Second, it also provides a response to points made earlier by other members of your committee for authority for special projects, even though an amount is not included, and also includes authority for States to be reimbursed for social services, whereas the administration's bill does not.

I think unless Mr. Holman has a point, those are the significant differences.

He does not. I have summarized it as far as the significant differences.

Mr. EILBERG. And your response to those differences?

Mr. WORTMAN. Our view is that our phasedown, a step-down approach, given other resources the Federal Government is making available through State and local governments, is consistent with the distribution pattern of these people, consistent with the size of this population as compared to other factors. We do have a fairly sizable number of immigrants to our country every year, and this is a way of moving the program into a normal state of Federal-State responsibility.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. SAWYER. I have been looking over the list of the relocation numbers of these Indochinese refugees; and it sure does not seem to me to be explained very substantially by climate. I recognize California has a very marked increase, like 25 percent; Texas a significant increase. But then take States like Pennsylvania, Minnesota, even North Dakota, Montana, and Michigan, all have had an upswing from 1976 to January 1977 totals.

And way down at the bottom it's like Mississippi, which has had virtually no increase; Alabama, other Southern States; so it certainly does not seem like that reshuffle does not explain to me as I look at these numbers—Ohio increasing, Minnesota increasing, Illinois significantly increasing, New York—you know, it just seems to me there must be some other very significant element in this thing, far beyond the climate. [See table in app. 4 at p. 164.]

Mr. WORTMAN. I might say if you look at the totals on the chart some have not been adjusted for the total refugees. A lot of numbers have increased, isn't that correct?

Mr. HOLMAN. That is correct.

Mr. WORTMAN. I am not trying to avoid an answer. I am saying one of the reasons that the increases are shown in the table we just handed in is a more recent update of State distributions. It starts off in the first column with only 114,000 refugees, which was on INS' report. The last table has 145,000. So there is an adjustment in figures. But other than that, would you talk to it? [See table in app. 4 at p. 164.]

Mr. HOLMAN. One factor which is not represented in this table, Mr. Congressman—because the table is based on the January 1977 alien

registration with INS—is that there was no way for us to be able to take into account migration, internal migration, which occurred in the United States after January. We do not have any figures on that.

You are quite correct, based on the reports we have had from the field, that there is not any overall migration from colder to warmer climates, although our reports from the field do indicate a migration being experienced from the northern part of the country particularly to Texas and Louisiana.

Mr. SAWYER. It just seemed to me again looking at the top States and those that have increased and decreased that you have a relatively significant decrease in Guam, for example, which seemingly would be compatible climatewise.

It seems to me there must be some much more pervasive impact causing this. I don't know. I am just looking at these numbers. That is the impression I have.

Mr. HOLMAN. It is very difficult to quantify. I feel that the factors are known—and one other one that might be mentioned is family reunification, where members of an extended family were scattered in different places—but it is just not possible to put a figure on the factors.

Mr. SAWYER. That's all, thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Wortman, you were present during the testimony of the State Department this morning, were you not?

Mr. WORTMAN. Yes, sir, I was.

Mr. EILBERG. Would you comment on the desirability of a 6-month continuing resolution on this matter as a temporary solution while we deliberate on a permanent solution to this problem?

I say that in the context that this Congress has such a short period to go that I don't know that we have that much time. We certainly are willing to exert ourselves.

Mr. WORTMAN. I would be supportive of that. In fact, sir, we did have representatives of the Department, including Mr. Holman, who testified before Senator Magnuson's appropriations committee 2 days ago and, in a discussion of continuing this program, the HEW continuing resolution or a separate continuing resolution, was discussed with Senator Magnuson; and at the staff level we are having similar discussions with Representative Flood's appropriations subcommittee of the House.

Mr. EILBERG. Will you summarize those discussions for us at this point so we may have the benefit of your thinking right now?

Mr. WORTMAN. You should also understand that the continuing resolution for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare is somewhat, as I sit here today, caught up in issues related to our annual appropriation bill between the two Houses. So it is changing daily on that.

But given satisfactory resolution of that it would be our hope that the Congress could pass a continuing resolution including this program next week, and I am not sure about the 6 months time period. Was that discussed?

Mr. HOLMAN. Yes. The question of the 6 months time period was raised by the Senate appropriations subcommittee when we met with them.

Mr. EILBERG. And?

Mr. HOLMAN. We responded favorably, as Mr. Wortman has, to that possibility.

Mr. WORTMAN. On our side of the street we have tried to work for that.

Mr. EILBERG. Briefly, what is your response to those supporting the Stark approach, who claim the administration's bill perpetuates the welfare syndrome, since it does not provide any incentive mechanism for breaking the welfare cycle? These critics also maintain that the programs that have been most beneficial and cost-effective will be terminated under the administration proposal at precisely that point in time when they are set to produce substantial results.

Can you comment on these particular criticisms?

Mr. WORTMAN. It is a judgment in terms of when you terminate this kind of effort. I think these investments in special projects which we have participated in, which Congress did appropriate funds for, demonstrate that we certainly agree with the theory. But it is just in our view that the extent people like this are desirous of becoming, and we want them to become, regular members of our culture, our society, that it is timely that they participate in existing special efforts.

Mr. EILBERG. Recognizing that your proposals are—to eliminate these programs, these special programs, in your opinion which of the two proposals, the administration's or the Stark proposal, would have the most impact in improving the refugees' situation in the United States?

Mr. WORTMAN. Improving their situation?

Mr. EILBERG. Yes.

Mr. WORTMAN. Well, I am not sure that in sum I would be bold enough to make a comparison just based on these two factors, because so many other influences have great bearing on this. I do feel our society has a lot of support institutions out there—religious, private, nonprofit—that are there to help citizens develop skills and adjust. And that these people should participate in those as any other group.

Mr. EILBERG. Which proposal more immediately would improve refugees' efforts to become self-sufficient immediately?

Mr. WORTMAN. I think the administration bill does an adequate job, because I think the basic things people need until they find their way are these assurances of health care and cash assistance.

Mr. EILBERG. And the Stark proposal, providing more money in programs, would not be more immediately beneficial?

Mr. WORTMAN. I would not say that 5 years from now, looking back, we could distinguish or that we could control this kind of experiment.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Wortman, you may wish to reflect on that question, or those questions more. We would welcome any further response.

We have other questions for you gentlemen, but our time has run out.

We thank you very much. If you have any additional material you would like to submit beyond that which we have requested, we would like to have it.

Please recognize also, as we told Secretary Habib, we are most anxious to come to markup as rapidly as possible.

Mr. WORTMAN. We will have the material for you. Once again, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much your holding this hearing on this matter at this late state of affairs.

Mr. EILBERG. Thank you.

The subcommittee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

[See app. 4 at p. 156 for additional questions to and information from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.]

# EXTENSION OF INDOCHINA REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1977

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP,
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
*Washington, D.C.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:45 a.m., in room B-352, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joshua Eilberg [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Eilberg, Hall, Fish, and Sawyer.

Also present: Garner J. Cline and Arthur P. Endres, Jr., counsel; Mark R. Zecca, assistant counsel; and Joseph Wolfe, associate counsel.

Mr. EILBERG. The subcommittee will come to order.

Today's hearing is a continuation of this subcommittee's consideration of various proposals to extend the Indochina refugee assistance program.

Last week we heard from various executive branch officials who testified in support of the administration's bill which was just recently submitted to the Congress.

I might say that there were many questions that members of this subcommittee had of the administration, which responses have not as yet been received, and I do hope that we are able to move on this bill quickly because time indeed is running out.

I deeply regret the fact that it has been submitted at such a late date but nevertheless I am hopeful that we will be able to give careful consideration to both the administration bill and the other bills that have been introduced.

Today we will hear from various witnesses who will present a somewhat different view on the administration's proposal, as well as discuss some of the provisions contained in previous proposals on this subject.

Our first witness this morning will be Congressman Stark who has introduced his own bill to extend the program, along with numerous cosponsors.

I would like to welcome you to the subcommittee and look forward to hearing your testimony in support of your legislation.

## TESTIMONY OF HON. FORTNEY H. STARK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA; ACCOMPANIED BY NEIL SIMON, LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT

Mr. STARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to ask permission to have my prepared remarks made part of the record and to depart from them a little bit and summarize. If you care to, I invite you or your staff to interrupt at any point, which may shorten the proceedings for you.

Mr. EILBERG. Without objection, your statement will be made part of the record.

[Prepared statement of Hon. Fortney H. Stark follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. FORTNEY H. STARK, JR.

Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for providing me with this opportunity to testify on legislation to extend the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program. This has been a matter of utmost concern to me, and I have introduced several pieces of legislation, most recently H.R. 9110, extending IRAP. These bills now have over 50 co-sponsors.

While I am pleased that the Administration is now supporting a 3-year extension of this program, I take strong exception to its limitations, especially as they regard social services funding and an immediate reduction of reimbursements to states for general assistance programs.

Let me explain. Although over 86 percent of the 145,000 Vietnamese refugees living in the U.S. were employed last year, nearly 35 percent were receiving some sort of cash assistance. In California, up to 46 percent were receiving cash assistance.

Specially, 95 percent of the refugee males worked; 86 percent of the female refugees worked.

What these figures prove is not only that most refugees made the effort to learn the language and secure a job in a foreign country, in spite of remarkable barriers facing them, but also that the greatest problem now facing the refugees in becoming self-sufficient is not unemployment, but underemployment.

The most important element of the current IRAP program to assist refugees consists of social services and training projects. I believe that this should be the focus of any IRAP extension.

Yet, under the ill-conceived Administration bill, no social services programs would be funded, and all 63 special Indochinese Training and Employment programs around the country, which provide language and vocational skill training, career counseling, and job placement services, would have to shut down.

Only through these programs will the unskilled or language-handicapped refugees gain full access to the job market. While cash and medical assistance are absolutely essential for the short run, we must, in the long run, tie them to language and/or vocational training which lead to greater employment opportunity. Without these programs, which the Administration proposes to terminate, the legislation becomes nothing more than a welfare program, threatening to institutionalize dependency.

The Administration claims that refugees who continue to need special assistance can be served through regular Federal programs such as CETA and Title XX of the Social Security Act. In fact, however, these programs cannot possibly be effective in reducing the dependency of refugees on cash assistance. Nearly all Title XX service agencies are already spending all of their available funds, and CETA programs have proved too inflexible and of little use in the resettlement effort. Moreover, many social insurance programs are simply not available to refugees due to existing regulations, or a lack of sufficient work records to meet eligibility requirements. In the final analysis, the Administration bill contains nothing that will enable the refugees to become fully self-supporting.

Additionally, the Administration's bill is drafted so as to preclude the possibility of all but 17 states to provide cash assistance to refugees not eligible for AFDC. Since under their proposal, reimbursement to states for cash aid would immediately decrease to 75 percent, only the 17 states with statewide general assistance programs would be able to authorize funds to make up the remaining share. Other states, lacking statutory authority to spend funds for general assistance, would be unable to operate such programs. As a result, states such as California, which do have general assistance programs, would be inundated by an in-migration of refugees from other states—thereby increasing the local burden in these areas.

I also want to emphasize the need to continue 100 percent funding for cash and medical assistance during fiscal year 1978. The sudden reduction of the Federal share to 75 percent would create havoc among the states, and effectively cripple the program. Only by providing 100 percent funding this year will states be able to plan for an orderly phase-down of the program. Regrettably, under the Administration's bill, phase-down of IRAP would be accomplished at the cost not only of the refugees, but of the state and local governments involved.

I urge the members of this Subcommittee to support these changes. It is vital to continue social services funding so that the refugees can be truly served and truly have a chance to integrate into American society, and to continue 100 percent funding for one more year so that state and local governments do not have to suffer a financial hardship which should be a national responsibility.

Only if these changes are made, can we have a responsible, humane, and cost-effective extension of IRAP.

Mr. STARK. I would also like to commend you as chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law for bearing the brunt of some politically unpopular issues. All too often you or your committee members receive criticism for programs that have fallen in your lap; and I think you have done an excellent job.

I think you and your staff have been most patient and understanding, and I hope that we won't try that patience too far in dealing with this final problem.

Mr. EILBERG. I might interrupt by saying, once again, as I said in my opening remarks we know what we have to do. We know the problems that come to us; but we need the cooperation of not only our colleagues in Congress but also of the administration, and I think that it is deplorable that just 2 weeks ago we got this legislation, with the program about to run out on September 30. I say it is outrageous.

Mr. STARK. I share the chairman's concern and frustration.

Of the 145,000 Vietnamese refugees, a preponderance of them, averaging 95 percent of the men and 86 percent of the women, are employed. There is among this group a remarkably high work ethic

Secretary Califano has now introduced before the committee on which I serve, the House Committee on Ways and Means, a Welfare Reform Act. It stresses the fact that we have to create incentives to work and that we have to provide training. Those on welfare, both the unemployed and underemployed are not working out of choice; they are not working because they cannot find jobs or they don't have the training to rise above the most minimal kind of jobs.

With the Indochinese refugees we have a group of people who are overcoming the most horrendous odds. They were functionally illiterate when they arrived, without friends, relatives. With our help, most have now found a place to live and jobs. Unless we provide them with social services, however, we can almost guarantee that many will become perennial, perpetual recipients of cash welfare. We can't let this happen.

The refugees are a healthy, active people who have the greatest urge to become American citizens and participate in our society. Clearly, they do not want to be dependent on Federal handouts.

Most of them are working people whom we classify as working poor. They are receiving public assistance only to supplement whatever salaries and wages they are able to earn. Continued language and vocational training will enable them to rise in the job market and become more sophisticated in the types of jobs they are able to perform.

In this way, the refugees will become the kind of productive citizen who pays taxes, and an earning asset to our economy rather than a perpetual drain.

I cannot emphasize too much this need for social services. In my opinion, it is a question of whether we shall be foresighted or myopic, thereby locking these people into a life of the most menial kind of jobs and guaranteeing a very slow assimilation into a society with language and culture and customs far different from that which they left.

In sum, we have a State problem that was created by the Federal Government: We have a group of people who more than anything want to participate in what is universally accepted as the American way. We are attempting to give them not that that they need less while denying that which they need most, social services.

In addition, by not continuing the fiscal year 1978, 100-percent funding to the States, our estimate is that only 17 States would be able to make the necessary adjustments to give any kind of assistance to these people in that year. So, it is also essential for us to keep the 100-percent level of funding in 1978 to give the States a year to adjust. Only then could a phaseout be effective.

I recognize that this would cost about $119.1 million in fiscal year 1978 and that the second budget resolution included only $72 million. We would have to try for a budget waiver, but I think if your subcommittee, and subsequently your full committee, would support this concept, that we would have broad bipartisan support, and could then go to the Budget Committee to ask for a waiver on this point. I certainly would pledge to work with the chairman and his colleagues in this effort.

I thank you for giving me the time to make these remarks.

I would be glad to answer any questions you now have for me.

Mr. EILBERG. I have a few questions, Mr. Stark.

Can you explain why, after over 2 years of providing forms of assistance to refugees which are unavailable to needy nonrefugees, that is, those legally here, that is to say, citizens or permanent resident aliens, that you propose to continue preferential treatment for refugees?

For example, for Indochinese refugees, some of the eligibility requirements for AFDC have been waived. After over 2 years in this country, would your bill continue to permit AFDC benefits for a single person with no children, when such benefits are denied to a nonrefugee applicant for AFDC?

Mr. STARK. Yes; it would. These people came here without the history needed in some areas to qualify for AFDC. Indeed the minute they arrived in our country they were poor and unemployed. They are all of the things that many of our other AFDC recipients did not become in 1 day. It seems to us that this is a necessary waiver.

Mr. EILBERG. I understand.

Let me try another point along the same line. You stated, properly, that refugees in States which have no general assistance programs will be cut off from benefits if the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Act is terminated or phased down, as the administration proposes. To

what extent are nonrefugees who live in those same States and who require assistance in the same predicament?

Mr. STARK. My reason for stating that is that if the States get 75 percent the first year, they wouldn't have time to go through their own authorization-appropriation process to fill that gap in a year.

Mr. EILBERG. But my point is that those who are not refugees suffer those disadvantages.

Mr. STARK. But they do not have the same barriers to overcome.

Mr. EILBERG. You said that in all but 17 States there were no programs?

Mr. STARK. No. What I said is, if the funding is not continued at the 100-percent level in the first year, fiscal year 1978, and if we cut back to 75 percent, all but 17 States would be unable to react quickly enough to makeup that difference. This would cripple the program.

But, in fact, many of them are in programs that would continue.

In California, for instance, we have a State supplemental income. That will go on regardless.

Mr. EILBERG. Is that true of all of the other 33 States? I question that and that is really the question I am asking you.

Mr. STARK. I really can't speak to all 33, but the States involved do see this refugee program as an additional burden on top of their average or standard public assistance load which they should not be expected to bear.

Mr. EILBERG. We agree that if there are people who do not qualify for AFDC and who are citizens, or who are permanent resident aliens, in a State where there is no general assistance program, that they have no benefits, there is no State program, for those people. They suffer disadvantages, and there is real cause for these nonrefugees to resent what they get compared with what we are providing for refugees.

Mr. STARK. I think that all people understand the special circumstances surrounding the Indochinese refugees in this country.

Mr. EILBERG. But in so many cases where there is a program, the State program does not provide the full benefits that the refugee has received and would be receiving under our program.

Mr. STARK. Well, that certainly wouldn't be the case in California. In other words, I view this as an incremental, additional load that was placed on the States.

Mr. EILBERG. Perhaps it is not a fair question of you. We may ask it of another witness.

For over 2 years the States have received full funding under the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Act. If we continue full funding for 1 more year, as you propose, why then should it be necessary for us to "wean" the States away from the Federal trough at reduced rates in the following 2 fiscal years? Why will the States not be able to assume full responsibility after fiscal 1978?

Mr. STARK. I do not believe it is a question of "weaning" States away from the Federal trough but of finding that the people we are attempting to assist will, through hard work, diligence and with the help of language training and vocational training, become more self-sufficient thereby lessening the need for public assistance as people learn and get higher skill levels and higher paying jobs they will leave

the program. I think that there is natural tendency for the program to be self-liquidating.

Mr. EILBERG. But you haven't quite answered—or at least I don't quite understand you—in terms of the necessity to "wean" the States away from the Federal trough.

Why do we have to go beyond 1 year? Why do we have to go 2, 3, 4, whatever the number we come out with?

Mr. STARK. The Vietnamese refugees were loaded on top of the normal caseload. If you accept the fact that they will assimilate into the normal economy, their numbers and needs will diminish over some period of time, perhaps 2 or 3 years. Each year the need to maintain that program should be reduced. For the moment I am disregarding the 15,000 new refugees and assuming we are not adding people to this population.

Mr. EILBERG. That, as you know, is not a safe assumption.

Mr. STARK. I know that, but I wanted to put that aside for a moment and say that given a stable population, logically, there will be phase down. There will be an upward mobility among the population we are trying to help that will eliminate the necessity for a continual program.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Sawyer?

Mr. SAWYER. Mr. Chairman, I don't know whether it is appropriate or not, but I have about a 2-page statement here from the head of our program in the Grand Rapids area that I would like to read into the record, if I may.

Mr. EILBERG. Please do.

Mr. SAWYER. It is an interesting program. It is the most successful in the United States, I may say. While it is a small number, approximately 700, we are a small community in the greater Grand Rapids area, probably 400,000, so 700 people is significant. We have also suffered a very high rate of unemployment, the whole State has. The group there is headed by Rev. Howard D. Schipper, and I would like to read his statement.

It says:

No other locale in the United States has worked as long or as hard on Indochinese resettlement than the Grand Rapids, Mich., area. We are thus directly acquainted with the problems your committee addresses as it considers extension of the Indochina program, and we are grateful for this opportunity to read our testimony into the record of the hearings.

On May 23, 1975, the greater Grand Rapids area organized the "Freedom Flight Task Force" to meet the needs of Indochinese refugees. From that date to the present the task force has administered a unique and successful program, unparalleled anywhere in the United States. Harnessing all the existing agencies and services, the communitywide and ecumenical task force of 16 members coordinated, advised and created the activities and programs which facilitated the fullest possible integration of some 150 refugee families of 700 persons into the community. Members of the task force from the beginning volunteered their time and services, so no administrative or other overhead costs were incurred. The entire operation was financed by a $10,000 grant from a local foundation, and by anticipated finances from the IRAP during the first year. Through the special projects funds allocated to HEW, the task force carried out its efforts during the second year with a grant of $40,000. With it we were able to employee three Vietnamese, teamed with two Americans, to implement our resettlement efforts, which concentrated on the reduction of welfare dependency and on the increase of gainful employment. Integral to the program has been the Adult Education Department's instruction in English language.

During the first year of operation we were able to reduce unemployment to about 15 percent, and the second year, which was funded under the special projects money, enabled us to achieve 100 percent employment.

Welfare dependency in our area a year ago ran at 7 percent, in comparison to a 29.83 percent national rate at that time. Today our area still has 19 cases of cash assistance, representing a low of 13 percent, while the national rate is 34 percent. Nearly all of these cases are large, struggling families who receive financial aid to augment their low wages. What we have managed to achieve in 2 years, the remainder of the country has been attempting to do for less than 12 months. Our local efforts must now upgrade the employment of refugees, 90 percent of whom are underemployed, in order to insure and stabilize their socio-economic integration.

We shall also be receiving another 50 to 75 new refugee persons among the newly authorized entries, and the full range of past services will be provided for them.

Therefore, from the perspective of our tested experience, it is essential that a 3-year extension be enacted. Having studied the administration proposal—H.R. 9133 and S. 2108, the Stark bill, H.R. 9110, and the jointly proposed amendment offered by Senators Kennedy and Cranston on behalf of Senator Humphrey, admendment 876 to S. 2108—we strongly advise the realistic phase down percentages of the Stark bill—100 percent, 75 percent, 50 percent—for the next 3 fiscal years. It is essential for social services to be included in the program and it is even more requisite to fund the special projects without which the entire program would be self-defeating. We believe the provisions of $25 million for special projects over the 3 years, as proposed by amendment 876, will enable the rest of the country to attain the desired goals which we hope to accomplish in another year.

Services for newly arriving refugees during the next year (a) can be performed within the framework of the phasedown or by some gradation dated from their arrival. State of local public and private agencies which service these new refugees will be able to provide for their needs with greater alacrity with an experienced, continuing delivery system.

While costs for this entire program will be substantial, the value of the redeemed and reconstructed lives of more than 150,000 contributing potential citizens outweighs the cost. The basic human rights of these refugees, for which so many Americans died and sacrificed, will be guaranteed by this careful program of assistance for their full assimilation in their chosen country of refuge.

We pledge ourselves to assist you in the implementation of the legislation you adopt. Sincerely, Reverend Howard D. Schipper, Chairman, Freedom Flight Task Force.

Mr. STARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EILBERG. Thank you. It appears you have some support from Grand Rapids, Mich.

Mr. STARK. We will take all the support we can get.

Mr. EILBERG. Let me ask you some more questions.

If we provide full funding for fiscal 1978, one must wonder whether the States will do anything during fiscal 1978 to prepare for your proposed phasedown.

What assurances do we have that the States will not come to us in one year saying that they absolutely must have full funding for the following fiscal year?

Mr. STARK. Mr. Chairman, you only have my assurance, believing as I do and having heard from my State of California and several others. Having worked on the phaseout provisions of my bill, this particular Congressperson doesn't care to come back to you and redo it.

I think the States had better get the message. You won't be bothered by us again if they don't.

Mr. EILBERG. I might say that I accept your word and your integrity, but I dare say there will be others popping up in your place.

Do you believe that the Humphrey formula is sufficient to meet the needs of the refugees and the States?

Mr. STARK. Certainly while one never likes to accept a lower compromise so early in the negotiations, but if that were proposed by the chairman, please don't stand between me and the microphone while I come up to accept, as Senator Humphrey would say.

Mr. EILBERG. I anticipated that. Mr. Stark, you know that the administration bill is based on actual costs. Your bill uses fiscal 1978 as a base year for the computation of percentage of reimbursements to the States for fiscal 1979 and fiscal 1980.

Would you please clarify why you feel this is necessary? What is wrong with the administration approach, that is, actual costs involved, rather than using fiscal 1978, as the base year for your percentage?

Mr. STARK. Based on our cost experience over the past several years, it makes sense to use fiscal 1978 as a base period.

Mr. EILBERG. The administration's bill, as I said, did not include this provision. I wonder if this provision adequately takes into consideration the migration of refugees from State to State and whether this provision would lock States into an outdated reimbursement formula?

Would you please try to explain that?

Mr. STARK. I wonder if the chairman would permit my assistant, Mr. Simon, to address that question?

Mr. EILBERG. Yes. Would you identify him?

Mr. STARK. He is Neil Simon.

Mr. SIMON. Mr. Chairman, that provision was put into the Stark bill due to a technical problem encountered in trying to design an effective phasedown of IRAP.

The reason that only 17 States will be able to provide services under the administration program is that States would be required to make up a share of the cost and only those 17 States have general assistance programs. Under the administration proposal they would have to make up 25 percent of the cost in fiscal year 1978. But lacking GA programs, 33 States don't have the statutory authority to contribute this 25 percent, so we were faced with the problem of how we could phase down the program while allowing all States to continue operating IRAP. It seemed that the most equitable way to resolve this problem was to base the phase-down percentages on a period during which 100-percent funding was continued.

In fact there will be a problem in migration. That is something we have to recognize. Hopefully, however, over the next year things will settle down a bit more if all States are able to continue their programs. If they cannot, refugees will move to the areas where they could get benefits, such as California.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Stark, today is September 27 and the target date for adjournment, as we know, is October 21, and it may be October 27, 28; but in any event, as we proceed to move this legislation, it has to go through markup here, through our full committee, the Rules Committee, the floor, conference committee. Realistically, we have a real time crunch here and I don't know that it is physically possible for us to do the kind of job that we want to do, and therefore I ask you what is your position on a 6-month extension of the refugee assist-

ance program while we consider the various proposals concerning the future of this program?

Mr. STARK. Would that, Mr. Chairman, continue the funding at its present level; in other words, at 100 percent continuation?

Mr. EILBERG. This is just an idea and does not represent a commitment on our part.

Mr. STARK. It would certainly seem to me to be far preferable to having the program terminate.

Mr. EILBERG. It is not original with us. This idea has some support in the Senate as of this moment and we are exploring that. We would like to go through the channels—I am speaking in behalf of the subcommittee—but I don't know that time permits us.

Mr. STARK. I see the dilemma that the committee is in, and I certainly find no fault in the solution that you suggest.

Mr. EILBERG. You have talked about special projects, but as I read your bill nowhere does it mention special projects as did the original 1962 act, and as does the Humphrey proposal.

Is it your intent that special projects be funded?

Mr. STARK. In the original bill I believe that special projects were considered as part of the social services, so I assume they would continue under that heading.

Mr. EILBERG. You would want them to be, anyway?

Mr. STARK. Yes.

Mr. EILBERG. You have just made an assumption, but this leads to my next question: Do you believe it would be advisable to explicitly authorize funding for special projects in your bill and to authorize specific expenditures as does the Humphrey proposal?

Mr. STARK. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I certainly think that would improve on it.

Mr. EILBERG. Would you say that the continuation of the special projects funding is the most important difference between your bill and the administration's proposal, or is it the amount of reimbursement for fiscal 1978?

Mr. STARK. I think those are equal points. Obviously, the elimination of the special projects social services, causes me great concern but I think they are both vital to the bill and I would hesitate to put them in order.

Mr. EILBERG. Senator Humphrey's proposal eliminates the special category of funding which you create for the new 15,000 parolees. Could you comment on the significance of this?

Mr. STARK. I suspect that it is just a question of not taking them into consideration. But I am unsure about this and cannot speak for the Senator.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Fish?

Mr. FISH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Stark, welcome. If I ask questions that have been answered already, please say so.

Mr. STARK. Thank you.

Mr. FISH. I am sorry I wasn't here for your main presentation.

One of the differences between your bill with respect to cash assistance and the administration's is the level of first-year funding under the continuation. You ask for, as Mr. Humphrey does, 100 percent. The administration's is 75 percent.

Why do you feel 100 precent funding during the coming fiscal year is necessary?

Mr. STARK. We dealt with that, Mr. Fish, but to repeat, all but 17 States would be unable to continue benefits during fiscal year 1978 because procedurally they couldn't make up that difference having no authority to do so. The administration's proposal would really work a hardship on the people in those 33 States.

Mr. FISH. I am glad to have those figures because during the administration testimony last week they didn't know how many States were not set up.

On the matter of special projects, I think we see eye to eye. It is appalling that the administration bill is zero for that. Their witness testified last Friday that the refugees should be treated as other U.S. residents and should compete for existing funds.

How do you respond to that?

Mr. STARK. The refugees came here in an unusual and unexpected manner. Without addressing issues such as Asian language problems as opposed to the European language problems and the different rates of assimilation, we must recognize that this group of people were dislocated by a tremendously devastating war and it was an incredibly quick uprooting. Overnight they became poor, unemployed, and illiterate, when they previously were for the most part employed, very literate, and often professional people. They came to this socioeconomic state in exceptional circumstances. They were put into the States by the Federal Government, and I think we have a responsibility to help the States assist these people.

Mr. FISH. Finally, quite outside of the act that we are considering is the Indochina Refugee Children's Assistance Act, Public Law 94–405, and this was mentioned by the HEW witness last week because $10.25 million would be awarded this month.

Do you know where this fits into the total problem? Does it give us any leeway as we consider the extension?

Mr. STARK. No, Mr. Fish, I do not know. We did not deal with that in our bill, and I cannot answer that.

Mr. FISH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Stark, you know that this afternoon on today's suspension calendar we have a bill which would adjust the status of the parolees that we are talking about here this morning to that of permanent resident aliens, and I know we are going to have your support.

Mr. STARK. You can count on that.

Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I was going to make the same observation, because so much of what Mr. Stark testified in terms of the problem, underemployment, we hope we will address with adjustment status.

We are the second suspension this afternoon, H.R. 7769, and hope you are on the floor and participate.

Mr. EILBERG. We invite your participation on that.

Mr. STARK. Thank you. I will be there.

Mr. EILBERG. We are grateful to you for your testimony and your meaningful contribution, and I hope we will come out with the best possible approach.

Mr. STARK. I am sure the chairman and the committee will, and I again want to thank you and your staff for dealing with this problem, with sensitivity, understanding and patience. Thank you for letting me be here.

Mr. EILBERG. Thank you very much.

Mr. SIMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EILBERG. Next is Mr. Stanley B. Breen, chairman, of the Coalition for the Effective Resettlement of Indochinese Refugees.

Mr. Breen, we are glad to welcome you, and I know at least one of your other guests very well, but would you introduce them all?

**TESTIMONY OF STANLEY B. BREEN, CHAIRMAN, COALITION FOR THE EFFECTIVE RESETTLEMENT OF INDOCHINESE REFUGEES; ACCOMPANIED BY NORMAN LOURIE, EXECUTIVE DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR FEDERAL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES; HUONG LESI, COORDINATOR OF VOLUNTEER SERVICES FOR UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE; AND NANCY NICALO, DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION SERVICES, CHURCH WORLD SERVICES**

Mr. BREEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman; Norman Lourie, on my left, who is deputy director, Federal programs, for the State of Pennsylvania; Huong Lesi, who is a recent American citizen from Vietnam, and she is coordinator of voluntary programs, State of West Virginia; Mrs. Nancy Nicalo, who is the director of immigration services for Church World Services.

Mr. EILBERG. Before you begin, I would like to acknowledge, and I hope all in the room will forgive me for this personal reference, but this Member began his legislative career when he was elected to the State house of representatives in Pennsylvania in 1954. At that time the man seated to your left, Mr. Lourie, was deputy secretary of welfare for the State of Pennsylvania, and from the moment of my arrival up to the present time he has been my close friend; and it is nice to have you here, Norman Lourie, and may you be functioning as vigorously and as eagerly as you have done over the years.

Mr. LOURIE. Thank you.

Mr. BREEN. Mr. Chairman, when I was in graduate school at the University of Chicago, I used some of Mr. Lourie's writings and research for my studies I am well acquainted with him for many years.

Mr. Chairman, I have a letter I would like to put in the record, from a congressional delegation in Minnesota, six Congressman who have supported the extension of the program.

Mr. EILBERG. Without objection, it will be made part of the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
*Washington, D.C., September 27, 1977.*

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE: We want to express our deep concern about the issue you are currently considering: assistance for

Indochinese refugees. The several bills pending before your subcommittee offer varying approaches to the funding of such assistance and we know you will weigh these proposals with great care. Our concern is that a continuing resolution will be necessary for assistance to continue while this consideration is going forward. and the nature of that continuing resolution is of great importance to Minnesota.

There are approximately 4,500 Indochinese refugees in Minnesota—a disproportionately large number in comparison to most other states. Compared with other states, a larger proportion of these refugees are employed than elsewhere and a smaller proportion are receiving public assistance. The fact remains, however, that most of them are benefiting from social services and support services of some description as they resettle. While our state government recognizes the inevitability of a phase-down of the federal share of support for this program, it is unprepared to deal with the kind of immediate cut-back that will occur within the next ten days unless this subcommittee acts quickly and with due concern for the impact of its actions.

If federal assistance is cut back drastically at present, Minnesota will be confronted with an added $1 million financial burden in fiscal year 1978 for welfare payments. Furthermore, nearly half of the refugees will not be eligible for assistance through the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program and will have to be helped through General Assistance funds. The State Department of Public Welfare informs us that they will simply have to end social services to these people if they are forced to meet this burden without continued major federal help in the coming fiscal year.

We believe a most acceptable and sensible course of action has been proposed by our colleague from California, Mr. Stark. The phase-down embodied in his proposal would allow states to continue support services and social services at the current level during fiscal year 1978. They will have time to plan for and adjust to the phase-down that will follow. This is only fair. If we refuse them this transition period, the lives of thousands of refugees trying to make new lives for themselves in this country will have the rug pulled out from under them—again. We hope you will not put the states in the position of having to reduce or end the services that attempt to make their resettlement in this country a successful one.

We urge you to accept the Stark proposal.

Sincerely,

RICHARD NOLAN,
ARLAN STANGELAND,
BRUCE F. VENTO,
DONALD M. FRASER,
JAMES L. OBERSTAR,
ALBERT H. QUIE,
*Member of Congress.*

Mr. BREEN. Mr. Chairman, I have a letter addressed to you, sir, from the Governor of the State of Minnesota. It is very brief. If I may, I will read it.

Mr. EILBERG. Please do.

Mr. BREEN [reading]. "Representative Joshua Eilberg, chairman House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, 2135 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C. Dear Representative Eilberg: I am sorry I cannot be present to testify at your hearings on September 27, 1977, but I had an important prior commitment. However, please be assured that I strongly support the Humphrey/Kennedy/Cranston/Stark legislation which provides for a 3-year phase down of the Indo-Chinese refugee assistance program. Continuation of this program is vital after September 30, as without it we cannot continue the very effective programs and services to the refugees in Minnesota.

"Mr. Stanley B. Breen, director of the Indo-Chinese Resettlement Office in Minnesota, will testify in behalf of my office and I look for-

ward to a positive action by your subcommittee. Very truly yours, Rudy Perpich, Governor".

Mr. Chairman, I have written testimony for members of the committee. Rather than read it, I would like, if I may, sir, to speak extemporaneously.

Mr. EILBERG. Without objection your statement will be made part of the record.

[The prepared statement of Stanley B. Breen follows:]

STATEMENT OF STANLEY B. BREEN, CHAIRMAN OF THE COALITION FOR THE EFFECTIVE RESETTLEMENT OF INDOCHINESE REFUGEES

As Chairman of the Coalition for the Effective Resettlement of Indochinese Refugees, I would like to express to the members of the House Subcommittee on Refugees and Immigration the Coalition's view on legislation extending the Indochina Migration & Refugee Assistance Act. The Coalition for the Effective Resettlement of Indochinese Refugees consists of more than 130 representatives of state, local and voluntary organizations throughout the United States. It represents all the major voluntary agencies responsible for resettlement, the 28 states in which 90 percent of the Indochinese reside, as well as county and private agencies who are closely involved in resettlement activities.

Over the last several months, members of the Coalition have worked closely with representatives of the Department of Health, Education, & Welfare, the State Department, the White House, and members of Congress to insure effective implementation of policies and legislation affecting the Indochinese refugees. We are, therefore, pleased that the Administration has recently requested legislation which would extend funding for certain portions of the Indochina Refugee Assistance Program (IRAP). This displays much needed attention to a problem which will not go away if we were to simply ignore it.

However, we have some very strong reservations about the content of the Administration bill. In its present form, the Administration proposal represents both bad policy—in that it perpetuates the welfare syndrome—and unequal administration—since only a minority of states could participate in the program.

The current refugee assistance program provides a comprehensive set of services, including social services, bilingual mental health counseling, employment and training programs, cash assistance, and medical assistance, which are designed to provide economic support to the refugees while they help the refugees acquire the tools for self-sufficiency.

The essential features which can aid the Indochinese in obtaining and upgrading employment, such as supportive social services, counseling, and training projects, would be eliminated under the Administration proposal. The Administration's bill provides only for cash and medical assistance for those refugees not eligible for AFDC and Medicaid, with temporary additional assistance to Indochinese refugees who arrived after August 31, 1977. Only a portion of these limited cash and medical services would be federally funded: 75 percent in fiscal year 1978, 50 percent in fiscal year 1979, and 25 percent in fiscal year 1980. Because no supportive services or employment and mental health projects would be funded, the Administration proposal breeds dependency by handing out a welfare check without providing an incentive and a mechanism for breaking the welfare cycle.

Unfortunately, the ongoing programs designed to reduce dependency among the general population cannot adequately provide the needed services. The Work Incentive program, which provides jobs and training to AFDC recipients, is not available to those receiving Indochina Refugee Assistance. The CETA program is of little use in the resettlement effort, since the Indochinese were not an identified service group when most prime sponsors were establishing their priorities in using limited funds. Nearly all Title XX service agencies are currently spending all of the available funds and therefore cannot provide comprehensive services to refugees without reducing vital services elsewhere (even if they had the bilingual capacity to deal with this group). English language instruction provided in Adult Education programs will aid in the long-range assim-

ilation of the refugee population but cannot have the immediate impact upon employment which comprehensive placement and training programs can have.

Programs which have proven themselves to be effective would be abandoned under the Administration proposal just at the time when they are beginning to produce substantial results. In 1976 HEW realized that existing resources were not adequate to reduce the high rate of welfare dependency among the Indochinese. Employment and training and mental health projects were therefore funded to meet the special needs of the refugees. Most of these began functioning in January of 1977 when the unemployment rate among the Indochinese was 13 percent. Six months later, a survey revealed an Indochinese unemployment rate of only 7.9 percent. While not all of the improvement can be attributed to the success of the special projects, it is clear that the concentrated efforts of the state and local governments and the voluntary agencies is having a substantial impact. The experience and resources of these projects will be lost without the supportive services and project funds necessary to maintain the programs to their successful completion.

The bill which the Subcommittee is currently considering is further hampered by administrative problems. The greatest of these is that most states do not have state-administered general assistance programs which meet the needs of unemployed refugees who are not eligible for AFDC. The Administration bill calls for a partial reimbursement for costs incurred. However, only 17 states have statewide general assistance programs which would authorize them to expend funds for this purpose. Some of these programs provide benefit levels as low as $30 per month. Since the reduction in federal funds would begin immediately, the states would have no opportunity to pass legislation to provide matching funds and would therefore be excluded from the program. The local taxpayers and the refugees would then bear the full weight of a cessation of federal funds for refugee relief. Those states which were able to continue to provide adequate services would find themselves inundated by an influx of new refugees. Internal migration is already hampering resettlement efforts as the Indochinese congregate in a few heavily impacted areas and this trend would be accelerated. The more gradual reduction of funding and the block grant approach of the Humphrey-Kennedy-Cranston-Stark measure would give the states considerable flexibility in their efforts to aid refugees within reasonable fiscal limits.

The reduction in services contained in the Administration bill would create substantial problems for affected refugees, voluntary agencies, and state and local governments. And while it would appear to reduce federal spending for this project, it would substantially increase the real burden upon the taxpayers who would have to fund long-term support for those who remain economically dependent.

The Coalition, therefore, recommends that several essential features, similar to those contained in bills introduced by Congressman Stark and Senators Humphrey and Kennedy, be incorporated into the Administration bill. These minimum requirements should include:

Continued funding for social services and special employment and mental health projects;

Uniformity of treatment among the states. This would be accomplished by providing 100 percent funding for current programs during the first year so that states would have time to seek supplemental funds through their legislators, and by providing funds on a block grant basis in the second and third years of the phase-out;

A planned phase-out of funding so that federal participation will be terminated at the end of three years.

These features would create the framework for a clear phase-out of special services so that neither the refugees nor the state and local taxpayers are unfairly burdened. It also provides a clear termination date so that the program is not continued indefinitely.

As I indicated at the beginning of this presentation, the Coalition has been seeking continued help for the Indochinese refugees for many months. However, the deficiencies in the current Administration proposal are so great that most of the Coalition members would actually oppose passage of the bill in its present form. This bill does not represent a reasonable compromise between those who would like to continue full federal funding indefinitely and those who seek to

reduce federal spending. It is a palliative which does not meet any of the real needs of the Indochinese or the American taxpayers.

Mr. EILBERG. I might comment, having read the statement, it is extraordinarily good, and obviously you know what you are talking about.

Mr. BREEN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. EILBERG. That is not to say that I yet favor any point of view. Our purpose here at this moment is entirely to get the facts.

Mr. BREEN. Yes, sir. I hope when the facts are known, the subcommittee will support some of this point of view.

The Coalition for the Effective Resettlement of Indochinese Refugees is a coalition of approximately 28 States, all of the major voluntary agencies, religious agencies. We got together in March of this year at our first meeting to talk about the Indochinese resettlement effort and the problems and some of the benefits.

I must say, sir, it was very gratifying to hear you say at the beginning your outrage at the administration putting this bill in 2 weeks ago. We have continuously met with the administration, top level officials at the White House and HEW, and they have continuously supported our proposal, our phasedown, our judicious, responsible approach, and we don't understand what happened in the intervening time.

We know they had time to get a proposal on much earlier and we are surprised and disappointed.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Breen, I might also add that our meeting last week with the administration officials was of lesser quality than it should have been in terms of answers not provided.

Mr. BREEN. The coalition, sir, when we first met, had 28 States and the private agencies, as I mentioned, and I might say the differences were oceanic, in that every State had its own point of view, every private agency might have had a point of view, and we coalesced and worked for 3 days at that time and agreed on a compromise statement which was submitted to some of your staff, was submitted to HEW, and the White House.

We met with the White House. We pointed out to them that we thought we were being responsible in that we were supporting a proposal that was cost effective, and that the administration bill, we believe, after much research, breeds dependency, and if the administration bill survives, what will happen is, an average of 34 percent of the refugees now on welfare will continue for many, many years, because the administration bill contains nothing, absolutely nothing, that will help these refugees get off of welfare.

The unemployment rate among refugees today is 7.9 percent as submitted by the congressional report of HEW in June of this year. At that time 7.9 percent is very little above the national average of unemployment by the other citizens of this country. However, the welfare rate is very high because although the unemployment rate is low, they are underemployed and are receiving supplemental payments such as medicaid, food stamps, and things like that.

You raised the question, very appropriate question, during Congressman Stark's testimony, doesn't this create a double standard in that refugees can go on the programs that other citizens have and if we

continue the refugee program extension, isn't that giving them something that other citizens of the country do not have?

Sir, they cannot be involved to any great extent in the CETA program because they are not identified as a service group, when most prime sponsors established their priorities in using limited funds and those funds are used up.

The work incentive program, which provides training, jobs and training to AFDC recipients, is not available to those receiving Indochina refugee assistance.

Title XX, which is for the service agencies, is at its top for most of the States throughout the country. For instance, I am familiar in Minnesota we have no funds in title XX.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Breen, would you hold?

Mr. FISH. I think you are making an important point and just so it is clear on this issue of why the CETA program is of little use, you spoke of the fact the Indochinese were not an identified service group at the time most prime sponsors were establishing their priorities.

Would you elaborate on this? These are terms of art I am not familiar with.

Mr. BREEN. The CETA program, Congressman Fish—the competition for CETA slots is very fierce, especially in urban areas, and CETA sponsors have been more responsive to "the traditional disadvantaged" groups since they aren't refugees.

Second, almost all of the CETA skill training program is conducted through vocational education facilities and then they insist on high entry level skills, good English, minimum sixth or eighth grade reading level, and many of them insist on high school graduate skills. The refugees, because of the language barriers, cannot qualify for CETA programs.

Mr. EILBERG. Will the gentleman yield for a minute?

Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt and ask unanimous consent that we could have this committee hearing covered by photography and by still cameras?

Mr. EILBERG. Without objection, that motion is granted.

Forgive us, Mr. Breen.

Mr. BREEN. In title XX, Congressman Fish and Mr. Chairman, at least 40 of the 50 States have reached their spending limit, which means they have no money left to provide specifically for refugees. In addition to that, it requires an established agency to request funds. The requests are competitive. In addition to that, it is unlikely that an established agency will take the chance of asking for funds for refugees when they could ask for the same funds for the traditional population and have a better chance of being funded.

So what we have is refugees that are getting jobs but are underemployed, and the administration provides no incentive to get them off of welfare. A little later I will ask Mrs. Huong Lesi to make a very brief statement about how refugees feel about welfare.

Mr. EILBERG. I hope you bear in mind we are anxious to get to the floor for that bill that would permit the adjustment of status.

Mr. BREEN. I will be very brief and summarize.

You also mentioned, Mr. Chairman, about different programs for different States. One of the problems with the administration bill is that it does not allow uniformity of spending because some States are locally funded for general assistance programs, some are State and local, and some are State.

The funding of 100 percent for next year and then the phase down will permit States to provide legislation, and you raised the question, again very appropriately, sir, about how do we know what the States will do? I can tell you that most of the States that I have been in contact with as chairman of this coalition are already talking about that.

The initial 2½ years that was pulled out by the administration was an arbitrary figure. We know it takes longer than that to resettle people, especially with the language problems and type of problems Congressman Stark referred to.

We feel we have been doing an outstanding job, as Michigan has. I am familiar with that program, with what Minnesota has done, what Wisconsin has done, and many States. Iowa has a marvelous program. We think we have done a good job. A statement was made by the State Department with regard to my testimony to the Senate committee. They thanked us for our commitment.

I raised the question, What good is commitment without resources; you can have all the commitment in the world if you don't have resources.

I would like to close, and open it up for questions, and if there are very technical questions, I may refer to Mr. Lourie who has a lot of expertise in this area; but we honestly believe that the administration proposal—these are my words now—is a sham, because it does nothing except breed welfare. It is not cost effective. There is no good social planning.

Our coalition position was derived from much argument, much compromise, much research, our working together with the highest levels of government, and many in the coalition believe that absolutely no program will be better than the administration program because it is a palliative; it is Pablum.

I am certainly not an expert on congressional matters and how Congress works; however, we would hope there could be some kind of continuing resolution or support for some funding while the legislation is being brought about in the best possible wisdom of Congress. I know this will take some time because of the lateness of the administration proposal.

Thank you very much.

Mr. EILBERG. Thank you very much, Mr. Breen.

Mr. Breen, if given a choice between the Stark and Humphrey-Kennedy bills, which would your organization support?

Mr. BREEN. There isn't a great deal of difference in the bills. It's 75 and 50. We would probably support the Kennedy position because there are more funds in social services and special projects, even though the phase-down is faster.

I also am in agreement with a fast phase down, because, certainly, the coalition felt we did not want to support a fiasco that would continue

funding for many, many years. That is why we thought we were being responsible. If it's 100, 60, and 30, the States know by the end of the third year they better take over the programs 100 percent on their own, and the coalition has agreed we are not going to come in and ask for any more funds, and we in the coalition have 90 percent of the revenues and the people that represent the coalition.

Mr. EILBERG. If given a choice between the administration bill and nothing, what would be the position of your organization?

Mr. BREEN. We never really took that position. A number of us feel strongly that the administration bill cannot be pushed on the American public because it isn't a real attempt at solving a problem, and sometimes one must blow the whistle and say this doesn't make sense. We would rather have nothing and there are a lot of us who feel that way.

Mr. EILBERG. You would rather have nothing?

Mr. BREEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. EILBERG. That is pretty strong language.

Mr. BREEN. Yes, sir. I don't believe I can be any stronger in saying the administration position is a sham.

Mr. EILBERG. Did I understand you correctly that if we are not able to explore this legislation in as great detail as we would like, that you would favor a 6-month continuing resolution at current funding levels?

Mr. BREEN. I don't know if it has to be 6 months, sir. I think we need, I don't know if it's possible, if a continuing resolution can be written so it continues until legislation is passed. That is what I would prefer, that it continues until the legislation authorization is passed.

Mr. EILBERG. We have had some indication by some State and local officials that the coalition does not fully represent their position with regard to the various proposals under consideration. Can you comment in your representative capacity as chairman of the Coalition for the Effective Resettlement of Indochinese Refugees, does your organization represent the views of all 28 States which have joined the coalition?

Mr. BREEN. There are elements in all of the States that would disagree with us, and I think it's a disagreement, just on degree. The State of California has stated, and in Senate testimony, they would like 100 percent for 3 years. Most of the people in the coalition, again being responsible citizens and professionals, feel that is asking too much, and we should have a phase-down, so the States can take over. There are some who feel, there are some States in the coalition that might have 200 refugees in their States, and it's a small number to work with, and they don't feel they need anything. But those States that represent the major population in the coalition, and I can go through the list by saying Texas, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Louisiana, Washington, Illinois.

Mr. EILBERG. That won't be necessary.

Mr. BREEN. The major States do support the position of the coalition that have most of the refugees.

Mr. EILBERG. I am concerned with the degree of support within the States for your position; can you comment on that?

Mr. BREEN. The degree of support within the States?

Mr. EILBERG. Yes.

Mr. BREEN. I would say it's 90 percent within the States. The 90 percent of professionals support our position; most of the Governors support our position. I have received correspondence from Governors and their executive staffs. There are a few States, again, who want 100 percent funding for 3 years, but when we took a vote at the first coalition meeting they agreed on the compromise, even though they still may want 100 percent.

Mr. EILBERG. You mentioned California. Are there any other differences between the views which you have expressed and the views of the State of California and the various counties in California?

Mr. BREEN. The various counties feel very strongly about 100 percent for the next year. They feel they must have 100 percent because their general assistance programs are locally funded, based on property tax, and they have no authority to raise the property tax, thus, the refugees through general assistance would drop down severely. It would cost the State of California, naturally, because they have most of the refugees, more than any other State in the country, about $40 million. In my opinion, they would like 100 percent for 3 years. We disagree with that position and the counties are the ones pushing that position, Los Angeles County and other counties, while I believe the State has supported our position.

Mr. EILBERG. Is it your impression Mr. Stark testified to that effect? I don't recall his saying that.

Mr. BREEN. No. Mr. Stark, I think, took again the most responsible position saying that there should be a phase down, and again, in my personal opinion, the State could live with a phase down. But there are some counties in California that want 100 percent.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Fish?

Mr. FISH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Breen, for your testimony. I will be very brief.

On this issue of our continuing resolution, because I hope that the choice is not between the administration bill and nothing, but at least a continuing resolution to keep things as they are until we do decide what to do, the problem I see with the continuing resolution is it would not cover the 15,000 refugees or the boat cases that are being permitted under conditional entry this month and next month and the month after.

How would those people be taken care of, in your judgment?

Mr. BREEN. I would defer that to Mr. Wells Klein, who will testify on behalf of the agencies. But a continuing resolution, I believe, would just be for a short period of time, if it's tied to the authorization and appropriation of legislation.

Mr. FISH. Second, I wonder if you could tell us or name a witness who can tell where the Indochinese Children's Assistance Act, Public Law 94–405, fits into this picture? We had testimony last Friday by HEW that in excess of $10 million would be awarded this month to that program. [See App. 4 at pp. 176, 180 for further information on P.L. 94–405.]

Mr. BREEN. This is a sticky question, sir. The children, we don't believe—and the coalition continuously need funds for education—the children under 16, especially young adolescents and elementary age, are doing very well. They have assimilated very well. In most cases this money, in the past, has gone for expanding existing adult basic education classes to accommodate the refugees. No new curriculum has been developed.

Mr. FISH. I am sorry; are you saying in most cases the money is going for adult education?

Mr. BREEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. FISH. What money, the $10 million?

Mr. BREEN. The $10.2 million.

Mr. FISH. The Indochinese Refugee Children's Assistance Act is going for the adult education program?

Mr. BREEN. I thought you said the new appropriation of $10.2 million.

Mr. FISH. Under the Indochinese Refugee Children's Assistance Act, which separate from what you are——

Mr. BREEN. I believe the money was for the past fiscal year. I don't believe there is new money for next fiscal year under that.

Mr. FISH. The impression I got was it had just been awarded. My assumption is because of the very name of the legislation, that it is directed at children, and is not going to meet the problem that concerns you and me of underemployment because of difficulties in language of adults. But I would like someone to testify to that effect.

Mr. EILBERG. Is Mr. Klein informed on that subject?

This is Mr. Wells Klein, vice chairman of the Committee on Migration and Refugee Affairs, American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service.

Mr. KLEIN. As I understand it, Mr. Congressman, there are two pots of money, one for children, which is, as I understand it, to supplement the school systems impacted States, and that is about $18 million; I am not sure of the title on this.

There is an additional sum of $10.2 million which is designed to deal with some of the projects or some of the concerns that we have for the self-sufficiency of the refugees.

Those projects have not yet been let or are just being let now, and we don't know a great deal about them.

However, based on the track record of $5 million, which was let in 1976, under a similar program, frankly nobody can see any benefit that came out of those.

The $10.2 million, as I understand it, is going basically for adult basic education.

Now, adult basic education is not geared to the non-English speaking person. In addition, it's going for vocational education, but most of the vocational education programs that we have, these are existing programs that will be funded additionally to assist Vietnamese refugees, but most of the adult education vocational education programs that we have, I think there is only one that is established for Vietnamese at this point. Most of them, and properly so, are designed for Spanish-speaking clientele, so essentially, although we don't know

what the projects are yet, essentially, we are concerned that this money is not going to be tied into the work that has already taken place in dealing with the problems of the Vietnamese population.

Mr. FISH. Mr. Klein, then, as I understand it, there are approximately 62 vocational and education training programs in 39 States.

Mr. KLEIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. FISH. Does this money, this $10.2 million, under Public Law 94–405, would it go into the continuation of those programs?

Mr. KLEIN. No, sir. It is quite separate from that.

Mr. BREEN. That money is being given to educational systems, boards of education, school districts. There were no geographic limitations, there is very little monitoring of that money.

Mr. FISH. Is that your understanding?

Mr. KLEIN. Yes.

Mr. BREEN. It would go to adult vocational education, and that is for refugees who already speak English, to upgrade them. Those who are illiterate, most of whom are on welfare, will receive no help from that.

Mr. KLEIN. May I say one other thing, Mr. Fish? It's unfortunate, but as far as we can tell, the allocation of the $10.2 million bears no relationship to the special project funding that you just mentioned of the 62 ongoing projects. As far as I know, and I am on the outside, there was very little coordination between the Office of Education and the task force, and we do know that there was no coordination between the Office of Education and the voluntary agencies on this, so you have two separate thrusts, and one of which we have some serious question about how effective it will be in immediate terms.

Mr. FISH. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Hall?

Mr. HALL. I have no questions.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Sawyer?

Mr. SAWYER. I have no questions.

Mr. EILBERG. Going on, Mr. Breen, your position on the continuation of support for services and special projects has been made quite clear. In addition, you support a 100 percent reimbursement for fiscal year 1978, with possible block grant funding in the second and third years of a phaseout formula.

Can you comment in detail on these proposals and describe the relative importance of each of these proposals?

Mr. BREEN. Yes, sir. The 100-percent funding is vital to give the States time to prepare for the phasedown, and to develop legislation so they can pick up costs.

The block grants and the type of human service projects that have been funded, vocational training, educational training, job placement, for instance, in Minnesota, sir, we have placed 317 refugees, 265 in jobs, and I believe it's 52 in training programs.

As of September 30, as of Friday, I have been informed by our welfare department that three people have been doing that, a Vietnamese assistant, an employment developer in my office, and our secretary are through. They cannot stay after this Friday, and thus the supervision over those 317 people, the relationship with the Gover-

nors—and we have been affected because we have been at the highest level of a State government—ceases. I don't know what is going to happen, to be very honest.

Block grants are good in the sense that they are competitive, and programs that are effective such as Grand Rapids, Mich., such as some of the programs in Iowa, Pennsylvania and Minnesota, will continue, because those programs will continue, hopefully, to be good.

The very essence of the successful resettlement of Indochinese refugees has been those human services programs that have taken them off welfare.

Mr. EILBERG. The administration bill provides a separate treatment for those refugees already here, and those coming under the new 15,000 parole program. Do you believe that separate treatment is justified from a reimbursement standpoint from the standpoint of providing necessary services to the refugees?

Mr. BREEN. Yes. I believe, especially, there should be a differential, but I believe you can't do the whole job in 2½ years. The first year, that is 1978, it will be the same. Then, I believe we must have a sharp phasedown for those that have been here for 3½ years at that time, but the new refugees should then continue on a program for, say, 2 years.

The added incentive for having some differences is that we have experience now, we have knowledge, we have trained people sitting out there, and if the program ends September 30, even if it ends for 1 month and then is continued, these people are out, they are looking for new jobs, and I don't know if we can reinvent the wheel.

This way we have the new refugees coming in getting 100 percent for 2 years, or whatever it might be, as Congress decides, the refugees that have been here getting it for 1 more, the States developing legislation to phase it down while continuing those effective programs that take them off of welfare, and eventually you reach a togetherness in 3 years or so where maybe only 5 percent of the refugees or 10 percent are on welfare instead of 35 or 40 percent that will be under the administration plan.

The problem with the administration plan is they do nothing for it, do absolutely nothing for those that are here already.

Mr. LOURIE. If I may, Mr. Chairman, one of the major differences between this group and other groups that have been absorbed in the United States is the fact that this group, particularly this group, did not have an ethnic community to welcome and help to absorb them, backed up by finances and services. I think that the voluntary agencies in this country are remarkable in the fact that I know that they have stretched themselves way beyond the Federal dollar. I think the States will do the same, as soon as they reach the point, as other groups in the United States, that these folks are part of the system.

I think the bill you are going to be dealing with this afternoon will go a long way in making the States feel comfortable about their taking on this group as belonging to them.

Mr. EILBERG. Finally, Mr. Breen, I know you and your organization have been concerned with the internal migration of Indochinese refu-

gees during the last year. Can you comment on this particular subject as it relates to the State of Minnesota and the State of California?

Mr. BREEN. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, those States that have the highest general assistance costs and statewide costs, which would include Pennsylvania, California, Illinois, and internal migration, will go to those States. This provides a real dichotomy for the refugees, because some of the States that have the better general assistance programs are also in the colder climate.

One of the interesting things that has happened in internal migration, we have had about 300 refugees in the past year go from Minnesota to California, but they are coming back to Minnesota, and they are willing to freeze in Minnesota because the employment opportunities seem to be better than they are in California.

The State of Texas has no general assistance program. After September 30 they have no program for refugees whatsoever. There are between 10,000 and 15,000 refugees in the State of Texas. We think they are going to go to California, and they are going to go to Pennsylvania and New York and Illinois and Minnesota.

Mr. EILBERG. Will this internal movement continue regardless of the action that is taken on the pending legislation?

Mr. BREEN. If the legislation provides for the human services programs we have spoken about, sir, I don't believe it will, because they are in training programs, they have jobs, they have supportive services, and there will be some internal migration because of the new refugees coming in. One interesting thing that happened that Mr. Lourie referred to is they had no ethnic culture here in this country.

The 15,000 new ones that are coming in, or will come in, I guess, I don't understand how that is happening legislatively, but they will have the beginnings of an ethnic culture here in this country now. That will make a difference. They will tend to go to those States.

For instance, 150 came into San Francisco last Tuesday. Minnesota got 31. I will never forget the day I hired my Vietnamese assistant in September of 1975, and he said to me, it's really cold here, does it get colder, when it was about 65 degrees, and this is the coldest day we have in Vietnam. He had never been through a Minnesota winter, and literally many of the wives, many of the women, especially, did not go out of the house in the winter time. Now they are starting to have jobs, and now they are starting to move out, but they will go to those States that have the programs, and I think we will have a vast internal migration if the administration bill passes.

Mr. EILBERG. If it doesn't pass, will the problem be aggravated; what do you anticipate will happen as far as internal migration is concerned?

Mr. BREEN. That is a very difficult question to answer. I couldn't answer that. I think they will go to the warmer climates. That would be my guess.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Fish?

Mr. FISH. I am just trying to really clarify what I was after before, and I think we have it. I think sometime in early summer or late spring a supplemental appropriation bill for 1977 was passed, and in that, for elementary and secondary education, under title II of the

Indochinese Refugee Children's Assistance Act, $18.5 million was appropriated. This goes to State agencies.

Mr. BREEN. Right. I believe, sir, however, that was money that the States had already spent, and they were being reimbursed for fiscal year 1977. I don't think that is for 1978.

Mr. FISH. Is there any doubt on that?

Mr. BREEN. I am not positive. Am I correct? No, it is for 1978. But, again——

Mr. FISH. I think this appropriation was passed in the middle of this year in order to anticipate the school year starting in September of this year.

Mr. BREEN. I see.

Mr. FISH. I am sure that is correct.

Mr. BREEN. I don't believe the major problem is again with the children.

Mr. FISH. No. I am not trying to be argumentative. I am trying to get it down here.

The next part of that same supplemental appropriation dealt with title III of the Indochinese Refugee Children's Assistance Act, and allocated $10,250,000 for this purpose.

Now, let's look at title III, because it's really very broad. Title III is called: Adult Education Provision, and I am now reading from Public Law 94–405: It says here, after the few words in the beginning:

> Carry out a program of making grants to State and local education agencies for such years for the purpose of operating special adult education programs for Indochina refugees as defined in section 3 of the Indochina Migration Refugee Assistance Act;

which simply defined the categories of refugees.

> Such grants may be used for: (1) Programs of instruction for adult refugees in basic reading, mathematics, development, enhancement of necessary skills, and promotion of literacy among refugee adults.

and it goes on. It seems to me that is exactly what we are talking about here, and if we are right and this provision operates like the other provisions, title II, to be effective for the period starting now, which is what I said earlier, the money is just about to be funded.

Then, Mr. Chairman, it would seem that things are not going to come to a screeching halt on September 30 because of the operation of another act separate and apart from the one we are continuing extension of.

Mr. BREEN. Mr. Fish and Mr. Chairman——

Mr. FISH. I am hoping that is the case, so we have a little time.

Mr. BREEN. First of all, those funds have not been allocated yet. The States have not been informed who is getting the money and who is not. As I mentioned before, there is no geographical balance in that, there is no monitoring by State or local government through the Office of Education, and to be very honest, the way they have allocated those grants, we understand, leaves much to be desired. They didn't read half of them. They were rushed and nobody knows who is getting that money yet.

In addition to that, the funds are for adult basic education. Because of the special language problems of the Indochinese, the most that can be expected of the new grants is service to the refugees whose

language skills and educational background are sufficient to benefit from the adult basic education program.

They will not provide funds, in other words, they will provide some funds for those who are already working, but need upgrading. That is very important. However, it will not help the illiterate, the new arrivals or the refugees who have not gained any experience in the American job market, that is, the welfare recipients, who need the most help.

Mr. FISH. Mr. Breen, if that is the case, certainly you cannot read that into title III.

Mr. EILBERG. I think we will have to have staff check that out further. [See app. 4 at p. 176.]

Mr. BREEN. Fine.

Mr. FISH. It's not being interpreted by HEW correctly.

Mr. BREEN. Mr. Klein had one other statement on that, Mr. Fish.

Mr. EILBERG. We will get to Mr. Klein in a moment. I will give a very brief opportunity, recognizing the time constraints we have for each of your associates, if they would like to make a very brief statement. You have heard all that has gone before.

Is there anything special you want to say?

Mr. LOURIE. I would just like to emphasize the fact that the States do need the time of notification to prepare their own fiscal lives. Pennsylvania doesn't have the same kind of a problem as some of the other States, so I feel fairly free about discussing it. We have a statewide, state-funded, state-administered, general assistance program, and in the spirit of the Quaker State and the tradition that Benjamin Franklin left us, if all of the Federal programs run out, I assure you that the Vietnamese and other refugees would be cared for under our general assistance program.

Mr. EILBERG. Nevertheless, Governor Shapp has written to us. [See app. 5 at p. 210.]

Mr. LOURIE. That's right. Nevertheless, we still like the idea of having the Federal Government take what is its responsibility and we would like to put our legislature on notice that within a period of time we will be supporting this population 100 percent. I think it's fairer for the other States that do not have such a program.

Mr. EILBERG. May I have the name of the young lady again?

Mrs. LESI. I am Huong Lesi. I have a written statement.

[The prepared statement of Huong Lesi follows:]

STATEMENT BY HUONG LESI, MEMBER, STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE COALITION FOR THE EFFECTIVE RESETTLEMENT OF INDOCHINESE REFUGEES

It has been noted that while the unemployment rate is low for refugees, the percentage of refugees on welfare is high.

The low unemployment rate reflects the refugees' intense desire to work. There are also countless examples of lawyers working as dishwashers, PHDs working in fast food establishments, and so on, which further demonstrates that the refugees are desperate to work, and will accept just about any job.

The percentage of refugees on welfare reflects the fact that these jobs simply do not pay enough to support large Indochinese families. These jobs, however, are the only ones refugees can get, given our lack of English, our lack of skills marketable in the United States, and our lack of knowledge of the American job market. There is a tremendous need for programs which will provide language training, vocational education, and orientation in the American world of work, if the refugees are ever to break out of the circle of low-paying jobs and welfare.

We are aware that the Administration's bill does not allow for the funding of special projects for the Indochinese, on the grounds that it is time that the refugees take advantage of already-existing programs. We would like to point out that these programs are almost all designed for people who speak English, and therefore they cannot help us. We therefore urge Congress to provide for special projects for the Indochinese—projects which will help us solve our particular language and employment problems.

Mrs. LESI. I am a volunteer coordinator for the refugee Indochinese program, and I just want to present the experience in society of the Indochinese refugees.

Mr. EILBERG. Whom do you represent?

Mrs. LESI. The Indochinese refugee population.

Mr. EILBERG. Do you represent the entire United States?

Mrs. LESI. Most of the States around the West Virginia area.

Mr. EILBERG. Please proceed.

Mrs. LESI. We just want to point out that we are in desperate need of special projects for vocational and training for the refugees, because we have a lot of lawyers working as dishwashers in fastfood establishments, and so we are really in need for the special training to upgrade these professional people.

Mr. EILBERG. Thank you very much.

Would you like to say something? What is your name?

Mrs. NICALO. I am Nancy Nicalo from the Church World Service. I would just say that Mr. Breen has accurately summarized just what the coalition has been working on, and from the point of view of the voluntary agencies, I would say that the mix and match that we have worked with State and other agencies has been tremendous, and we now have an opportunity, based on experience, to key in on some of the major problems still remaining before this group.

I might say that as a woman, one of the groups that my agency is looking at are the problems of refugee women and their adjustment in the United States. Now, that is surfacing. For 2 years we were in an emergency, rush, pressure. Now we can do a good job.

Mr. BREEN. Mr. Chairman, may I make one short statement?

Mr. EILBERG. Yes, go ahead.

Mr. BREEN. This is the first time the church, voluntary, private, and State agencies have ever worked together on an immigration, refugee situation, and to my knowledge, from the people who have been in the field for many years, they have never been together like this. What we really need is an ongoing refugee policy that will take care of these problems so that we are not going in emergency situations every year with a new country or new situation, and I know Congress is working on that, and I know you are.

I, personally, as chairman of the coalition, commend that approach, but the emergency is September 30, and I do understand that special project funds could be under the continuing resolution, but without the continuing resolution I think we will have a major catastrophe amongst the Indochinese population in this country.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Breen, we want to thank you very much for your very major contribution, you and your coalition.

We appreciate your help, and we hope that our association will be a continuing one and that you will support us with whatever good legislation we bring to the floor.

Thank you very much.

Mr. BREEN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Wells Klein, vice chairman, Committee on Migration and Refugee Affairs, American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service.

We welcome you, and please identify your associates.

**TESTIMONY OF WELLS KLEIN, VICE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON MIGRATION AND REFUGEE AFFAIRS, AMERICAN COUNCIL OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES FOR FOREIGN SERVICE; ACCOMPANIED BY NANCY NICALO, CHURCH WORLD SERVICE; DONALD HOHL, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, MIGRATION AND REFUGEE SERVICES, U.S. CATHOLIC CONFERENCE; JEANNE MacDANIELS, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE**

Mr. KLEIN. If you have seen some of the faces before, it's because the voluntary agencies and the coalition, as Mr. Breen said, have been working very closely.

To my right is Donald Hohl, who is associate director of the Migration and Refugee Services of the U.S. Catholic Conference; to his right is Jeanne MacDaniels, regional director, the International Rescue Committee. To my left is Nancy Nicalo of Church World Service.

Mr. Chairman, we have a prepared statement which I believe you have. If you would like me to summarize it I will be glad to do that.

Mr. EILBERG. It would be just as well if you would do that, if you wish, and without objection the statement will be made a part of the record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Klein follows:]

STATEMENT OF WELLS KLEIN, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON MIGRATION AND REFUGEE AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN COUNCIL OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES FOR FOREIGN SERVICE

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, my name is Wells Klein, I serve as the Vice Chairman of the Committee on Migration and Refugee Affairs of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service. I am also the Executive Director of the American Council for Nationalities Service, one of the participants in the Indochinese resettlement program. The resettlement voluntary agencies joining me in this testimony are:

American Council for Nationalities Service.
American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees.
Church World Service.
HIAS.
International Rescue Committee.
Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service.
Migration and Refugee Services, U.S. Catholic Conference.
Tolstoy Foundation.

In the past 25 years nearly 2 million refugees have come to the United States, most of them with the assistance and sponsorship of the voluntary agencies which have a wide network of constituents throughout the country. The agencies' resettlement programs are linked to local churches, synagogues, social service

agencies and other organizations, reflecting the person-to-person concern of Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and nonsectarian agencies, a major segment of our citizenry.

With the takeover by the communists of established governments in Southeast Asia in 1975, approximately 145,000 Indochinese Refugees have been brought to the United States to enable them to establish a new life in a free society. Even as that movement continues albeit on a reduced scale, these deliberations are undertaken to provide the means to enable these refugees and those who follow to become fully self-supporting, contributing members of that society.

Due to the unexpected sudden collapse of the government of South Vietnam on April 30, 1975, it was not possible to plan or control the exodus of those who fled that country during those final days. Masses of people including American citizens were evacuated to temporary shelters throughout the Pacific including Guam and Wake Island. With the approach of the typhoon season it was necessary to have (in effect) a second evacuation, this time to hastily constructed or reactivated shelters, including tents at military facilities throughout the United States.

Unfortunately, that same atmosphere of urgency and emergency which affected many of the decisions in the movement to, and establishment of, the refugees in campsites on the mainland also prevailed within the Congress and the Administration when the enabling legislation was being considered. As a result, a basic error was made when the authorizing legislation provided for the termination of the program on September 30, 1977. The assumption was of course that these refugees could be fully integrated into our economy and society within that period of time. In the haste to provide funding to meet the immediate needs, little time was devoted to analyzing the long-term needs of this particular refugee population.

Had there been time prior to the fall to establish entry criteria and to admit the Indochinese of those bases, the period required for their resettlement undoubtedly would have been shortened. As we all know, however, there was little control over those who left and information as to the make-up of the refugee population was not available at the time decisions on their future were being made.

In addition, the Indochinese are of a culture entirely different from that of the United States—the family structure, mores, religion, language and even their food. Many refugees were unskilled and some were illiterate. A high number were women with dependent children separated in the evacuation from the head of the household.

In previous large-scale refugee resettlement programs where Germans, Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Cubans, etc. were brought to this country, it was possible to place them within their own ethnic communities where the resettlement process was naturally accelerated. The Indochinese had no such ethnic community in this country to which to turn, a factor which incidentally contributed to the movement of many of these refugees from the site of original placement, thus impeding permanent and effective resettlement.

Despite all these handicaps the Indochinese have made remarkable progress. According to the June 20, 1977 report of the HEW Task Force to the Congress, only 7.9 percent of the refugees in the work force were unemployed, compared to approximately 7 percent for our domestic work force in general. (We understand that the report which is due out this week will show that now 5.8 percent of the refugees in the work force are unemployed.) The report points out also that 36 percent of the refugees are receiving some type of cash assistance—to supplement their earnings. While that percentage is high, it indicates, however, that the refugees are not only eager to work but will and are taking menial, entry-level jobs to support themselves and their families.

We feel this brief review of the history of the Indochinese Program is necessary to bring into focus their basic needs, their progress and what we feel is required to further assist them down the road to self-sufficiency. To that end, we recommend that legislation be enacted which will include certain basic provisions.

*A. For the refugees now here*

(1) A planned phase-down during the next three years with continued funding during 1978 with 100 percent reimbursement to the states. It is essential that the funding for next year be at the 100 percent level. If it is any less, then only the

17 states which have wholly state-funded general assistance programs will have the funds to enable them to participate. The other 33 states have neither the authority nor the funds to continue assistance as at the present time. The funding at the 100 percent level is thus mandatory so that assistance can be granted the refugees during the coming year and to allow the states to pass the required legislation to permit them to participate in future years.

(2) That funding during 1979 and 1980 be reduced so that the states and counties can adjust to and, at the same time, assume responsibility for their needs.

(3) That funds be made available for social services and special projects such as job development, job counseling, and job upgrading, to enable those refugees presently in the work force to remain there and to provide the unemployed a means to "get off welfare." Counseling is urgently needed now and will continue to demand a high priority in counteracting the effects of culture shock, the difficulties experienced by professional persons who, for the most part, must depart from their area of expertise to undertake less skilled employment, for the former members of the military, especially the officers who must adjust to new employment in the civilian society and to offset some of the mental health problems which arise as a result of the separation of husbands from wives and children from parents. It is in these areas that the voluntary resettlement agencies not only have the expertise, but fill the void which exist in so many state or county programs. Without these types of projects, the refugee may lose the gains he has made and those presently unemployed will for the most part remain there.

*B. For new arrivals*

We urge support of this subcommittee in developing funding for the processing, transportation and resettlement assistance for the 15,000 additional refugees whose admission has been authorized.

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, we wish not only to recognize but to applaud the support you have given both individually and collectively in this humanitarian endeavor. Special mention should be made of the action taken by the subcommittee in reporting out H.R. 7769 providing for adjustment of status and our appreciation to Representative Fish, for having sponsored this important legislation. We wish also to take note of the excellent and cooperative relationships which have been developed between the voluntary agencies and the state and local governments, which have been unparalleled in the past. We—and may I include the federal and local public sectors as well—face this resettlement, not from a political standpoint, but as a welcome humanitarian endeavor in behalf of our fellow man.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KLEIN. I would like to state the testimony I am giving this morning is on behalf of the American Council for Nationalities Service; American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees; Church World Service; HIAS; International Rescue Committee; Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service; Migration and Refugee Services, U.S. Catholic Conference; and Tolstoy Foundation.

The testimony goes into some of the background of the refugee situation with which you are particularly well acquainted. We do talk some about the present situation, and the phenomenon that was discussed between yourself and administration witnesses last Friday and discussed again this morning, the phenomenon of a high level of work, a very clear work ethic among the refugee population, yet, a high level of reliance on cash assistance, which suggests a high level of underemployment.

The agencies have taken the position that the 100 percent funding the first year is critical, and we believe in a phasedown, we do not believe that we should be coming back to the Congress again if we can get a realistic phasedown.

We believe, as Mr. Breen and other witnesses have testified this morning, and Congressman Stark, that the special projects and the

social services are absolutely critical to the effective resettlement of this population.

We have not taken a position as agencies on the administration bill, but let me simply say that the administration bill does not contain any of the factors which we consider bottom line, and, therefore, we would have trouble supporting it.

Mr. EILBERG. That summarizes the essence of the testimony?

On page 2 of your statement you cite the emergency conditions that surrounded the enactment of the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975. However, you also state that "a basic error was made when the authorizing legislation provided for the termination of the program on September 30, 1977." While I certainly agree that there was an urgent atmosphere surrounding congressional deliberations on that legislation, I disagree most emphatically with your conclusion that the termination date represented a "basic error."

Mr. KLEIN. Yes, I was, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EILBERG [continuing]. You would know that we considered all these matters in great detail including the long term needs of these refugees as well as the long term responsibilities of the voluntary agencies. As a result, I would be very interested in knowing the detailed activities of the voluntary agencies which have been designed to make this group of refugees self-sufficient.

Have any of your constituent organizations established any special programs or projects with this purpose in mind?

Mr. KLIEN. Let me first say, Mr. Chairman, that the word "error" may be in error. At that time, as we all know, the country was faced with an immediate task of immense proportions. We were in the middle of a very severe recession. The administration came to the Congress, and I can recite in your hearing in the back listening to administration witnesses and your dialog with them——

Mr. EILBERG. And you remember we were on top of it before Saigon fell.

Mr. KLEIN. I am, sir, and I am aware of the fact that the adminitsration was not.

Mr. EILBERG. Yes, I have to agree to that.

Mr. KLEIN. It took congressional intervention for the agencies to start talking with the administration, as a matter of fact. I think what we mean here is simply it was essential to pass legislation at that time and it was hurried. We had no experience with an Indochinese refugee settlement. We had no experience with large Indochinese refugee camps in the United States. The decision had to be made in retrospect.

I think we feel that the termination of September 30, 1977, was premature. I think that was what we are driving at in this case.

You asked about the various projects, the things the voluntary agencies have done to assist with the assimilation of the refugees. Each of the agencies, as you are aware, operates differently, depending on our own constituency and our modus operandi how we resettle refugees. Some of us use churches, some of us social agencies, some use regional offices to handle resettlement.

I might ask Nancy Nicalo to respond in terms of the Church World Service, and the various projects they are funding from Church World funds to help with the resettlement of Indochinese refugees.

Mrs. NICALO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would just give an example of one or two which I feel have been extremely well handled, and are important in relationship to this group.

For one thing, Church World Service did establish regional offices in California at the time, and we are continuing to maintain one because we feel that is a high impact area. We are also looking at the other high impact areas in the United States and taking that into consideration.

Mr. EILBERG. But how have you been helping refugees become self-sufficient?

Mrs. NICALO. I will give an example of one project which I think is excellent, and is also an example of an interagency effort, which is also important because it makes the dollar go even further. That is a job bank in Santa Ana, Calif., in which the State welfare agency is also assisting, where we know, and it's made known to the job bank, those refugees who are on welfare and need job search assistance.

The bank even is also in touch with employers throughout the region; they have been able to establish a track record now with these employers and are now getting calls from the employers for persons who would fit their needs.

The group, there are several agencies involved, among them Church World Service.

Mr. EILBERG. Do other agencies use that technique as well?

Mrs. NICALO. Yes; actually, the job bank is located in the Catholic Charities office there in Santa Ana, and other agencies, IRC has added a staff member, supplied a staff member in a variety of ways in which we are cooperating in that. All agencies refer their caseload to that job bank. Their placement record has been very good, and, in addition, one important key has been the liaison with the employers.

There are often some misunderstandings that occur between an employee, the refugee, and the employer, and these can be dealt with quickly so that refugee is back on the job, if he has left it because of this misunderstanding, or can be placed again.

We feel this is important, also, because we know these training programs have been going on for the current 2 years. We are going to get a whole bundle of trainees on the job market, and we felt this was important, then, for the continuing self-sufficiency of these refugees.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Klein, in your statement, you also note that the failure to establish specific criteria for the admission of Indochina refugees has adversely affected resettlement efforts. As you may know, we made every effort to establish specific categories of eligible refugees which placed particular emphasis on family reunification but that in the long run our efforts were unsuccessful.

In your judgment, should the categories have been restricted to those who would have been most "resettleable" in the United States, and, in connection with that, what consideration should be given to this resettleability factor in future large scale refugee programs?

Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, I think there is always a temptation to look at the refugee population and say we will take the ones that are the most resettleable. This is what the French have done vis-a-vis the Indochinese refugees in Thailand by and large, and there has been almost a creaming factor there.

Mr. EILBERG. A what factor?

Mr. KLEIN. A creaming, taking the cream off the top.

I think we are referring here to the fact that although criteria, there was an attempt to set up criteria at the time of the exodus. The implementation of those criteria was almost, it didn't really exist. The chaos that existed at the time resulted in large numbers of people who met the criteria who were left behind. Other large numbers of people who may not have met the criteria did leave. We did not get a planned exodus from Vietnam in the sense of meeting criteria for meeting resettlement in the United States.

This is in contrast, let's say, to the present, what are we calling it now, Indochina parole program, 1977. I get mixed up in the terminology sometimes, where there are well thought-out criteria, and well defined, which have been established in the consultation with the administration and Congress, and in which also the agencies are quite comfortable.

Mr. EILBERG. I don't think you quite addressed the point of resettleability. I would like to have you expand a little more on that.

Mr. KLEIN. From my own point of view, and speaking for myself and my own agency, it would be far simpler if the only refugees we took were the ones that most easily resettled. I don't think that would be meeting the basic humanitarian consideration involved.

I think what we ought to be concerned with is resettleability as a factor, but much more a question of family reunion and some equity, some reason why a particular group of refugees should have the right, or should be considered for entry into the United States, and I would put that over and above the consideration of resettleability.

Mr. EILBERG. Can you identify those additional factors now or later for the record?

Mr. KLEIN. I think the factors would be people who have in some way, they are really the IPP criteria people, who in some way have been associated with the United States, either working for the United States in Government or private agencies, or people who by reason of training or education associated with the United States, they have some sort of equity in a philosophical sense vis-a-vis this country.

Then, the others are those who would be political refugees in a very real sense, the so-called high risk category, where their future is really in jeopardy, either in the country that they are refugee from, or in many cases near by where any possibility of returning is out of the question.

In other words, I would put that in the so-called high risk people.

Mr. EILBERG. We would be interested in any further reflections on this subject, because this will come up repeatedly as we meet future requests for parole and also in connection with pending refugee legislation which is passed through the subcommittee.

Mr. KLEIN. I think this is something the agencies might turn their attention to and come up with some thoughts on this.

Mr. EILBERG. We invite your attention.

Mr. KLEIN. We will provide it, Mr. Chairman. I think we welcome the opportunity. We have not really faced this question this way before.

Mr. EILBERG. What special efforts are now being made by the voluntary agencies to respond to the specific resettlement problems of the

new 15,000 refugees? In this regard, it has been noted by HEW, and I am sure by your knowledge and reading, as mine, that this group may have far greater difficulties in adjusting to American culture than the other refugee groups.

Mr. KLEIN. First, let me say no specific efforts as yet, the time frame has been too short. We are still involved in the mechanics of moving them here.

But we have thought considerably about this. I think it's worthwhile to break this new group of refugees down into two categories, those who will come under family reunion, or will have family here. Those people will be joining families here, regardless of whether they are Vietnamese, boat cases coming out of Malaysia or Laos coming out of Thai camps. Since they will be joining family, there will be a support system in existence already, and we are kind of counting on that and plan to work with it.

The people coming who will not be joining family here represent, I think, a somewhat more difficult resettlement consideration. However, as against the refugees that came in 1975 or the expanded parole program refugees that came in 1976, they will be joining peer groups, the group Mr. Lourie talked about earlier.

Incidentally, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lourie and I go back a long ways. He bounced me on his knee. He was one of my father's students.

Mr. EILBERG. Were you in Harrisburg, too?

Mr. KLEIN. No, sir, that was in New York, but they will be joining a peer group, and they will be joining an established resettlement structure and mechanism for Indochinese refugees that the agencies have already around the country.

I think we will be much better prepared to handle them than we were prepared to handle the spring and summer of 1975 refugees. But let me ask my colleagues if they would like to comment on this. It's an interesting question.

Mr. EILBERG. Mrs. Nicalo?

Mrs. NICALO. I would like to comment, Mr. Chairman.

I think I spent a day in Los Angeles and we brought in a number of directors of the projects we have been associated with in our own staff, but the most interesting aspect, of course, came from the Asian community itself, and the chairman of the Asian Protestant Council there has proposed a project in which they want to participate and be active, now that they recognize these are their people and they want to be very active in assisting, and that, for us, was a real encouraging point.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Klein, I cannot emphasize too much the interest of the subcommittee and staff in programs that the voluntary agencies are engaged in, and our interest and curiosity is continuous, and we would welcome information from time to time as to what you are doing, so our understanding will be so much improved.

Mr. KLEIN. We welcome providing it, sir. We do provide an input to the quarterly report, but whenever I write that input, I kind of have the feeling I am going over the same ground again. It might be more useful for all of us to give you more specifics than we have in the past. There are a lot of projects out there being operated by individual agencies and consortiums, all aimed at many of the same things, which is essentially self-sufficiency.

Mr. EILBERG. In your statement you indicate that despite the severe handicaps confronting Indochina refugees that remarkable progress has been made.

What role have the voluntary agencies played in achieving this progress?

Mr. KLEIN. Let me respond to the first part of your question, sir.

Working with the coalition, as Mrs. Nicalo and Mr. Hohl and myself, particularly, we have become aware of the much greater involvement of State governments in the resettlement process than we had been aware of before, or at least that I had been. I think we are all, as agencies, very much in favor of a greater degree of cooperation and planning cooperation initially between the agencies, the Federal Government, and the State governments.

Now, this is a new twist for us, in a way. I don't know that we have said this to you before, but it's very apparent to us. Perhaps it should have been more apparent at the national level, and was more apparent on the local level, but it was certainly apparent to us that we need a degree of sophisticated coordination between the agencies, the Federal Government, and the States, and we are concerned about that with this new 15,000 that are coming in——

Mr. EILBERG. Would you care to comment about the States of Washington, Iowa, and other governmental sponsors?

Mr. KLEIN. I have no local agencies in any of those States. It is my understanding from a number of sources that the State of Iowa has done a superb job on resettling the Tai Dam. I understand there were some problems in the State of Washington, but, as I understand it, that program is moving well. However, let me ask others to comment on that, if I may.

Mr. HOHL. I think, in general, Mr. Klein's statement portrays the situation factually. The State of Iowa experience was good, is good, and I understand that they will be taking more refugees. Some of the State programs, New Mexico, for example, Maine, and Washington, and Washington being the largest of any attempt undertaken by the States, did not reach the goal.

There was a difficulty in the State of Washington, perhaps in the manner in which the refugee was initially handled. He was taken out of a camp setting, principally from the west coast camp, he was taken up and was put into another camp setting in the State of Washington. He was immediately fed into the welfare system. They all went onto welfare. Then there was a project and process for them to get out of this welfare system and into self-sufficiency.

We had heard statistics about a year after the last camp was closed in December of 1975 that there was a majority of the people in the State of Washington still on welfare. We think that perhaps the attempt on the part of the State to use the State structure almost solely, almost exclusive of the private sector, they were just not able to cope with resettlement. They didn't know how to go about it.

As Mr. Klein has said, however, I believe now that the situation has improved considerably. They made mistakes initially, as did some of the other States.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Klein, what consultations are held by the voluntary agencies with local and State governments to determine local

government reaction to the influx of large groups of refugees in their area?

Mr. KLEIN. I know that in California, on a county level as well as a State level, there are almost constant consultations going on between the county officials and the resettlement agencies. California has developed an interesting approach. They have developed forums, they are called; there is the Orange County forum, and the Los Angeles forum, and there is the Santa Clara forum, which are really forums, exactly that, they are places where the State, the county, the voluntary resettlement agencies, and other community groups come together and discuss resettlement problems, discuss resettlement strategy, and it is also used as a mechanism for increasing community participation in the resettlement process.

Mr. EILBERG. Is this an isolated thing or general?

Mr. KLEIN. No; again resettlement really takes place at the grass roots level, and there is immense variation. I can talk about one of our experiences in Binghamton, N.Y.

Mr. EILBERG. I mean to say, generally, do you have substantial contact with local government?

Mr. KLEIN. Our local agency through the regional offices or the diocese or the regional structures, the ecumenical councils. The national agencies don't as much, such as in the context of the coalition where we have had extensive and ongoing discussion.

Mr. EILBERG. It is my understanding that the voluntary agencies assure the U.S. Government that they will provide employment and lodging to the refugee as well as to see that the refugee will not become a public charge.

How binding from a legal standpoint are these assurances? Have the voluntary agencies lived up to these assurances?

Mr. KLEIN. The assurances the voluntary agencies provide the Government vary according to the refugee program. There are no such assurances, for instance, with the 135,000 that came in 1975. We were asked by the Government, and we were quite willing to be asked, to help resettle these people.

Where we are providing assurances as in the conditional entry program, we do provide assurance that we will provide housing and employment. I do not believe we provide assurance that the refugees will not become a public charge.

We do not like to see the refugees become a public charge, and I would like to be very clear on that. To the last point, it is my understanding there were assurances, and it may not be in a refugee situation, Mr. Chairman. I am not quite clear on this, but where they have been tested in court, where there have been affidavits of support, I guess it is, that the courts have found those not binding. But this is not the same thing as an assurance given by the agency in a conditional entry situation.

Mr. EILBERG. So far the obligation is a moral obligation rather than legal one?

Mr. KLEIN. It goes beyond moral, I think, Mr. Chairman, because we accept funding from the Federal Government to assist in this process. I think we would be very remiss and subject to a great deal of criticism and perhaps legal action, if we did not assist the refugee with housing and employment, and all other aspects of his resettlement.

Mr. EILBERG. In your opinion, in those cases where you have undertaken to assume responsibilities, to what extent have the voluntary agencies lived up to these assurances?

Mr. KLEIN. I think each of us, Mr. Chairman, would say we have lived up to it fully and beyond what is called for. I am sure that out of a population of approaching 150,000 people, one might be able to find a refugee situation where it was debatable whether the voluntary agency met the conditions of that commitment. But it would probably be a situation where for some reason we lost track of the refugee, where a refugee came into a sponsorship situation and then moved, unbeknownst to us, and we simply lost track.

Mr. EILBERG. How would you comment on the question about the increased numbers who are receiving cash assistance?

Mr. KLEIN. I think the employment figures point out that we have done, voluntarily agencies, I don't like to be self-serving in this testimony, but I guess we should be, I think the employment figures point out we have done a pretty good job in getting refugees into employment. It has been difficult, very difficult, particularly during the first year and a half or two years, when we were facing, we were working in a recession period, and when many of the refugees had little or no English language.

The problem has been to put the refugees into sufficiently financial employment to permit them to be self-sufficient, and we recognize this is a problem.

Mr. EILBERG. What legal obligations do sponsors incur?

Mr. KLEIN. Boy, that is one I would like; anyone have a thought?

Mr. HOHL. If you are talking about a sponsor, where I go through my diocese or parish, a sponsor comes forward, there is absolutely no legal obligation, period, if we are talking here about an Indochinese refugee.

Mr. EILBERG. Yes. Suppose, Mr. Hohl, after you turned the individual refugee over to a particular parish, what obligation does the parish have, if any?

Mr. HOHL. I suppose at most it would be a matter of a promise. We have gone to them and asked them to do something for us, and in behalf of the refugee, and they have agreed to undertake the responsibility. Beyond that, there certainly is no legal obligation, and so far as a moral obligation is concerned, I think that is quite evident that there is one there, and they readily recognize that.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Klein, don't you think sponsors should have some legal obligations?

Mr. KLEIN. This is a personal judgment, Mr. Chairman. If we are talking about individual sponsors, my answer would be no. I think the resettlement agency is the place where the only obligation should be vested. We are the professionals, and we ask the individual sponsor to assist in this process. This is the structure of resettlement in this country. Other countries do it differently, but I think in this country that we would lose the support of the American public in that kind of outpouring, effective at the grass roots level.

Mr. EILBERG. You are saying, in effect, the voluntary agency should have the responsibility? Are you saying that?

Mr. KLEIN. Yes, sir. I am not talking about, can we define this a little more tightly?

Mr. EILBERG. That is really the question. There are some terms that have not been defined.

Mr. KLEIN. The term "sponsor," that term certainly is a fuzzy one.

Mr. EILBERG. The term "settlement" is a fuzzy one, and yet these people are coming in and shifting around, and no one is responsible for them, it appears, and that is what concerns the subcommittee.

Mr. KLEIN. Could I reply this way? I think I would not be willing to say that the voluntary agencies, resettlement agencies, should have a legal responsibility vis-a-vis the resettlement of a refugee. I think our lawyers would probably look askance at that, what we are committing ourselves to in terms of resources that may not exist, et cetera.

I think clearly we have a very strong moral and practical responsibility to see that the practical resettlement of the refugee is accomplished, and by the refugee I think we are all talking about process over time, not 6 months, a year, or year and a half, we are talking about helping the refugee become a functional, contributing member of the society.

I would not like to see any legal responsibility fall on an individual sponsor of a family or church group or a community group, because I think in that case we would cut off that source of support for resettlement, and I think we would be defeating our own purpose.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Klein, when do the voluntary agencies consider that a refugee is resettled permanently?

Mr. KLEIN. I would say that we consider him resettled permanently when he is a self-sufficient, contributing member of this society. We still provide him with counselling and support assistance beyond that. It would be very hard to define.

The State Department has been trying to define it under some pressure from the GAO in the GAO report, but we found it very hard to define resettlement, and putting a time frame on it just doesn't work that way.

I think what we are all after is an operational definition which assures the Congress and the public of a responsible approach to the resettlement of the refugee and assures the agency of a flexibility in handling that resettlement obligation.

Mr. EILBERG. What are the reporting requirements of the voluntary agencies as stipulated in contracts with the Department of State?

Mr. KLEIN. We are going through the process now of discussing reporting requirements. The final reporting requirements on the Indochina Refugee Act as they worked out were inadequate. I think we recognize it; I think the Department of State recognizes it; and I think you and your staff recognize it.

There are two kinds of reporting that, I feel, and I am speaking for myself now, are required—first, financial reporting on the expenditure of public funds. If we receive public funds we should be accounting for those public funds. I don't think anyone questions that.

Second, a form of reporting which will give us a judgment on how effective the resettlement process is and what kinds of problems there are. I would like to see this an informal reporting in terms of field reports to the central agency and sharing this with the Government so that we can all identify problem areas and prove our services to the refugees.

Mr. EILBERG. I take it then we have not yet reached this level or goal that you have just described?

Mr. KLEIN. I think we are pretty close to the goal of the financial reporting. Am I correct on this?

Mrs. NICALO. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. It is built into the USRP contract which we have all recently signed. We are in the final stages of negotiation on the parole program contract.

One of the problems, Mr. Chairman, is, as you know, the resettlement process involves not only public funds, resettlement grants, but also a good deal of private money, either cash or donated goods, services and time. Sometimes it is a little bit difficult to separate this out, but we know we have to in terms of the use of public funds, and we know that we want to be able to indicate the fact that resettlement does cost the private sector significantly more than we are receiving from a contract with the Department of State for this purpose.

I think we have had a problem in terms of the resettlement grant.

Mr. EILBERG. In its Report on the Domestic Resettlement of Indochina Refugees, the GAO concluded that "it would be desirable to examine VOLAG expenditures after December 1975, when the camps close and before the program ends to determine both the nature and the purpose of the expenditures, and whether all VOLAG funds set aside for anticipated costs until September 1977, should remain outstanding." In other words, GAO says that there is considerable money appropriated which has not yet been spent, and the question arises whether that money should be returned or not.

Can you comment on this particular situation? Can you describe in detail the nature of VOLAG expenditures since the closing down of the reception centers?

Mr. KLEIN. Yes, sir, as a matter of fact, we wrote, as the American Council of Voluntary Agencies, a fairly strong letter to the GAO, and I would be glad to submit a copy of that for the record here.

Mr. EILBERG. We would like to have it. [See p. 127.]

Mr. KLEIN. Where we raised two questions with the GAO report.

We said three things in essence: First, we commended them basically for their findings and recommendations. We think it was in most respects a fair report. We said that we hope that in any future report that they would place the resettlement experience in the broader context that existed at the time, the suddenness, the fact that this is the first time we had refugees in camps other than transit camps such as Fort Kilmer, refugees in camps in the United States, the large numbers in a very short period of time, the fact that there was no anticipation of it, the fact that it all happened in the middle of a severe recession, and the fact that the American public was suffering a severe hangover, Vietnam hangover, and there was ambivalence about this refugee movement, some of the policy decisions that were made early on which we felt did not necessarily lead to the good resettlement, such as the pressure to close the camps more quickly, I think, than the agencies felt was good for resettlement; and I think we testified to that effect 2 years ago.

What we asked was the GAO in their next report, if they do one, to put this in a broader perspective.

Then we specifically took exception to the GAO report on the subject of their questioning of whether far more funds should not have been spent by the voluntary agency resettlement fund by the time the camps were closed in December of 1975. The implication in the GAO report was that most of the funds should have been spent there because that was resettlement.

Our contention is that resettlement begins when the refugee leaves the camp and is a process that continues over months and years, and to have spent most of the resettlement grants by the end of 1975 would have been an improper use of public funds; it would have been immoral in terms of refugee welfare and it would have been completely out of keeping with our experience and what we know to be good resettlement practice, and we simply told the GAO that we felt they were off base on that.

Mr. EILBERG. But they were funds that are presently in your possession which have not yet been spent?

Mr. KLEIN. There are some funds in varying degrees in the possession of various agencies and in some respects we don't really know how much because we are still dealing with the problem of the computers; but some of the agencies have some funds remaining.

Some of the agencies have projected expenditures over the next year, year and a half or two, for refugee resettlement projects, some of these programs that Mrs. Nicalo was talking about.

We have a statement from the State Department on the use of funds after September 30. I don't know if you have seen a copy of this letter. If you haven't, we will make a point of seeing that you get one. It is a lovely piece of writing which says, in effect, (a) all the funds received for refugee resettlement must be used for refugee resettlement; (b) there is no legal obligation to return funds not spent by September 30; (c) there is a moral obligation; and (d) if the agency has a planned program for expenditure of funds after September 30, that should be submitted to the Department of State for approval.

I think we can live with this interpretation by the Department of State because we see continuing refugee needs.

Mr. EILBERG. What is the date of that letter? Do you remember?

Mr. KLEIN. August 26.

Mr. EILBERG. 1977?

Mr. KLEIN. 1977. [See p. 129 for text of letter.]

Mr. EILBERG. 1977. Can you comment on the status of the audit recommended by GAO of the expenditures of these resettlement funds?

Mr. KLEIN. The audit is going forth. As of now, all of our books are being audited, as of September 30, 1977, all of the agencies.

Mr. EILBERG. And would you give us your reactions when that audit is completed?

Mr. KLEIN. Yes, or the State Department will have the audit. It is an audit being carried out by State.

Mr. EILBERG. We will get that, but we would also like to have your reaction.

Mr. KLEIN. If we have a problem, we will be glad to submit our reactions.

Mr. EILBERG. Not only if you have a problem.

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Mr. Hall?

Mr. HALL. I am interested in that letter that you just commented about. Did I understand you to say that the Department of State wrote you a letter, or your organization, stating that all funds should have been spent, or did not have to be spent—which was it?—by a certain date?

Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Congressman, I don't have the letter before me now, and we are getting into some slightly tricky ground here, legally. Let me respond to your question but ask that my response not be considered definitive.

Mr. HALL. Let me ask you one more question with reference to that. Did I understand you to say that this letter also says that you are not under any responsibility to return that money that has not been spent?

Mr. KLEIN. It is very clear in terms of the contract that we have with the Government that there is no stipulation that funds unexpended by September 30, 1977, must be returned.

It is equally clear in that contract that all funds received for Vietnamese refugee resettlement must be spent for that purpose.

Mr. HALL. But not by the 30th of September?

Mr. KLEIN. No, sir. This gets down to a legal interpretation of the intent of Congress where the legislation says that all funds must have been obligated—I think that is the terminology—by September——

Mr. HALL. These funds have not been spent. Have they been obligated?

Mr. KLEIN. They have certainly been obligated by the Government.

Mr. HALL. Been obligated to you, but have you obligated them?

Mr. KLEIN. We have obligated either in passing them out to our network of resettlement services or in programing and budgeting for these funds.

Mr. HALL. Approximately how much money are we talking about that has not been spent?

Mr. KLEIN. In my own case, we are talking about something on the order between $20,000 and $40,000. Other agencies will have more or less depending on their modus operandi.

"None of such funds shall be available for obligation for any purpose after September 30, 1977." That is the wording of the operative phrase.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Hall is referring to the letter, referring to the closing of the camps. We are anxious to know what is in that letter.

Mr. HALL. The August 26 letter.

Mr. KLEIN. August 26, 1977. That does not relate to closing of the camps.

Mr. HALL. I thought the August 26 letter referred to the manner in which the money had been spent and did not have to be returned?

Mr. KLEIN. The August 26 letter had nothing to do with the closing of the camps.

Mr. EILBERG. But you stated, I thought, as I understood that, from the Government's point of view, it anticipated that the moneys or the bulk of the moneys would be spent by the time it closed the camps?

Mr. KLEIN. That was the GAO report, and that we took very serious exception to.

Mr. EILBERG. We would like to have, if you would, a written statement, a reaction from you, on the GAO report on that point.

Mr. KLEIN. We will submit that to you, sir, and we will submit a copy of the letter that we wrote the GAO on that subject.

[The information referred to follows:]

AMERICAN COUNCIL OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES
FOR FOREIGN SERVICE, INC.
*New York, N.Y., August 3, 1977.*

Mr. ELMER STAATS,
*Comptroller General of the United States, U.S. General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. STAATS: The eight below listed agencies having resettlement contracts with the Department of State under which the vast majority of Indochinese refugees were resettled following the fall of Vietnam and Cambodia in 1975, have read the May 10, 1977 Report to the Congress on the Domestic Resettlement of Indochinese Refugees with great interest. While each agency might agree or disagree with specific observations and recommendations in the report in varying degrees, we generally consider the report an objective and reasonable evaluation of the resettlement program at the time the report was compiled. Furthermore, we find ourselves in general agreement, or certainly not taking the exception to, the general thrust of the recommendations contained in the report. However, we feel it is important that we communicate to you one general observation on the report as it reflects the Indochinese resettlement experience, and take specific exception to a point of view articulated in the report which we feel represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the resettlement process.

We believe it would have been more helpful to the Congress, to the general public, and to our agencies, if the report had placed the facts and figures of the resettlement experience into the context of the times. Initial resettlement of Vietnamese refugees took place under extremely difficult circumstances. The fall of Cambodia and Vietnam took this country by surprise and no advance planning whatsoever had been done with regard to resettlement. The 130,000 refugees who arrived in the United States in the Spring and Summer of 1975 were the largest number of refugees ever to arrive in the United States at one time, and this was the first time we ever had refugee camps (as distinguished from a processing center) in the United States. The resettlement program was undertaken during a period of serious recession and in the midst of a good deal of ambivalence about the U.S. role in Vietnam and the resettlement of refugees in the United States.

Finally, the agencies operated under heavy pressure from the U.S. Government to move refugees out of camp as quickly as possible. All of these considerations directly impinged on the resettlement program and represented factors with which the voluntary agencies had to deal on a daily basis. If the GAO does a follow-up report on the resettlement of Indochinese refugees, we hope you will find it possible to place your report within a broader context than provided in the report of May 10, 1977.

As mentioned above, we also believe there is a point of view contained in the report which represents a misunderstanding of the actual process of resettlement. On page 19 of the report, under the heading of "Conclusions," you state "Most VOLAG program resettlement costs would probably have been incurred by December 1975, when most refugees were sponsored and placed into American communities." Again, on page 20, the report recommends that the Secretary of State instruct the Inspector General For Foreign Service to—"take immediate steps to examine VOLAG funds spent after December 1975 to determine the nature of the expenditures and whether VOLAG funds set aside for anticipated costs until the program terminates in September 1977, should remain oustanding."

The implications of these two statements is that most of the resettlement, and expenditures of funds, should have been accomplished by December 1975. This is in direct contrast to our experience with resettlement over many years and with what we believe to be the most effective approach to assisting refugees integrate into American society. Resettlement only begins when the refugee arrives in his new community. It is a process extending over months and years and involves far more than initial placement in housing and the purchase of food and clothing. If the voluntary agencies had been so short sighted as to have spent most of the resettlement funds by December 1975, the resettlement program

would have foundered, and the resettling agencies, as well as the Government, would have been justifiably vulnerable to criticism for lack of adequate planning and for lack of concern for the welfare of the refugee population.

Again, we would like to emphasize that we find the report, in its entirety, a reasonably balanced and objective document and we hope you will view our comments as deriving from the same concern for the effective use of public funds as is the mandate of the General Accounting Office.

Sincerely yours,

MRS. INGRID WALTER,
*Acting Chairman, Committee on Migration and Refugee Affairs.*

U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
*Washington, D.C., September 16, 1977.*

MRS. INGRID WALTER,
*Acting Chairman, Committee on Migration and Refugee Affairs, American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, Inc., New York, N.Y.*

DEAR MRS. WALTER: We thank you for the views expressed in your letter of August 3, 1977, concerning our report to the Congress entitled "Domestic Resettlement of Indochinese Refugees—Struggle for Self-Reliance" dated May 10, 1977.

You stated that the report would have been more helpful to everyone concerned had the facts and figures been placed within a broader context to indicate the extremely difficult circumstances that existed during the initial resettlement of the Indochinese refugees. Also, you mentioned that the voluntary agencies (VOLAGs) operated under heavy pressure from the U.S. Government to move refugees out of the reception centers as quickly as possible.

We believe that these two issues were adequately covered in our report. For example, on page 3 of the report, we stated that:

"In 1975, with the sudden influx of Indochinese refugees, the Government again turned to VOLAGs. Their expertise and experience were needed, since the United States had never before experienced the arrival of so many refugees in so short a time."

On pages 25 and 38 of the report, we further point out that:

"Some Task Force and VOLAG officials told us that pressure came from the Congress and the Executive Branch to remove the refugees from the reception centers as quickly as possible, which may have been a contributing factor to resettlement in high unemployment areas."

"Throughout the Indochinese program, however, according to some VOLAG representatives, the Interagency Task Force pressured VOLAGs to quickly remove the refugees from the camps and encourage them to use individual sponsors which were easier to obtain than group sponsors."

Another matter discussed in our report which you found troublesome was the statement on page 19 that "Most VOLAG program initial resettlement costs would probably have been incurred by December 1975, when most refugees were sponsored and placed into American communities. * * *" taken in concert with our recommendation on page 20 that the Secretary of State instruct the Inspector General for Foreign Service to

"* * *—take immediate steps to examine VOLAG funds spent after December 1975 to determine the nature of the expenditures and whether VOLAG funds set aside for anticipated costs until the program terminates in September 1977, should remain outstanding."

In your letter you indicated that these statements are in direct contrast with the resettlement experience of the VOLAGs.

As stated on page 17 of our report, VOLAG officials were of the opinion that their legal responsibility under the contracts ended when the refugees were placed with sponsors, which coincided with the time the reception centers were closed in December 1975. As further stated in the report, it was the VOLAG's decision to continue assisting refugees until they were employed and self-supporting members of the community, "* * * even though it might take several years for some refugees to reach this position." It was never made clear to us, however, whether this assistance after the refugees were placed with sponsors would take the form of direct cash payments or services or training.

Our basic concern over VOLAG funds spent after December 1975 is related to the complete lack of reporting of expenditures on the part of the VOLAGs. United States Government contracts which do not contain expenditure reporting provisions are virtually unprecedented. Because of this lack of account-

ability, we believe an audit to determine the nature of such expenditures is important in the absence of adequate financial reporting.

Further, despite the fact that VOLAG funds had been set aside for additional assistance to refugees, about one-third of them were on the welfare rolls as of December 1, 1976.

We trust this information will be of assistance to you and again we appreciate your constructive observations of our report.

Sincerely yours,

GREGORY J. ABART,
*Director, Human Resources Division.*

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Hall?

Mr. HALL. Can you make available a copy of the August 26 letter? That was from the Department of State to you?

Mr. KELIN. That was from the Department of State to us. Let me just make a note here.

Mr. HALL. I would like to have a copy of that letter made a part of the record.

Mr. EILBERG. Would you do that, and would you also let Mr. Hall have a copy, since he has expressed interest in the matter?

Mr. KLEIN. I will, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
*Washington, D.C., August 26, 1977.*

Mr. JOHN E. MCCARTHY,
*Director, Migration and Refugee Services, U.S. Catholic Conference (USCC), Washington, D.C.*

DEAR JOHN: This letter outlines some events which affected the resettlement grants authorized for Indochinese refugee resettlements and sets forth the policy regarding such funds, their use, and the disposition of interest which may have accrued on U.S. Government funds in the custody of Voluntary Agencies.

1. FUND AVAILABILITY

Historically, funds were appropriated by the Congress to cover costs which would be incurred for refugee resettlement. Contracts were negotiated with Voluntary Agencies and some other organizations, authorizing a grant of $500 per refugee resettled. Clearly, the intent of Congress was that the Voluntary Agencies should be generally reimbursed for expenses incurred with the Indochinese refugee resettlement. However, there was no intent that a profit would be made by the Agencies.

The Congress expected that all refugees would be resettled by September 30, 1977 and contemplated that all costs for refugees would have been paid by September 30, 1977. The actual resettlement of refugees has taken longer than anticipated. Therefore, it is now evident that expenses may be incurred after September 30, 1977.

Public Law 94-23 authorizes the U.S. Department of State to incur the obligation of funds up through September 30, 1977. Public Law 94-24 limits the actual obligation period to June 30, 1976. The Department of State met applicable legal requirements by entering into contractual arrangements with Voluntary Agencies prior to June 30, 1976.

Following what is considered to be the intent of the Congress, a memorandum dated April 12, 1976 was distributed to all Voluntary Agencies stating that, except in certain instances, unused funds at September 30, 1977 were to be returned to the Department of State. This requirement was generally accepted by all Agencies as a moral commitment although in all cases the contract did not require such a return of funds.

Subsequently, on March 2, 1977, the Department of State Legal Adviser ruled that Voluntary Agencies were not legally obligated to return unexpended resettlement grant funds at September 30, 1977. This legal interpretation did not, however, remove the moral responsibility of the Agencies to return any funds which are in excess at September 30, 1977.

The following policy is provided for Voluntary Agencies' guidance and consideration concerning the return of excess funds to the U.S. Department of State following September 30, 1977:

(*a*) With respect to funds made available to resettle Indochinese refugees authorized to enter the U.S. on and prior to June 30, 1976, which exceed obligations incurred through September 30, 1977, such excess funds should be returned to the Department of State, except as explained in (*b*) below.

(*b*) In those cases where specific Indochinese Refugee program requirements are known, funds may be retained if a planned schedule of expenditures covering the period October 1, 1977 to September 30, 1979 is submitted to the Department of State (D/HA/ORM) by October 31, 1977 for approval. Such plans should be stated as specific categories of planned expenditures and be accompanied by the rationale supporting the requirement.

2. INTEREST EARNED

The general policy followed by the U.S. Government and the Department of State is that any interest earned on U.S. Government funds must be returned for deposit to a Miscellaneous Receipt Account in the U.S. Treasury. The general rule followed in U.S. Government operations is that payment will be made after the services are received, which is after the Contractor has expended his funds. When authorized, funds may be advanced to Contractor for subsequent off-set against bills which are submitted for services performed.

Almost all Voluntary Agencies received advances from the Department of State and in most cases these advances were liquidated as actual resettlement grant payments were approved. In this light, the Voluntary Agencies were considered to have earned eligibility for the grant payment when the refugee left the U.S. camp site. The Department of State audits of other grant programs have always considered all funds disbursed as advances when such funds were provided prior to the expenditure of funds by the Grantee (i.e., the Voluntary Agency).

Thus it becomes a matter of interpretation as to when the Agency was seeking reimbursement for expenditures incurred or requesting an advance of funds. In fairness to all concerned, and in assuring that all legal requirements are met, the following policy is given for Voluntary Agency guidance and consideration.

(*a*) All interest earned on U.S. funds must be returned to the U.S. Department of State.

(*b*) Voluntary Agencies are eligible for payment of the $500 resettlement grant when a refugee leaves the resettlement camp, regardless of the expense which may have been incurred by the Agency.

(*c*) Funds are considered as advances to Voluntary Agencies when at the end of any month total payments made to the Agency exceed the total of resettlement grants earned.

Your continued cooperation in completing the activities related to the Indochinese refugee program is sincerely appreciated.

Sincerely,

JAMES L. CARLIN,
*Deputy Assistant Secretary for*
*Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (D/HA/ORM).*

Mr. KLEIN. May I make one more comment on that letter, which is, it really relates to funds that the agencies have in their possession, resettlement funds, on September 30. May those funds be used for continuing resettlement needs or must they be returned to the Government? Our feeling is very strongly that we have continuing resettlement needs for these refugees, particularly those who came under the Laotian program who have been here for 1 year, 1½ years, or sometimes less than 1 year, and the letter simply says that we may continue to use those funds against approved programs, if I remember the content of that letter correctly.

This, we feel, is reasonable because we feel that there are continuing needs.

Mr. EILBERG. We are advised that voluntary agencies have been accepting per capita grants for refugees who merely registered with the agency, having had a sponsor already designated. Is this still the practice? What is the rationale for accepting grants for these refugees when nothing was really done for them?

Mr. KLEIN. There were two ways in which refugees left the camps: One was through a sponsorship arrangement with one of the voluntary agencies where they went out to a voluntary agency, arranged a sponsorship situation. However, particularly during the early days a number of refugees went out through privately arranged sponsorship situations where there was a telephone verification of a sponsorship.

By the way, incidentally, I think in retrospect none of us feel that this was very good resettlement and I think you would probably agree. It was the pressure to move people out; or where they went out to friends or relatives. A decision was made, and appropriately, we think, that these refugees would be better off if they did come under the umbrella of one of the resettlement agencies. Therefore, in some instances where these refugees came to us for assistance, we did incorporate them into our system.

Mr. EILBERG. But it doesn't seem fair to me for you to have received the per capita grant, say, of $500, when the particular refugee never went through the camp.

Mr. KLEIN. They didn't go through the camp processing of the agency, but they have been receiving significant services since, the whole range of services.

Mr. EILBERG. But the range of services certainly cannot compare with a refugee who went through the whole process.

Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to overstate my position on that because I recognize you have a valid point here. Certainly, the costs incurred by the agencies in handling the camp processing—in our case it came to something like $18 per capita—those costs were not incurred for the refugees we picked up, if you will, after they left camp. We made every attempt where a refugee came to us for assistance afterward, and many of these private sponsorships broke down badly, very badly. I mean, so many of the individual "breakdown situations," and I use that term in quotes, were these private sponsorship situations or the telephone verification sponsorships. In many cases we really had to put the pieces together again, find new sponsorships, find new resettlement possibilities, but the range of variation was broad.

I have to grant you that. In my judgment, I would say we would probably have spent as much money on these situations as we did on the out-of-camp situations, but I couldn't prove that.

Let me ask my colleagues if they can comment on this.

Mr. HOHL. There was one thing. I think you have described the camp situation very well. We, the agencies, certainly had difficulties in the initial days of the camp programs. We were at swordspoints quite often with the various agencies of Government that were in charge of the camps, in charge of releasing the refugees from the camps, and so forth.

We were unalterably opposed from the outset and if we ever had another situation we would take the same posture, that the refugee

should not be released without the protection, and the umbrella protection, of the agency.

Mr. EILBERG. But, Mr. Hohl, the fact is that a large number—and it is not right at my fingertips—never passed through the camps, never really had any supervision, and those settlements became permanent and yet the voluntary agency took the same figure for those people as they did for those that they provided all the other services for. It strikes me that that is not fair.

Mr. HOHL. It depends on the mechanism, and granted I don't think there is any question at all the mechanism could be improved or could have been improved, I think the types of refugees to which you make reference were those who were here as students, perhaps as visitors, diplomats, et cetera. I don't know in terms of numbers. I don't even talk in terms of my own agency let alone the agencies in general, how many of those as a matter of record—I think the HEW has these figures. They could say how any of this type became a part of the program. There again, beyond that I don't know how many of those who came in, as it were, registered with us, to seek assistance, and so on or to seek perhaps protection or the comfort that they needed, the security they needed, if there was a breakdown.

I do know this, that we did handle a large number of refugees who were in the U.S. population at the time of the fall to whom we gave considerable assistance, considerable financial assistance.

Mr. EILBERG. I don't want you to think I am not sympathetic or understanding, but we have to defend whatever bill we bring to the floor. If I am asked this question, I am only going to be embarrassed at this state of my knowledge as to that kind of reimbursement.

Mr. KLEIN. I think Mr. Hohl put his finger on it when he talked about the mechanism. The mechanisms at that time were far from perfect. Policy was being made almost ex post facto very often. There may have been some inequity in that.

I think we have all done our best to provide services to this group on the same order of services to others, but I think if we look back, one can say that the mechanisms were lacking in some respects. As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, when I think of my anger and frustration back in the summer and fall of 1975 and now look at the refugee resettlement program in retrospect, I am amazed that it has worked so well.

Mr. EILBERG. I will just ask you one more question. Time is fast running out.

Are the contracts with the State Department specific enough to enable voluntary agencies to determine the extent of their obligations financially and otherwise?

Mr. KLEIN. I believe so, Mr. Chairman. I am not quite sure. The extent of our obligations financially—we have an obligation to use public funds for the purposes intended, which is resettlement in this case. We have a clear-cut obligation to use those funds for no other purpose.

We will also be using other funds, both cash and in goods and services donated, for the resettlement purpose. Am I answering your question, sir?

Mr. EILBERG. I just want to know if the contract is definite enough and you are approaching the anwser to that and, again, my concern

has to do with the fact that there is every indication that there will be additional refugee or parole programs, and I would like to see this as tight as possible; and we have already decided between us that there are certain terms that have not been defined.

Mr. KLEIN. The terms for resettlement have been firmed up in the contract. Resettlement is defined. There is no time limit and I don't think we would be in favor of putting a time limit on it, that a refugee is not resettled for 6 months, is resettled after 2½ years or something of this sort, because it varies so much.

Mr. EILBERG. How would you define "resettlement"?

Mr. KLEIN. I would have to define it in my terms as that point at which the refugee becomes self-supporting, sustaining, and a contributing member of society, and I don't mean just contributing in terms of paying taxes. I mean contributing in terms of participating in our society.

Now, in some cases, as we know with older people, they will never be resettled and we know that from immigrant experiences going back for 50, 100 years. But if we talk about the family, when that family is in that situation I would call them resettled. They may still need specialized services and we will still be providing those specialized services, but I would call them resettled.

Mr. EILBERG. What about the establishment of uniform transitional allowances by the voluntary agencies to prevent VOLAG shopping? This was one of the recommendations of GAO.

Mr. KLEIN. I think that is dealt with in the new contract. I think there is a term in there which says pocket money up to $50 per capita or $100 per family; in other words, not to exceed that amount. I don't think we are going to run into that nasty problem, and it was a nasty problem, in the present 15,000 or any future waves.

I think we do have to remember that the agencies are different in their structure, are different in their constituencies and the modus operandi.

Mr. EILBERG. And the amounts given up in transitional allowances vary substantially?

Mr. KLEIN. Yes. That is being tightened up and it is tightened up in the new contract.

Mr. EILBERG. What would you think, finally, of the HEW rather than the Department of State negotiating the resettlement contracts?

Mr. KLEIN. We have an interesting phenomenon here, Mr. Chairman. The Department of State is responsible within the administration for the movement of refugees to this country, including the processing overseas, Department of State and INS. After the refugees get here, the voluntary agencies are responsible for their resettlement, but we know full well that we are not talking only about voluntary agencies' participation; we are also talking about Federal and State participation.

I am not sure that I would like to recommend that the agencies work with HEW on resettlement contracts rather than State.

It might be six of one and half a dozen of the other, but I would personally be very much in favor of a closer relationship between State, the agency, HEW, and the State governments.

Mr. EILBERG. Doesn't it make sense for HEW to be more involved than State, since it has supervision of the ongoing programs after the refugees arrive here?

Mr. KLEIN. Certainly to be more involved with the resettlement process than State, that is logical. Whether that translates into voluntary agencies contracting with HEW rather than the State Department, I would have to think about that one fairly carefully.

Mr. EILBERG. We would like to have your considered response.

Mr. KLEIN. There is a great deal that is involved with refugee resettlement that takes place overseas and HEW would be totally out of its depth in that kind of situation.

Mr. EILBERG. Would you give us your position on that question? It is difficult.

Mr. KLEIN. It is one of those toughies.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Klein, I want to say that the performance of you and your group here was extraordinary and I think the best answers we have had that I can remember from the voluntary agencies, let's say, in quite some time, and it has been said before and I say again that we do want to work together on continuing problems.

I recognize that we all have limitations of time, but we don't want to be ignorant. We want to know what you are doing and we want to be a vehicle for improving the situation wherever we can. I say this, recognizing the terribly sensitive questions and problems involved, and the positions that we may have to take, whether in consultation with the Attorney General or while justifying programs on the floor. It is very important that we know what you are doing and I want to thank all of you very much for your help this morning.

Mr. Hohl?

Mr. HOHL. Just one comment on that, Mr. Chairman.

Certainly, those are most welcome remarks that you have made. We as the American Council of Voluntary Agencies, perhaps if I could speak for the agencies, and I don't think I will be out of turn, would welcome perhaps a little more formal type of arrangement than somebody saying let's get together sometime, and sitting down with your staff as concerns all matters regarding refugees, whether it be this program or other ongoing programs.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Hohl, I don't want to say no to your proposal, but I don't think your proposal is realistic. I prefer that we meet and I would like us to meet and I would like to be informed, and I would like to know what you are doing, I cannot promise you that we will do it, simply because of the nature of this institution that we are part of.

Mr. HOHL. I had in mind in terms of staff, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. EILBERG. OK.

Did you want to say something?

Mr. KLEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your comments.

Mr. EILBERG. The subcommittee will adjourn, subject to the call of the Chair.

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m. the hearing was adjourned, the subcommittee to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

# APPENDIXES

## APPENDIX 1

### ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

### A. MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

#### STATEMENT BY HON. LES AUCOIN, AND HON. AL ULLMAN, REPRESENTATIVES IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OREGON

MR. CHAIRMAN: I am pleased to submit written testimony to your subcommittee regarding extension of the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Act. It reflects the views of both myself and my colleague from the State of Oregon, Congressman Al Ullman.

Congressman Ullman and I have co-sponsored one or more of the bills now under your consideration. We have done so because our West Coast state now has more than 3,500 Indochinese refugees. The Oregon Department of Human Resources estimates 500 additional Indochinese refugees will move into the state annually for the next several years, based on the experience of 1976.

Of the 3,500 Indochinese refugees now residing in Oregon, about 2,100 are receiving some form of public assistance or job development service from the State of Oregon.

Only 1,000 of these refugees in Oregon will be eligible to continue to receive regular services if the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Act is not extended. The other 1,100 refugees in the state already have been told their assistance will be terminated the end of this month, since Oregon's Emergency Board, which handles appropriations matters while the Legislature is not in session, has declined to fund the programs for refugees unless the Congress extends existing federal legislation. This termination of the program will mean the loss of 40 staff positions within the Department of Human Resources.

Failure to extend the full range of special Indochinese refugee assistance including such social services as job training and English language instruction would be extremely untimely and unfortunate. This assistance should not go on forever, of course. But a premature termination of this assistance would result in long-term losses, both for the refugees themselves, and for our nation.

In Oregon, the Department of Human Resources placed almost 700 Indochinese refugees in jobs last year. Some 600 refugees were entered in English language training courses. As refugees master the language, they desperately need skill training so they become competitive in the job market.

Oregon officials, under the leadership of Richard A. Davis, director of the Department of Human Resources, have taken a most practical approach in the tailoring of their refugee assistance in that they are emphasizing the need for job-related skill training in the coming year.

As more refugee families move to Oregon, the task will continue.

The Carter Administration is proposing an extension of the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Act that would restrict the services available to refugees to welfare only and provide for a relatively sharp decline in funding support over the next three years, including far less than 100 percent funding support in fiscal year 1978.

Congressman Ullman and I would argue against that approach. There is evidence, at least in our state, that the program is just beginning to produce the kind of results we want. Therefore, we should not restrict the services available or be too quick to phase out the program's funding. The results could be counter-productive in effectively assimilating these displaced people into our

society and local and state economies. Instead, we support an approach more like the approach recommended by our colleague, Congressman Stark, which returns full funding for social services for three years, while phasing out during that period welfare funding support.

We believe the Stark approach is reasonable based on Oregon's experience where 21 percent of the refugee households receiving public assistance of some type are employed or are contributing to their financial needs. This, incidentally, compares with only 19 percent employment of Aid to Dependent Children families.

Of 900 cases opened in Oregon in the last year in which refugee families received all of their cash needs from the state, almost two-thirds now have been moved to partial cash assistance or closed out altogether as a result of job development training.

Moreover, nearly three-fourths of all Indochinese refugee families in Oregon (including those not on public assistance) are employed.

However, large families cannot be expected to be fully financially independent by the employment of one person. Therefore, it is necessary to continue special services and financial assistance until they are totally assimilated and have achieved financial self-sufficiency.

This program has not been easy either for the refugees or the state agencies handling the assistance program. Let's face it, being uprooted from your native country which has been ravaged by war is not an easy thing to cope with. Not surprisingly, many of the Indochinese refugees are facing serious phychiatric problems stemming from their relocation. Learning a new language, new customs and a new trade are trials enough without adding the stress of termination of the services they need to help them survive in their new country.

We need extension of the entire program at 100 percent funding levels in the next year. We believe at this time the gradual phase-out of welfare funding in fiscal years 1979 and 1980 is acceptable, but we oppose phasing out funding for social services.

Only in this way can we keep faith with the responsibility we accepted when we allowed the refugees to come to America—in recognition that their need to leave Vietnam stemmed from their loyalty to and trust in the policies of the United States. The Vietnamese refugees need individual and special attention in their first crucial years here. We must not fail them. It would not be in keeping with our ideals and our resolute commitment to the human rights and human dignity of the world's citizens abroad or at home.

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STATEMENT OF HON. BOB WILSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

MR. CHAIRMAN: I do appreciate the opportunity your Committee has afforded me to submit testimony in support of extending the life of the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975. This program has been of immense help in the past and I hope it will be extended so it may continue to help in the future.

Approximately 65,000 Southeast Asian refugees are dependent upon this program for their subsistence. Of that total, about 23,000 refugees are aided in California. If the Federal program is allowed to expire on September 30th, thousands of refugees will be left with no immediate aid available.

My concern, which is shared by many state and local government officials in areas where Indochinese refugees have concentrated, is that this externally created burden—which results from a gesture of humanitarian good will on behalf of all Americans—will be forced upon a relatively small number of state and local taxpayers. As an example, the annualized costs for Indochinese refugees currently on AFDC and General Assistance in my area of San Diego, should IRAP terminate, is estimated to be $1.7 million.

There will be serious human and fiscal consequences if we allow this program to expire. Our states are not prepared to absorb the costs of IRAP without causing an excess burden on already overextended services and state and local tax bases.

The burden of public assistance resulting from the immigration of Indochinese refugees to this country will remain, regardless of the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program. The critical issue relates to the proper location of responsibility for funding this burden. The commitment to the Indochinese refugees, as

a national commitment, should be shared equally among all of our citizens. If the program is allowed to terminate, this will not be the case, as assistance will revert to the state and local governments who will have to finance such aid.

I believe the multi-year extension that is under consideration is of the utmost necessity and I would urge you to give it your wholehearted support.

Thank you.

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STATEMENT OF HON. JERRY M. PATTERSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify on legislation to extend the Indo-Chinese Refugee Assistance Program. The 1975 Act which provided aid to states and local governments to offset the fiscal impact of services rendered to refugees, expires on September 30.

I believe we must continue to recognize the ongoing federal responsibility in helping to resettle the refugees who have come to our shores from Indo-China under the Federal Refugee Assistance Program.

I am a cosponsor of H.R. 9110, introduced by Congressman Pete Stark and cosponsored by more than forty-five of my colleagues.

H.R. 9110 recognizes the need for continued assistance, but at the same time avoids the danger that the program will become a permanent part of the federal budget. H.R. 9110 calls for a three year federal program integrating assistance into ongoing federal and state programs. It calls for 100 percent reimbursement to states and local governments for fiscal year 1978, 75 percent in fiscal 1979 and 50 percent in fiscal year 1980. The bill also includes $25 million for special projects to assist refugees in normalizing their lives and gaining the education and necessary skills to effectively integrate into the mainstream of American Society. Funds for these special projects would be made available to state or local public agencies, as well as private voluntary agencies participating in the Indo-Chinese Refugee Assistance Program.

In my own district in Orange County, Calif., there is a private organization which has been effective in helping many of the 3,000 refugees in the county become self-reliant.

H.R. 9110 also takes into account the 15,000 additional refugees whose admission was recently authorized by the Attorney General.

Unfortunately, the Administration has proposed a three year extension of the Indo-Chinese Refugee Assistance Program, which I feel is grossly inadequate. It immediately cuts funding for the first year to 75 percent, reduces it to 50 percent the second year and to 25 percent the third. This will place undue hardships on the states and local governments who are already feeling the burden of public assistance to the Indo-Chinese refugees who immigrated here as a result of actions taken by the federal government. The federal government, therefore, should take its share of the responsibility in resettling the refugees.

The Administration's bill also excludes money for special social services. It does nothing to help the refugees get off the welfare roles and assimilate into our society.

Since the Indo-Chinese Refugee Assistance Program was implemented in 1975 the refugees have made remarkable progress in successfully integrating into our communities. But the resettlement process is still in motion and for many it is just beginning. This requires a continuation of federal support with 100 percent funding next year and a goal towards complete phase-down in three years. H.R. 9110 will achieve this end.

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to submit for the record written testimony by Dennis B. Hart, Director, Social Services of the County of Orange, California. Mr. Hart's testimony points quite clearly to the need for continued federal support for the Indo-Chinese Refugees.

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## B. CONCERNED INDIVIDUALS, GROUPS

STATEMENT OF DENNIS B. HART, DIRECTOR, SOCIAL SERVICES, COUNTY OF ORANGE, CALIF., REPRESENTING THE ORANGE COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

Mr. Chairman, Honorable Members of the Committee: My name is Dennis Hart. I am the Director of Social Services in Orange County, California. By

direction of the Orange County Board of Supervisors, I am here to acquaint this Committee with the anticipated fiscal impact upon Orange County should the Indochina Refugee Assistance Program (known as IRAP) not be extended.

As you may be aware, a relatively high percentage of the Indochinese refugees are concentrated in California—33 percent. This represents about 50,000 individuals of which 29.6 percent were receiving public assistance as of December 1, 1976. Of that 29.6 percent, 15 percent—more than 3,000 persons—were receiving assistance in Orange County.

We expect that these percentages will hold true when applied to the 15,000 new refugees recently admitted into the United States; or a net increase of approximately 5,000 new refugees establishing residence in California. About 1,500 of that 5,000 will need assistance, with 225 to 230 having need of assistance in Orange County.

We are deeply concerned that a cessation of the current federally supported IRAP program on September 30 will result in an excessive share of what we believe to be a national responsibility being shifted to local government and local property owners.

In the County of Orange, a transfer of the IRAP caseload existent on July 1, 1977 to the regular aid programs will result in increased costs of approximately $2.5 million a year. Medical only, food stamp and foster care cases will add on an estimated $120,000 to $200,000 plus another estimated $255,000 for the new cases expected from the 15,000 new refugees in the country. The costs to the county for administering the services and financial programs for the current eligible refugees would be an estimated $838,724. Additionally, based upon our most recent survey, it is very possible that 40 percent of the current IRAP households will qualify for no help whatsoever under changed eligibility criteria. These persons will be forced to face insurmountable financial and social problems.

I believe these facts and figures clearly demonstrate the reason for our concern. We urge you to extend the Indochina Refugee Assistance Program.

In the event that Congress decides not to re-fund the refugee program, Orange County, California, recommends that additional Federal appropriations be provided for the funding of necessary administrative and grant costs in the current income maintenance and services programs. This recommended action would prevent the shifting of a tremendous fiscal burden to the citizens of Orange County. Over and above the fiscal concerns, Orange County is disturbed about the impact of these changes upon a refugee people who were given what appeared to be a humanitarian invitation to enter our country. Now the specter of being cast adrift hovers over 40 percent of our refugee households.

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STATEMENT BY MARION WOODS, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF BENEFIT PAYMENTS, CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND WELFARE AGENCY

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I am Marion Woods, Director of the Department of Benefit Payments in California. I want to thank you for this opportunity to address you on the issue of extending the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program (IRAP) which was estabilshed under Public Law 94-23 and Public Law 94-24. As spokesman for the state with the largest Indochinese refugee population and as director of the state agency which has the responsibility for administering the AFDC and Food Stamp programs, among others, I am here to express California's concern about the effects which failure to extend the current IRAP program would have on the Indochinese refugees, and on the states.

In enacting Public Law 94-23 and Public Law 94-24, Congress estabilshed as a national policy Federal responsibility for the successful resettlement of 130,000 Indochinese refugees. This commitment included a recognition of the fact that such resettlement was dependent upon the refugees' assimilation into American society and upon their ability to become self-sufficient by means of securing adequate employment. Congress recognized that refugee assimilation and self-sufficiency was not to be achieved within a few weeks or a few months. Therefore, to aid the refugees with their adjustment to American society, Congress estabilshed programs which would meet the basic needs of the refugees during the transition period between resettlement and assimilation. These programs provide refugees, who are in need, with cash assistance, medical assistance, social services, employment training, and instruction in English as a second language.

The program of assistance was designed to expire September 30, 1977. This limitation was intended to prevent assistance from continuing long after the need for such programs ceased, and appears to have been based on an assumption that as of October 1, 1977, few, if any, of the refugees would be in need of the type of assistance authorized under Public Law 94–23 and Public Law 94–24. This assumption has proven to be incorrect. While many of the refugees have been able to successfully resettle their families, find jobs and adjust to a new culture, there are a substantial number of other refugees who still have not become employed or achieved self-sufficiency. The magnitude of this can be seen in the statistics on refugees who continue to receive some form of assistance.

It is currently estimated that there are in California some 60,000 of the original 130,000 refugees. While HEW figures show that 26,000 of these refugees were resettled directly to California, secondary migration of refugees has resulted in a dramatic increase in California's refugee population. Of the refugees who are now living in the state, approximately one-half are receiving assistance, whether cash allowance, medical assistance or social services. This high percentage results primarily from the inability of the refugees to find employment. The refugees have a strong work ethic, but their employment problems stem from a lack of language and a lack of job skills which are transferable to the U.S. economy.

In addition to the inability to find employment, other factors have contributed to the failure of many refugees to adjust to American society, these include mental depression, guilt and anxiety over lost relatives, and the breakdown of relationships with sponsors. These needs have been addressed through special projects and social services funded by the original authorization. Continuation of these programs is essential if full and successful resettlement is to be achieved.

The current status of the refugee situation clearly demonstrates two things, first, the original purpose behind the refugee assistance program—effective resettlement of Indochinese refugees in American society—has not been achieved, since a substantial number of refugees continue to be dependent upon the assistance provided by IRAP. It can be expected that the acute problems of the refugees will ultimately subside. Most of them will adjust to our culture, learn our language, and become economically self-sufficient. When this occurs, it will be realistic to consider terminating the program. Until this occurs, the continued involvement of the Federal Government is essential to achieve the effective resettlement of the Indochinese population.

Second, the 2½ years established by Congress as the period during which refugee assistance would be available to Indochinese refugees has not provided adequate time for the refugee population to find employment and become assimilated into American society. While it is expected that there will always be some refugees who will occasionally need some type of assistance, the current refugee case load still includes many for whom the program has not met its goals. We agree with the Congressional intent of Public Law 94–23 that the IRAP program should not continue endlessly, but we believe also that the program should not be prematurely terminated.

In the absence of Congressional extension of the IRAP program, refugees will have to qualify for the regular aid programs. Some will qualify for AFDC, others will qualify for local general assistance programs, and many will be ineligible for any type of cash assistance. In a large number of California counties, General Assistance recipients receive either a very low amount of assistance or no cash assistance at all.

The effect of the termination of the IRAP program will also be substantial on the states. At the outset of the refugee resettlement program, the states were assured that the refugees would not be a burden on the states and that refugees would be evenly distributed throughout the United States. Termination of funding of this program on September 30, 1977, will shift considerable costs to state and local government. For California, where approximately 60,000 refugees now reside, it is estimated that state and local costs for public assistance in fiscal year 1977–78 (including cash assistance, Medi-Cal, and social services) will be $38 million. This increased burden on our country governments will be particularly acute, since an estimated $7 million will be in the form of county general relief.

With California property owners in revolt over soaring taxes, social services budgets strained to the utmost, and communities faced with the effect of the severest drought in this century, such an added burden seems unfair indeed. Due to the large number of refugees in our State, California taxpayers under any continuation of IRAP that does not include full funding will already have assumed a disproportionate share of what should be the entire nation's burden.

Several proposals for extending the IRAP program have been suggested, some of which call for an immediate reduction in federal funding under a phase-down plan. We believe a severe phase-down and shift of responsibility to state and local governments is inequitable and inconsistent with the national commitment which our country has undertaken. In addition to shifting the Public Assistance costs to the state and local governments, some proposals also fail to recognize the critical need for funds to continue self-sufficiency projects and special social services in support of such projects. Failure to continue the efforts to assist refugees in attaining self-sufficiency leaves little hope that those refugees currently on Public Assistance will ever be able to break out of the welfare cycle.

As a representative of the state which has accepted the greatest number of Indochinese refugees brought into this country by the Federal Government, I urge consideration of a full extension of the IRAP program for a reasonable period of time. Full federal funding for three years of all elements originally recognized as essential to the refugee resettlement would enable the country to establish a coherent and consistent national policy relating to refugee and immigrant resettlement in the United States. Only then can the state and local governments accomplish the task initiated by the Federal Government.

Again, I thank you for the opportunity to address the committee on an issue which is of such critical importance to California and to all of the state which have accepted Indochinese refugees.

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STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES

The Indochinese refugee assistance program established by Congress in 1975 has successfully resettled some 150,000 refugees into the United States. An additional 15,000 refugees are arriving now and others will follow. Termination of the federal program is premature as long as refugees are arriving and as long as substantial numbers of refugees remain in need of income assistance, medical assistance, social services, job development, and language training.

Despite the national character of the Indochinese refugee assistance program, the majority of refugees have settled in approximately ten states, notably California, Texas, Michigan, and Illinois. Although most refugees have succesfully assimilated, more than one-third continue in need of public assistance.

As long as the resettlement and assimilation of Indochinese refugees remain a problem of national scope, it is only fair that the costs be shared by all Americans.

Therefore NACo urges your committee to support legislation to continue 100 percent federal funding of public assistance and social services to Indochinese refugees for at least one year; and to phase down the federal contribution only when the costs will not create disproportionate tax burdens for Americans in certain states and counties.

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RESOLUTION OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

On motion of Supervisor Hedgecock, seconded by Supervisor Hamilton, the following resolution is adopted:

Whereas, in May, 1975 the Congress passed, and the President signed, Public Laws 94–23 and 94–24, the Indochinese Migration and the Refugee Assistance Act, and

Whereas, these laws authorized, and provided appropriations for, the establishment of the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program, and

Whereas, the integration of Indochinese refugees into the mainstream of the American culture and economy has not occurred at the rate assumed by the Congress when it passed the Indochinese Migration and Refugee Assistance Act, and

Whereas, large numbers of Indochinese refugees have large families, little or no education, few marketable employment skills, and poor health, and hence are dependent upon public assistance to satisfy their monetary and medical needs, and

Whereas, under the provisions of the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program the federal government provides full cost-reimbursement to states for the welfare costs of cash assistance, medical assistance, and social services rendered to Indochinese refugees who met eligibility criteria, and

Whereas, the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program will terminate on September 30, 1977, unless the Congress provides supplemental appropriations, and

Whereas, such termination of federal funding will result in significant increases in caseloads for the program for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), MediCal and Social Services Programs in California, and

Whereas, such caseload increases will result in increased costs to the taxpayers of San Diego County of more than $1.83 million per year in property taxes alone, not including increases in costs derived from personal income taxes which the States of California must share, and

Whereas, the unemployment rate in San Diego County is among the highest in the nation, making it unlikely that the disproportionately large number of refugees migrating here will find adequate employment, thus increasing the likelihood of their continued reliance upon public assistance, and

Whereas, the commitment made to the Indochinese refugees by the United States Congress was a Federal commitment, and

Whereas, the placement of the burden of this commitment on a relatively small number of local and state governments would be inequitable and would not represent the good intentions of the Congress: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved*, That the Board of Supervisors of the County of San Diego urges the Congress to continue full-cost federal funding of the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program until such time as the provision of public assistance to the Indochinese refugees no longer places a disproportionate burden on any given local or state government.

Passed and adopted this 16th day of March, 1977, by the following vote:

Ayes: Supervisors Hamilton, Moore, Hedgecock, and Taylor.

Noes: Supervisors, none.

Absent: Supervisor Bates.

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STATEMENT OF KEITH COMRIE, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am Keith Comrie, Director of Los Angeles County Department of Public Social Services. I appreciate this opportunity to comment on the need for new legislation to continue the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program which currently expires on September 30, 1977.

As you know, there are approximately 150,000 Indochinese Refugees in the United States, about one-third of whom receive some form of public assistance.

The State of California estimates that between 40 percent and 60 percent of all Indochinese Refugees live in California. Estimates for fiscal year 1977–78 indicate that total IRAP costs for California will amount to $39 million for cash assistance, Medi-Cal and Social Services. Without 100 percent Federal funding, the State and counties will have to shoulder $27 million of this amount. The Los Angeles County share of this amount will be $4 million. These figures will surely increase with secondary migration of refugees from areas that have no General Assistance programs and/or do not aid federally ineligible AFDC-Unemployed Parent cases. In addition, in the Standard Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program once a father is fully employed, regardless of his net take-home pay, his family no longer qualifies for any cash assistance. In the IRAP program, special work incentives are available so that it always pays to work through the continuing availability of part of the welfare grant in some cases. The voluntary agencies and the public sector have worked extremely hard to reduce the dependency level of this latter group, especially over the last six months. If the special work incentives are now dropped, many fathers may be put in the position of being able to have more income to support their families through welfare rather than working. They may, therefore, quit work and further increase welfare costs.

I, therefore, urge that a small task force be convened to determine the full impact of terminating the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program. I recommend that the IRAP program be continued with the same rules and regulations as it has at present for at least one year while representatives from Congress, the Administration, State officials, local administrators, and voluntary agencies jointly collect information and provide specific case examples to you of the impact of various changes you might elect to make. I believe a detailed report could be ready for you within six to nine months.

We are impressed with the effort of many sectors of the population, especially the Refugees themselves, in working toward self-sufficiency. The current Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program provides a work incentive which I believe

96-725—78——10

it is important to give careful consideration to before changing the rules. I would be happy to provide any support necessary in developing such a report for Congress.

Thank you for this opportunity to testify before this distinguished Committee.

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STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS REGARDING INDOCHINESE REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

At this particular time, when the property tax burden for the average taxpayer has reached overwhelming and disporportionate dimensions as a means of public financing, it is peculiar and alarming that the Federal government should choose to compound this burden by failing to take responsibility for a program for which only the Federal government has the authority and wherewithal to deal equitably.

The Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program (IRAP) was established by Congress in the Spring of 1975 in connection with the Federal government's intention to bring into this country 150,000 refugees from Indochina. It was the hope of the Congress in establishing the IRAP Program that the Indochinese refugees would assimilate quickly into the American economy and society; hence, an automatic termination date of September 30, 1977, was built into the program's authorization bill.

In fact, however, the Indochinese refugees have not, in many cases, assimilated rapidly into the American economy and society. This is not surprising, given a review of the socio-economic profile of the refugees on their arrival. Even in 1975 such a review demonstrated the very apparent potential for severe problems in the area of housing, education and health due to the large size of refugee families, their relatively low level of education, their lack of marketable employment skills, and in many cases their manifest poor health.

And so the findings of a recent GAO report (HRD–77–35) were not surprising: They indicated that between December 1975 and December 1976 the percentage of Indochinese refugees receiving public assistance increased from 19 percent to 30 percent nationwide. The increase in California was from 31 percent to 46 percent. Such figures are not indicative, by any measure, of rapid assimilation! Quite the contrary, they are indicative of a very poorly prepared group being asked to compete in a very competitive job market!

If the IRAP Program terminates in schedule at the end of this month, what will be the impact on the property taxpayer in San Diego County? First, it is important to note that of the 150,000 refugees initially brought to this county, more than one-third have settled in California. Secondly, it is important to note that as of December 1976, of the refugeees in California 14,787 were receiving some form of IRAP-financed public assistance. Thirdly, following a caseload increase of 9.5 percent during the past year, the IRAP caseload in San Diego County has leveled off at 2,335 recipients.

If the IRAP Program terminates, those of the 2,335 individuals who qualify will be converted to regularly financed AFDC and Social Services Programs. The cost of such assistance will be shared by the federal, state and county governments. Those who do not qualify will be converted to General Relief, which is totally financed by county governments. The added cost to the County of San Diego—and to the property taxpayers of this county—will be in excess of $2 million for the federal fiscal year beginning October 1, 1977.

And the costs will go beyond the $2 million cited above: (1) On July 15, 1977, it was announced that an additional 15,000 Indochinese refugees would be brought into the country. At some point in the near future, federal support of these refugees will cease. The cost burden in San Diego County is projected to be $228,000 for refugees who are anticipated to immigrate to this area. (2) The County of San Diego, as have virtually all other counties in California, has completely depleted its Title XX social services funds. The very great need to provide services to the Indochinese refugees threatens a significant reduction in service resources for other needy groups in this community.

The dialogue in Washington, related to the extension of the IRAP Program, frequently alludes to the essentially humanitarian nature of the program; the efforts of the national church groups and voluntary agencies are founded upon this humanitarian concern.

Without a doubt, the IRAP Program does represent a humanitarian gesture in regard to which all Americans may take pride. But let us not forget that the Indochinese refugees, as would be the case with any other group of indigent persons, are eligible for and must receive public assistance if their circumstances so warrant. Apart from its symbolic value, therefore, IRAP has represented an effort on the part of the federal government to distribute the cost of a federally-created public assistance burden equitably among the federal, state, and local governments.

The concern of this Board, which is shared by many state and local government officials in areas where Indochinese refugees have concentrated, is that this externally created burden—which results from a gesture of humanitarian good will on behalf of all Americans—will be forced upon a relatively small number of state and local taxpayers. The Secretary of HEW, Joseph Califano, in his September 7 letter to the Vice President transmitting HEW's proposal for an extension of IRAP, stated:

"We believe the enclosed draft bill represents a reasonable approach to meeting the needs of Indochinese refugees. Our proposal takes into account the Federal responsibility for these individuals, as well as their own ability gradually to support themselves and the role of the States in carrying out welfare and social services programs."

Under that proposal, the federal government would provide supplemental funding to the states, for those refugees not otherwise eligible for AFDC, SSI, or Medicaid, at sharing rations of 75 percent in fiscal year 1978, 50 percent in fiscal year 1979, and 25 percent in fiscal year 1980. It would not provide for the funding of administrative costs. It would provide full federal support of the 15,000 new refugees through March 1979, after which time such supplemental support would be reduced as described above. All special Federal support for the Indochinese refugees would terminate by the end of March 1982.

Most surely, the HEW proposal does not reflect the ability of these individuals to "gradually support themselves." The proposal's phasedown provision assumes a more rapid assimilation than that which is taking place. At the same time, the number of refugees on the welfare rolls is increasing. Nor does the HEW proposal take "into account the Federal responsibility for these individuals . . ."

What the HEW proposal does reflect is an attempt by the Federal government to place on selected State and local governments the financial burden for a situation created by the Federal government.

The humanitarian gesture made by the Federal government to the Indochinese refugees was made on behalf of all Americans. Bringing the refugees here created numerous obligations for support which will remain until such time as the refugees in fact are assimilated. The resulting burden of public assistance will remain, regardless of the future of the IRAP Program. The critical issue relates to the proper location of responsibility for funding this burden. The burden should be shared equally on a national basis. It should be financed by means of the nationwide income tax, not by the local property tax in selected communities.

[Attachment]

CASELOADS AND COSTS FOR CALIFORNIA COUNTIES

| County | Cases | Persons | Estimated annual costs | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Total | Assistance | Administrative | Social service |
| Los Angeles | 2,220 | 5,978 | $4,908,631 | $3,800,000 | $1,000,000 | $108,631 |
| San Diego | 810 | 2,335 | 2,269,883 | 1,432,872 | 192,359 | 644,652 |
| Orange | 820 | 3,224 | 2,559,174 | 1,720,450 | 184,694 | 654,030 |
| Alameda | 231 | 631 | 381,636 | 260,844 | 56,666 | 64,126 |
| Total | 4,063 | 12,168 | 10,119,324 | 7,214,166 | 1,433,719 | 1,471,439 |

CALCULATION OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY COSTS RELATED TO IMMIGRATION OF 15,000 NEW INDOCHINESE REFUGEES SHOULD IRAP PROGRAM TERMINATE

*Data*

(1) California has approximately 50,000 (33 percent) of all Indochinese refugees in the United States.

(2) As of December 1, 1976, 29.6 percent (14,787) of California's refugees were on IRAP-supported public assistance.

(3) As of December 1, 1976, San Diego County had 15.3 percent (2,264) of refugees statewide on IRAP assistance.

(4) As of July 1, 1977, San Diego County had 257 AFDC–U (IRAP) cases, with a potential County cost of $806,472, or $3,138 per case.

(5) As of July 1, 1977, San Diego County had 227 AFDC–FG (IRAP) cases, with a potential County cost of $227,376, or $1,002 per case.

(6) As of July 1, 1977, San Diego County had 326 GR (IRAP) cases, with a potential County cost of $399,024, or $1,224 per case.

(7) Annualized County costs for Title XX Social Services and public assistance administrative costs as of July 1, 1977 were estimated to be $840,000 should IRAP terminate.

(8) Total AFDC/GR (IRAP) cases in San Diego County as of July 1, 1977 were 810, involving 2,335 refugees and 2.88 individuals per case.

*Assumptions*

(1) California will receive 5,000 (33 percent) of new refugees.

(2) Approximately 30.5 percent of these individuals statewide will require public assistance/social services.

(3) Approximately 15.3 percent of public assistance cases statewide will be in San Diego.

(4) Approximately 31.7 percent of the public assistance cases in San Diego will be AFDC–U, 28.0 percent AFDC–FG, and 40.2 percent GR.

TOTAL ANNUALIZED COSTS AS OF JULY 1, 1977, SHOULD IRAP PROGRAM TERMINATE

| | Cases | Persons | Total cost | Cost Breakdown | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Federal | State | County |
| AFDC–U | 257 | 1,066 | $1,612,932 | 0 | $806,472 | $806,472 |
| AFDC–FG | 227 | 943 | 1,299,348 | $649,680 | 422,292 | 227,376 |
| General relief | 326 | 326 | 399,024 | 0 | 0 | 399,024 |
| Total | 810 | 2,335 | 3,311,304 | 649,680 | 1,228,764 | 1,432,872 |

*Social services costs.*—$644,652 for SW salaries alone, plus support staff, materials and indirect costs. Would displace Title XX services.

*Administrative costs.*—Total costs are $329,084, of which $192,359 would be County costs.

*Caseload trends.*—Anticipated 5 percent increase by October 1, 1978: 851 cases involving 2,452 persons. Total cost would be $3,842,178; of which $1,662,132 would be County cost.

*Miscellaneous.*—Currently have 45 cash-eligible cases, but families have chosen not to accept aid. To reduce County costs to $1 million would require overall 40 percent reduction in caseload.

*Calculations*

(1) San Diego County will be required to provide public assistance to 81 new cases involving 233 refugees as follows:

| Type of aid | Cases | Annual cost to county |
|---|---|---|
| AFDC–U | 26 | $81,588 |
| AFDC–FG | 23 | 23,046 |
| General relief | 32 | 39,168 |
| Total | 81 | 143,802 |

(2) Based upon estimated social services/administrative costs to County for current IRAP caseloads ($840,000), such costs for new refugees will approximate $84,000 annually.

*Conclusions*

(1) Total annualized costs to County of San Diego for existing Indochinese refugees (based on August 1, 1977 caseloads), should IRAP terminate, will be $1,662,132.

(2) Total annualized costs to County of San Diego for additional Indochinese refugees, should IRAP terminate, will be $227,802.

(3) Total annualized costs to County of San Diego for existing and additional Indochinese refugees, should IRAP terminate, will be $1,889,934.

[Attachment]

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[From the San Diego Union, Sept. 24, 1977]

REFUGEE BILLS DUE

On Sept. 30 the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program expires, and unless Congress acts posthaste, some state and local governments will have to start paying bills that clearly are the federal government's responsibility.

In 1975 the federal government instituted the program, under which welfare costs for refugees of the war in Southeast Asia who are living in the United States have been paid. The program expires next Friday.

An end to federal assistance would mean that this state would have to pick up $24 million in welfare costs, and various California counties about $15 million. San Diego County would have to pay $2.5 million.

What to do? A bill to extend the program has been proposed, by the administration, but because it offers less than full reimbursement of welfare and retraining costs, it is not wholly satisfactory. Obviously, time is short. However, the wisest course would be for Congress to extend the present program for at least another year. Thus the federal government would maintain its responsibility, and taxpayers of pertinent state and local governments would not be unfairly indebted. And, during the year of extension, Congress more calmly could assess the problems of refugees, the state and local governments, and the national interest.

[Attachment]

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[From the San Diego Union, Sept. 23, 1977]

SAN DIEGO JOINS PLEA FOR U.S. FUNDS

COUNTIES FIGHT REFUGEE AID CUTOFF

(By G. M. Prather)

WASHINGTON.—California county officials yesterday asked Congress to extend for one year full federal funding for the Indochina Refugee Assistance Program so local taxpayers are not forced to pick up the tab through increased property taxes.

Officials from San Diego, Los Angeles, Orange and Alameda counties told the Senate Human Resources Committee that unless the federal funding is continued, "a relatively small number of state and local taxpayers will be forced to bear the financial burden for a situation created by the federal government."

Roger Honberger, Washington representative for San Diego County, said it would cost the county $2.3 million for the social and medical services and benefits currently funded by the federal government. (Other county estimates have ranged from $1.00 million.)

Keith Comrie, director of the Department of Public Social Services for Los Angeles County, said the cost to that county would be $4.9 million.

Honberger said San Diego would be forced to raise property taxes by 3.3 cents for $100 valuation, bringing the total bill to $1.858.

Comrie said Los Angeles would not be able to increase taxes and would be forced to reduce services in other areas.

"The very great need to provide services to the Indochinese refugees threatens a significant reduction in service resources for other needy groups in this community," Honberger said.

The Carter administration is proposing a phased reduction in the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program (IRAP), created in the spring of 1975 after the fall of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to allow 150,000 refugees to enter this country.

"It was the hope of the Congress in establishing the program that the Indochinese refugees would assimilate quickly into the U.S. economy and society. Hence, an automatic termination date of Sept. 30, 1977, was built into the program's authorization bill, Honberger said.

"This assumption has proven to be incorrect," said Marion Woods, director of the Department of Benefit Payments in the California Health and Welfare Agency.

Woods said an estimated 60,000 of the original 130,000 refugees now reside in California and approximately one-half are receiving assistance either in the form of cash benefits, medical assistance or social services.

All of the California officials asked the Senate to provide at least one more year of full federal funding for the refugee assistance program to allow the assimilation process to continue.

Sen. Alan Cranston, D-Calif., a member of the Human Resources Committee that conducted yesterday's hearings, said it is unlikely Congress will be able to act before the Sept. 30 cutoff date.

But he said funding could continue temporarily if Congress passes a "continuing resolution" while the full bill works its way through the House and Senate.

He added that an additional 15,000 refugees can be expected to settle in California over the next three to five years. This would add, for example, $228,000 to the cost burden for San Diego County alone, Honberger testified.

Sen. S. L. Hayakawa, R-Calif., also a member of the Human Resources Committee, asked Comrie if granting the continued funding would not encourage refugees to stay on public assistance.

"My concern is just the opposite," Comrie said. "If funding is cut off before the assimilation process is complete, we may lock ourselves into continued long-term support by taking the social and education services away too early."

[Attachment]

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[From the Los Angeles Times, Sept. 23, 1977]

EXTENSION OF FEDERAL REFUGEE AID SOUGHT

MORE INDOCHINESE ARRIVING IN STATE; U.S. ASSISTANCE DUE TO END SEPT. 30

(By Ellen Hume)

WASHINGTON.—About 45,000 to 75,000 more Indochinese refugees will arrive in the United States during the next few years and as many as half of them are expected to settle in California, according to Senate testimony Thursday.

But even as hundreds of new refugees are arriving this week in San Francisco, the federal government is preparing to cut off aid to them and the nation's 146,000 Vietnamese and other Indochinese immigrants, witnesses told the Senate Human Resources Committee.

California Gov. Brown called Rep. Peter W. Rodino Jr. (D-N.J.) Tuesday to find out what progress was being made on legislative efforts to extend the $455 million federal program, a Brown spokesman said. Rodino said that he told Brown the program was "in some difficulty."

If the federal payments are terminated Sept. 30, as the law provides California taxpayers will have to spend $39 million to sustain the 60,000 refugees already living in the state, Marion Woods, director of California's Department of Benefit Payments, testified.

Lost Angeles County would have to cut back on other programs to come up with its $4 million share of that burden, Keith Comrie, the county's director of public social services, told the committee.

"The Indochinese people do not like to be on welfare. It makes them feel like second-class citizens," said Hung Le Si, an Indochinese member of the Coalition for the Effective Resettlement of Indochinese Refugees.

But even refugees who arrived here in 1975 still need English classes, career counseling and job placement services, she said. State Department officials testified that even though 92 percent of the refugees are employed, 35 percent need some financial assistance because they are in low-income jobs.

"The original purpose behind the refugee assistance program—effective resettlement of Indochinese refugees in American society—has not been achieved," Woods testified.

"It can be expected that the acute problems of the refugees will ultimately subside . . . until this occurs, the continued involvement of the federal government is essential to achieve the effective resettlement of the Indochinese population," he said.

A long-delayed Carter Administration proposal, extending federal refugee subsidies for three years, but at reduced levels, has been introduced in the Senate by Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) and in the House by Rodino and Joshua Eilberg (D-Pa.)

But Cranston and other California members of Congress have since concluded that the Administration's proposal does not go far enough. It would provide a 75 percent subsidy for refugee relief programs in 1978, 50 percent in 1979 and 25 percent in 1980, when it would end.

An amendment sponsored by Sens. Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.), Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), Cranston and S. I. Hayakawa (R-Calif.) would continue the federal relief subsidy at 100 percent in 1978, 60 percent in 1979 and 30 percent in 1980.

Although Cranston said it will be "very tough" to get the new bill through by the Sept. 30 deadline, he expects that some extension may be granted to finance relief programs while the legislation is being considered. The Humphrey-Kennedy amendment would cost $233 million, Kennedy said.

Cranston suggested Thursday that because so many more refugees may be coming to the United States about one-third to one-half of them will settle in California—Congress ultimately should consider "some more permanent legislation" dealing with the entire immigration issue.

[Attachment]

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[From the San Diego Evening Tribune, Sept. 22, 1977]

REFUGEE COST BURDEN FOUGHT

(By Janette Corey)

San Diego County taxpayers may have to pick up a $2-to $3-million-a-year tab to support Indochinese refugees, Supervisor Lucille Moore said yesterday.

This could happen if Congress cuts off its aid program for refugees on welfare Sept. 30 as scheduled, she said.

The action would mean that the cost of supporting the 2,320 refugees on welfare in the county would have to be borne by county taxpayers, she said, and could result in a 3- to 3.5-cent hike in the county property tax rate.

County staff members, who have described the situation as an "acute problem," say the county can also expect to pay an additional $300,000 a year to support refugees now arriving in this country who want to settle in San Diego.

In the past two years around 75,000 of the 150,000 Indochinese refugees who fled their war-torn countries have settled in California and although there is no accurate count of the number living in San Diego County, it has been estimated at 22,000.

Under the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program, the federal government has been paying welfare costs for refugees who haven't yet become self-supporting.

But the program is due to expire Sept. 30 and unless it is extended, local and state governments will have to absorb the cost.

"We just cannot afford to carry out a national policy at the local level," Moore said.

The Board of Supervisors has been prodding White House officials and Congress since March to extend the program and the San Diego Refugee Coalition also is seeking extension of the aid program.

Legislation has been introduced in Congress to help ease the transition from federal to state and local support, including a proposal by Sen. Alan Cranston, D-Calif., which would phase out federal assistance gradually.

Cranston's proposal would call on the federal government to pay 75 percent of welfare costs in the first year, 50 percent the second year and 25 percent the third year. Another pending bill would provide a 100 percent, 60 percent and 30 percent phase out.

Local officials are asking for full reimbursement for three years.

Opponents of extending the federal aid program contend that it would lead to "another unending program of government handouts."

They say it would "institutionalize the program," like a similar program in 1961 to aid Cuban refugees, a plan that is still in effect.

The county's chief administrative officer, David Speer, said there is little support in Congress for continuing the federal aid program to Indochinese refugees, because few places in the country are affected as greatly as California by the problem.

The state and its counties will face a combined $39 million burden if they have to pick up total support of the program, state officials said.

Speer said Cranston understands the state's plight and may modify his phase-out proposal.

Last year the number of Indochinese refugees receiving public assistance increased from 19 percent to 31 percent nationwide and 31 percent to 46 percent in California, Speer said.

Moore said the county would be willing to conduct Indocinese aid programs including work-training.

[Attachment]

[From the San Diego Union, Sept. 23, 1977]

REFUGEES FACE LOSS OF U.S. WELFARE PAY

COUNTY MAY HAVE TO FOOT BILL UNLESS PLAN EXTENDED, BOARD TOLD

(By Roger Showley)

Nearly 1,400 Indochinese refugees face the lost of welfare payments a week from today, unless Congress extends the special aid program begun when the refugees came here two years ago, county officials said yesterday.

Ruben E. Dominguez, administrator of the county Human Resources Agency, told the Board of Supervisors in a report that local property taxpayers may have to assume the $1,984,174 cost of the program if Congress fails to act before the Sept. 30 expiration of the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program (IRAP).

Dominguez recommended supervisors deny county-financed general relief payments to some of the refugees.

Dominguez said more than one-fourth of the estimated 8,000 to 10,000 refugees in the county are receiving some form of aid under IRAP. Most of these recipients, he said, suffer from language problems and inadequate job skills in an area with a chronically high unemployment rate of almost 10 percent.

"The refugees are in a very precarious situation," Dominguez, said of the looming cutoff of federal aid. "I hope it doesn't get to the point where, as a result of passing the responsibility around, we end up with chewing up people."

Dominguez said in his report to the supervisors that there are 2,325 refugees receiving aid, of whom 942 would be eligible for the federal Aid to Families with Department Children (AFDC) program and 1,333 others are ineligible for federal payments but could receive money under the county's general relief program.

The refugees still are classified as "parolees" by the federal Immigration and Nationalization Service and thus ineligible for general relief under county requirements, Dominguez said.

He said the refugees' immigration status could be changed, as is proposed in a bill before Congress, so that county-funded general relief payments then would be required. He estimated the cost at $1.22 million in payments and $560,000 in other services and administrative expenses.

Dominguez summed up the aid program's status this way: If Congress allows the IRAP program to expire next Friday and takes no other action, 942 refugees will begin receiving federal AFDC payments at a cost to the county of $134,174. The other 1,383 refugees will receive no funds of any kind if the supervisors deny them eligibility.

If these refugees seeking general relief are granted permanent alien immigration status in place of their status as parolees, then the county would be required to spend $1.78 million in unanticipated costs—which represents the bulk of the supervisors' contingency reserve.

"We are morally responsible for them," Dominguez said in an interview, "but the bill should be paid by the feds (federal government)."

Dominguez said he spent most of this week in Washington trying to convince a Senate committee that the IRAP aid should be extended as it is now for at least one more year.

The Carter administration favors continuing the program at only 75 percent of its present level for the next 12 months, 50 percent the following year and 25 percent the year after, with termination Sept. 30, 1960.

[Attachment]

[From the San Diego Evening Tribune, Sept. 22, 1977]

VIET REFUGEE SHOWDOWN

The federal government continues to admit Vietnamese refugees. The first of 15,000 additional refugees being admitted to this country by special approval from Congress arrived in San Francisco this week.

That's good. The plight of these refugees, many of them "boat people" who set out upon the South China Sea in small vessels seeking haven, must concern us. We have a special responsibility to them because of our country's long and agonizing involvement in Indochina.

But it is a national responsibility. If admitting these refugees and helping them become assimilated into our society is any burden, it should be a national burden.

Congress, however, has set Sept. 30 as the deadline after which the federal government will no longer offer special assistance to Vietnam refugees who find themselves on public welfare or in need of language and job training programs.

That will thrust the burden directly upon local property taxpayers in California, which has about a half (75,000) of all the refugees in the nation. Welfare payments will continue but instead of costing the federal government, they will cost California $39 million a year. And many training programs will probably have to be suspended, despite their excellent record of success in job placements.

These are sturdy, independent people but many of them come into our country with serious handicaps. Present high unemployment in our economy may decline but it may take years for many of these refugee families to become completely self-supporting.

It was unrealistic for Congress, when it passed the Indochinese refugee aid act in 1975 to put a two-year expiration date on its benefits. Many thousands of Cuban refugees continue to receive special federal assistance 15 years after coming to this country.

As the Cubans are concentrated around Miami, the Vietnamese are concentrated in Southern California. Their numbers are increasing in this region as they come here from other areas of the country.

The caseload increase in the last year in San Diego County was 10 percent and we now have 2,320 refugees on the welfare roll. The cost to county taxpayers will be $2.5 million a year if the federal government refuses to extend its aid.

The Congress voted to admit these refugees. It must not shirk its continuing responsibility to care for them.

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STATEMENT FROM THE AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR EMIGRES IN THE PROFESSIONS, INC.

The American Council for Emigres in the Professions is a private, non-profit, non-sectarian organization which, since 1945, has been involved solely in the vocational rehabilitation of the refugee professional. It is the only such organization in the United States. The American Council's services to the refugee include: job development, job placement, English as a second language, counseling, cultural orientation, and retraining. Throughout thirty years of continuous existence and experience, the American Council has learned that this complete package of services is essential to the effective vocational rehabilitation of the refugee. To help the refugee learn English without helping him/her to find employment, or to help the refugee locate a job opportunity without helping him/her to understand the cultural complexities of the American employment interview, are halfway measures. Likewise, public assistance payments for food, clothing, and shelter, without supportive services leading to self-sufficiency, are an inadequate and ineffective response to the refugee resettlement problem. In a year when the Administration is seeking welfare reform and job incentives for the population at large, why should the Indochinese refugee population be encouraged to remain dependent upon public assistance?

In view of these considerations, and based upon our agency's experience as the country's only established vocational rehabilitation organization for the refugee, we strongly urge that the Committee:

"Reject the Administration's proposed bill for extension of the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program

"Support Congressman Fortney Stark's proposed bill for a limited extension of the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program, including both phased-down Federal reimbursement for public assistance payments and funds for job development, job placement, English as a second language, counseling, cultural orientation, and retraining services."

An extension of the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program definitely is needed. All organizations and programs serving the Indochinese refugee will agree that underemployment and unemployment remain unsolved problems, and that they are based upon the refugees' lack of fluency in English, unfamiliarity with American culture, lack of marketable job skills, and resultant psychological

depression. However ,these problems are treatable only through the creation of well-planned and well-funded programs which include all of the suportive services enumerated earlier in this statement. Public assistance payments, while sometimes necessary so that heads of families may be free to participate in retraining programs, must be regarded as a partial solution. Both for the Indochinese refugees who have been in the United States since 1975, and for those "boat cases" who now are arriving, additional supportive services are essential.

It is unrealistic to expect the Indochinese refugees to seek already existing services in the communities where they reside. Each community has its own minority group problems and, in appropriating public funds for programs to alleviate these problems, leaves relatively few enrollee slots for the Indochinese refugees. Furthermore, it is not logical for the Administration to advocate a reduction in Federal reimbursement to the States for public assistance payments in the first year of the extension. Such a first-year reduction of 75 percent reimbursement means that the States must appropriate matching funds. Because there is no time for State legislatures to meet and to vote on such 1977–78 matching funds, the States will not be able to participate in the program until 1979. Many Indochinese refugee families therefore will experience reductions in the cash assistance payments for which they currently are eligible, and this will hinder, rather than promote, the ability of adult family members to enroll in retraining and English as a second language programs.

Historically, refugee resettlement in the United States has been the responsibility of private social service agencies. These agencies know that two years are insufficient to recover from the trauma of fleeing one's homeland, and to adjust effectively to the complexities of a new society. Federal financial assistance is necessary in order for the private social service agencies to develop and implement the manpower conservation programs which will guide the Indochinese refugees toward self-sufficiency. Ultimately, the refugee is not the only beneficiary of this Federal investment in his/her potential. American society will be strengthened immeasurably.

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## Appendix 2

### Congressional Budget Office Memorandum

Congressional Budget Office,
U.S. Congress,
*Washington, D.C., September 29, 1977.*

Memorandum to: Mr. Joshua Eilberg, Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law.
From: Lucia Becerra, Congressional Budget Office.
Subject: H.R. 9110, Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act.

I have reviewed the methodology and estimates prepared by HEW of H.R. 9110. I concur with both. An intensive search for additional data on which to base an independent estimate has revealed no further information. Below you will find the estimates provided by HEW.

H.R. 9110

[In millions of dollars]

| | Fiscal year— | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 |
| Cash assistance | 52.2 | 40.2 | 18.9 |
| Medical assistance | 34.1 | 26.2 | 12.3 |
| Social services[1] | 16.9 | 17.9 | 16.2 |
| State and local administration | 12.4 | 9.6 | 4.4 |
| Total to States | 115.6 | 93.9 | 51.8 |
| Federal program administration and services | 2.5 | 2.1 | 1.5 |
| Total | 118.1 | 96.0 | 53.3 |

[1] Social services estimates are based on 3 years of full funding.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
U.S. CONGRESS,
*Washington, D.C., October 14, 1977.*

Memorandum to: Mr. Joshua Eilberg, Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law.
From: Cyrus P. Karr, CBO.
Subject: S. 2108, A bill to amend the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975.

Pursuant to your request, the table below shows estimated outlays for S. 2108 broken down by type of expenditure.

ESTIMATED OUTLAYS UNDER S. 2108

[In millions of dollars]

| | Fiscal year— | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 |
| Cash assistance | 52.2 | 45.2 | 18.9 | 8.4 | 0 |
| Medical assistance | 34.1 | 26.2 | 12.3 | 5.5 | 0 |
| Social services | 16.9 | 13.4 | 8.1 | 2.7 | 0 |
| State and local administration | 12.4 | 9.6 | 4.4 | 2.0 | 0 |
| Total to States | 115.6 | 89.4 | 43.7 | 18.6 | 0 |
| Federal program administration and services | 2.5 | 2.1 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 0 |
| Subtotal | 118.1 | 91.5 | 45.2 | 20.1 | 0 |
| Special projects and programs | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5 |
| Total | 123.1 | 96.5 | 50.2 | 25.1 | 5 |

## APPENDIX 3

### ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE WITH ANSWERS AND ADDITIONAL SUBMISSIONS BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
*Washington, D.C., September 30, 1977.*

Hon. JOSHUA E. EILBERG,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law, House of Representatives.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for the opportunity to have Undersecretary Habib testify last Friday on the Indochina refugee situation.

At that hearing a number of questions were raised the answers to which are enclosed.

Please let me know if we can be of any further assistance. As Mr. Habib indicated we look forward to consulting closely with you and your committee on the future approach to the Indochina refugee problem.

Sincerely,

DOUGLAS J. BENNET, Jr.,
*Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.*

Enclosures.

*Question.* What is the evidence that, since the announcement of the new U.S. program to parole 15,000 refugees, there has been a greater willingness in countries of temporary asylum to offer safehaven to Indochina refugees?

Answer. As the Committee is aware, the U.S. dialogue with countries of temporary asylum and those that are willing to offer permanent resettlement opportunities to Indochina refugees has been a continuous one. An important element of President Carter's July 15 decision to authorize the Attorney General to consult Congress on parole authority was that the State Department concurrently approach other governments on temporary and permanent resettlement. In August when parole was approved instructions were sent to a number of Embassies in both types of countries in an effort to encourage (a) greater acceptance of refugees for temporary asylum pending resettlement, (b) additional permanent resettlement places for refugees, and (c) special contributions to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) earmarked for the support

of those fleeing Indochina. Parallel demarches by UNHCR were also carried out and are continuing.

To date the most noteworthy results have occurred in Malaysia, a country with an initially good record of extending both permanent and temporary asylum and of cooperation in the care of Indochina refugees with the UNHCR, ourselves and other interested governments, particularly France. The flow of boat refugees which began in the late summer or early fall of 1976 reached flood proportions in the first half of this year and coincided with a hiatus in the American program for resettlement. On February 10, 1977, the number of refugees in Malaysia totaled 911, over twice what it had been three or four months previously, and by mid-summer of this year it had reached nearly 3,000. This rapid increase severely taxed the already strained Malaysian administrative apparatus and created internal political problems related to Malaysia's ethnic situation.

In reaction to this and to fears that the refugees would not leave Malaysia, state and federal officials resorted to "pushing off" boats in the hope that they would find refuge elsewhere. As a result, there are many cases of refugee boats which landed four or more times at points down the eastern coast of the Malay Peninsula from southern Thailand to Singapore before the refugees finally, in desperation, sank or burned their boats to avoid being pushed off again.

Despite repeated approaches by the USG and the UNHCR on this subject, the Malaysian Government continued its tough attitude toward the refugees until it became possible to tell them confidently that the U.S. was planning a new, significant intake. By the time of the Parole Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law on August 4, steps were being taken in Malaysia to halt the "pushing off" of refugees and to take into the regular refugee camps several hundred refugees held incommunicado while their boats were being repaired. We were assured by the Malaysian Government at the highest level that Malaysia would implement a humanitarian policy of offering temporary asylum to boat case refugees.

While the change was not as dramatic, a similar softening of attitudes has been observed in other noncommunist countries bordering the South China Sea. In addition, our joint demarches with the UNHCR and growing awareness of the refugee problem has resulted in Japanese Government moves to ease the legal requirements for receiving Indochina refugees for temporary asylum. The Japanese Government, which has already allowed about 1,000 Vietnamese to take refuge in Japan, will allow others to do so. It is also considering positively an additional special contribution to the UNHCR for the refugees.

*Question.* Have you gotten results from your recent approaches to governments seeking additional permanent resettlement places for Indochina refugees?

Answer. Although a new series of approaches to friendly governments was carried out following President Carter's decision on July 15 to seek Congressional approval to parole 15,000 more Indochinese refugees into the U.S., one must keep in mind that for months the U.S. and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees have been in almost continuous consultation with a number of governments on this problem. There is no question but that our decision is responsible for a large number of recent increases, although the exact numbers attributed to our efforts cannot be determined.

Some countries, aware of the President's July 15 decision and conscious of the burden placed on countries of first asylum by the flood of Vietnamese boat refugees decided on new resettlement opportunities prior to or at the same time as our own. In the period since our new effort was made public, these governments have continued to push ahead with programs discussed in State Department testimony before this Subcommittee on August 4, 1977. For example, Australia is in the process of admitting 1,500 to 2,000 refugees over the next year as is Canada, bringing the total accepted by these countries to about 5,000 and 9,000 respectively. New Zealand has told us it will take about 400 more for a total of 560. England and Belgium will take about 200 new refugees each, and Denmark 150. Japan will apparently allow several hundred "temporary" refugees to remain indefinitely. Some other countries approached by us have said they are unable to take additional Indochina refugees at this time because they are heavily involved in taking refugees from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but they have agreed to accept close family members of Indochinese already resettled within their borders and have not ruled out the possibility of taking additional Indochinese at some time in the future.

The impact of these new resettlement programs has been significant. They add an estimated 3,975 over about the next year which, when added to the 1,000

monthly currently taken by France and our own program to take 15,000, totals some 31,000 over the next twelve to fourteen months. We and the UNHCR will continue to press other governments to take more refugees for permanent resettlement. So long as the United States is willing to take a leading role, there should continue to be useful accretions to the totals of resettlement opportunities.

*Question.* What are some concrete examples of the refugee situation leading up to the U.S. decision to accept 15,000 additional Indochina refugees?

Answer. To illustrate the difficulties facing refugees who escape by boat from Vietnam and to provide some examples of Vietnamese refugees who flee by boat a sampling of cases landing in Malaysia is described in Part 1 below. Also included (Part 2) are some case studies of refugees from Laos and Cambodia who have fled overland into Thailand. (Real refugee names are not used so as to keep these examples unclassified.)

1. BOAT REFUGEES

Malaysia, like Thailand, is one of the main recipients of refugees fleeing Vietnam by sea. During 1975 and 1976 the United States, France and others took hundreds of Indochinese refugees from Malaysia leaving a balance in the early fall of 1976 of under 400 persons.

This sudden upsurge of boat refugees coincided with a hiatus in the American effort to resettle Indochinese and a decline in intakes by other countries except for France. Still the refugees continued to come in increasing numbers, and their flight in crowded boats over stormy seas often involved great danger and sometimes death. The Malaysian federal and state authorities, becoming more and more concerned by the flood, once again began to "push boats off", usually after furnishing the occupants with food, fuel and medical assistance and repairing their boats where necessary. A letter received by our Embassy in Kuala Lumpur from a young Vietnamese conveys the atmosphere of desperation that prevailed among these people at that time (the next is slightly abridged):

KUALA BESUT POLICE STATION,
*May 21, 1977.*

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR,
*Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.*

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: This is a S.O.S. letter. Please rescue us. Ten human lives depend on you and your promptness because we are in a real despearate (sic) situation. My name is ---------- I was an Army Captain of the Armed Forces of the RVN. I have been in the U.S.A. two times, the first time from July to November 1965 at the U.S. Army ---------- School ----------; the second from December 1972 to September 1973 at ----------. (I still have papers and certificates concerning my U.S. training). Now, I am a captain of a fishing boat carrying 10 Vietnamese people, included (sic) 3 women and a little nine year old girl, running away from the crazy communists in Vietnam. Along the coast of Malaysia (Trengganu State) we had engine trouble and water leaking through the boat. We are now at a small sea-town named Kuala Besut and today the Malaysian police will escort us to the international water and chase us away instead of all our troubles with the boat and my asking for help. Mr. Ambassador, while you are reading this letter my boat may sink at any time or possibly already sunk. No need to be an expert mechanic to know that an engine can completely break down. If it has a defective lubricating system (oil pressure not right) and my boat is in this condition. Even if I can keep the engine running we will be in very preillous (sic) condition after a few hours . . . because of . . . this rate of water leaking through the boat I have to use the bilge pump continuously and with the bearing they've—---------- just changed (not a sealed bearing) it will surely break after a few hours of use and with the boat full of water in one hour we will sink down. Please rescue us by: 1. Send a rescue team on a helicopter or fast boat to the international water along the Malaysian coast from Kuala Besut to South direction in order to search a light blue painted with white stripes fishing boat numbered ----------. The boat is about 14 meters long by 3 meters wide with carrying a S.O.S. panel and a white flag and it is heading south if still afloat. 2. Please accept us as political refugees (6 people listed below, the other 4 people have already got immigration permission from Canada) and let the Malaysian Government know so they let us wait in their territory. According to American tradition, to the human rights that President Jimmy Carter so often declares and by humanity reasons I

sincerely hope you will accept my requisition (sic) because I was an army officer . . . and I have escaped from the communist rehabilitation camp. Will be jailed for life or killed by the communists. I have relatives who live in the States, My father, my mother, my son and my brothers and sister are working and living in the U.S. now. Their names and addresses are listed below. Your help will be remembered. All the life of ten human being (s).

Very Sincerely yours

(Signed) _____

During late May 1977 the U.S. Embassy was provided a list of boats, containing a reported 600 refugees, that had been "detected," resupplied and sent on their way. A circular telegram to other Posts in the area turned up no reports of the boats ever having arrived (although it is likely that in at least some cases the refugees destroyed the boats upon landing in order to avoid being pushed off once again). We have few concrete reports of boats lost at sea because most of these have gone down at sea out of sight of anyone. There is, however, a recorded case of the sinking of a boat with 37 people on board off of the coast of Sabah on the night of June 9, 1977. The boat, crowded and in poor condition, had been refueled, and revictualed before being escorted into international waters off of Sarawak by a Malaysian patrol boat. The craft continued north past Brunei, presumably en route to the Philippines, but went down in a storm off of Kimanis Bay. Only four people of the mixed group of men, women and children were rescued.

A final example gives the full flavor of the situation before the Malaysians changed their position under the influence of demarches by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and news of a possible new program to take 15,000 additional refugees. In July, an American Embassy official interviewed a party of refugees who had landed four times in Malaysia and once in Singapore before being given temporary asylum. In only one place in Malaysia were they allowed to take on supplies and twice (in both Malaysia and Singapore) they were towed out into international waters at high speed on rough nights. Finally, desperate at not being able to find a place to land they approached the beach at Kuala Sedili, Johore State, Malaysia were police motioned them to move off. When they continued to approach, guns were fired in the air so the leaders of the group told the women and children to jump into the water and wade to the beach where they were finally allowed to remain.

Malaysian, Thai and Indonesian receptivity to boat refugees has been directly related to the new U.S. parole program. These, and other countries of first asylum, are willing to extend protection and assistance to boat refugees only if there is a good assurance that they will not have to deal with them permanently.

### 2. LAO AND CAMBODIAN REFUGEES

In Thailand 2,000 boat cases have accumulated but the more significant burden consists of almost 50,000 refugees who have fled by land into Thailand from Laos and Cambodia. The present flow is predominantly from Laos. The great majority of refugees presently arriving are ethnic Lao (earlier there had been substantial numbers of Hmong) from Laos. The Lao border guards have been known to fire on fleeing refugees as they cross the Mekong River border into Thailand. Several drownings a month are reported. On the other hand there has been one recent instance of refugees fom Laos arriving at a Thai immigration station during daylight hours—though this kind of refugee movement has occurred in only a tiny proportion of cases.

A former interpreter for the American mission in his late twenties fled recently after trying to make a go-of-it under the new government. He had initially thought it possible he could serve with the new government as a development technician; when this appeared unrealistic he still thought it possible to remain in Laos in some other capacity. However he finally fled to Thailand when he became convinced that he would never be permitted to hold a job and that he would be subjected to re-education at a remote center. He believed that with the increased Vietnamese military presence he would be particularly vulnerable as a former U.S. employee.

He is now volunteering as an interpreter to assist the voluntary agency's medical program in the refugee camp where he is located.

A Lao working with a regional development project held his job until the summer of 1976 and then felt that his involvement with this program supported by the former Lao government, Thailand and the U.S. would cause him to be sent off for re-education. His wife, who is with him in a refugee camp in

Thailand, has a sister who is a former secretary with the Mission and is now residing in the United States.

A former major in the Lao armed forces under the anti-communist government volunteered for re-education when the new government came to power in the spring of 1975. After more than a year his family despaired of his return and fled to Thailand where they are in a refugee camp. They have heard rumors that the former major had recently escaped from the re-education camp in northern Laos but was arrested while looking for his family in Vientiane.

The flow of refugees from Cambodia has slowed to about 100 per month but the cases of two recent Cambodian escapees offer a striking contrast. The first case (more typical of recent Cambodian refugees) is the story of four youngsters in their late teens who fled with a group of about 12 from a farming village in western Cambodia. The four were the sole, known survivors of a 10-day escape trek in which hunger, an ambush and mines at the border took their toll. The four were then arrested by the Thai for illegal entry in accordance with Thai law; during this incarceration they were fed minimum rations which allowed them to begin recuperating from their ordeal. They are presumed by now to have been transferred to a refugee camp.

Then there is the Cambodian in his thirties who was educated abroad in engineering and went on to assume several important government positions in the transportation and public works fields, directing one key program which was managed jointly by the Cambodian and U.S. governments. His wife and children died while attempting to escape with him.

*Question.* Is it not true that many of the refugees are fleeing in search of better economic opportunities rather than escaping from actual political persecution? Is there not an analogy to be drawn with Haiti or Yugoslavia?

Answer. First, most of those who are fleeing Indochina do so because of political persecution, either direct or indirect. The entire social structure of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos is being recast in the communist mold and in all three countries force and the threat of force is used to accomplish this.

In Cambodia, force has been most savagely applied and entire socio-economic classes have been deliberately targeted for elimination.

In South Vietnam many socio-economic classes are now seriously and permanently disadvantaged, for example, by restrictions on employment opportunities and education and by pressure to work under primitive conditions in new agricultural lands.

In Laos, although some who worked in the former government have moved into the communist administration, a process similar to that in Vietnam is going on.

Admittedly many refugees who leave these nations describe their reasons for flight in economic terms. On deeper questioning, however, they turn out to have suffered economic deprivation for political reasons and as this situation continues they know they can expect their children to be labeled as sons and daughters of "class enemies" has been done in other communist societies.

It must be acknowledged that some refugees also may be leaving primarily for economic reasons. However, the fact that the societies of Indochina are in midst of total restructuring makes it next to impossible to identify those who leave solely to improve their economic status. In Laos, for example, two large parties recently purchased legal emigration by forfeiting their homes and other assets. These people, however, by the very fact of having acquired enough assets to buy their way out, clearly fit into a social class which is being disadvantaged not to say eliminated, for political reasons. Because of parlous economic conditions in some areas of Laos, many refugees along the Lao-Thai border do cross primarily to escape privation. However, even in these cases, political fears help motivate the departures from their lands and homes. Finally, escape from all three countries is hazardous and the future is uncertain. Thus privation must be weighed against the risk of capture and punishment in most cases.

Over time, the political situation in Indochina may stabilize sufficiently so that individuals leaving solely for economic reasons can more easily be distinguished from political refugees. In Yugoslavia, for example, the more stable and settled society, and relative freedom to leave the country, make such a determination easier.

Even if Indochinese refugees who leave primarily for economic reasons could be readily identified, we must realize that they cannot now be returned without fear of persecution. By contrast, in Haiti we have specific assurances on this point from the Haitian Government and U.S. officials can satisfy themselves as to the well-being of returnees.

In the case of Indochinese, on the contrary, reports indicate that individuals returned to any of these countries inevitably face a very serious danger of political persecution and punishment, possibly including death, whatever their motive for leaving. Thus, even if it were possible to clearly delineate which refugees left Indochina from political motivation and which primarily for economic reasons, it is not possible to return Indochinese refugees to their homelands forcibly without subjecting them to unacceptable risks of persecution.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S VIEWS ON H.R. 7175 (FORMERLY H.R. 3056)

[See question from Chairman Eilberg pp. 40, and 43.]

The Department's position on the provisions of H.R. 7175 remains the same as that expressed on its predecessor, H.R. 3056, in testimony of March 3, 1977, which included the following points:

1. The Department supports the establishment of a separate numerical limitation of 20,000 annually for "normal flow" refugees.
2. The Department supports the broadening of the definition of "refugee" to bring it into substantial conformity with the definition contained in the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.
3. The Department supports establishing institutionalized procedures for dealing with the admission of refugees in emergent circumstances.
4. The Department supports the proposal to accord permanent residence without regard to numerical limitations to all aliens admitted as refugees two years after their initial admission as refugees.
5. The Department opposes the requirement that a finding be made that other countries will accept a fair share of refugees before the United States can respond to an appeal for assistance from a recognized international refugee organization.
6. The Department is concerned that the provision for two separate kinds of emergent situations (an appeal from an international refugee organization and a case of direct concern to the United States) might prevent the United States from invoking the "direct concern" provisions if an appeal had previously been received from an international refugee organization.
7. The Department believes that there should not be a fixed limit on the number of refugees who could be admitted in any given emergent situation and that the total in each case should be decided through the consultative process based on the facts of each situation.
8. The Department believes that the provision for termination of an individual refugee program after its commencement by a resolution of either House of the Congress could have substantial practical disadvantages and that all decisions concerning the scope and nature of a refugee program should be resolved in the consultative process.

H.R. 7175 includes two significant provisions not included in H.R. 3056—a detailed description of the requirements for "consultation" by the President with the Congress concerning a proposed refugee program and an entirely new section establishing a combined Executive Branch/Legislative Branch Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy which would be charged with making a complete study of United States immigration and refugee policy. Both matters remain under review and the Executive Branch has not as yet taken a formal position on either.

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## APPENDIX 4

### ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE WITH ANSWERS AND ADDITIONAL SUBMISSIONS BY HEW

### A. HEW RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS

The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has provided the following information in response to questions submitted by the Subcommittee:

*Question.* It has been suggested that the legislation before us would be counterproductive in that it would perpetuate a welfare system and eliminate any incentives on the part of States to strengthen their job development efforts. Shouldn't the Federal Government place primary emphasis on funding special programs or projects which will help a refugee become self-sufficient? Wouldn't this be a better approach than the administration proposal, which perpetuates or institutionalizes "dependency" by reimbursing States for welfare assistance? Isn't it true that we have received a better "return" on those Federal dollars that have been spent for job-related programs than those which have been expended for reim-

bursing States for welfare costs? If so, why doesn't the proposed bill continue authority for social services or job-related projects?

Answer. The Administration bill is based on the premise that it is preferable to begin a phasing-down of the refugee assistance program rather than to continue it on the present basis of full Federal funding. The recommendation that reimbursement be continued to the States, although on a scaled-down basis, for cash assistance and medical assistance is intended to help offset the most serious costs which will otherwise fall on States and localities as a result of the presence of needy refugees. This approach suggests that social services and adult training programs should be available to refugees on the same basis as to other residents of the communities in which they live, and under the regular funding arrangements for such programs. We believe that the possibility of reducing the need for cash assistance provides an incentive to States to continue efforts directed toward the self-sufficiency of refugees. We have also taken into account that Federal funds in the amount of $10.25 million, which were appropriated under the Indochina Refugee Children Assistance Act of 1976, will be awarded this month by the Office of Education for refugee adult education projects which will be in operation during fiscal year 1978.

*Question.* Under the 1975 Act, what proportion of the $455 million which was authorized and appropriated has been spent on job-related programs such as job placement and training, career counseling, vocational training, English language programs, etc. What percentage has been spent on reimbursing States for welfare assistance provided to Indochina refugees? Shouldn't the proposed legislation target funds for job development and placement?

Answer. Of the $455 million total, $203 million, or approximately 45 percent has been available to HEW.

Of the $455 million, 7.5 percent can be specifically identified as being utilized for job-related training, counseling, or English language programs. An additional 3.5 percent is estimated as the amount which will have been provided to the States for social services; some of these funds will also have been utilized for job-related purposes.

The estimated amount provided to States for welfare assistance—that is, for cash assistance, medical assistance, and State administrative costs—is approximately 31 percent of the $455 million.

With respect to the question of whether the proposed legislation should target funds for job development and placement, the Administration proposal, as we have indicated, recommends that these services be provided to refugees through the ongoing nationwide programs that exist for this purpose.

*Question.* The 1962 Refugee Assistance Act upon which the 1975 Act is based includes authorization for the funding of employment projects and health services. Does HEW fund special projects under the 1975 Act which do not fit into these categories and if so, do you feel that the 1962 and 1975 Acts provide sufficient authorization for such funding? Has HEW evaluated the success of those special projects which have been funded? If so, what are the results? If not, why?

Answer. The special projects which have been funded by HEW have related to employment and to mental health. To date, we have found the authorizations provided by the 1962 and 1975 Acts to be sufficient to meet program needs.

With respect to the employment projects, data are required to be reported regularly, technical assistance has been provided on request, and on-site monitoring is carried out. Overall, the projects have been successful, with 5,088 job placements reported through June 30, 1977. The mental health projects have been on a small scale, with total funding of only $157,000. They have been helpful primarily in providing training for mental health professionals to work with refugees, in exploring mental health needs among the refugees, and in suggesting that the training of bilingual paraprofessionals who could provide crisis-intervention services and a linkage between refugees and established mental health facilities can be an effective means of meeting needs in this area.

*Question.* What has been the mechanism under the 1975 Act for providing assistance to States to enhance their job-related services to Indochina refugees? It is our understanding that in some cases it has been funneled to the States under the title XX program (social services under the Social Security Act), whereas in other States these funds have been provided directly in the form of grants or contracts? Can you comment on the methods which have been utilized for channeling resources to the States for job-related programs for refugees?

Answer. Policies under the Indochinese program authorize the States to provide the same social services to refugees as those which a State provides to non-

refugees. In a few States, the State social service plan under title XX includes authority to provide training and other job-related services; such social services are reimbursed to the States under the Indochinese appropriation. In other States, the funding for employment training projects has been provided through project grant awards. HEW has also authorized all State welfare agencies to fund positions for the purpose of detemining appropriate work or training, of developing jobs and training opportunities, and of providing counseling.

*Question.* Would you please describe for the Subcommittee the different eligibility requirements for cash assistance and medical assistance that have been established for Indochina refugees? Is it equitable to establish more lenient requirements for welfare assistance for refugees than for our own citizens? What is the legislative authority for waiving certain of the categorical requirements for Indochina refugees?

Answer. In order to qualify for assistance, either cash or medical, refugees must meet the same standards of need—that is, of having little or no income—as those which apply in the AFDC program in the State in which the refugees are residing. Similarly, the level of assistance would be the same as that in the State's AFDC program. The requirement which is not imposed is that, in order to qualify for assistance, the refugees need to consist of one-parent families with minor children.

The need is to be able to make federally funded assistance available so that destitute refugees do not become a burden on local public or charitable resources. Without this backup assistance, it would be very difficult—probably impossible—to carry out a resettlement program for large numbers of refugees; States and sponsors would simply not be willing to receive them.

In some areas, which have general assistance programs equivalent to their AFDC programs, the aid available under the refugee assistance program is exactly the same as that available to nonrefugees. In areas which have minimal general assistance programs, it is not equivalent. While this is not entirely equitable in the latter areas, it does take into account that refugees, not having been in the United States for a very long period, have not had the opportunity to qualify for other sources of income maintenance such as unemployment compensation or the AFDC–UF program for families with unemployed fathers, for which refugees lack the documented work history required.

In not imposing categorical requirements in the Indochinese program, we have followed the experience in the Cuban resettlement program which has proved beneficial throughout the years.

*Question.* It is our understanding that only about one-fourth of the Indochina refugees would be able to qualify for regular Federal programs such as AFDC if the categorical requirements were not waived. Can you comment on this problem and describe why only such a small percentage will be able to qualify? Is there no way HEW could continue to waive the categorical requirements for assistance and place these people on the regular Federal programs if this legislation is not extended?

Answer. Most of the refugees cannot qualify for AFDC because they are two-parent families or couples or single individuals without children. Under the refugee legislation, there is no requirement that categorical limitations be imposed, but, once all or part of the funding for a refugee case came under the AFDC or Medicaid program, the satutory limitations of titles IV and XIX of the Social Security Act would apply and could not be waived.

*Question.* If it is not legally possible to continue to waive certain eligibility requirements for Indochina refugees and if this program is not extended, what types of assistance will be available to Indochina refugees? What will happen in those States which have not established general assistance programs? In your judgment, will Indochina refugees be eligible for aid in all States where general assistance programs have been established? If not, in what States will they be eligible?

Answer. If the program is not extended, needy refugees will have to rely on the AFDC and general assistance programs. Needy aged, blind, and disabled refugees—of whom there are only a small number—are already eligible and included under the SSI program.

Refugees should be eligible to apply under the existing general assistance programs. However, "general assistance" is of course a catch-all term to describe any program that provides some aid to some persons who are not eligible under AFDC or SSI. Where these programs exist, there is wide variation in them—sometimes from county to county. Aside from differences in levels of aid, they

may be restricted in other ways—for example, to a person who is medically unemployable or to a one-time emergency payment.

The indications are that in most localities that have a general assistance program at least some refugees would be eligible, but in almost all States many refugees would not be eligible. The estimates which we have from almost all of the States indicate that at least 19,000 refugee cash assistance recipients will have their assistance terminated October 1 if the program is not extended and that the number may run as high as 27,000.

*Question.* In October 1976, HEW attempted to strengthen the employment and training requirements for persons receiving cash assistance under the Indochina program. Apparently it was felt that the Indochina refugees should be subject to the same work requirments as non-refugees to the extent possible. What were the results of these HEW efforts?

Answer. The structure of the refugee assistance program provides positive incentives to work, and the requirement that employable persons accept appropriate work or training follows similar requirements which apply in the AFDC program. The very high employment rate among the refugees indicates the success of this approach, which also reflects the basic determination of the refugees themselves to be self-supporting.

*Question.* In a recent GAO report, it was indicated that another problem of great concern to the HEW Task Force was the concentration of refugees in States with high unemployment; and, as a result, the Task Force discouraged the voluntary agencies from resettling refugees in these areas. What efforts have been made to resolve this particular problem? Were these efforts successful or is this a continuing concern of HEW?

Answer. This was actually identified by the GAO report as a matter of concern to the Interagency Task Force during the period of massive resettlement from the refugee camps which was completed in December 1975, before the Interagency Task Force was terminated and responsibilities transferred to HEW.

With regard to new refugees coming in, the resettlement agencies are endeavoring to avoid areas where there are few job opportunities, although, of course, those who are being reunited with their family members will be joining them where they reside.

*Question.* What efforts have been made by HEW to insure that those administrative expenses which are reimbursed are actual expenses which have been incurred as a part of the Indochina refugee program? In other words, are there any special audit or quality control procedures which have been established by HEW to insure that the State has developed proper procedures to identify those administrative expenses which relate to the Indochina program? Has HEW uncovered any particular abuses in this area?

Answer. HEW has provided considerable technical assistance to the States in the development of appropriate procedures to accurately identify proper expenses and has reviewed the procedures as part of the regular reviews of the cost allocation systems utilized by the State welfare agencies. The States are also subject to audit by the HEW Audit Agency and GAO, and audit exceptions would be taken for any improper charges believed to have occurred. We are not now aware of any particular abuses.

*Question.* There has been much concern by some for continuing social services and special projects. If social services to refugees and special projects were cut off or significantly cut back would this eliminate or greatly reduce the special State offices and local agencies which have been formed to assist the refugees? Can you comment on this matter and was this a factor in the Administration's decision to terminate authority for social services?

Answer. The Administration's approach to these questions was in the context of a program which was scheduled to expire entirely on September 30 of this year. We considered, first, whether there was sufficient potential impact that would result from termination to merit some extension of special Federal funding. Secondly, we considered the question, if some aspects of the program were continued, what would constitute a reasonable phasing-down that could avoid an unduly long-term Federal program?

We felt that the basic proposal should be to offset the situation which would occur on the basic matters of cash and medical assistance where no Federal funds would be provided if the refugee program did not continue to exist. Where substantial Federal funding already existed, as in the AFDC, SSI, Medicaid, social service, and employment training programs, we felt these would be appropriate areas to begin a phasedown.

The intent of the Administration proposal is not to suggest that training or social services no longer exist for the refugees, but rather that these activities be

provided within the context of the Nation's ongoing programs of adult education, comprehensive employment and training services, and the title XX social services programs, for all of which the refugees are eligible on the same basis as non-refugees.

Some States have indicated their intent to reduce or eliminate special State offices, and we are not certain that this is commensurate with the provision of equitable services to the refugees. We are not sure as to the effect of termination on local agencies in general since such local agencies as public welfare departments and public training programs have responsibility to provide equitable services to refugees and non-refugees alike.

*Question.* Would you provide the Subcommittee with a description of the Federal administrative costs of the program as well as a State-by-State breakdown of their administrative costs?

Answer. On the Federal side, we have provided certain direct services to refugees which include: A nationwide toll-free telephone hotline service with a trilingual refugee staff who provide information and referral services; the publication of three informational newspapers for refugees—in Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Lao editions; technical assistance to Indochinese self-help organizations in the United States, which are generally referred to as Mutual Assistance Associations; and responses to a wide range of written inquiries from refugees, including information on family reunification, immigration status, and other matters, as well as on a wide range of questions relating to domestic resettlement in the areas of jobs, training, schools, medical assistance, and so on. We also provide technical assistance to employment training projects and to State and local agencies, including monitoring of these activities. Liaison is also carried out with the resettlement agencies, and special efforts have been made to resolve resettlement problems arising from time to time. Other responsibilities include overall program and financial planning and management. The staff consist of 35 in the Washington office and 29 in the ten HEW Regional Offices. Most of the staff members are refugees. The estimated cost of these Federal activities is $2 million in fiscal year 1977.

We are providing a table which indicates the States' estimates of their administrative costs for fiscal 1977.

*Indochinese refugee assistance program: State estimates of administrative costs, fiscal year 1977*

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama | $13,547 | Missouri | $49,404 |
| Alaska | [1] | Montana | 5,983 |
| Arizona | 55,110 | Nebraska | 66,679 |
| Arkansas | 57,478 | Nevada | 83,708 |
| California | 3,906,400 | New Hampshire | [1] |
| Colorado | 190,880 | New Jersey | [1] |
| Connecticut | [1] | New Mexico | 17,357 |
| Delaware | [1] | New York | 5,306 |
| District of Columbia | 26,964 | North Carolina | 23,044 |
| Florida | 671,784 | North Dakota | 11,885 |
| Georgia | 30,574 | Ohio | 7,500 |
| Guam | 20,000 | Oklahoma | 236,143 |
| Hawaii | 156,001 | Oregon | 600,314 |
| Idaho | 15,703 | Pennsylvania | [1] |
| Illinois | 331,225 | Rhode Island | 56,535 |
| Indiana | 38,980 | South Carolina | 124,220 |
| Iowa | 247,430 | South Dakota | [1] |
| Kansas | [1] | Tennessee | 9,434 |
| Kentucky | 30,819 | Texas | 565,991 |
| Louisiana | 27,542 | Utah | 16,951 |
| Maine | [1] | Vermont | [1] |
| Maryland | 239,681 | Virginia | 152,862 |
| Massachusetts | 32,201 | Washington | 1,110,000 |
| Michigan | 114,504 | West Virginia | [1] |
| Minnesota | 321,000 | Wisconsin | 390,540 |
| Mississippi | 1,526 | Wyoming | [1] |
| | | Total | 10,063,205 |

[1] Not available.

*Question.* One of the recommendations set forth in the recent GAO report on resettlement of Indochina refugees was that the State Department insure that resettlement contracts include a precise definition of the term "resettlement"

and that uniform transitional allowances be established by the voluntary agencies to prevent "VOLAG shopping." Can you comment on these two recommendations?

Answer. The State Department has advised us that in its contracts this year, with regard to both the 15,000 new Indochina refugees and refugees generally, it has included a clear definition of resettlement which has been accepted by the voluntary agencies. The voluntary agencies have also agreed to a common scale for the provision of pocket money to individual refugees and refugee families. Discusisons were also held with the voluntary agencies on the question of uniform transitional allowances to meet initial expenses following resettlement, and, on this, the conclusion was that the diversity of operating procedures among the voluntary agencies and the differing costs for different localities precluded uniform amounts or procedures. We understand, however, that the problem of "VOLAG shopping" was a problem only while the refugee camps were in operation in this country, but has not been a problem since then nor will it be with respect to the 15,000 new refugees since voluntary agencies are assigned, as in the case of new refugees who are joining family members already in the United States and are under the auspices of the same voluntary agency as the original family members.

*Question.* It has also been suggested that the efforts be made to identify and more carefully define the respective responsibilities of the Federal, State, and local governments and the voluntary agencies in the resettlement process, thereby allowing each party to assume and discharge those responsibilities with which it has had the most success. Can you comment on this particular idea? Should HEW expand its role in the resettlement process and perform services similar to those now provided by the Jewish Agency in Israel in resettling refugees? Should assistance be provided only to those refugees who are involved in a large-scale program or should they also be provided to individual refugees who are admitted to this country under the regular provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act?

Answer. We believe that, overall, the relative responsibilities of the public and voluntary sectors are well defined. It is of course true that there are variations from one locality to another and from one agency to another. In some areas the public agencies have appeared to be more successful than in others, and similarly there have been variations in the success of the voluntary agencies. Because some agencies—both public and voluntary, and indeed individual sponsors—go so far beyond the average in their initiatives and special efforts, we are inclined to feel that it would be difficult to define roles much more specifically and at the same time avoid a dampening effect on the more creative and aggressive efforts to help the refugees become self-sufficient. We do, however, think that this is a question that should be kept in mind on an ongoing basis, with a view to improvements whenever possible.

With regard to the services provided by the Jewish Agency in Israel, we shall be pleased to study these and to consider this in relation to the American resettlement scene.

With respect to providing assistance to refugees who reach the United States individually or as small groups, rather than in a large-scale movement such as the evacuation, we believe that assistance and services should be made available on a basis that would help to avoid any undue impact which might occur in a particular county or locality and which can more effectively help refugees to reach a self-supporting status. Thus our proposal recommends assistance and services on behalf of the 15,000 new Indochinese refugees although they will reach the United States gradually over a period of months and do not constitute a truly large-scale refugee movement.

*Question.* Do you feel that the only rational long-range solution for these problems is a federally run, federally funded welfare system?

Answer. Certainly a major problem is that the existing welfare programs are not well suited, in general, to receiving and aiding a newly arriving refugee population where refugees do not have any ties within the United States or a work history here which could qualify them for unemployment compensation. This results from the fact that in most parts of the country the welfare programs are limited to certain types of needy cases based on family composition, usually the AFDC-type case in which there are minor children and the father is absent. This problem can be overcome during a period in which there is full Federal funding under a refugee assistance program, but it reappears when such funding is ended or substantially reduced.

These limitations relate not only to cash assistance to need refugees but also to medical assistance.

We concur that the long-range solution depends on a substantial reform of the

welfare system that couples aid to needy persons, regardless of age or family characteristics, with strong self-support efforts and incentives.

*Question.* Have there been any studies of the impact of this refugee migration on our population situation, our housing problems, our labor, economic, city planning, and regional development policies? And if not, why hasn't this been done? It appears to us that it is impossible to formulate sensible policies in these areas without analyzing these impacts.

Answer. We are currently aware of only one study bearing on some of these areas, "A Pilot Study of the Dispersal and Assimilation of Indochinese Refugees" by Lorraine Garkovich, a doctoral candidate at the University of Missouri-Columbia; this study was carried out with the support of the Ford Foundation. We believe that one factor has been the short amount of time that has passed since the completion of the initial resettlement from the camps. We will try to determine whether other studies may have been made which have not been brought to our attention, as well as to consider possible avenues for research.

*Question.* How do you justify the creation of a separate category of aid for the new 15,000 parolees? Some observers have specifically criticized your bill for this. Is this not creating an administrative monstrosity? Why should not all refugees be aided strictly on the basis of justified need regardless of their date of entry?

Answer. The major question in regard to the scope and level of funding on behalf of the 15,000 new refugees related to the impact on the States. It is our feeling that the new refugees will encounter many of the same problems initially as the original group of refugees and that, in recognition of this, it would be appropriate to provide a period of full Federal funding to the States for cash and medical assistance, social services, and State-local administrative costs, prior to beginning a phasedown. In our proposal, it would be necessary only for the State to maintain a record of the refugee's date of arrival in the United States—that is, whether the refugee arrived on or after August 11, 1977. While this would create an additional record-keeping item, we felt that the resultant higher level of funding to the States would constitute a benefit outweighing any inconvenience.

*Question.* In an article which appeared in The Washington Post on September 19, 1977, it was indicated that many Indochina refugees are illegally sending money back to Vietnam. Has HEW surveyed the scope of this problem? Further, it is our understanding that a "needs test" is applied to Indochina refugees as a precondition to refugee assistance, and it would be interesting to know whether the monies which are sent abroad are considered as a part of the refugee assets in determining eligibility for welfare. Isn't it possible that a refugee could become needy by sending substantial sums of money to relatives in Vietnam?

Answer. Welfare eligibility is based on need and family size taking into account income received, with the need standards and payment levels based on those applying in the State's AFDC program. Since earnings from employment would be the major factor, regardless of how a refugee disposed of those earnings, eligibility could not be attained by sending some of the earnings out of the country. We would also be inclined to believe, purely from an economic standpoint, that sending funds abroad would be much more likely to occur among the nearly two-thirds of the refugees who are not receiving any cash assistance, since their incomes are above the level of eligibility for assistance and they would therefore be in a better position to spare some funds. There is, however, no way in which we would be able to determine the extent to which refugees might be sending funds abroad which—probably indirectly—would be destined for their relatives in Indochina. Since refugees are aware of the illegality of sending funds to Vietnam, we do not feel that there would be a response to inquiries by us on this.

*Question.* It has been suggested on occasion that HEW assume the responsibility for negotiating resettlement contracts with the voluntary agencies. In other words, there would be a transfer of this responsibility from the Department of State to HEW which is the agency primarily responsible for domestic resettlement. Is there any merit in this suggestion?

Answer. We believe that the voluntary agencies have done an excellent job under difficult circumstances. Never before have so many refugees been resettled in the United States in such a short period of time, and the unemployment situation which prevailed throughout most of the country at the time the refugees arrived made the resettlement program even more difficult.

On the HEW side, we have had a continuing relationship with several of the voluntary agencies since the Cuban program began in 1961 and have been responsible for the VOLAG contracts for the Cuban program.

Based on the experience to date, we do not believe that the success of the respective resettlement efforts has been affected by whether the contracts were negotiated by HEW or the State Department.

RESPONSE TO QUESTION FROM CHAIRMAN EILBERG DURING HEARING
[See p. 79]

*Question.* Do varying State benefit rates in case assistance programs determine internal migration patterns?

Answer. We are familiar with five studies dealing with patterns of population movement within the United States. These studies indicate that the primary motivating factors in internal migration are social (i.e., to be with relatives) or related to securing employment. The studies indicate that the amount of cash assistance is not a primary motivating factor in movement.

The five studies referred to are:

"*Welfare Careers and Low Wage Employment*," by Joe H. Miller and Lewis A. Ferman, for the Department of Labor, December 1972 (pp. S0–S6).

"*Life Cycle Theory of Migration: Whether to Migrate as a Function of Change*," by John Bishop, Discussion Paper, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis., October 1976.

"*The Geographic Mobility of Labor*," by J. B. Lansing and Eva Meuller, Ann Arbor Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1967.

"*The Administration of Aid to Families with Dependent Children in New York City, November 1968–February 1969*, Report of a joint review carried out by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the New York State Department of Social Services, September 1969.

"*Geographic Payment Variation in a Federal Welfare System*, by Janice Peskin, Technical Analysis Paper No. 14, Office of Income Security Policy of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, January 1977.

B. STATISTICAL INFORMATION RELATING TO RESETTLEMENT

*Number of Indochinese refugee cash assistance recipients whose assistance will be terminated Sept. 30, 1977—State estimates*[1]

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama | 64 | Nebraska | 219 |
| Alaska | (2) | Nevada | 141 |
| Arizona | 11 | New Hampshire | 3 |
| Arkansas | 115 | New Jersey | 0 |
| California | 6,900–14,600 | New Mexico | 16 |
| Colorado | 1,014 | New York | 0 |
| Connecticut | 90 | North Carolina | 85 |
| Delaware | 37 | North Dakota | 61 |
| District of Columbia | 70 | Ohio | (2) |
| Florida | 900 | Oklahoma | 443 |
| Georgia | 145 | Oregon | 1,028 |
| Hawaii | 0 | Pennsylvania | 0 |
| Idaho | (2) | Rhode Island | 84 |
| Illinois | (2) | South Carolina | 8 |
| Indiana | 272 | South Dakota | 99 |
| Iowa | 675 | Tennessee | 54 |
| Kansas | 185 | Texas | 1,765 |
| Kentucky | 255 | Utah | 40 |
| Louisiana | 977 | Vermont | 2 |
| Maine | 19 | Virginia | 795 |
| Maryland | 375 | Washington | 990 |
| Massachusetts | 76 | West Virginia | 25 |
| Michigan | (2) | Wisconsin | 651 |
| Minnesota | (2) | Wyoming | 2 |
| Mississippi | 226 | Guam | 52 |
| Missouri | (2) | Puerto Rico | -- |
| Montana | 110 | Virgin Islands | -- |
| | | Total | 19,079–26,779 |

[1] If legislation terminates.
[2] Not available.

TABLE 1.—*Indochinese refugees in the United States, Sept. 1, 1977*

| | |
|---|---|
| Resettled under special parole program | 129,792 |
| Resettled under humanitarian parole program | 528 |
| Resettled under special Lao program | 3,466 |
| Resettled under expanded parole program | 11,000 |
| Resettled under "boat cases" program (as of Aug. 1, 1977) | 914 |
| Total | 145,700 |

TABLE 2.—INDOCHINESE REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES BY STATES

| Rank | State | INS report January 1976 | INS report January 1977 | Adjusted January 1977 total[1] |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | California | 24,692 | 34,222 | 35,445 |
| 2 | Texas | 9,033 | 12,001 | 12,486 |
| 3 | Pennsylvania | 6,744 | 6,828 | 7,043 |
| 4 | Virginia | 4,641 | 6,056 | 6,241 |
| 5 | Louisiana | 3,368 | 5,918 | 6,131 |
| 6 | Washington | 4,173 | 5,094 | 5,260 |
| 7 | Florida | 4,450 | 4,875 | 5,052 |
| 8 | Illinois | 3,583 | 4,114 | 4,254 |
| 9 | New York | 3,704 | 4,029 | 4,187 |
| 10 | Minnesota | 3,464 | 3,679 | 3,813 |
| 11 | Oklahoma | 3,088 | 3,467 | 3,585 |
| 12 | Ohio | 2,773 | 3,018 | 3,108 |
| 13 | Maryland | 2,417 | 2,910 | 3,001 |
| 14 | Oregon | 1,958 | 2,821 | 2,924 |
| 15 | Iowa | 2,308 | 2,815 | 2,901 |
| 16 | Missouri | 2,678 | 2,762 | 2,854 |
| 17 | Michigan | 2,346 | 2,662 | 2,750 |
| 18 | Hawaii | 1,678 | 2,395 | 2,468 |
| 19 | Colorado | 1,909 | 2,373 | 2,465 |
| 20 | Wisconsin | 1,747 | 2,284 | 2,356 |
| 21 | New Jersey | 1,622 | 1,871 | 1,945 |
| 22 | Indiana | 1,749 | 1,775 | 1,843 |
| 23 | Kansas | 1,576 | 1,778 | 1,829 |
| 24 | Arkansas | 1,663 | 1,531 | 1,592 |
| 25 | Georgia | 1,292 | 1,477 | 1,527 |
| 26 | Massachusetts | 1,198 | 1,379 | 1,420 |
| 27 | Nebraska | 1,114 | 1,357 | 1,401 |
| 28 | North Carolina | 1,000 | 1,357 | 1,398 |
| 29 | Connecticut | 976 | 1,259 | 1,310 |
| 30 | Alabama | 1,170 | 1,217 | 1,253 |
| 31 | Arizona | 1,153 | 1,114 | 1,148 |
| 32 | Kentucky | 845 | 1,007 | 1,041 |
| 33 | Utah | 654 | 992 | 1,025 |
| 34 | Tennessee | 898 | 970 | 1,010 |
| 35 | South Carolina | 749 | 931 | 968 |
| 36 | New Mexico | 751 | 728 | 749 |
| 37 | Nevada | 394 | 559 | 575 |
| 38 | Rhode Island | 202 | 520 | 535 |
| 39 | South Dakota | 459 | 467 | 480 |
| 40 | Guam | 720 | 451 | 464 |
| 41 | District of Columbia | 406 | 396 | 453 |
| 42 | Mississippi | 407 | 393 | 410 |
| 43 | Idaho | 301 | 349 | 359 |
| 44 | North Dakota | 344 | 332 | 350 |
| 45 | Montana | 205 | 333 | 348 |
| 46 | Maine | 328 | 296 | 304 |
| 47 | Alaska | 85 | 286 | 294 |
| 48 | West Virginia | 214 | 191 | 197 |
| 49 | Delaware | 144 | 173 | 178 |
| 50 | New Hampshire | 143 | 124 | 129 |
| 51 | Vermont | 96 | 86 | 88 |
| 52 | Wyoming | 124 | 86 | 88 |
| 53 | Virgin Islands | 13 | 15 | 15 |
| 54 | Puerto Rico | 21 | 35 | 35 |
| 55 | To unknown State | 359 | 606 | 606 |
| | Total | 114,140 | 140,774 | 145,700 |

[1] Adjusted to include 914 refugee "boat cases" with known State locations (as of Aug. 1, 1977) and 4,012 other refugees whose State location has not been ascertained.

TABLE 3.—*"Boat cases" program distribution by State, Apr.–Aug. 23, 1977*

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama | 1 | Montana | 5 |
| Alaska | 0 | Nebraska | 6 |
| Arizona | 2 | Nevada | 0 |
| Arkansas | 17 | New Hampshire | 2 |
| California | 248 | New Jersey | 21 |
| Colorado | 24 | New Mexico | 0 |
| Connecticut | 15 | New York | 43 |
| Delaware | 1 | North Carolina | 3 |
| District of Columbia | 46 | North Dakota | 8 |
| Florida | 38 | Ohio | 4 |
| Georgia | 8 | Oklahoma | 18 |
| Hawaii | 5 | Oregon | 23 |
| Idaho | 0 | Pennsylvania | 20 |
| Illinois | 23 | Rhode Island | 0 |
| Indiana | 17 | South Carolina | 11 |
| Iowa | 6 | South Dakota | 0 |
| Kansas | 0 | Tennessee | 12 |
| Kentucky | 5 | Texas | 143 |
| Louisiana | 27 | Utah | 5 |
| Maine | 0 | Vermont | 0 |
| Maryland | 8 | Virginia | 12 |
| Massachusetts | 2 | Washington | 21 |
| Michigan | 12 | West Virginia | 0 |
| Minnesota | 26 | Wisconsin | 7 |
| Mississippi | 6 | Wyoming | 0 |
| Missouri | 13 | Guam | 0 |
| | | Total | 914 |

TABLE 4.—ALIENS WHO REPORTED UNDER THE ALIEN ADDRESS PROGRAM BY SPECIFIED NATIONALITY, STATE OF RESIDENCE

| State | Vietnamese | Cambodian | Laotian | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | 125,352 | 5,603 | 9,819 | 140,774 |
| Alabama | 1,052 | 49 | 116 | 1,217 |
| Alaska | 260 | 1 | 25 | 286 |
| Arizona | 968 | 42 | 104 | 1,114 |
| Arkansas | 1,404 | 23 | 104 | 1,531 |
| California | 31,255 | 1,612 | 1,355 | 34,222 |
| Colorado | 2,077 | 100 | 196 | 2,373 |
| Connecticut | 1,045 | 56 | 158 | 1,259 |
| Delaware | 167 | 1 | 5 | 173 |
| District of Columbia | 317 | 43 | 36 | 396 |
| Florida | 4,669 | 50 | 156 | 4,875 |
| Georgia | 1,260 | 60 | 157 | 1,477 |
| Hawaii | 1,837 | 19 | 539 | 2,395 |
| Idaho | 322 | 1 | 26 | 349 |
| Illinois | 3,437 | 179 | 498 | 4,114 |
| Indiana | 1,631 | 20 | 124 | 1,775 |
| Iowa | 2,109 | 65 | 641 | 2,815 |
| Kansas | 1,631 | 33 | 124 | 1,788 |
| Kentucky | 832 | 17 | 158 | 1,007 |
| Louisiana | 5,736 | 83 | 99 | 5,918 |
| Maine | 258 | 27 | 11 | 296 |
| Maryland | 2,556 | 280 | 74 | 2,910 |
| Massachusetts | 1,255 | 33 | 91 | 1,379 |
| Michigan | 2,375 | 51 | 236 | 2,662 |
| Minnesota | 3,335 | 124 | 220 | 3,679 |
| Mississippi | 379 | 0 | 14 | 393 |
| Missouri | 2,648 | 32 | 82 | 2,762 |
| Montana | 208 | 6 | 119 | 333 |
| Nebraska | 1,207 | 51 | 99 | 1,357 |
| Nevada | 465 | 9 | 85 | 559 |
| New Hampshire | 119 | 2 | 3 | 124 |
| New Jersey | 1,749 | 60 | 62 | 1,871 |
| New Mexico | 555 | 31 | 142 | 728 |
| New York | 3,475 | 188 | 366 | 4,029 |
| North Carolina | 1,190 | 13 | 154 | 1,357 |
| North Dakota | 300 | 26 | 6 | 332 |
| Ohio | 2,622 | 51 | 345 | 3,018 |
| Oklahoma | 3,345 | 13 | 109 | 3,467 |
| Oregon | 2,153 | 481 | 187 | 2,821 |
| Pennsylvania | 6,329 | 228 | 271 | 6,828 |
| Rhode Island | 220 | 64 | 236 | 510 |
| South Carolina | 856 | 23 | 52 | 831 |
| South Dakota | 367 | 24 | 76 | 467 |
| Tennessee | 702 | 40 | 228 | 970 |
| Texas | 10,889 | 402 | 710 | 12,001 |
| Utah | 721 | 117 | 154 | 992 |
| Vermont | 77 | 8 | 1 | 86 |
| Virginia | 5,473 | 280 | 303 | 6,056 |
| Washington | 4,533 | 384 | 177 | 5,094 |
| West Virginia | 170 | 6 | 15 | 191 |
| Wisconsin | 1,710 | 62 | 512 | 2,284 |
| Wyoming | 85 | 0 | 1 | 86 |
| U.S. territories and possessions: | | | | |
| Guam | 446 | 0 | 5 | 451 |
| Puerto Rico | 35 | 0 | 0 | 35 |
| Virgin Islands | 11 | 0 | 4 | 15 |
| To unknown State | 525 | 33 | 48 | 606 |

TABLE 5.—ANALYSIS OF CASH ASSISTANCE CASELOAD, INDOCHINA REFUGEES

| | Sept. 15, 1975 | Dec. 15, 1975 | Feb. 29, 1976 | June 1, 1976 | Sept. 1, 1976 | Dec. 1, 1976 | Mar. 1, 1977 | May 1, 1977 | Aug. 1, 1977 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Number resettled in United States | 92, 274 | 128, 110 | 130, 072 | 130, 592 | 138, 058 | 144, 072 | 144, 758 | 144, 908 | 145, 700 |
| 2. Cash assistance cases | 3, 362 | 8, 705 | 11, 854 | 13, 688 | 14, 205 | 14, 955 | 16, 856 | 17, 684 | 16, 380 |
| 3. Increase in cases since previous report | (1) | 5, 343 | 3, 149 | 1, 834 | 517 | 750 | 1, 901 | 828 | −1, 304 |
| 4. Percentage increase in cases since previous | (1) | 159 | 36 | 16 | 4 | 5 | 13 | 5 | −7 |
| 5. Cash assistance persons | 10, 969 | 23, 768 | 31, 272 | 38, 707 | 41, 188 | 44, 221 | 50, 204 | 52, 219 | 50, 771 |
| 6. Increase in persons since previous | (1) | 12, 799 | 7, 504 | 7, 518 | 2, 481 | 3, 033 | 5, 983 | 2, 015 | −1, 448 |
| 7. Percentage increase in persons since previous | (1) | 117 | 32 | 24 | 6 | 7 | 14 | 4 | −2 |
| 8. Average number of persons per approved case | 3. 26 | 2. 44 | 2. 63 | 2. 82 | 2. 89 | 2. 96 | 2. 98 | 2. 95 | 3. 10 |
| 9. Average number of persons per new case for reporting period | (1) | 2. 39 | 2. 38 | 4. 09 | 4. 79 | 4. 04 | 3. 15 | 2. 43 | (2) |
| 10. Percentage of population on cash assistance | 11. 88 | 18. 55 | 24. 04 | 29. 63 | 29. 83 | 30. 69 | 34. 68 | 36. 04 | 34. 85 |

[1] Initial report.
[2] Not available.

TABLE 6.—CASH ASSISTANCE CASES, INDOCHINA REFUGEES, BY STATE

| State | Number of cases on cash assistance | | Percentage increase or decrease |
|---|---|---|---|
| | May 1, 1977 | Aug. 1, 1977 | |
| **Region I:** | | | |
| Connecticut | 117 | 77 | −34.2 |
| Maine | 16 | 18 | +12.5 |
| Massachusetts | 209 | 201 | −3.8 |
| New Hampshire | 14 | 5 | −64.3 |
| Rhode Island | 53 | 53 | 0 |
| Vermont | 4 | 4 | 0 |
| Total, region I | 413 | 358 | −13.3 |
| **Region II:** | | | |
| New York | 238 | 233 | −2.1 |
| New Jersey | 143 | 139 | −2.8 |
| Puerto Rico | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Virgin Islands | | 0 | 0 |
| Total, region II | 381 | 372 | −2.4 |
| **Region III:** | | | |
| Delaware | 15 | 16 | +6.7 |
| Maryland | 390 | 336 | −13.8 |
| Pennsylvania | 662 | 530 | −19.9 |
| Virginia | 662 | 614 | −1.3 |
| West Virginia | 17 | 18 | +5.9 |
| District of Columbia | 114 | 88 | −22.8 |
| Total, region III | 1,820 | 1,602 | −12.0 |
| **Region IV:** | | | |
| Alabama | 54 | 53 | −1.9 |
| Florida | 561 | 497 | −11.4 |
| Georgia | 67 | 61 | −9.0 |
| Kentucky | 127 | 108 | −15.0 |
| Mississippi | 18 | 30 | +66.7 |
| North Carolina | 90 | 83 | −7.8 |
| South Carolina | 28 | 21 | −25.0 |
| Tennessee | 53 | 35 | −34.0 |
| Total, region IV | 998 | 888 | −11.0 |
| **Region V:** | | | |
| Illinois | 368 | 332 | −9.8 |
| Indiana | 137 | 117 | −14.6 |
| Michigan | 358 | 313 | −12.6 |
| Minnesota | 287 | 271 | −5.6 |
| Ohio | 290 | 235 | −19.0 |
| Wisconsin | 247 | 241 | −2.4 |
| Total, region V | 1,687 | 1,509 | −10.6 |
| **Region VI:** | | | |
| Arkansas | 103 | 99 | −3.9 |
| Louisiana | 326 | 186 | −42.9 |
| New Mexico | 24 | 24 | 0 |
| Oklahoma | 236 | 195 | −17.4 |
| Texas | 749 | 724 | −3.3 |
| Total, region VI | 1,438 | 1,228 | −14.6 |
| **Region VII:** | | | |
| Iowa | 285 | 230 | −19.3 |
| Kansas | 125 | 129 | +3.2 |
| Missouri | 288 | 248 | −13.9 |
| Nebraska | 116 | 103 | −11.2 |
| Total, region VII | 814 | 710 | −12.8 |
| **Region VIII:** | | | |
| Colorado | 333 | 307 | −7.8 |
| Montana | 49 | 48 | −2.0 |
| North Dakota | 22 | 18 | −18.2 |
| South Dakota | 27 | 18 | −33.3 |
| Utah | 95 | 85 | −10.5 |
| Wyoming | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| Total, region VIII | 529 | 479 | −9.5 |

TABLE 6.—CASH ASSISTANCE CASES, INDOCHINA REFUGEES, BY STATE—Continued

| State | Number of cases on cash assistance | | Percentage increase or decrease |
|---|---|---|---|
| | May 1, 1977 | Aug. 1, 1977 | |
| **Region IX:** | | | |
| Arizona | 14 | 21 | +50.0 |
| California | 7,000 | 6,750 | −3.6 |
| Hawaii | 610 | 605 | −.8 |
| Nevada | 50 | 35 | −30.0 |
| Guam | 125 | 102 | −18.4 |
| Samoa | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total, region IX | 7,799 | 7,513 | −3.7 |
| **Region X:** | | | |
| Alaska | 2 | 1 | −50.0 |
| Idaho | 25 | 24 | −4.0 |
| Oregon | 661 | 619 | −6.4 |
| Washington | 1,117 | 1,077 | −3.6 |
| Total, region X | 1,805 | 1,721 | −4.7 |
| Total, all regions | 17,684 | 16,380 | −7.4 |

TABLE 7.—WELFARE AND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE FOR INDOCHINESE REFUGEES (REPORTS FROM STATES AS OF AUG. 1, 1977)

| States | Financial assistance | | | | Medical assistance (only) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Applications authorized (currently receiving) | | Applications pending | | Authorized persons | Pending | |
| | Cases | Persons | Cases | Persons | | Cases | Persons |
| Alabama | 53 | 213 | 3 | 16 | 43 | 0 | 0 |
| Alaska | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Arizona | 21 | 74 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Arkansas | 99 | 302 | NA | NA | 114 | NA | NA |
| California | 6,750 | 20,000 | NA | NA | 7,000 | NA | NA |
| Colorado | 307 | 1,122 | 3 | 19 | 122 | 0 | 0 |
| Connecticut | 77 | 254 | 0 | 0 | 289 | 0 | 0 |
| Delaware | 16 | 55 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 0 | 0 |
| District of Columbia | 88 | 113 | 2 | 2 | 82 | 1 | 1 |
| Florida | 497 | 1,589 | 23 | 76 | 235 | 0 | 0 |
| Georgia | 61 | 168 | 1 | 7 | 50 | 0 | 0 |
| Hawaii | 605 | 1,631 | 1 | NA | 98 | 2 | NA |
| Idaho | 24 | 112 | 0 | 0 | 31 | 0 | 0 |
| Illinois | 332 | 1,131 | 40 | 155 | 226 | 8 | 27 |
| Indiana | 117 | 461 | 2 | 2 | 148 | 0 | 0 |
| Iowa | 230 | 758 | 0 | 0 | 1,373 | 0 | 0 |
| Kansas | 129 | 500 | 0 | 0 | 550 | 0 | 0 |
| Kentucky | 108 | 366 | 3 | 4 | 27 | 0 | 0 |
| Louisiana | 186 | 1,206 | 50 | 236 | 142 | 3 | 4 |
| Maine | 18 | 81 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Maryland | 336 | 695 | 5 | 25 | 545 | 10 | 36 |
| Massachusetts | 201 | 444 | 3 | 12 | 233 | 4 | 8 |
| Michigan | 313 | 1,205 | 7 | 27 | 187 | 5 | 15 |
| Minnesota | 271 | 1,005 | 1 | NA | 437 | 9 | NA |
| Mississippi | 30 | 146 | 11 | 38 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Missouri | 248 | 1,145 | 0 | 0 | 211 | 0 | 0 |
| Montana | 48 | 181 | 0 | 0 | 41 | 6 | 9 |
| Nebraska | 103 | 391 | 0 | 0 | 102 | 0 | 0 |
| Nevada | 35 | 116 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 0 | 0 |
| New Hampshire | 5 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 0 | 0 |
| New Jersey | 139 | 550 | 0 | 0 | 91 | 0 | 0 |
| New Mexico | 24 | 111 | 2 | 5 | 135 | 1 | 4 |
| New York | 233 | 779 | 0 | 0 | 458 | 0 | 0 |
| North Carolina | 83 | 183 | 0 | 0 | 52 | 0 | 0 |
| North Dakota | 18 | 87 | 1 | 5 | 39 | 0 | 0 |
| Ohio | 235 | 757 | 0 | 0 | 526 | 0 | 0 |
| Oklahoma | 195 | 521 | 1 | 4 | 101 | 2 | 7 |
| Oregon | 619 | 1,833 | 5 | 21 | 237 | NA | 6 |
| Pennsylvania | 530 | 1,725 | 7 | 25 | 524 | 7 | 18 |
| Rhode Island | 53 | 253 | 0 | 0 | 109 | 11 | 16 |
| South Carolina | 21 | 56 | 1 | 3 | 55 | 0 | 0 |
| South Dakota | 18 | 96 | 1 | NA | 69 | 0 | 0 |
| Tennessee | 35 | 74 | 5 | 14 | 46 | 5 | 18 |
| Texas | 724 | 2,411 | 37 | 135 | 294 | 9 | 32 |
| Utah | 85 | 244 | 3 | 6 | 54 | 1 | 1 |
| Vermont | 4 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 |

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE 7.—WELFARE AND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE FOR INDOCHINESE REFUGEES (REPORTS FROM STATES AS OF AUG. 1, 1977)—Continued

| States | Financial assistance | | | | Medical assistance (only) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Applications authorized (currently receiving) | | Applications pending | | Authorized persons | Pending | |
| | Cases | Persons | Cases | Persons | | Cases | Persons |
| Virginia [1] | 614 | 1,543 | 66 | 165 | 543 | 32 | 59 |
| Washington [1] | 1,077 | 2,834 | 10 | 13 | 229 | 1 | 1 |
| West Virginia [2] | 18 | 41 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 0 | 0 |
| Wisconsin [3] | 241 | 957 | 0 | 0 | 462 | 0 | 0 |
| Wyoming | 3 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Guam | 102 | 302 | 0 | 0 | 32 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 16,380 | 50,771 | 294 | 1,015 | 16,427 | 117 | 260 |

[1] As of June 1, 1977.
[2] As of Aug. 15, 1977.
[3] As of July 1, 1977.

TABLE 8.—SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME: NUMBER OF INDOCHINESE REFUGEES ELIGIBLE FOR FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED PAYMENTS, BY REASON FOR ELIGIBILITY AND STATE, AUG. 1, 1977

| State | Total | Aged | Blind | Disabled |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | 2,302 | 1,810 | 45 | 447 |
| Alabama | 12 | 6 | ---- | 6 |
| Alaska | 1 | 1 | ---- | ---- |
| Arizona | 10 | 7 | ---- | 3 |
| Arkansas | 28 | 20 | ---- | 8 |
| California | 684 | 526 | 14 | 144 |
| Colorado | 17 | 14 | 1 | 2 |
| Connecticut | 17 | 16 | ---- | 1 |
| Delaware | 2 | ---- | ---- | 2 |
| District of Columbia | 1 | ---- | ---- | 1 |
| Florida | 74 | 52 | ---- | 22 |
| Georgia | 21 | 19 | ---- | 2 |
| Hawaii | 22 | 20 | ---- | 2 |
| Idaho | ---- | ---- | ---- | ---- |
| Illinois | 38 | 32 | ---- | 6 |
| Indiana | 25 | 22 | ---- | 3 |
| Iowa | 60 | 49 | 5 | 6 |
| Kansas | 33 | 28 | ---- | 5 |
| Kentucky | 8 | 6 | 1 | 1 |
| Louisiana | 205 | 161 | 4 | 40 |
| Maine | 3 | 2 | ---- | 1 |
| Maryland | 36 | 28 | 1 | 7 |
| Massachusetts | 11 | 10 | ---- | 1 |
| Michigan | 24 | 20 | 1 | 3 |
| Minnesota | 31 | 25 | 1 | 5 |
| Mississippi | 14 | 11 | ---- | 3 |
| Missouri | 52 | 42 | 1 | 9 |
| Montana | 1 | ---- | ---- | ---- |
| Nebraska | 21 | 19 | 1 | 1 |
| Nevada | 13 | 8 | ---- | 5 |
| New Hampshire | ---- | ---- | ---- | ---- |
| New Jersey | 24 | 18 | ---- | 6 |
| New Mexico | 10 | 8 | ---- | 2 |
| New York | 57 | 45 | ---- | 12 |
| North Carolina | 19 | 14 | ---- | 5 |
| North Dakota | 4 | 3 | ---- | 1 |
| Ohio | 26 | 20 | 1 | 5 |
| Oklahoma | 69 | 59 | ---- | 10 |
| Oregon | 41 | 34 | 1 | 6 |
| Pennsylvania | 104 | 81 | 1 | 22 |
| Rhode Island | 4 | 2 | ---- | 2 |
| South Carolina | 11 | 7 | 1 | 3 |
| South Dakota | 3 | 2 | ---- | 1 |
| Tennessee | 10 | 8 | ---- | 2 |
| Texas | 241 | 188 | 6 | 47 |
| Utah | 7 | 4 | ---- | 3 |
| Vermont | ---- | ---- | ---- | ---- |
| Virginia | 89 | 73 | 4 | 12 |
| Washington | 78 | 64 | ---- | 14 |
| West Virginia | 2 | 2 | ---- | ---- |
| Wisconsin | 35 | 30 | 1 | 4 |
| Wyoming | ---- | ---- | ---- | ---- |
| Unknown | 4 | 3 | ---- | 1 |

TABLE 9.—LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION OF PERSONS 16 YR AND OLDER BY SEX AND RELATIONSHIP TO HEADS OF HOUSEHOLD IN SURVEYS I, II, III, IV, AND V

[Weighted percentages]

| Relationship to head of household | Survey I* [1] | | Survey II [2] | | Survey III [3] | | Survey IV [4] | | Survey V [5] | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Unweighted | Percent in labor force | Unweighted | Percent in labor force | Unweighted | Percent in labor force | Unweighted | Percent in labor force | Unweighted | Percent in labor force |
| **MALES** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total | 2,886 | 69.0 | 2,527 | 78.7 | 955 | 80.0 | 932 | 76.5 | 889 | 79.2 |
| Head | 1,251 | 87.2 | 1,552 | 89.4 | 546 | 89.5 | 570 | 86.7 | 533 | 87.9 |
| Spouse | 57 | 62.2 | 20 | 80.0 | 5 | 100.0 | 9 | 90.6 | 12 | 100.0 |
| Child or spouse of child | 765 | 40.0 | 357 | 55.5 | 183 | 58.5 | 175 | 42.8 | 162 | 54.9 |
| Grandchild/nephew/niece | 99 | 56.0 | 68 | 64.7 | 13 | 69.2 | 16 | 73.9 | 12 | 78.8 |
| Parent or spouse | 76 | 27.9 | 61 | 24.6 | 23 | 43.5 | 22 | 39.6 | 22 | 19.4 |
| Other relative | 581 | 61.8 | 398 | 71.4 | 106 | 67.9 | 89 | 60.6 | 88 | 68.2 |
| Unrelated/NA | 37 | 28.0 | 371 | 84.1 | 79 | 91.1 | 51 | 96.9 | 60 | 87.9 |
| **FEMALES** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total | 2994 | 39.3 | 1973 | 40.0 | 759 | 44.1 | 754 | 44.5 | 715 | 48.8 |
| Head | 291 | 62.7 | 170 | 71.2 | 71 | 66.2 | 75 | 68.4 | 74 | 77.0 |
| Spouse | 1034 | 35.5 | 812 | 32.5 | 345 | 38.0 | 361 | 46.0 | 343 | 50.0 |
| Child or spouse of child | 800 | 33.3 | 387 | 49.1 | 169 | 43.2 | 157 | 34.1 | 145 | 50.8 |
| Grandchild/nephew/niece | 88 | 34.4 | 32 | 31.3 | 12 | 75.0 | 11 | 46.8 | 13 | 36.9 |
| Parent or spouse | 218 | 6.8 | 195 | 5.6 | 69 | 10.1 | 65 | 9.4 | 62 | 3.0 |
| Other relative | 537 | 45.2 | 339 | 51.3 | 91 | 64.8 | 82 | 58.7 | 77 | 56.7 |
| Unrelated/NA | 26 | 48.4 | 38 | 50.0 | 2 | 50.0 | 3 | 39.8 | 1 | ..... |

[1] I—July–August 1975.
[2] II—November–December 1975.
[3] III—July–August 1976.
[4] IV—March–April 1977.
[5] V—July–August 1977.
* Wave I data include persons 14 yr and older.

TABLE 10.—EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF PERSONS 16 YR AND OLDER BY SEX AND RELATIONSHIP TO HEADS OF HOUSEHOLD IN SURVEYS I, II, II, IV, AND V

[Weighted percentages]

| Relationship to head of household | Survey I [1] | | Survey II [2] | | Survey III [3] | | Survey IV [4] | | Survey V [5] | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Unweighted | Percent employed | Unweighted | Percent employed | Unweighted | Percent employed | Unweighted | Percent employed | Unweighted | Percent employed |
| **MALES** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total | 1,887 | 68.2 | 1,988 | 82.0 | 764 | 89.9 | 704 | 94.6 | 705 | 95.1 |
| Head | 1,110 | 68.1 | 1,119 | 82.9 | 489 | 90.6 | 497 | 93.8 | 473 | 94.4 |
| Spouse | 38 | 63.0 | 16 | 68.7 | 5 | 100.0 | 8 | 100.0 | 12 | 100.0 |
| Child or spouse of child | 303 | 67.5 | 198 | 78.8 | 107 | 89.7 | 76 | 95.4 | 94 | 97.1 |
| Grandchild/nephew/niece | 44 | 70.6 | 44 | 81.8 | 9 | 88.9 | 10 | 100.0 | 8 | 100.0 |
| Parent or spouse | 21 | 54.1 | 15 | 60.0 | 10 | 80.0 | 8 | 100.0 | 3 | 100.0 |
| Other relative | 356 | 69.1 | 284 | 77.1 | 72 | 83.3 | 56 | 96.9 | 60 | 92.7 |
| Unrelated/NA | 15 | 50.0 | 312 | 87.2 | 72 | 93.1 | 49 | 96.9 | 55 | 98.6 |
| **FEMALES** | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total | 1,122 | 50.9 | 789 | 70.1 | 327 | 82.0 | 318 | 86.4 | 354 | 93.2 |
| Head | 194 | 53.7 | 121 | 80.2 | 47 | 91.5 | 50 | 85.4 | 53 | 92.5 |
| Spouse | 352 | 46.2 | 264 | 64.8 | 131 | 77.9 | 160 | 84.8 | 176 | 91.7 |
| Child or spouse of child | 276 | 52.9 | 190 | 72.1 | 73 | 86.3 | 52 | 92.0 | 75 | 92.6 |
| Grandchild/nephew/niece | 28 | 51.5 | 10 | 70.0 | 9 | 66.7 | 4 | 100.0 | 4 | 100.0 |
| Parent or spouse | 16 | 27.9 | 11 | 72.8 | 7 | 42.9 | 5 | 68.0 | 2 | 100.0 |
| Other relative | 244 | 55.1 | 174 | 68.4 | 59 | 84.7 | 45 | 89.8 | 44 | 100.0 |
| Unrelated/NA | 12 | 53.1 | 19 | 73.7 | 1 | 100.0 | 2 | 50.0 | ..... | ..... |

[1] I—July–August 1975.
[2] II—November–December 1975.
[3] III—July–August 1976.
[4] IV—March–April 1977.
[5] V—July–August 1977.

TABLE 11.—EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF PERSONS 16 YR AND OLDER BY AGE AND SEX IN SURVEYS I, II, III, IV, AND V

[Weighted percentages]

| Age | Survey I [1] | | Survey II [2] | | Survey III [3] | | Survey IV [4] | | Survey V [5] | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Unweighted | Percent Employed | Unweighted | Percent Employed | Unweighted | Percent Employed | Unweighted | Percent Employed | Unweighted | Percent Employed |
| MALES | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total | 1,888 | 68.2 | 1,988 | 82.0 | 764 | 89.9 | 704 | 94.6 | 705 | 95.1 |
| 16 to 24 | 550 | 64.2 | 743 | 82.4 | 234 | 88.0 | 197 | 97.1 | 217 | 95.2 |
| 25 to 34 | 578 | 75.6 | 687 | 82.7 | 270 | 91.9 | 246 | 95.3 | 238 | 95.7 |
| 35 to 44 | 451 | 71.1 | 347 | 82.7 | 152 | 92.8 | 146 | 93.5 | 140 | 97.5 |
| 45 and over | 309 | 52.1 | 211 | 77.7 | 108 | 85.2 | 115 | 90.1 | 110 | 90.6 |
| FEMALES | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total | 1,120 | 50.9 | 789 | 70.1 | 327 | 82.0 | 318 | 86.4 | 354 | 93.2 |
| 16 to 24 | 446 | 51.5 | 310 | 72.6 | 109 | 84.4 | 86 | 88.2 | 113 | 93.1 |
| 25 to 34 | 406 | 51.0 | 295 | 70.8 | 121 | 82.6 | 126 | 87.9 | 129 | 95.6 |
| 35 to 44 | 205 | 53.2 | 123 | 65.8 | 67 | 83.6 | 73 | 84.0 | 81 | 96.7 |
| 45 and over | 63 | 41.3 | 61 | 62.3 | 30 | 66.6 | 33 | 80.3 | 31 | 73.3 |

[1] I—July–August 1975.
[2] II—November–December 1975.
[3] III—July–August 1976.
[4] IV—March–April 1977.
[5] V—July–August 1977.

TABLE 12.—WEEKLY WAGES AND SALARY INCOME IN SURVEYS II, III, IV, AND V

[Weighted percentages]

| Weekly wages and income level | Survey I [1] | Survey II [2] | Survey III [3] | Survey IV [4] | Survey V [5] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | (6) | 2184 | 955 | 940 | 998 |
| Zero wages | (6) | 1.9 | | | 1.3 |
| Less than $50 | (6) | 10.5 | 8.0 | 6.4 | 4.9 |
| $50 to $99 | (6) | 40.0 | 27.6 | 16.9 | 16.2 |
| $100 to $199 | (6) | 44.4 | 57.6 | 65.2 | 63.3 |
| $200 and over | (6) | 3.2 | 5.3 | 9.9 | 14.3 |
| Not available | (6) | | 1.5 | 1.6 | |

[1] July–August 1975.
[2] November–December 1975.
[3] July–August 1976.
[4] March–April 1977.
[5] July–August 1977.
[6] Data not available.

TABLE 13.—MONTHLY INCOME OF REFUGEE HOUSEHOLDS FROM ALL SOURCES IN SURVEYS I, II, III, IV, AND V

[Weighted percentages]

| | Survey I [1] | Survey II [2] | Survey III [3] | Survey IV [4] | Survey V [5] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | 1570 | 1424 | 617 | 645 | 607 |
| Under $200 | 42.1 | 17.6 | 5.3 | 4.0 | 3.2 |
| $200 to $399 | 14.2 | 15.4 | 13.1 | 11.0 | 7.8 |
| $400 to $599 | 17.3 | 20.9 | 22.2 | 22.0 | 20.6 |
| $600 to $799 | 11.5 | 12.6 | 13.9 | 16.2 | 14.0 |
| $800 and over | 14.9 | 32.4 | 41.2 | 43.8 | 51.4 |
| Not available | | | 4.2 | 2.8 | 3.1 |

[1] July–August 1975.
[2] November–December 1975.
[3] July–August 1976.
[4] March–April 1977.
[5] July–August 1977.

TABLE 14.—MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME FROM ALL SOURCES BY COMPONENTS OF INCOME IN TERMS OF PERCENT OF DOLLAR CONTRIBUTIONS TO HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN SURVEYS I, II, III, IV, AND V

[Weighted percentages]

| | Survey I [1] | Survey II [2] | Survey III [3] | Survey IV [4] | Survey V [5] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total households | 1,570 | 1,424 | 617.0 | 645.0 | 607.0 |
| Wages and salary | | | 90.4 | 87.9 | 90.8 |
| Refugee financial assistance | | | 6.7 | 8.2 | 6.1 |
| SSI | | | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.5 |
| Other | | | 1.7 | 2.5 | 1.6 |

[1] July–August 1975.
[2] November–December 1975.
[3] July–August 1976.
[4] March–April 1977.
[5] July–August 1977.

Note: Data not available in surveys I and II.

TABLE 15.—PRESENT OCCUPATION OF HEADS OF HOUSEHOLD BY VIETNAM OCCUPATION

[Weighted percentages]

| Vietnam occupation | Total | | Present occupation | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | White collar | | | Blue collar | | | |
| | Number | Percent | Professional | Managers | Clerical and sales | Craftsman | Operatives transport | Laborers | Other blue collar |
| Total | 472 | 100 | 7.0 | 2.3 | 18.7 | 29.5 | 11.5 | 7.2 | 24.0 |
| White collar | 319 | 100 | 10.3 | 3.5 | 25.6 | 26.1 | 9.0 | 4.0 | 21.5 |
| Professional | 142 | 100 | 17.7 | 3.9 | 20.1 | 29.1 | 10.5 | 1.7 | 16.9 |
| Managers | 71 | 100 | 4.0 | 5.1 | 22.5 | 30.5 | 11.8 | 2.7 | 23.4 |
| Clerical and sales | 106 | 100 | 4.3 | 2.1 | 34.1 | 19.9 | 5.6 | 7.7 | 26.3 |
| Blue collar | 153 | 100 | .9 | ..... | 5.8 | 35.7 | 16.0 | 13.1 | 28.5 |
| Craftsman | 68 | 100 | 2.3 | ..... | 6.0 | 44.2 | 16.7 | 12.4 | 18.5 |
| Operatives and transport | 16 | 100 | ..... | ..... | ..... | 38.2 | 4.8 | 13.3 | 43.7 |
| Other Blue collars | 69 | 100 | ..... | ..... | 6.8 | 28.5 | 17.8 | 13.5 | 33.3 |
| Laborers | | | | | | | | | |
| Not ascertained | | | | | | | | | |

Note: Survey V, July-August 1977.

TABLE 16.—REASONS FOR NOT SEEKING EMPLOYMENT IN SURVEYS I, II, III, IV, AND V

[Weighted percentages]

| Reasons | Survey I [1] | Survey II [2] | Survey III [3] | Survey IV [4] | Survey V [5] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | 259 | 1,723 | 612 | 663 | 545 |
| Attending school | 35.5 | 34.4 | 49.2 | 56.0 | 48.2 |
| Keeping house | 17.3 | 32.2 | 36.6 | 28.2 | 29.8 |
| Poor health | 6.5 | 14.1 | 13.2 | 17.7 | 21.3 |
| Poor English | 19.3 | 19.0 | 11.3 | 14.9 | 9.1 |
| Other means of support | 10.8 | 3.5 | 2.5 | 1.6 | .5 |
| Discouraged | ..... | 1.1 | .3 | .1 | .4 |
| Other | 17.0 | 5.5 | 3.1 | 2.1 | 3.1 |

[1] July–August 1975.
[2] November–December 1975.
[3] July–August 1976.
[4] March–April 1977.
[5] July–August 1977.

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TABLE 17.—DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS BY NUMBER OF EMPLOYED PERSONS 16 YR AND OLDER

[Unweighted data]

| Number of employed persons | Number of households | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Total | 607 | 100.0 |
| With no employed person | 62 | 11.0 |
| With 1 person employed | 246 | 43.3 |
| With 2 persons employed | 212 | 31.1 |
| With 3 persons employed | 47 | 7.3 |
| With 4 persons employed | 22 | 3.0 |
| With 5 persons employed | 14 | 1.9 |
| With 6 or more employed | 4 | .5 |

Note: Survey V, July-August 1977.

TABLE 18.—DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS BY NUMBER OF EMPLOYED PERSONS 16 YR AND OLDER, BY SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD, SURVEY V—JULY-AUG. 1977

[Weighted percentages]

| Size of household and number of employed persons | Unweighted | Weighted (percent) |
|---|---|---|
| Total | 607 | 100.0 |
| A. 1-person households | 110 | 21.3 |
| With no employed person | 20 | 17.9 |
| With 1 person employed | 90 | 82.1 |
| B. 2-person households | 73 | 13.1 |
| With no employed person | 9 | 10.0 |
| With 1 person employed | 22 | 31.8 |
| With 2 persons employed | 42 | 58.2 |
| C. 3-person households | 64 | 10.7 |
| With no employed person | 5 | 6.0 |
| With 1 person employed | 18 | 29.0 |
| With 2 persons employed | 34 | 52.1 |
| With 3 persons employed | 7 | 12.9 |
| D. 4-person households | 77 | 11.8 |
| With no employed person | 4 | 7.7 |
| With 1 person employed | 28 | 36.1 |
| With 2 persons employed | 35 | 42.5 |
| With 3 persons employed | 5 | 6.89 |
| With 4 persons employed | 5 | 6.9 |
| E. 5-person households | 62 | 10.4 |
| With no employed person | 6 | 15.1 |
| With 1 person employed | 20 | 30.7 |
| With 2 persons employed | 29 | 43.8 |
| With 3 persons employed | 5 | 7.7 |
| With 4 persons employed | 2 | 2.7 |
| With 5 persons employed | | |
| F. Households of 6 or more persons | 221 | 32.6 |
| With no employed person | 18 | 8.5 |
| With 1 person employed | 68 | 33.8 |
| With 2 persons employed | 72 | 31.4 |
| With 3 persons employed | 30 | 13.3 |
| With 4 persons employed | 15 | 5.7 |
| With 5 persons employed | 14 | 5.8 |
| With 6 or more persons employed | 4 | 1.4 |

TABLE 19.—HOURS WORKED PER WEEK FOR EMPLOYED PERSONS IN SURVEYS II, III, IV, AND V

[Weighted percentages]

| Hours worked | Survey I [1] | Survey II [2] | Survey III [3] | Survey IV [4] | Survey V [5] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | ([6]) | 2,184 | 935 | 940 | 998 |
| Less than 15 | ([6]) | 4.1 | 2.5 | 1.9 | 1.3 |
| 15 to 29 | ([6]) | 9.8 | 10.5 | 10.1 | 10.3 |
| 30 to 39 | ([6]) | 9.5 | 7.3 | 7.7 | 4.3 |
| 40 plus | ([6]) | 76.0 | 79.7 | 80.0 | 84.1 |
| Not available | | .5 | | .2 | |

[1] July–August 1975.
[2] November–December 1975.
[3] July–August 1976.
[4] March–April 1977.
[5] July–August 1977.
[6] Data not available.

TABLE 20.—EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF PERSONS 16 YR AND OLDER BY PROFICIENCY IN ENGLISH, IN SURVEYS I, II, III, AND V [1]

[Weighted percentages]

| Proficiency in English | Survey I [2] | | Survey II [3] | | Survey III [4] | | Survey V [5] | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Unweighted | Percent employed | Unweighted | Percent employed | Unweighted | Percent employed | Unweighted | Percent employed |
| Total | 2,988 | 62.7 | 2,003 | 78.4 | 1,091 | 87.5 | 1,059 | 94.5 |
| Understand English: | | | | | | | | |
| Not at all | 127 | 56.7 | 155 | 71.0 | 47 | 72.3 | 25 | 88.8 |
| Some | 1,856 | 60.6 | 1,481 | 78.5 | 794 | 87.5 | 672 | 93.4 |
| Well | 975 | 67.8 | 363 | 81.0 | 250 | 90.4 | 362 | 97.1 |
| Speak English: | | | | | | | | |
| Not at all | 141 | 53.2 | 161 | 70.8 | 50 | 72.0 | 27 | 90.1 |
| Some | 1,873 | 60.9 | 1,484 | 78.6 | 790 | 87.0 | 681 | 93.5 |
| Well | 946 | 68.1 | 355 | 80.8 | 251 | 90.4 | 351 | 97.0 |
| Read English: | | | | | | | | |
| Not at all | 142 | 52.8 | 173 | 69.9 | 59 | 72.9 | 38 | 92.3 |
| Some | 1,791 | 61.4 | 1,432 | 78.8 | 768 | 87.5 | 689 | 93.4 |
| Well | 1,024 | 66.7 | 393 | 80.4 | 264 | 90.9 | 332 | 97.3 |
| Write English: | | | | | | | | |
| Not at all | 155 | 53.5 | 179 | 70.4 | 59 | 74.6 | 38 | 92.6 |
| Some | 1,812 | 61.5 | 1,444 | 78.7 | 769 | 87.4 | 704 | 93.5 |
| Well | 991 | 66.7 | 376 | 80.6 | 263 | 90.9 | 317 | 97.1 |

[1] Data not available in survey IV.
[2] July–August 1975.
[3] November–December 1975.
[4] July–August 1976.
[5] July–August 1977.

## C. Information Relating to the Indochina Refugee Children Assistance Act of 1976

*Title II funding as of September 30, 1977*

| | |
|---|---|
| Total number of refugees served | 50,677 |
| Public school refugees served | 46,430 |
| Nonpublic school refugees served | 4,249 |
| Number of school districts | 2,187 |
| Districts with more than 100 refugees | 84 |
| Districts with less than 100 refugees | 2,103 |
| Entitlement × $300 | 34,536 |
| Entitlement × $600 | 16,141 |

*Greatest concentrations of refugee children by State*

| | |
|---|---|
| 1. California | 15,512 |
| 2. Texas | 3,816 |
| 3. Louisianna | 2,669 |
| 4. Virginia | 1,807 |
| 5. Florida | 1,800 |
| 6. Washington | 1,695 |
| 7. Pennsylvania | 1,481 |
| 8. Oregon | 1,285 |
| 9. Illinois | 1,238 |
| 10. Iowa | 1,478 |
| 11. Minnesota | 1,306 |
| 12. Maryland | 1,176 |
| 13. Oklahoma | 1,054 |
| 14. Wisconsin | 1,037 |
| 15. New York | 1,030 |

*Smallest concentrations of refugee children by State*

| | |
|---|---|
| 1. West Virginia | 75 |
| 2. Alaska | 62 |
| 3. Delaware | 60 |
| 4. Washington, D.C. | 53 |
| 5. Maine | 45 |
| 6. Vermont | 40 |
| 7. New Hampshire | 37 |
| 8. Wyoming | 15 |

*Greatest concentrations of nonpublic school refugees*

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. California | 931 | 9. Michigan | 138 |
| 2. Pennsylvania | 200 | 10. Ohio | 133 |
| 4. Indiana | 188 | 11. Kentucky | 131 |
| 3. Missouri | 194 | 12. New York | 130 |
| 5. Texas | 184 | 13. Nebraska | 109 |
| 6. Wisconsin | 174 | 14. Oklahoma | 106 |
| 7. Louisiana | 159 | 15. Massachusetts | 102 |
| 8. Illinois | 147 | | |

INDOCHINESE REFUGEE CHILDREN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

| | Number of school districts | Public school refugees | Nonpublic school refugees | Total number of refugees served | Districts with more than 100 refugees | Districts with less than 100 refugees | Times $300 | Times $600 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Alabama | 27 | 423 | 64 | 487 | 1 | 26 | 474 | 13 |
| 2. Alaska | 1 | 62 | 0 | 62 | 0 | 1 | 62 | 0 |
| 3. Arizona | 23 | 397 | 25 | 422 | 1 | 22 | 382 | 40 |
| 4. Arkansas | 37 | 512 | 44 | 556 | 1 | 36 | 356 | 200 |
| 5. California | 290 | 14,581 | 931 | 15,512 | 27 | 263 | 8,965 | 6,547 |
| 6. Colorado | 32 | 761 | 68 | 829 | 2 | 30 | 595 | 234 |
| 7. Connecticut | 42 | 373 | 48 | 421 | 0 | 42 | 421 | 0 |
| 8. Delaware | 9 | 55 | 5 | 60 | 0 | 9 | 60 | 0 |
| 9. District of Columbia | 1 | 45 | 8 | 53 | 0 | 1 | 53 | 0 |
| 10. Florida | 34 | 1,711 | 89 | 1,800 | 7 | 27 | 1,412 | 388 |
| 11. Georgia | 20 | 333 | 9 | 342 | 0 | 20 | 342 | 0 |
| 12. Hawaii | 1 | 892 | 17 | 909 | 0 | 1 | 100 | 809 |
| 13. Idaho | 6 | 105 | 5 | 110 | 0 | 6 | 110 | 0 |
| 14. Illinois | 184 | 1,138 | 147 | 1,285 | 1 | 183 | 910 | 375 |
| 15. Indiana | 55 | 372 | 188 | 560 | 0 | 55 | 560 | 0 |
| 16. Iowa | 87 | 1,084 | 154 | 1,238 | 1 | 86 | 995 | 243 |
| 17. Kansas | 20 | 424 | 59 | 483 | 2 | 18 | 297 | 186 |
| 18. Kentucky | 22 | 264 | 131 | 395 | 1 | 21 | 374 | 21 |
| 19. Louisiana | 24 | 2,510 | 159 | 2,669 | 4 | 20 | 911 | 1,758 |
| 20. Maine | 9 | 34 | 11 | 45 | 0 | 9 | 45 | 0 |
| 21. Maryland | 20 | 1,108 | 68 | 1,176 | 3 | 17 | 621 | 555 |
| 22. Massachusetts | 35 | 269 | 102 | 371 | 0 | 35 | 368 | 3 |
| 23. Michigan | 53 | 601 | 138 | 739 | 1 | 52 | 641 | 98 |

INDOCHINESE REFUGEE CHILDREN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM—Continued

| | Number of school districts | Public school refugees | Non-public school refugees | Total number of refugees served | Districts with more than 100 refugees | Districts with less than 100 refugees | Times $300 | Times $600 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 24. Minnesota | 91 | 1,200 | 106 | 1,306 | 2 | 89 | 1,161 | 145 |
| 25. Mississippi | 24 | 283 | 42 | 325 | 1 | 23 | 277 | 48 |
| 26. Missouri | 34 | 638 | 194 | 832 | 1 | 33 | 444 | 388 |
| 27. Montana | 13 | 114 | 6 | 120 | 0 | 13 | 95 | 25 |
| 28. Nebraska | 17 | 276 | 109 | 385 | 0 | 17 | 379 | 6 |
| 29. Nevada | 3 | 183 | 0 | 183 | 1 | 2 | 162 | 21 |
| 30. New Hampshire | 4 | 37 | 0 | 37 | 0 | 4 | 37 | 0 |
| 31. New Jersey | 96 | 361 | 23 | 384 | 0 | 96 | 381 | 3 |
| 32. New Mexico | 5 | 194 | 0 | 194 | 1 | 4 | 152 | 42 |
| 33. New York | 110 | 900 | 130 | 1,030 | 1 | 109 | 1,004 | 26 |
| 34. North Carolina | 21 | 343 | 18 | 361 | 0 | 21 | 361 | 0 |
| 35. North Dakota | 14 | 91 | 29 | 120 | 0 | 14 | 109 | 11 |
| 36. Ohio | 101 | 650 | 133 | 783 | 1 | 100 | 746 | 37 |
| 37. Oklahoma | 26 | 948 | 106 | 1,054 | 2 | 24 | 601 | 453 |
| 38. Oregon | 124 | 1,478 | 0 | 1,478 | 2 | 122 | 1,060 | 418 |
| 39. Pennsylvania | 115 | 1,281 | 200 | 1,481 | 1 | 114 | 1,259 | 222 |
| 40. Rhode Island | 8 | 260 | 24 | 284 | 1 | 7 | 154 | 130 |
| 41. South Carolina | 13 | 200 | 21 | 221 | 0 | 13 | 221 | 0 |
| 42. South Dakota | 19 | 96 | 13 | 109 | 0 | 19 | 109 | 0 |
| 43. Tennessee | 28 | 276 | 80 | 356 | 0 | 28 | 356 | 0 |
| 44. Texas | 57 | 3,632 | 184 | 3,816 | 11 | 46 | 2,693 | 1,123 |
| 45. Utah | 9 | 294 | 12 | 306 | 0 | 9 | 292 | 14 |
| 46. Vermont | 10 | 37 | 3 | 40 | 0 | 10 | 40 | 0 |
| 47. Virginia | 35 | 1,754 | 53 | 1,807 | 3 | 32 | 890 | 917 |
| 48. Washington | 56 | 1,600 | 95 | 1,695 | 3 | 53 | 1,297 | 398 |
| 49. West Virginia | 9 | 61 | 14 | 75 | 0 | 9 | 75 | 0 |
| 50. Wisconsin | 73 | 863 | 174 | 1,037 | 2 | 71 | 1,012 | 25 |
| 51. Wyoming | 3 | 7 | 8 | 15 | 0 | 3 | 15 | 0 |
| 52. Guam | 37 | 319 | 0 | 319 | 0 | 37 | 100 | 219 |
| 53. Puerto Rico | | | | | | | | |
| 54. Virgin Islands | | | | | | | | |
| Total | 2,187 | 46,430 | 4,249 | 50,677 | 84 | 2,103 | 34,536 | 16,141 |

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
OFFICE OF EDUCATION,
*Washington, D.C.*

CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION OF ENTITLEMENTS

**Title II, The Indochina Refugee Children Assistance Act of 1976, Public Law 94–405**

*Recipients.*—Grants to State Educational Agencies and through them sub-grants to local educational agencies.

*Descriptions.*—Allotment of funds for period covering July 1, 1976 to September 30, 1977 under the provisions of Title II, of the Indochina Refugee Children Assistance Act of 1976. Funds for this program are provided through the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1977 (Public Law 95–26).

The grants are being made by the Commissioner of Education to State Educational agencies and through them to local educational agencies which are providing public educational services for Indochinese refugee children, ages 5 through 17. These grants are non-discretionary. A local educational agency qualifies for a sub-grant if, during the grant period, it is providing public educational services to at least one eligible Indochinese refugee child, and if, during the period of obligation, it makes available public educational services for all refugee children for whom it received funds.

*State allocations.*—Enclosed is a list which shows the amount of the grant awards by State. These allocations have been computed in accordance with the formula contained in P.L. 94–405. Each State grant has been ratably reduced by 9.48% in accordance with Section 204(a) of the Act due to the fact that the sums appropriated are not sufficient to pay in full the total amount which State educational agencies are otherwise entitled to receive under this Act.

*Ratable reduction of grants under Public Law 94-405.*—The Advice of Allotment for the Indochinese Refugee Program designated the amount of $18,316,832 for grants to LEAs and the amount of $183,168 for State Administration. The total amount requested for grants to LEAs was $20,235,900. By dividing the $20,235,900 into the allocation of $18,316,832 it was ascertained that the amount of the allocation is 90.52% of the requested amount. Thus, each State's approved request for grants to LEAs was ratably reduced by the difference—9.48%.

| | SEA/LEA request[1] | SEA/LEA approved | SEA 1 percent administration | Total approved | Total requested |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Aug. 31, 1977 | $20, 235, 900 | $18, 317, 538 | $180, 566 | $18, 498, 104 | $20, 435, 376 |
| 1. Alabama | 150, 000 | 135, 780 | 1, 358 | 137, 138 | 151, 500 |
| 2. Alaska | 18, 600 | 16, 837 | 0 | 16, 837 | 18, 600 |
| 3. Arizona | 138, 600 | 125, 461 | 1, 255 | 126, 716 | 139, 986 |
| 4. Arkansas | 225, 600 | 204, 213 | 2, 042 | 206, 255 | 227, 856 |
| 5. California | 6, 625, 200 | 5, 997, 131 | 59, 971 | 6, 057, 102 | 6, 691, 452 |
| 6. Colorado | 318, 900 | 288, 668 | 2, 887 | 291, 555 | 322, 089 |
| 7. Connecticut | 126, 300 | 114, 327 | 1, 143 | 115, 470 | 127, 563 |
| 8. Delaware | 18, 000 | 16, 294 | 163 | 16, 457 | 18, 180 |
| 9. District of Columbia | 15, 900 | 14, 393 | 144 | 14, 537 | 16, 059 |
| 10. Florida | 656, 400 | 594, 173 | 5, 942 | 600, 115 | 662, 964 |
| 11. Georgia | 102, 600 | 92, 874 | 929 | 93, 803 | 103, 626 |
| 12. Hawaii | 515, 400 | 466, 540 | 4, 665 | 471, 205 | 520, 554 |
| 13. Idaho | 33, 000 | 29, 872 | 0 | 29, 872 | 33, 000 |
| 14. Illinois | 531, 000 | 480, 661 | 4, 807 | 485, 468 | 536, 310 |
| 15. Indiana | 168, 000 | 152, 074 | 1, 521 | 153, 595 | 169, 680 |
| 16. Iowa | 444, 300 | 402, 180 | 4, 022 | 406, 202 | 448, 743 |
| 17. Kansas | 237, 600 | 215, 076 | 2, 151 | 217, 227 | 239, 976 |
| 18. Kentucky | 124, 500 | 112, 697 | 1, 127 | 113, 824 | 125, 745 |
| 19. Louisiana | 1, 328, 100 | 1, 202, 196 | 12, 022 | 1, 214, 218 | 1, 341, 381 |
| 20. Maine | 13, 500 | 12, 220 | 122 | 12, 342 | 13, 635 |
| 21. Maryland | 519, 300 | 470, 070 | 4, 701 | 474, 771 | 524, 493 |
| 22. Massachusetts | 113, 400 | 102, 650 | 1, 027 | 103, 677 | 114, 534 |
| 23. Michigan | 251, 100 | 227, 296 | 2, 273 | 229, 569 | 253, 611 |
| 24. Minnesota | 438, 600 | 397, 021 | 3, 970 | 400, 991 | 442, 986 |
| 25. Mississippi | 111, 900 | 101, 292 | 1, 013 | 102, 305 | 113, 019 |
| 26. Missouri | 364, 200 | 329, 674 | 3, 297 | 332, 971 | 367, 842 |
| 27. Montana | 43, 500 | 39, 376 | 394 | 39, 770 | 43, 935 |
| 28. Nebraska | 144, 000 | 130, 349 | 1, 303 | 131, 652 | 145, 440 |
| 29. Nevada | 61, 200 | 55, 398 | 554 | 55, 952 | 61, 812 |
| 30. New Hampshire | 11, 100 | 10, 048 | 100 | 10, 148 | 11, 211 |
| 31. New Jersey | 118, 200 | 106, 995 | 1, 070 | 108, 065 | 119, 382 |
| 32. New Mexico | 70, 800 | 64, 088 | 0 | 64, 088 | 70, 800 |
| 33. New York | 387, 000 | 350, 312 | 3, 503 | 353, 815 | 390, 870 |
| 34. North Carolina | 108, 300 | 98, 033 | 980 | 99, 013 | 109, 383 |
| 35. North Dakota | 39, 300 | 35, 574 | 356 | 35, 930 | 39, 693 |
| 36. Ohio | 247, 500 | 224, 037 | 2, 240 | 226, 277 | 249, 975 |
| 37. Oklahoma | 454, 800 | 411, 685 | 4, 117 | 415, 802 | 459, 348 |
| 38. Oregon | 567, 300 | 513, 520 | 5, 135 | 518, 655 | 572, 973 |
| 39. Pennsylvania | 509, 400 | 461, 109 | 4, 611 | 465, 720 | 514, 494 |
| 40. Rhode Island | 124, 200 | 112, 426 | 1, 124 | 113, 550 | 125, 442 |
| 41. South Carolina | 66, 300 | 60, 015 | 600 | 60, 615 | 66, 963 |
| 42. South Dakota | 32, 700 | 29, 600 | 296 | 29, 896 | 33, 027 |
| 43. Tennessee | 100, 500 | 90, 973 | 910 | 91, 883 | 101, 505 |
| 44. Texas | 1, 481, 700 | 1, 341, 235 | 13, 412 | 1, 354, 647 | 1, 496, 517 |
| 45. Utah | 96, 000 | 86, 899 | 869 | 87, 768 | 96, 960 |
| 46. Vermont | 12, 000 | 10, 862 | 109 | 10, 971 | 12, 120 |
| 47. Virginia | 831, 000 | 752, 221 | 7, 522 | 759, 743 | 839, 310 |
| 48. Washington | 630, 300 | 570, 548 | 5, 705 | 576, 253 | 636, 603 |
| 49. West Virginia | 22, 500 | 20, 367 | 204 | 20, 571 | 22, 725 |
| 50. Wisconsin | 320, 400 | 290, 026 | 2, 900 | 292, 926 | 323, 604 |
| 51. Wyoming | 4, 500 | 4, 073 | 0 | 4, 073 | 4, 500 |
| 52. Guam | 161, 400 | 146, 099 | 0 | 146, 099 | 161, 400 |
| 53. Puerto Rico | | | | | |
| 54. Virgin Islands | | | | | |

[1]SEA/LEA request is ratably reduced by 9.48 percent.

*Fiscal year 1977 grants awarded under the emergency adult education program for Indochina refugees*

| *Grantee* | *City* |
|---|---|
| Alabama: Alabama State Department of Education | Montgomery. |
| Arizona: | |
| Phoenix Union High School System | Phoenix. |
| Pima County Superintendent of Schools | Tucson. |
| Scottsdale Unified School District | Phoenix. |
| Arkansas: Arkansas Department of Education | Little Rock. |
| California: | |
| Berkeley Unified School District | Berkeley. |
| California State Department of Education | Sacramento. |
| Corona-Norco Unified School District | Corona. |
| Escondido Union High School District | Escondido. |
| Garden Grove Unified School District | Garden Grove. |
| Long Beach Unified School District | Long Beach. |
| Los Angeles Harbor College | Wilmington. |
| Los Angeles Unified School District | Los Angeles. |
| Metropolitan Adult Education Program | San Jose. |
| Newport-Mesa Unified School District | Newport Beach. |
| Peralta Community College District | Oakland. |
| Sacramento City Unified School District | Sacramento. |
| San Francisco Community College District | San Francisco. |
| Santa Barbara Community College District | Santa Barbara. |
| Stockton Unified School District | Stockton. |
| Colorado: State Board for Community Colleges and Occupational Education | Denver. |
| Florida: | |
| Pinellas County District School Board | Clearwater. |
| Sarasota County School Board | Sarasota. |
| Seminole Community College | Sanford. |
| Georgia: Atlanta Public Schools | Atlanta. |
| Hawaii: Department of Education, Community Services Section | Honolulu. |
| Idaho: Boise State University Area Vocational School | Boise. |
| Illinois: Illinois Office of Education | Springfield. |
| Indiana: Bartholomew Consolidated School Corporation | Columbus. |
| Iowa: | |
| Des Moines Area Community College | Ankeny. |
| Indian Hills Community College | Ottumwa. |
| Kirkwood Community College | Cedar Rapids. |
| Kentucky: | |
| Hardin County Board of Education | Elizabethtown. |
| Jefferson County Board of Education | Louisville. |
| Louisiana: Lousiana State Department of Education | Baton Rouge. |
| Maine: Portland School Committee | Portland. |
| Massachusetts: Worcester Public Schools | Worcester. |
| Michigan: Grand Rapids Public Schools | Grand Rapids. |
| Missouri: | |
| Kansas City School District | Kansas City. |
| St. Louis Public Schools | St. Louis. |
| Montana: Missoula Technical Center | Missoula. |
| New Jersey: New Jersey Department of Education | Trenton. |
| New York: | |
| Center for Career & Occupational Ed., NYC Board of Education | Brooklyn. |
| Fulton City School District | Fulton. |
| Rensselaer-Columbia-Green Board of Cooperative Educational Services | Castleton. |
| Rochester City School District | Rochester. |
| Syracuse City School District | Syracuse. |
| Ohio: | |
| Cleveland Board of Education | Cleveland. |
| Toledo Public Schools | Toledo. |

*Fiscal year 1977 grants awarded under the emergency adult education program for Indochina refugees*—Continued

| *Grantee* | *City* |
|---|---|
| Oregon: | |
| Chemeketa Community College | Salem. |
| Portland Community College | Portland. |
| Treasure Valley Community College | Ontario. |
| Pennsylvania: | |
| Allegheny Intermediate Unit | Pittsburgh. |
| Millersville State College | Millersville. |
| Rhode Island: Providence School Department | Providence. |
| Tennessee: Memphis City Schools | Memphis. |
| Texas: | |
| Dallas Independent School District | Dallas. |
| Houston Community College System | Houston. |
| Virginia: | |
| Arlington Public Schools | Arlington. |
| Fairfax County Public Schools | Falls Church. |
| Norfolk City School Board | Norfolk. |
| Richmond Public Schools | Richmond. |
| Wisconsin: | |
| Area Vocational, Technical & Adult Education District No. 1 | Eau Claire. |
| Lakeshore Technical Institute | Cleveland. |
| Waukesha County Technical Institute | Pewaukee. |

Total number of grant awards: 65.
Total amount of grant awards: $10,029,327.

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[From the Federal Register, Vol. 42, No. 84, May 2, 1977, Pt. VI]

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE

OFFICE OF EDUCATION

[45 CFR Part 165]

STATE ADULT EDUCATION PROGRAMS

## Emergency Adult Education Program for Indochina Refugees

Agency: Office of Education, HEW.

Action: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

Summary: This document governs the award of grants to State and local educational agencies for the purpose of operating special adult education programs for adult Indochina refugees in Fiscal Year 1977 in order to facilitate their integration into American society and to contribute to their employability.

Comment date: Comments must be received on or before June 1, 1977.

Address: Comments should be addressed to Paul V. Delker, U.S. Office of Education, 7th and D Streets SW., Room 5056, Washington, D.C. 20202. All relevant material received on or before the 30th day after publication of this notice will be considered. Comments received in response to this notice will be available for public inspection at the above office, Mondays through Fridays, between 8:30 a.m. and 4:00 p.m.

For further information contact: Paul V. Delker (202-245-2278).

Supplementary information: All comments, suggestions, or recommendations to be considered must be received not later than June 1, 1977.

In accordance with section 431(g) of the General Education Provisions Act (20 U.S.C. 1232(g), S. Rept. No. 94-882 (94th Cong., 2d Sess.) at 108), the Commissioner is contrained to issue regulations to implement the program.

1. *Summary of emergency adult education program for adult Indochina refugees.* This subpart governs a program of grants to State and local educational agencies in Fiscal Year 1977 to operate the following types of one-year adult education programs for adult Indochina refugees:

(a) Programs of instruction in basic reading, mathematics, promotion of literacy and development and enhancement of necessary skills;

(b) Special adult education projects operating in conjunction with Federal and non-Federal occupational programs to develop occupational and related skills;

(c) Educational support services, including tutoring in geographically isolated areas, counseling, job placement, and follow-up;

(d) Any combination of programs and services described in (a), (b), and (c).

The goals of the special adult Indochina refugee program to be funded under this subpart are to:

(a) Facilitate the integration of adult Indochina refugees into American society; and

(b) Contribute to the employability of adult Indochina refugees through development of basic education and occupational skills.

Only State and local educational agencies are eligible for grants available under this subpart. The Congress has provided for direct application by State educational agencies and local educational agencies to assure rapid implementation of the special programs uniquely designed for needs of adult Indochina refugees (S. Rept. No. 94–432, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 7). A State educational agency and one or more local educational agencies or two or more local educational agencies are eligible to file a joint application in which each joint applicant is directly responsible for carrying out a portion of the program. The Commissioner will not fund an application from a local educational agency unless the appropriate State educational agency has provided the assurance of nonduplication required in § 166.79(a). Applications are evaluated using criteria described in § 166.80. No State or local cost sharing is required.

Eligible participants in programs provided under this subpart are adult Indochina refugees, as defined in § 166.76, who possess a Form I–94 indicating a person has been paroled into the United States or has been granted voluntary departure status.

2. *Public comment to the notice of intent to issue regulations.* As a first step in the regulation process, the Commissioner published a Notice of Intent to Issue Regulation in the Federal Register on November 23, 1976 (41 FR 51652–51654). The public was invited to offer comment, advice, and guidance to the Office of Education in response to identified or other issues relating to the development of regulations for this program. The suggestions received from the public have been given consideration in the preparation of this proposed rule.

The public's comments and the Commissioner's responses to these comments are summarized as follows:

*Issue (a)—Support services.* What types of educational support services are required to meet the needs of adult Indochina refugees?

*Comments.* The comments mentioned guidance and counseling, day care services, and transportation as the support services needed to serve the educational needs of adult Indochina refugees.

*Response.* This regulation provides that educational support services may be included as a component of a program of adult education instruction and a program of combined adult educational-occupational skills training instruction, or as an independent program where need for these services is demonstrated. Support services may include guidance and counseling, such as job development, placement, and follow-up, and tutoring when the program is to be operated in a geographically isolated area. The Commissioner has determined that day care services shall not be considered support services for the purposes of this subpart. The legislation and legislative history do not indicate that funding was intended for day care services and the Commissioner concludes that the limited resources which may be available for the programs will be more effectively spent on more educationally related support services.

Transportation costs may be allowable if need is demonstrated.

*Issue (b).—Pre-service and in-service Training.* What provisions for pre-service and in-service training of teachers, counselors, and paraprofessionals are needed to meet the special educational needs of adult Indochina refugees?

*Comments.* The responses expressed the view that there is a need for additional training of teachers, counselors, and paraprofessionals in the culture and background of Indochinese. One of the comments stated that a local educational agency should be able to contract directly with outside trainers and consultants to provide suitable staff training in aspects of Indochinese culture.

*Response § 166.71(b)—Program Purpose.* As indicated in this section and in paragraphs one and two of the preamble, the purpose of the program authorized by the Act is to provide emergency adult education programs to assist the adult Indochina refugees in developing basic skills and to become productive members of the society. In view of these purposes, the Commissioner, in § 166.81 (f) will allow pre-service or in-service training provided it can be demonstrated that the required competence is not otherwise available.

*Issue (c).—Duplication of services.* What criteria should be used to determine whether a State educational agency provides reasonable assurance that a grant to a particular local educational agency would not result in duplication of services already being provided?

*Comments.* It was suggested in the comments that a State educational agency provide a listing of on-going activities in the State and a description of coordination of activities.

*Response § 166.79—State review of applications.* The Commissioner relies on the assurance of the State educational agency as to non-duplication and does not impose any requirements as to the adequacy or basis of assurance.

*Issue (d).—Cash assistance refugees.* Should priority be given in the evaluation of grant applications to the number of cash assistance refugees in the area of the local educational agency or State educational agency applicant?

*Comments.* Comments from the public expressed the opinion that it is too early to evaluate HEW projects designed to remove the refugees from the cash assistance rolls, and for this reason priority should be given according to the total number of refugees needing services within a given area. One commentator indicated that additional funding is needed to continue existing programs and that the aim of the programs funded under this subpart should be to provide language skills to all the refugees, and enable them to adjust to American society.

*Response § 166.80(b)—Evaluation.* The regulation provides that a major consideration in the evaluation of a proposed project will be the extent of the need for education programs designed especially for adult Indochina refugees. The regulation allows for flexibility in the types of needs to be shown and the evidence of a given need. Thus, the number of refugees on cash assitance may be used by a local educational agency or State educational agency to indicate need for services, but is not the exclusive criterion of "need" for a program. The Commissioner is also concerned about the needs of refugees living in geographically isolated areas who have not been served by existing programs, as well as needs of many refugees who came to this country with occupational skills but who need adult education classes (combined adult education-occupational curriculum) to adapt to their new work environment. See § 166.80 (c) and (i).

*Issue (e).—Priorities.* Should priority be given to any of the three types of grants under this Act (programs of instruction and administration, special projects to develop occupational and related skills, and educational support services) or which combines any of the above-mentioned types of programs which may be funded?

*Comments.* The comments indicated that priorities should be given to:

(1) Educational support services to accompany existing programs of instruction (examples of support services needed were transportation, tutoring, guidance and counseling); and

(2) Adult education classes with emphasis on technical vocabulary integrated into vocational and occupational instructional programs.

*Response.* An application which provides support services (described in the comment on issue (a)) as a component of a program of adult education instruction receives points in the evaluation of criteria.

With regard to the suggested combined adult educational-occupational program, it is evident that many adult Indochina refugees have received basic skills instruction but could benefit from adult education instruction as a component of an occupational training program which teaches new occupational skills and/or the transferability of existing skills to the new work environment. For example, adult Indochina refugees who were auto mechanics in Cambodia might attend an adult education course through which they could acquire literacy and adaptive skills to greatly enhance their chances of securing employment as mechanics.

Adult education programs related to occupational skills could be an integral component of existing Federal or non-Federal occupational training programs, such as the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973, and the Vocational Educational Act of 1963, as amended. However, where it is documented in the application that occupational education and training for refugees is unavailable or insufficient, a program funded under this subpart may provide a combined occupational-adult education program to enable refugees to acquire necessary jobs and language skills to obtain employment. An application which proposes a project to provide an adult education program which operates in conjunction with an occupational training program, or where necessary as a combined occupational-adult education program, will receive points in the review of application criteria.

(29 U.S.C. 801 and 20 U.S.C. 1241.)

*Issue (f).—Provision for expertise.* Should provisions be included in the grant application to assure that the expertise of private and other public organizations already employed in educating Indochina adults is utilized by State and local eductional agency recipients of grants? If so, how can the Office of Education ensure that utilization by State educational agencies and local educational agencies of these private and other public organizations in providing services to the refugees is carried out on a cost-effective basis?

*Comments.* Comments from the public expressed the view that local educational agencies and State educational agencies should have flexibility to enter into contracts or coordinate with other voluntary resettlement agencies or associations which have experience with refugees. One comment also stressed the need for continuation of already established resource dissemination and technical assistance centers to serve education needs of adult Indochina refugees.

*Response 45 CFR 100a.30; § 166.80(g)—Service contracts.* An applicant may enter into service contracts with public and private agencies and organizations to obtain services from resource, dissemination, and technical assistance centers to provide educational services to adult Indochina refugees, subject to the Code of Federal Regulations. Further, applications which involve cooperative arrangements with, and obtain support services from, voluntary agencies, business, and industry will receive points in the evaluation criteria as shown in this document.

3. *Citations of legal authority.* As required by section 431(a) of the General Education Provisions Act (20 U.S.C. 1232(a)), a citation of the statutory or other legal authority for each section of the regulation has been placed in parentheses on the line following the text of the section.

4. *Other applicable regulations.* The proposed regulation does not contain provisions relating to general fiscal and administrative matters. Requirements of this nature are covered by the General Education Provisions Regulations (45 CFR Parts 100 and 100a) as cross-referenced in the proposed regulation.

5. *Notice to prospective applicants.* The notice of closing date for receipt of applications under this subpart will be published in the Federal Register at a later date.

6. *Other information.* The Office of Education has determined that this document does not contain a major proposal requiring preparation of an Inflation Impact Statement under Executive Order 11821 and OMB Circular A-107.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Program No. 13.579, Emergency Adult Education Program for Indochina Refugees.)

Dated: March 3, 1977.

WILLIAM F. PIERCE,
*Acting U.S. Commissioner of Education.*

Approved: April 27, 1977.

JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.,
*Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.*

## PART 166—STATE ADULT PROGRAMS

### SUBPART H—EMERGENCY ADULT EDUCATION PROGRAM FOR INDOCHINA REFUGEES

Sec.

166.71 Scope and purpose.
166.72 Applicability of General Education Provisions Regulations.
166.73 Definitions.
166.74 Eligible applicants.
166.75 Grantee responsibilities.
166.76 Eligible participants.
166.77 Eligible activities.
166.78 Application requirements.
166.79 State review of applications.
166.80 Criteria for evaluation of applications.
166.81 Allowable costs.
166.82 Records and reports.

AUTHORITY: Pub. L. 94-405, 20 U.S.C. 1211b.

### § 166.71 Scope and purpose.

(a) *Scope.* The regulations in this subpart govern the Emergency Adult Education Program for Indochina Refugees for which Federal funds are authorized by section 315 of the Adult Education Act (20 U.S.C. 1211b), as added by section 301 of Pub. L. 94-405, the Indochina Refugee Children Assistance Act of 1976, 20 U.S.C. 1211b. These funds are authorized for the period beginning July 1, 1976, and ending September 30, 1977.

(b) *Purpose.* The purpose of this program is to provide grants to State and local educational agencies to operate special adult education programs for adult Indochina refugees, as defined in section 3 of the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975, as amended.
(20 U.S.C. 1211(a) ; 22 U.S.C. 2601 note.)

§ 166.72 Applicability of general education provisionn regulations.

(a) Subchapter A of this Chapter, entitled "General Provisions for Office of Education Programs" and commonly referred to as the General Education Provisions Regulations, pertains to fiscal, administrative, property maangement and other matters. Parts 100 and 100a of the General Education Provisions Regulations (45 CFR Parts 100 and 100a) apply to assistance under this subpart except for the following provisions which do not apply :

(1) § 100a.16 (relating to project description) ;

(2) § 100a.19(b) (relating to cooperative management) ; and

(b) The General Education Provisions Regulations are referred to in this subpart as "GEPR".
(20 U.S.C. 1211b ; 45 CFR Parts 100, 100a.)

§ 166.73 Definitions.

(a) The terms "adult education", "local educational agency", "State", and "State educational agency", as used in this subpart, are defined in section 303 of the Adult Education Act (20 U.S.C. 1202).

(b) "Adult" means any individual who has attained the age of sixteen.

(c) The term "Indochina Refugee", as defined in the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Oct of 1975, as amended by Pub. L. 94-313 and used in this subpart, means an alien who :

(1) Because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion, fled from Cambodia, Vietnam, or Laos ;

(2) Cannot return there because of fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion ; and

(3) Is in urgent need of assistance for the essentials of life.
(20 U.S.C. 1201, 1211b ; 22 U.S.C. 2601 note.)

§ 166.74 Eligible applicants.

(a) *General.* Only the following are eligible to apply for grants under this subpart :

(1) State educational agencies ; and

(2) Local educational agencies.

(b) *Joint applications.* Two or more local educational agencies or a State educational agency and one or more local educational agencies may submit a joint application under § 100a.19(a) of the GEPR to provide programs of adult education to meet the needs of adult Indochina refugees.
(20 U.S.C. 1211b(a) ; 20 U.S.C. 1221c(b)(1), 1232c(b)(1).)

§ 166.75 Grantee responsibilities.

(a) A State or local educational agency which applies for a grant under this subpart must establish that it is prepared to operate the programs of adult education for adult Indochina refugees for which it requests assistance.

(b) A recipient of a grant under this subpart may not award a sub-grant to another entity or person.

(c) A recipient of a grant under this subpart may, in accordance with § 100a.30 of the GEPR, enter into a service contract to carry out a portion of the grant activities, subject to the provisions of § 100a.30(b) of the GEPR (prohibiting transfer of responsibility) and subpart I of Part 100a of the GEPR (relating to procurement by grantees).

(d) No State or local cost sharing is required.
(Implements 20 U.S.C. 1211b.)

§ 166.75 Eligible participants.

Only adult Indochina refugees who possess a form (I.N.S. Form I-94) issued by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, indicating that they have been paroled into the United States or have been granted voluntary departure status may participate in a program assisted under this subpart.
(Implements 20 U.S.C. 1211b ; 22 U.S.C. 2601 note.)

§ 166.77 Eligible activities.

A grantee may use funds under this subpart only for:

(a) Programs of instruction (including administrative costs of planning and operating these programs) for adult Indochina refugees in basic reading, mathematics, the promotion of literacy, and the development and enhancement of necessary skills (such as consumer, social, survival, occupational, and communication skills) for the purpose of enabling the adult refugees to become employable and productive members of the American society.

(b)(1) Adult education programs designed to operate in conjunction with existing Federal and non-Federal programs and activities to develop occupational and related skills for adult Indochina refugees, particularly programs authorized under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 (20 U.S.C. 801) or under the Vocational Education Act of 1963, as amended (20 U.S.C. 1241).

(2) Where occupational skills programs are otherwise unavailable or insufficient, combined occupational-adult education programs to provide adult Indochina refugees with skills necessary to their obtaining employment;

(c) Programs providing educational support services which meet the needs of adult refugees, including but not limited to (1) tutoring (in the case of geographically isolated refugees) and (2) guidance and counseling with regard to educational, career, and employment opportunities (such as job placement and job follow-up services); or

(d) Any combination of programs described in paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this section.

(Implements 20 U.S.C. 2111b(a).)

§ 166.78 Application requirements.

(a) *General.* To receive consideration for assistance under this subpart, an applicant (as described in § 166.74) must submit to the Commissioner an application which meets the requirements of paragraphs (b) through (h) of this section. The Commissioner does not consider applications proposing a program of more than 12 months in duration.

(b) *Nature and purpose of program.* An application under this section must contain information sufficient to satisfy the Commissioner that the proposed program will serve, through activities described in § 166.77, the special adult education needs of adult Indochina refugees who are in or near the area served by the applicant.

(c) *Need for program; assurance of participation.* An application under this section must:

(1) Identify the needs of the target population to be addressed by the proposed program, and supply documentation of those needs; and

(2) Provide reasonable assurance that the adult Indochina refugees to whom the program is addressed will participate in the program if it is available.

(d) *Program description.* An application under this section must:

(1) Describe the objectives and design of the program in relation to the needs set forth under paragraph (c) of this section;

(2) In the case of a joint application, specify the parts of the program to be carried out by each of the applicants.

(e) *Budget.* An application under this section must:

(1) Set forth a detailed budget by program component showing any non-Federal sources of funds; and

(2) Include separate budgets in the case of joint applications corresponding to programs, services, and activities of each of the applicants.

(f) *Applicant qualifications.* An application under this section must contain sufficient information to enable the Commissioner to determine qualifications of the applicant for receiving an award. The application must include information about key professional personnel regarding such matters as their education, training, and experience in areas of adult and/or occupational education and qualifications for the proposed position, together with a description of the applicant's available facilities and other resources for the program.

(g) *Coordination.* An application under this section must describe plans for coordination of services and resources under the proposed program with Federal or non-Federal programs such as those carried out under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 or the Vocational Education Act of 1963, as amended. The application must also describe plans for such coordination with programs carried out by voluntary agencies, sponsor groups, public assistance agencies, social/vocational rehabilitation services, business and industry, social organizations, health services, legal aid, and with other State and local educational activities.

(h) *Additional information.* An application under this section should include other information which is responsive to the applicable criteria set forth in § 166.80 in sufficient detail to permit review of the application in accordance with these criteria. Information which relates to a particular criterion should identify that criterion.

(Implements 20 U.S.C. 1211(c).)

§ 166.79 State review of applications.

(a) The Commissioner may not approve an application under this subpart from a local educational agency (for the State in which that local educational agency is located) assures the Commissioner that the program proposed in the application will not duplicate existing and available (Federal and non-Federal) adult education programs which meet the needs of adult Indochina refugees.

(b) To facilitate review by the State educational agency, a local educational agency applying for assistance under this subpart shall:

(1) Send a copy of its application to the State educational agency at the same time that it sends the application to the Commissioner, and

(2) Notify the Commissioner that it has sent the application to the State educational agency by furnishing the Commissioner a copy of its transmittal letter.

(c) The State educational agency has 30 days from the receipt of the application from the local educational agency to notify the Commissioner in writing whether the application does nor does not duplicate existing and available programs. If the Commissioner does not, within that period, receive this notification, the Commissioner need not give further consideration to the application.

(Implements 20 U.S.C. 1211b(b).)

§ 166.80 Criteria for evaluation of applications.

The Commissioner evaluates applications which meet the requirements of this subpart only according to the following criteria. Each criterion is weighted and includes the maximum score that can be given for that criterion with the total number of points equaling 100. Applications will be judged on the basis of the extent to which each criterion is met. An application which receives a score of less than 30 points will not be approved.

(a) *Need.* (Maximum 10 points.) The application:

(1) Describes the need for the proposed adult Indochina educational program;

(2) Provides specific evidence of the need; and

(3) Describes, where appropriate, on-going and planned activities in the community relative to the need.

(b) *Objectives.* (Maximum 10 points.) The objectives:

(1) Are significant and meet clearly identified needs of adult Indochina refugees;

(2) Clearly describe the proposed project outcomes; and

(3) Are capable of being measured and attained.

(c) *Program design.* (Maximum 15 points.) The application clearly describes how:

(1) The overall design relates to the objectives; and

(2) Each segment of the design relates to one or more objectives.

(d) *Applicant's staff competencies and experience.* (Maximum 25 points.) The application clearly describes:

(1) The names and qualifications (including project management qualifications) of the project director and key professional staff and the qualifications and, to the extent feasible, the names of consultants and advisory groups;

(2) Time commitments planned for the project director, staff, advisory groups, and any consultants;

(3) Past and successful experiences of the proposed project director and key staff members in similar or related projects; and

(4) Staff competences that are essential to understand the cultures of the adult Indochina refugees and to assist them in becoming self-sufficient members of the American society.

(e) *Evaluation plan.* (Maximum 5 points.) The application includes valid and reliable procedures for assessing and documenting the progress of participants.

(f) *Cooperative arrangements.* (Maximum 15 points.) The application clearly describes arrangements and support services to be provided by existing agencies in order to maximize the impact of the proposed program. The types of agencies with which cooperative arrangements are encouraged include but are not limited to voluntary agencies, sponsor groups, public assistance agencies, social/vocational rehabilitation services, business and industry, social organizations, health

services, legal aid, and other existing State and local education, employment, and training programs.

(g) *Budget and cost effectiveness.* (Maximum 5 points.) The application provides a justifiable and itemized statement of cost which is substantiated by line items in the proposed budget and is cost effective.

(h) *Facilities and equipment.* (Maximum 5 points.) The application describes adequate facilities, equipment, and materials for the operation of the proposed program.

(i) *Reaching the geographically isolated.* (Maximum 5 points.) The application provides for meeting the educational needs of previously unserved adult Indochina refugees living in isolated geographic areas.

(j) *Support services.* (Maximum 5 points). The application provides for support services for adult Indochina refugees, including but not limited to guidance and counseling.

(Implements 20 U.S.C. 1211b.)

§ 166.81 Allowable costs.

(a) Allowable costs under grants awarded under this subpart are determined in accordance with the applicable cost principles subject to the limitations in this section. See § 100a.81 of the GEPR.

(b) Stipends and/or dependency allowances are not allowable.

(c) The cost of child care is not allowable. (Grantees are encouraged to utilize the services of volunteers or other community agencies for child care services.)

(d) Transportation costs are allowable only where need is demonstrated.

(e) The development of curriculum materials is not a priority for this program, and the cost of such development is allowable only if it can be demonstrated that necessary materials do not exist or cannot be obtained from existing sources.

(f) The cost of limited pre-service or in-service training of personnel is allowable if it can be demonstrated that the required competence is not otherwise available on a cost-effective basis.

(Implements 20 U.S.C. 1211b.)

§ 166.82 Records and reports.

(a) Each grantee shall report to the Commissioner on all programs and services provided adult Indochina refugees from Federal funds granted under this subject.

(b) A grantee shall submit these reports as part of the financial and narrative reporting requirements set forth in subparts P and Q of Part 100a of the GEPR.

(c) In addition to reporting the information required under § 100a.432 of the GEPR, a grantee shall include the following in the performance report:

(1) Total number of adult Indochina refugees that participated in adult education programs which were funded from a Federal grant awarded under this subpart by:

(i) Type of program (basic skills program of instruction, adult education program operating in conjunction with occupational skills program, and support services program); and

(ii) Nature of instruction (English as a second language, bilingual education, adult education, and occupational training);

(2) Total number of participants under this subpart who:

(i) Gained employment;

(ii) Obtained a better job; and

(iii) Were removed from public assistance; and

(3) A list of those agencies and resources that participated in meeting the objectives of this grant and the extent of their participation.

(Implements 20 U.S.C. 1211b.)

[FR Doc. 77-12570 Filed 4-29-77;8:45 am]

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D. Additional Information Submitted by HEW

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
Social and Rehabilitation Service,
*Washington, D.C., October 22, 1976.*

PROGRAM INSTRUCTION

Action Transmittal: SRS-AT-76-160 (APA).
To: State administrators and other interested organizations and agencies.
Subject: Indochinese refugees: Employment or Training Requirements and Other Requirements Under the Refugee Assistance Program.

BACKGROUND

At the time that the refugee assistances program began, requirements related to assistance were kept to a minimum because of the urgent emergency situation and the need to implement the program quickly. Over time, it has become appropriate to introduce into the refugee assistance program additional requirements, most of which are similar to those which apply to non-refugees.

The requirements transmitted by this Program Instruction have been the subject of extensive review, in draft, by State and local welfare agencies, the voluntary resettlement agencies, Indochinese refugee organizations and individuals, and other interested parties. Comments received have indicated a wide concurrence with respect to the need for and appropriateness of applying requirements for employment and training in the refugee cash assistance program and clarifying other aspects covered by this transmittal. All comments received have been taken into consideration in the final development of this Program Instruction.

INTRODUCTION

As attached. This Instruction covers: Employment or training requirements; sanctions; training requirements for employed recipients; receipt of assistance while attending school; purchase of service to carry out employment or training requirements; hearings and appeals; non-applicability of the 100-hour limitation; disregards; and recertification.

*Previous issuances.*—SRS–AT–75–27 (June 9, 1975); SRS–IM—75–20 (August 18, 1975); SRS–AT–75–79 (August 22, 1975); SRS–AT–75–80 (August 22, 1975); SRS–AT–75–88 (September 16, 1975); SRS–AT–76–11 (January 15, 1976); SRS–AT–76–12 (January 19, 1976); SRS–AT–76–62 (April 14, 1976); SRS–AT–76–124 (August 6, 1976).

*Issuance superseded.*—SRS–AT–75–79 (August 22, 1975) is superseded by the present issuance.

*Effective date.*—December 1, 1976, or at any earlier date following receipt of this transmittal as determined appropriate by the State welfare agency.

*Inquiries to.*—SRS Regional Commissioners.

M. KEITH WEIKEL,
*Acting Administrator.*

(Insert the following immediately after the section "Financial Assistance to Refugees" on p. 4 of Action Transmittal SRS–AT–75–27, June 9, 1975).

*I. Employment or Training Requirements*

A. All employable refugees who apply for or receive cash assistance, and all employable members of the assistance unit of which they are a part, must register for employment with the State Employment Service, and must accept an employment of training opportuntiy, from any source, which is determined appropriate for that refugee by the State or local welfare agency. The welfare agency may delegate determination of appropriate work or training to the Employment Service or to the WIN Unit where such exists. An individual is considered employable unless one of the following exemptions applies:

1. An individual who is under age 16, or who is under age 21 and is attending school or training full time, or who is age 21 or over and is attending school or training as approved by the welfare agency or its designee;

2. A person who is ill, incapacitated, or over 65;

3. A person whose presence in the home is required because of illness or incapacity of another member of the household;

4. A mother or other caretaker of a child under the age of 6 who is caring for the child; or

5. A mother or other caretaker of a child, when the nonexempt father or other nonexempt adult relative in the home is registered and has not refused to accept employment without good cause. Inability to communicate in English does not make the refugee "unemployable."

B. As an applicant for assistance, an employable refugee shall not, during 30 consecutive calendar days immediately prior to the receipt of aid, have voluntarily quit for the purpose of receiving assistance, or refused to apply for or accept an appropriate offer of employment, as determined by the welfare agency or its designee. The dependent family of such an ineligible applicant may, however, apply for and receive cash assistance.

C. As a recipient of assistance under the refugee assistance program, an employable refugee shall not, while in receipt of aid, have voluntarily quit for the pur-

pose of receiving assistance, or refused to apply for or accept an appropriate offer of employment or employment-related training meeting any applicable minimum wage requirement, as determined by the welfare agency or its designee.

D. Appropriate Work and Training Criteria: The determination of "appropriate work" shall be made by the welfare agency or its designee in accordance with the following criteria:

1. Appropriate work may be temporary, permanent, full-time, part-time, or seasonal work if such work meets the other work standards of this document;

2. The wage shall meet or exceed the Federal or State minimum wage law, whichever is applicable, or if such laws are not applicable, the wage shall not be less favorable than the wage normally paid for similar work in that labor market but in no event shall it be less than three-fourths of the minimum wage rate;

3. The daily hours of work and the weekly hours of work shall not exceed those customary to the occupation; and

4. No individual shall be required to accept employment if—

(*i*) The position offered is vacant due to a strike, lockout, or other bona fide labor dispute;

(*ii*) The individual would be required to work for an employer contrary to the conditions of his existing membership in the union governing that occupation. However, employment not governed by the rules of a union in which he has membership may be deemed appropriate.

In addition to meeting the criteria in this section, for training to be appropriate, the quality of the training must meet local employers' requirements so that the individual will be in a competitive position within the local labor market. The training must also be likely to lead to employment which will meet the appropriate work criteria, as defined in this document.

The following additional standards must be met before an employable adult cash assistance recipient can be required to accept a work or training assignment:

1. The job or training assignment must be related to the physical and mental capability of the individual to perform the task on a regular basis. Any claim of adverse effect on physical or mental health shall be based on an adequate medical testimony from a physician or licensed or certified psychologist indicating that participation would impair the individual's physical or mental health. Cost of obtaining such medical evidence is an allowable 100% reimbursable cost to the State.

2. The total daily commuting time to and from home to the work or training site to which the individual is assigned shall not normally exceed 2 hours, not including the transporting of a child to and from a child care facility, unless a longer commuting distance and time is generally accepted in the community, in which case the round trip commuting time shall not exceed the generally accepted community standards.

3. When child care is required, and provided by the State agency, it must meet the standards governing the receipt to such care under the State's title XX program and must be available during the hours the individual is working or engaged in training or English-language instruction plus any additional necessary commuting time. Day care which is obtained by the applicant or recipient, and is treated as a work-related expense by the State agency, is not required to meet these standards.

The State agency's provision of child care services is limited to those in training, except for such other child care as the State may provide in accordance with its title XX plan. Employed refugees are expected to purchase day care services if needed, and shall be reimbursed for this work-related expense.

4. The work or training site to which the individual is assigned must not be in violation of applicable Federal, State, and local health and safety standards.

5. Assignments shall not be made which are discriminatory in terms of age, sex, race, creed, color, or national origin.

*II. Sanctions*

Refusal of an employable adult recipient to register with the Employment Service or to accept or continue such an employment or training opportunity without good cause as outlined above, as determined by the welfare agency or its designee, will result in the following actions:

A. The welfare agency will provide (either directly or through arrangements with the Employment Service or an appropriate Voluntary Resettlement Agency or sponsor), counseling within 7 days intended to provide the refugee with an understanding of the implications of his refusal to accept employment or training, and to encourage the refugee's acceptance of such opportunity. Only one such counseling session is required but additional counseling may be provided at the discretion of the welfare agency.

B. If the employable refugee recipient continues to refuse an offer of employment or training, assistance will be terminated 30 days after the date of his original refusal. The refugee shall be given at least 10 days' written notice of the termination of assistance and the reason therefor. This sanction shall be applied in the following manner:

1. If the assistance unit includes other individuals, then the grant shall be reduced by the amount included in behalf of that refugee. If the employable refugee is a caretaker relative, assistance in the form of protective or vendor payments will be provided to the remaining members of the assistance unit.

2. If such individual is the only individual in the assistance unit, the grant shall be terminated.

3. The refugee's sponsor, or the voluntary resettlement agency where there is not a sponsor, will be notified of the action taken in item 1 or 2, above.

4. A decision by the refugee to accept employment or training, made at any time within the 30-day period after the date of the original refusal, shall result in the continuation of assistance without interruption if the refugee continues to meet the income requirements for continued assistance.

5. An employable refugee may reapply for assistance 30 days after the termination of assitance because of refusal to accept or continue employment or training.

*III. Training Requirements for Employed Refugee Recipients*

In the instance of a refugee who is employed and receiving supplementary assistance, the welfare agency shall:

A. Require part-time training such as English-language or skill training, if available and determined appropriate, if the refugee is employed part-time (less than 100 hours per month), as a condition for continued receipt of assistance.

B. Encourage, but not require, part-time English-language or skill training if the refugee is employed full-time (100 or more hours per month).

*IV. Receipt of Assistance While Attending School*

A. All employable refugees not exempt as defined in section I–A, above, "Employment or Training Requirements," are required to register for work and to accept appropriate work or training as determined by the welfare agency or its designee, with the exception stated in item B, below.

B. A full-time student who is 21 years of age or older and who is currently receiving cash assistance at the time of the effective date of this transmittal shall be allowed to finish the current semester.

C. Full-time attendance in a college program for a person age 21 or over is not considered appropriate training unless:

1. The individual will finish his/her degree within one year;

2. The program has a definite short-term employment objective (less than one year) and is approved by the welfare agency or its designee as part of an employability plan for the refugee; or

3. The individual is an Indochina professional who is attending college to become relicensed in his/her profession, in which case continued attendance shall be approved up to September 30, 1977, if such course of study is not completed earlier.

D. A refugee of any age who is otherwise eligible shall not be denied cash assistance while enrolled and participating in a training program which is part of an employability plan approved by the welfare agency or its designee—that is, training intended to have a definite short-term (less than one year) employment objective.

*V. Purchase of Service to Carry Out Employment or Training Requirements*

To carry out the requirements of this transmittal, the welfare agency shall be authorized to fund one or more positions, or to purchase such services on an hourly basis, in the Employment Service, the WIN unit, an appropriate voluntary agency, or any other nonprofit organization. Such services may include the determination of appropriate work or training, the development of jobs and training opportunities, and counseling. The purchase of training is not authorized under this section.

*VI. Hearings and Appeals*

The procedures and provisions of 45 CFR 205.10 shall apply in the refugee assistance program.

*VII. 100-Hour Limitation on Employment*

Refugees are eligible for cash assistance, based on existing State need standards, regardless of the number of hours worked. The 100-hour limit on employ-

ment in the AFDC–UF program does not apply under the refugee assistance program.

*VIII. $30 and ⅓ Disregard*

The $30 and ⅓ disregard and other disregards which apply in the AFDC program shall apply in the same manner in the refugee assistance program but without regard to the composition of the assistance unit. Thus the requirements of 45 CFR 233.20(a)(11) ("Disregard of income applicable only to AFDC") shall be applied in the refugee assistance program, except for those portions relating to participation in the WIN program since recipients of refugee asssitance are not eligible for WIN.

*IX. Recertification*

Recertification and any other State eligibility reports shall be required for refugee assistance recipients at least as frequently as for AFDC recipients.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
*Washington, D.C., September 28, 1977.*

To: Directors of State welfare agencies participating in Indochinese refugee assistance program.

Subject: Authorization to Make October 1977 Payments to Refugee Cash Assistance Recipients.

Authorization is provided to the States to make an October 1977 payment to refugee cash assistance recipients eligible under the policies currently in effect. The funds authorized to the States under the existing agreements with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare are increased by the amounts indicated below for this purpose. These amounts are based on each State's most recently received estimate of cash assistance requirements, reduced to allow for the fact that a portion of the refugee recipients are expected to qualify for the AFDC program. This authorization expires October 31, 1977; the payments to recipients must be made during the month of October.

| *State* | *Additional Authorization* | *State* | *Additional Authorization* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama | 7,682 | Missouri | 43,400 |
| Alaska | ---------- | Montana | 11,340 |
| Arizona | 2,380 | Nebraska | 22,960 |
| Arkansas | 11,200 | Nevada | 6,930 |
| California | 2,100,544 | New Hampshire | 1,400 |
| Colorado | 53,741 | New Jersey | 30,800 |
| Connecticut | 18,879 | New Mexico | 2,678 |
| Delaware | 3,042 | New York | 72,590 |
| District of Columbia | 21,140 | North Carolina | 10,584 |
| Florida | 60,060 | North Dakota | 7,056 |
| Georgia | 7,000 | Ohio | 36,483 |
| Guam | 39,265 | Oklahoma | 34,300 |
| Hawaii | 180,701 | Oregon | 142,800 |
| Idaho | 4,480 | Pennsylvania | 115,150 |
| Illinois | 77,000 | Rhode Island | 10,080 |
| Indiana | 17,855 | South Carolina | 2,282 |
| Iowa | 56,000 | South Dakota | 5,741 |
| Kansas | 29,211 | Tennessee | 5,040 |
| Kentucky | 23,800 | Texas | 120,345 |
| Louisana | 44,100 | Utah | 20,580 |
| Maine | 4,199 | Vermont | ---------- |
| Maryland | 49,392 | Virginia | 140,000 |
| Massachusetts | 43,120 | Washington | 277,234 |
| Michigan | 62,358 | West Virginia | 2,253 |
| Minnesota | 71,400 | Wisconsin | 84,000 |
| Mississippi | 847 | Wyoming | 622 |

PHILIP A. HOLMAN,
*Acting Director, Special Programs Staff,*
*Office of Family Assistance.*

## Indochinese Refugees

*Amounts authorized to States for cash assistance, medical assistance, social services, and State/local administration: Inception of program (May 1975) through September 30, 1977*

| State | Amount | State | Amount |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama | $286,540 | Nebraska | $830,000 |
| Alaska | 50,000 | Nevada | 591,301 |
| Arizona | 1,075,000 | New Hampshire | 63,120 |
| Arkansas | 358,769 | New Jersey | 1,438,000 |
| California | 64,561,174 | New Mexico | 464,166 |
| Colorado | 2,685,945 | New York | 3,735,000 |
| Connecticut | 631,844 | North Carolina | 718,459 |
| Delaware | 92,950 | North Dakota | 317,555 |
| District of Columbia | 892,835 | Ohio | 1,207,000 |
| Florida | 4,162,968 | Oklahoma | 1,582,752 |
| Georgia | 363,452 | Oregon | 7,266,396 |
| Hawaii | 4,612,663 | Pennsylvania | 4,045,674 |
| Idaho | 179,000 | Rhode Island | 355,900 |
| Illinois | 4,327,500 | South Carolina | 368,257 |
| Indiana | 1,166,801 | South Dakota | 260,715 |
| Iowa | 2,831,751 | Tennessee | 223,061 |
| Kansas | 1,424,214 | Texas | 5,053,445 |
| Kentucky | 1,074,148 | Utah | 749,000 |
| Louisiana | 1,731,542 | Vermont | 75,000 |
| Maine | 117,000 | Virginia | 4,060,000 |
| Maryland | 2,500,561 | Washington | 13,229,929 |
| Massachusetts | 1,260,000 | West Virginia | 60,550 |
| Michigan | 2,996,825 | Wisconsin | 3,200,000 |
| Minnesota | 3,333,461 | Wyoming | 32,760 |
| Mississippi | 24,853 | Guam | 1,133,610 |
| Missouri | 1,654,000 | | |
| Montana | 450,404 | Total | 155,844,333 |

## Social Services Under Title XX, Social Security Act

A. Services directed at the following principal goals:

1. Achieving or maintaining economic self-support to prevent, reduce, or eliminate dependency.
2. Achieving or maintaining self-sufficiency, including reduction or prevention of dependency.
3. Preventing or remedying neglect, abuse, or exploitation of children and adults unable to protect their own interests, or preserving, rehabilitating, or reuniting families.
4. Preventing or reducing inappropriate institutional care by providing for community-based care, home-based care, or other forms of less intensive care.
5. Securing referral or admission for institutional care when other forms of care are not appropriate, or providing services to individuals in institutions.

B. Examples of services:

1. Child day care services.
2. Protective services for children and adults.
3. Services to children and adults in foster care.
4. Home management services.
5. Family planning.
6. Information and referral.
7. Transportation.
8. Preparation and delivery of meals.
9. Health support services.
10. Services for the mentally retarded, blind, emotionally disturbed, physically handicapped, alcoholics, and drug addicts.

C. Services of major importance to Indochinese refugees.

1. Day care for children whose parents are in employment-training programs.
2. Transportation services to training programs.
3. Information and referral services.

*Social services.*—Under Title XX of the Social Security Act, grants are made to States within two ceiling allocations. In the basic program there is a $2.5 billion ceiling limitation on Federal matching to provide social services to assist eligible persons to become or remain economically self-supporting and self-sufficient; to protect children and adults who cannot protect themselves from abuse, neglect, and exploitation, and to help families stay together; to prevent or reduce in appropriate institutional care by providing for community-based care, home-based care, or other forms of less intensive care; and to arrange for institutional placement, when appropriate, and for services to individuals in institutions.

Within the basic program, grants are made to States based on matching rates of 75% for all services except family planning services which are matched at 90%.

In addition, legislation, Public Law 94–401, dated September 7, 1976, authorized an additional $240 million earmarked for title XX day care services and grants to hire welfare recipients in jobs related to the provision of child care services—$40 million for the TQ and $200 million for 1977. These funds are used to match expenditures in the transition quarter at the rate of 75% for provision of child day care services and 100% for grants to hire welfare recipients. In 1977, the 100% rate applies to both the provision of child day care services and for grants to hire welfare recipients.

SOCIAL SERVICES COSTS

[In thousands of dollars]

| | 1976 | TQ | 1977 | 1978 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total costs | 2,825,617 | 687,172 | 3,349,229 | 3,184,844 |
| Federal share: | | | | |
| Day care | 632,000 | 162,000 | 802,550 | 705,000 |
| Foster care | 160,000 | 40,000 | 192,000 | 192,000 |
| Protective | 186,000 | 46,000 | 209,000 | 207,000 |
| Homemaker/chore | 284,000 | 71,000 | 310,000 | 308,000 |
| Health related | 133,000 | 33,000 | 153,000 | 151,000 |
| Services to mentally retarded | 71,000 | 18,000 | 86,000 | 83,000 |
| Family planning | 67,000 | 17,000 | 88,000 | 76,000 |
| Drug abuse/alcoholism | 50,000 | 13,000 | 75,000 | 63,000 |
| All other | 547,380 | 118,213 | 681,089 | 616,300 |
| Total Federal share | 2,130,380 | 518,213 | 2,576,589 | 2,401,300 |

Title XX of the Social Security Act was signed into law on January 4, 1975. The effective program date was October 1, 1975. Title XX legislates that citizens of the State be provided the opportunity to actively participate in the development of the social services program to be carried out by the State. There must be a planning process which includes citizen representation and involvement. Also a period of time must be provided during which the public may review and submit comments regarding the proposed program.

A State's plan for the provision of social services under Title XX is not subject to approval by the Federal government. The plan is a product of the cooperative effort of the State and its citizens. Title XX does require, however, that at least one service provided be directed to each of the five goals specified in the law. In addition the law requires that at least three services be provided for SSI recipients and family planning services must be provided to recipients of AFDC.

While the social services program is to be in effect in every political subdivision, services to be provided may differ in different areas within the State based on the needs of the locality or area. Services may be provided to persons who receive financial assistance under AFDC, persons whose needs were taken into account in determining the needs of AFDC recipients, persons who receive financial assistance under SSI or State Supplementary payments and persons whose gross monthly income does not exceed 115% of the State's median income of a family of four adjusted for size of family. Fees may be charged for services but such fees must be reasonably related to the individual or family income.

# The Typical Family Compared with the AFDC Family

*by Howard Oberheu*

While the general characteristics of a family receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children have been generally known for some time, there has been little effort to compare the typical AFDC family with the typical U.S. family. This comparison* may produce some surprises for those who thought that AFDC families have much larger numbers of children than the national average and that most of them are illegitimate.

In 1973, when the most recent study of AFDC families was made, there were about 7.5 million children in three million families receiving just under $600 million in AFDC payments monthly. (By February of this year there were 8.1 million children in 3.6 million families receiving $813 million in monthly payments.)

The AFDC program is designed to provide financial assistance to needy families with children. One parent must be either deceased, incapacitated, absent from the home, or, in about half the States, present but unemployed. In addition to money, AFDC families are eligible for medical services, social services and food programs.

The AFDC families comprise 10 percent of the families (with children) in the U.S. and 12 percent of the children.

Of the 4.3 million families (with children) in the general population headed by a woman, 2.25 million are AFDC families. To put it another way, three-fourths of AFDC families are headed by a woman.

* All comparisons in this article are based on the 1973 study of AFDC families and a survey by the Bureau of the Census (March 1973).

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*Mr. Oberheu is a statistician in SRS' National Center for Social Statistics, Office of Information Systems.*

Nearly half of the AFDC mothers are full-time homemakers with pre-school children. Most of the remaining mothers who are not working are in training, attending school or incapacitated for employment.

Very few of the children receiving support are without the care of their natural or adoptive mother. Usually mothers have never married, are divorced, separated or are widowed. The mother is deceased or absent from the home in only about one in 20 families. In these few instances care is most likely provided by the grandmother.


Typical Family
2 1 3
AFDC Family
4 4 5
Moved in Past 12 Months
The AFDC families are considerably more mobile than the average family. In fact, the rate of moves made by AFDC families during the 12-month period preceding the study is double that of the average family.

**The children**

Children receiving AFDC are relatively younger than children in the average family and have an even chance of being legitimate. Most of the AFDC children have not reached their teens and few are between the ages of 18 and 20 in States providing assistance to this age group. In AFDC families where there is only one child, a third are likely to be of pre-school age.

The youngest child of the assistance group is under

school age in more than half the families. As expected, this group has relatively fewer working mothers and would be expected to have a greater demand for child care services. The youngest child is 12 or more in only one of seven AFDC families. If for no other reason, these families will be leaving the AFDC rolls during the next few years because the children will exceed the age for eligibility. At the time of the study the typical AFDC case was on the rolls for about two years.

**The AFDC family**

In the typical AFDC family there are between three and four recipients (a mean of 3.6), one of whom is an adult; eight out of 10 families have one adult.

When there is no adult in a family, the average number of children is 2; with one adult it is 2.6 children; with two adults it is 3.3 children.

When there are two adults in an AFDC family, the second adult is usually the father who is incapacitated or unemployed.

AFDC families without adults frequently have a mother who has remarried. The stepfather is supporting his wife but is not legally responsible to support the children.

In many instances, the AFDC assistance group is composed of the entire household. About five percent of the households have a second assistance group. In about a third of the households, however, there are those who do not receive assistance for one reason or another. Most of these are brothers and sisters, including half-brothers, half-sisters, stepbrothers or stepsisters of the children receiving benefits.




**Race**

Although white families outnumber black families nine to one in the U.S., there is a near even distribution of the two groups receiving AFDC. About one in four black families and one in 38 white families in the U.S. population receive AFDC. In addition, about 3.8 percent of AFDC families are of other races, while 1.2 percent of the general population is composed of other races. While nearly one in 20 persons are of Spanish origin, in AFDC families almost three in 20 are of this ethnic background.

Of the families with children who are not included in the assistance group studied, one in four have children in another assistance group. While some States do not provide AFDC to children over the age of 17, 42 States make provision for children attending school through the age of 20. Nearly 10 percent of families have children between 18 to 20 who are not receiving assistance because they do not attend school regularly. One out of every eight families with some children not receiving assistance have children over the 17-year age limit.

Of all the AFDC families in the U.S. five percent include a stepfather, 14 percent grandparents, 13 percent other relatives and three percent nonrelatives. One-third of households with some persons not receiving AFDC assistance in the group studied receive either AFDC in another group, Supplemental Security Income because of blindness, another form of disability, or age, or assistance provided from State or local funds.




**Residence**

While two-thirds of the U.S. population live in metropolitan areas, the concentration of AFDC families in these areas is even greater than the nations' average. And about a quarter of AFDC urban dwellers live in the six cities of a million residents or more (New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Houston and Detroit).




**Employment Status of Women Heading Families**

There is a striking difference between the employment status of the women who heads the average family and the women heading the AFDC family. The unemployment rate of the AFDC family head is three times that of the average family. Of the AFDC family heads not in the labor force, 46.9 percent are full-time homemakers caring for pre-school children. Others are not in the labor force because they are in training, incapacitated or are not looking for a job.



**Sex of Family Head**

AFDC families are considerably more likely to be headed by a woman than the average family. About half of all families with children which are headed by a woman receive AFDC.

That few States require the stepfather to support his stepchildren may result in the children being eligible for assistance, although the mother is not eligible for AFDC because of her husband's support. The unemployment or incapacity of the stepfather of a family would not be the basis for eligibility in most States, but rather the absence of the natural father.

**The father**

In nearly half of the families where children receive assistance, the parents are either divorced or separated and the father is not providing for their care.



**Education Level of Mothers Heading Families**

AFDC mothers are on the average younger and less educated than the average woman heading a family.

The mother under age 25 is better educated than both the mother with a larger family and the father who is not living at home.

The AFDC father is relatively less educated than the mother. Less than half of the fathers enter high school and only 20 percent complete high school.

In eight percent of AFDC families the father is incapacitated, in four percent he is unemployed; fathers of two percent of the children are in correctional institutions. Even in many families where the father is present, he is not the natural father of some of the children.

In addition, nearly a third of the children who are not supported by the father were conceived out of wedlock. For this reason, two areas of recent emphasis have been family planning services and obtaining support from absent parents. Fifteen percent of the children live with their father. Of these, about two-thirds have incapacitated fathers, a third of them live in States that provide assistance when the father is unemployed. The fathers of four percent of the children are deceased.

In the past, half of the absent fathers could not be located, making it impossible to obtain their support. A new



**Number of Children in Family**

Contrary to popular belief, a majority of the AFDC families do not have large numbers of children. Only when families have four or more children is there a marked difference between the two groups.

Federal program to locate absent fathers is improving child support collections.

The median age of fathers in the home is 41.9 years, relatively older than the mothers. It is likely the relatively older mothers are part of the two-parent households. Barely one percent of the fathers are under 20 and an additional 21 percent are under 30.

More than half the AFDC fathers living at home are incapacitated (54 percent) and others are reported unable to find work (28 percent). Slightly more than 10 percent are employed either full or part time, although not at a level at which they could fully support their families.

More than two-thirds of the fathers who are unemployed have been so for more than a year. The usual occupation of 60 percent of them is classified as blue collar worker. A majority of these are nonfarm laborers. ■

*Reprints of this article are available free of charge in quantities of 50 or less. Arrangements can be made for greater quantities by writing the Editor.*

[The following table gives the percentage of total costs for the States' regular A.F.D.C. and Medicaid programs which are provided from federal funds:]

FEDERAL PERCENTAGES AND FEDERAL MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PERCENTAGES

| State | July 1, 1975, to Sept. 30, 1977 | | Oct. 1, 1977, to Sept. 30, 1979 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Federal medical assistance percentage | Federal percentage | Federal medical assistance percentage | Federal percentage |
| Alabama* | 73.79 | 65.00 | 72.58 | 65.00 |
| Alaska* | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 |
| Arizona | 60.48 | 56.09 | 60.81 | 56.46 |
| Arkansas* | 74.60 | 65.00 | 72.06 | 65.00 |
| California* | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 |
| Colorado* | 54.69 | 50.00 | 53.71 | 50.00 |
| Connecticut* | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 |
| Delaware | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 |
| District of Columbia* | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 |
| Florida | 57.34 | 52.60 | 56.55 | 51.72 |
| Georgia | 66.10 | 62.34 | 65.82 | 62.02 |
| Guam* | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 |
| Hawaii* | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 |
| Idaho* | 68.18 | 64.64 | 63.58 | 59.53 |
| Illinois* | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 |
| Indiana* | 57.47 | 52.75 | 57.86 | 53.18 |
| Iowa* | 57.13 | 52.37 | 51.96 | 50.00 |
| Kansas* | 54.02 | 50.00 | 52.35 | 50.00 |
| Kentucky* | 71.37 | 65.00 | 69.71 | 65.00 |
| Louisiana | 72.41 | 65.00 | 70.45 | 65.00 |
| Maine* | 70.60 | 65.00 | 69.74 | 65.00 |
| Maryland* | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 |
| Massachusetts* | 50.00 | 50.00 | 51.62 | 50.00 |
| Michigan* | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 |
| Minnesota* | 56.84 | 52.05 | 55.26 | 50.29 |
| Mississippi* | 78.28 | 65.00 | 78.09 | 65.00 |
| Missouri | 58.98 | 54.42 | 60.66 | 56.29 |
| Montana* | 63.21 | 59.12 | 61.10 | 56.78 |
| Nebraska* | 55.59 | 50.65 | 53.46 | 50.00 |
| Nevada | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 |
| New Hampshire* | 60.29 | 55.87 | 62.85 | 58.73 |
| New Jersey* | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 |
| New Mexico* | 73.29 | 65.00 | 71.84 | 65.00 |
| New York* | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 |
| North Carolina* | 68.03 | 64.48 | 67.81 | 64.23 |
| North Dakota* | 57.59 | 52.87 | 50.71 | 50.00 |
| Ohio* | 54.39 | 50.00 | 55.46 | 50.51 |
| Oklahoma* | 67.42 | 63.80 | 65.42 | 61.58 |
| Oregon* | 59.04 | 54.49 | 57.29 | 52.54 |
| Pennsylvania* | 55.39 | 50.43 | 55.11 | 50.13 |
| Puerto Rico* | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 |
| Rhode Island* | 56.55 | 51.73 | 57.00 | 52.22 |
| South Carolina | 73.58 | 65.00 | 71.93 | 65.00 |
| South Dakota* | 67.23 | 63.59 | 63.80 | 59.78 |
| Tennessee | 70.43 | 65.00 | 68.88 | 65.00 |
| Texas | 63.59 | 59.55 | 60.66 | 56.29 |
| Utah* | 70.04 | 65.00 | 68.98 | 65.00 |
| Vermont* | 69.82 | 65.00 | 68.02 | 64.46 |
| Virgin Islands* | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 | 50.00 |
| Virginia* | 58.34 | 53.72 | 57.01 | 52.24 |
| Washington* | 53.72 | 50.00 | 51.64 | 50.00 |
| West Virginia* | 71.90 | 65.00 | 70.16 | 65.00 |
| Wisconsin* | 59.91 | 55.46 | 58.53 | 53.92 |
| Wyoming* | 60.94 | 56.60 | 53.44 | 50.00 |

*The Federal share of the maintenance assistance payment is calculated thus:

1. Regular formula:
   (a) OAA, AB, APTD (Guam and the Virgin Islands), AABD (Puerto Rico): Within the statutory ceiling for each of these jurisdictions, the Federal payment is based on ½ of the expenditures up to $37.50 per recipient per month. The statutory ceilings per fiscal year (for all assistance and administrative costs) are: Guam—$1,100,000; Puerto Rico—$24,000,000; the Virgin Islands—$800,000. (The programs of OAA, AB, APTD, and AABD were repealed for the 50 States and the District of Columbia on Jan. 1, 1974, when the federally administered program of supplemental security income for the aged, blind, and disabled went into operation.)
   (b) AFDC: The Federal Government pays ⅚ of the average monthly payment per recipient up to $18. Of the amount of the average payment above $18 and up to $32, the Federal Government pays the "Federal percentage" assigned to the State in the table above; except that, for Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, the Federal Government pays ½ of the expenditures up to $18 per recipient, within the statutory ceiling for assistance and administrative costs (see paragraph (a) above).
2. Alternate formula:
   Under sec. 1118 of the Social Security Act, those States operating an approved plan for medical assistance (title XIX) have the option of using the "Federal medical assistance percentage" for the total of allowable expenditures for maintenance assistance and medical assistance. (The maximum on the average monthly payment per recipient does not apply as it does under the regular formula.) The 47 States which have elected this option as of Oct. 1, 1976 are indicated by an asterisk (*).
3. Emergency assistance:
   If a State elects to include emergency assistance in its plan for AFDC, the Federal Government pays 50 percent of such assistance for families with children not to exceed 30 days in any 12-mo period.

### General Mental Health of the Indochinese

Reviewing the research literature reveals that throughout history experiences involving the sudden uprooting and migration of populations has been accompanied by extreme and often lingering physical, psychosomatic, and social stress.

The Indochinese refugees who have arrived in the United States have been known to face a similarly broad range of both acute and chronic problems of identification and adjustment. Whether forced or voluntary, the precipitous departure from home and homeland has evoked the anxiety and insecurity inherent in the new and unknown. These responses are often reinforced by other evidence:—the sense of isolation and abandonment felt by many Indochinese are exacerbated in the face of the unpredictable avalanche of social, vocational and economic problems—apathy and depression, disappointment and anger. These and other psychological aspects of stress can be experienced along with a range of psychosomatic complaints.

Historically, immigration into the United States by other nationalities has not had quite the hurried circumstances surrounding their immigration as had the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese, for instance, have not had the local, well established communities into which to migrate where they can be assured of an existing Vietnamese culture, providing them with economic and social support that all people need. They have not had established neighborhoods or churches, nor any of the other familiar cultural landmarkings, which would make them feel comfortable. They, naturally, must also contend with the given fact that many of them will never be able to return to their homeland because of political reasons.

We are learning now of incidental factors which are contributing to the various degrees of mental disturbances. During the time of the massive evacuations, few people had adequate time to prepare for such a permanent move. States are now experiencing that, as the Indochinese attempt to become part of the American work force such small things as verification of high school graduation have become a hindrance to receiving certification in certain fields, such as cosmetology, even though the actual training is completed. The Vietnamese continue to experience unanticipated, unpredictable anxiety provoking circumstances that the American society is yet unable to respond to.

The circumstances surrounding the immigration of the Vietnamese to the United States has been unique in many respects. Their mental health problems and the circumstances surrounding them have been comparably unique. The varied and continued study, assessment, and treatment of this new population of American society must continue.

### Fact Sheet

#### INDOCHINESE REFUGEES: NATIONAL PROSPECTIVE

The HEW Task Force for Indochinese Refugees created by the Indochinese Immigration and Refugees Assistance Act of 1975 has been reporting to Congress on a quarterly basis on the Indochinese Refugees Assistance Program. The following information is data extracted from the 9th Report to Congress, dated June 20, 1977:

#### INTRODUCTION

Since the refugees program began, in May 1975, a total of $203 million has been available to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

#### INCOME SUPPLEMENT

As of May 1, 1977, 52,219 refugees representing 36% of the refugee population were receiving at least part of their support from Federally funded refugee cash assistance. The monthly increases in cash assistance are growing but at a smaller percentage rate.

#### EMPLOYMENT

A National sample of the Vietnamese Refugees was conducted, in March-April 1977, to study a number of economic and social factors. From that study the survey found that the overall employment rate for refugee males was 94.6% and the rate for females was 86.4%. For the United States population in general, the comparable March rates were 93.5% for males and 91.5% for females, based on the percentage of persons in the labor force who are employed.

UNDEREMPLOYMENT

While the resettlement program's primary efforts have been directed towards obtaining employment and self-sufficiency for refugee families, a large number of refugee families remain underemployed. (This can be best typified by the fact that 93.5% of the males are employed, yet 36% of the refugee population are receiving some type of Federal cash assistance supplementation.)

EDUCATION

The Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1977 (PL 95-26) provided $18.5 million for Title II, and $10.25 million for Title III for the implementation of the Indochinese Refugee Children's Assistance Act (PL 94-405). Title II provides funds to local school districts for the education of refugee children, while Title III provides funds for project grants to state and local education agencies for adult refugee education.

STATUS

The primary concern among the refugees is to adjust their immigration status from parolee to permanent resident alien. Enactment of legislation presently pending in the House and Senate would open a wide range of employment opportunities for refugees, and make them eligible for instate tuition rates at many state colleges and universities, and for enlistment in the United States Armed Forces.

FAMILY REUNIFICATION

A growing frustration among refugees, individually and collectively, is over their inability to do something constructive to help relatives. This has been noted by the Refugee Task Force, and National and State Resettlement Agencies. This frustration over family separation has been a growing contributing factor to problems of resettlement and adjustment, and is viewed as a further cause for depression and psychological strain among the refugees.

NATIONAL MENTAL HEALTH PROJECTS

Psychiatric therapy is alien to the Indochinese culture and the Indochinese stigmatize mental health problems. The language barrier has also inhibited effective treatment. Five National Demonstration Projects have been funded to explore potential approaches to the Mental Health problems of the Indochinese.

*Region I.*—Funded by a $20,000 grant to the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health, the team composed of a social worker and a paraprofessional made site visits to each of the six New England States and reviewed the cases of refugees identified by clergy, agencies and sponsors. The team has developed information refugees, and has lent permanence towards efforts to help assist mental health systems realistically address the needs of refugees, and pass along information to agencies, sponsors, and providers of social services.

*Region V.*—The Refugees Mental Health Project, located in Columbus, Ohio, called together the resettlement offices of the six states in the Region for a two day workshop on mental health problems among the refugees. The workshop discussion centered on how best to provide proper mental health services to the refugees, especially those with more severely urgent needs for assistance.

*Region VIII.*—A six member team consisting of a Vietnamese paraprofessional, a psychologist and five Asian Americans (1 psychiatrist, 2 psychologists, a social worker, and a public nurse), completed a six months project in Denver, Colorado, treating 50 Indochinese families and designing a comprehensive plan for delivery of Mental Health services to the refugee population of Colorado.

*Region IX.*—The International Institute of San Francisco, under a $68,000 grant, is continuing a year long project to provide training and services in three counties to refugees who will be trained as mental health paraprofessionals.

*Region X.*—The Asian Counseling and Referral Service, in Seattle, Washington, under a $20,000 grant utilizes a toll free telephone line, public service radio and TV announcements. Audio tapes were also developed to help professional counselors to reach refugees effectively.

STATE PROGRAMS CATEGORICALLY DESIGNED FOR INDOCHINESE REFUGEES

In the areas of mental health and related service, not all states have taken the initiative or found the need to categorically design and/or fund Social Services for the Indochinese refugees. Pennsylvania, for instance, is a case in point. Any

social service received by an Indochinese refugee, contained in the Title XX State Plan, is paid for 100% by the Federal Government. However, this funding is above and beyond Pennsylvania's regular Title XX apportionment. The services are received from those agencies which have Title XX contracts to serve the overall Pennsylvania population eligible for Title XX services.

In addition to the social services programs, many states have established a service out of the Governor's Office which functions as a "point" of information and referral. It is usually under the service heading of "information and referral" that these states receive their 100% Federal Financial Participation (FFP). The following states have established categorical services for Indochinese refugees:

*Wisconsin.*—The State of Wisconsin, within the Governor's Division of Emergency Government, has established the Wisconsin Resettlement Assistance Office with an operating budget of $55,000. The responsibilities of this office are as follows:

1. To develop and maintain comprehensive information on all available services—Federal, state and private agencies. This includes knowledge of services for low income purposes and the use of existing other comprehensive information and referral services where available.
2. To link through a referral procedure, the refugees, sponsors, volunteer agencies, state, local, Federal, or private agencies with the appropriate services.
3. To follow up and determine whether the referred service was delivered.
4. To promote through public education an awareness of the information and referral service, and an understanding of the resettlement process.

Specifically, these responsibilities will be accomplished through the following activities:

(*a*) A coordinated public education, information and referral effort, under the guidance of the Governor's Office and the Resettlement Office.

(*b*) The establishment of a toll free number for information sharing.

(*c*) Printing and circulation of a bi-lingual news letter, regarding available programs, specific areas of assistance available, and other matters of related interest, and sent to the voluntary sponsoring organizations, the effected state agencies, the refugees and sponsors.

*California.*—The International Institute of San Francisco has received one of five Mental Health Demonstration Project grants from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare Task Force on Indochinese Refugees. They have identified the following problems and are undertaking the following approach.

Agencies working with Indochinese refugees in California are finding that an increased number of mental health problems are surfacing. Depression, anxiety reactions, and psychosomatic disorders are common. Less common, but evident, are suicides, husband, wife and children abuse, marital conflicts caused by separation. There have been manifestations of maladjusted children. Finally, a number of schizophrenia and paranoia cases have surfaced. While few in number, these are the most difficult.

These mental health problems are arising from the following conditions:

1. Separation of family members during the evacuation.
2. Lack of preparations for the evacuation.
3. Decisions that were of necessity, hastily made, at the time of the evacuation.
4. The unlikelihood of not being able to return safely, if at all to their homeland.
5. Underemployment or no employment.
6. Cultural differences.
7. Inability to speak English and scarcity of persons in the American society speaking the Indochinese languages.
8. The lack of an Indochinese "community".
9. Inadequate housing.
10. Uncertainty about the future and their status.

In order to service the comprehensive mental health needs of the Indochinese in a concentrated three county area, a pilot project was designed with the following purposes:

1. To identify the incidence of mental health problems among the Indochinese refugees within the three counties.
2. To develop a Demonstration Pilot program for training paraprofessionals to assist professionals in reducing mental health problems.
3. To provide linkages between the refugees and mental health services.

4. To assist mental health agencies in relating to the problems of the refugees and thereby helping to reduce the number and severity of mental health cases.

5. To disseminate to the refugees information about mental health services.

*Louisiana.*—The State of Louisiana, by far, has the most comprehensive and substantive human services program categorically designed for the Indochinese refugees. The contract has been awarded to the Associated Catholic Charities (ACC), in New Orleans. ACC's proposal includes:

Employment services, health related services, home information services, housing improvement services, education and training services, and family counseling services. For many of these services the staff of ACC function as case manager. Other services they provide direct. A summary of the services is as follows:

1. *Employment services.*—these services are available five days a week, with interpreter services available at on the job sites when it is deemed necessary. The specific activities of the staff include:

(*a*) Exploration and assessment of employment needs of individual clients.

(*b*) Assessment of employment potential and aptitudes of clients.

(*c*) Individual and group counseling in the expectations of American employers and procedures for securing and maintaining employment.

(*d*) Referral to and arrangement with prospective employers on behalf of the clients. Within the employment staff, job developers and interviewers work cooperatively for and with the client.

The job developer after securing detailed information about the client and his career goal attempts to develop specific job opportunities for that particular individual. This service has been so successful in Louisiana that the Departments of Welfare and Labor are exploring the possibility of contracting out services for ACC to place WIN participants.

2. *Health Related Services.*—Staff are involved in planning programs and services for the immediate long-term, follow-up and referral needs of clients. Therefore, the staff is involved in the following specific activities:

(*a*) Exploration and assessment of health needs.

(*b*) Medical service arrangements.

(*c*) Mental health referrals.

(*d*) Dental, eye, speech, and hearing arrangements.

(*e*) Outreach in health-related services.

(*f*) Medical education in terms of familiarizing refugees with home health care.

(*g*) Working in conjunction with health providers in order to insure that the refugee understands and follows through on health programs.

(*h*) Maintaining a central file on each client which will include the worker's observation of progress and problems of the client.

The health related services staff also developed twenty bi-lingual video tape health education lessons. These video taped lessons are used for teaching health education to the clients. They have also prepared a health care handbook, published in Vietnamese and English. Interpreter services were also created in order to accompany the potential client to a hospital or public clinic on a twenty-four hour, seven day a week basis.

3. *Home Management Services.*—These were designed to provide clients with social services directed toward maintaining and operating their own homes in an efficient and independent manner. This was done through individual and family counseling sessions and through formal and informal instruction and training in four areas of household management:

(*a*) Management of household budgets.

(*b*) Care and maintenance of the home, including the use of common household equipment and proper cleaning techniqques.

(*c*) Consumer eduaction.

(*d*) Nutrition and food preparation, including safe cooking and storage methods.

4. Housing Improvement Services—The specific activities of this service are to:

(*a*) Assist clients in locating suitable and adequate housing at affordable prices.

(*b*) Making repairs to their homes or apartments.

(*c*) Working with landlords and others to upgrade substandard housing.

(*d*) Assist refugee clients in purchasing and renting their own homes.

5. *Education and Training Services.*—Upon the client's request for participation in "English as a Second Language" instruction course and/or cooperation

with an education counselor regarding the continuation of their formal education, the following activities have been designed:

(a) Education and training supervisors will be responsible to organize and supervise the English instructors and their classes at up to five different sites. The education and training supervisors will also work with and supervise the Education Counselor to arrange for placement in high school, college or vocational training for clients.

6. *Family Counseling Service.*—Upon the referral to a Family Counseling Service the intake, diagnosis, and initial determination of treatment will be made. Whenever feasible a group work methodology will be used as the treatment method because it offers the most suitable environment for dealing with cultural adjustment issues.

The project staff will develop bi-lingual video tapes on different aspects of adjustment to life in the United States. A series of at least thirty tapes will eventually be developed on subjects such as:

(a) The roll of WIN in the United States.
(b) The nuclear family.
(c) Differing cultural attitudes towards aging.
(d) Coping with grief and loss, as in separation from family and homeland.
(e) The experiences of other immigrant groups and their process of adjustment to life in the United States.
(f) The importance of retaining one's culture and identity.
(g) Raising children in America, and
(h) Family Systems—American and Vietnamese.

These video tapes will be used primarily in group sessions and as discussion initiators.

A number of the video tapes were also designed as short, job, service announcements prepared for a weekly thirty minute radio program in Vietnamese, aired in New Orleans on Sunday mornings.

*Pennsylvania.*—The Pennsylvania Office of Mental Health is presently awaiting the funding of a $20,000 proposal to train mental health staff on the awareness of the cultural adjustment process, so that:

(1) Adjustment problems do not become debilitating emotional problems.
(2) Inappropriate referrals do not enter the mental health system.
(3) Mental health staff know where to turn within their area for information and consultation regarding an Indochinese referral.

The bulk of this project will concentrate on a needs assessment program to determining the training needs of the Community Mental Health Staff as indicated by the number of clients and type of disturbances being seen at present, as well as those needs expressed by Community Mental Health Center Staff themselves. From this data, and other information provided by the Centers, a comprehensive training needs assessment for the staff dealing with the Vietnamese will be developed.

The primary mental health staff to be trained will be those individuals who make initial contact with potential clients entering the mental health system in Pennsylvania.

The second target group of individuals for this training will be "Consultation and Education Specialists" from each Community Mental Health Center and Base Service Unit.

The training objectives are the following:

(1) Trainees will be able to discriminate between broad differences in Indochinese and American cultures, as well as achieve a heightened awareness and understanding of the concept "culturally different".

(2) Trainees will be familiar with the Indochinese resettlement process and the adjustment problems inherent in the transition.

(3) Trainees will have a general written guide to "do's and don't" in the interview situation involving an Indochinese client.

(4) Trainees will have a listing of sponsoring agencies in their locale plus state and federal agencies which can be called on for consultation services in the event of an Indochinese referral.

(5) Trainees, when dealing with an Indochinese referral or family member, will be attuned to a cultural etiology of the disturbance and, therefore, seek our specialized services.

## APPENDIX 5

### CORRESPONDENCE

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
*September 29, 1977.*

Hon. JOSHUA P. EILBERG,
*Chairman, Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law Subcommittee, Rayburn House Office Building.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: For your information, we are forwarding to you a copy of correspondence receive from the Secretary of the Maryland Department of Human Resources. This letter concerns the effect of the expiration of the Indochinese Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 on our State of Maryland.

We greatly appreciate your attention to this most urgent matter.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS.
PAUL S. SARBANES.
NEWTON I. STEERS, Jr.
GLADYS NOON SPELLMAN.

[Attachment]

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
*Baltimore, Md., September 22, 1977.*

Hon. NEWTON I. STEERS, Jr.,
*Cannon House Office Building,*
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR CONGRESSMAN STEERS: Since the fall of Saigon and the sudden subsequent migration of 145,000 Indochinese refugees to the United States, Maryland State government and voluntary agencies in Maryland have been actively pursuing the mutual goal of assimilation and resettlement of our new residents.

Many Indochinese have successfully adjusted to their new home, despite strong barriers in language and culture. As you know, the refugees arrived at a time when our country was experiencing one of its highest unemployment rates. It is clear that problems still remain for a portion of the Indochinese. Nationally, more than 30 percent of the refugees are dependent on government assistance.

Maryland has one of the largest refugee populations with the majority residing in Montgomery County. In addition to a special employment program in Montgomery County, the state is reimbursed approximately $80,000 per month for financial, and medical assistance and social services provided to Indochinese refugees.

The Indochinese Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 has provided 100 percent federal financial reimbursement for assistance provided to refugees. The legislation expires on September 30, 1977. I am aware that congressional intent was that special assistance to Indochinese be time limited to avoid a very long term situation similar to the Cuban Refugee Program. I am in agreement with that intent, but believe that two years is not an adequate period to expect resettlement for the Indochinese. Additionally, there are many Indochinese who have been in this country much less than two years.

There have been attempts in Congress recently to initiate continuation of a program for Indochinese refugees. Representative Fortney Stark has introduced H.B. 7221 and the Administration has presented its bill to the Speaker of the House. It is my understanding that Senator Kennedy has agreed to submit another bill in the Senate. However, there has been little activity regarding this legislation and time is short, as the program ends on September 30, 1977.

Unless new legislation is enacted, all special assistance to refugees will end on September 30, 1977 and states will have to pick up their share of assistance

costs for those refugees still eligible. Assuming that one half of those receiving assistance will still be eligible, state costs would approximate $250,000 per year. Even more significant is the fact that many refugees will be left with no support and all special programs to help the refugees successfully assimilate and resettle in their new homes will be terminated. In Maryland, the results of our special efforts for the Indochinese have had positive effects in achieving self-sufficiency for many refugees.

The purpose of this letter is to request any support that you can provide for the continuation of the program.

Sincerely,

RICHARD A. BATTERTON,
*Secretary.*

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CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
*Washington, D.C., September 23, 1977.*

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law, Rayburn Building, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am forwarding the enclosed correspondence I recently received from the Honorable George R. Ariyoshi, Governor, State of Hawaii, regarding H.R. 7221, the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975.

It is my understanding that hearings are now in progress on this measure. I do hope that the attached information may in some way, be of benefit during your current deliberations.

With best wishes and aloha,

Sincerely,

CEC HEFTEL, *Member of Congress.*

[Attachment]

EXECUTIVE CHAMBERS,
HONOLULU,
*August 30, 1977.*

Hon. CECIL HEFTEL,
*U.S. House of Representatives, Connon House Office Building, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR CEC: Your kind assistance is respectfully requested in support of H.R. 7221. As you already know, the Indo-China Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975, as amended, provides for much needed financial, medical, and social services assistance to Indochinese refugees in the United States. The effects of this program were significantly felt in Hawaii where there continues to be an increasing number of such refugees electing to resettle here. A substantial number of these refugees, almost 2,000 individuals, are currently on our public assistance rolls at a cost of over $2.5 million annually. However, the applicable program of federal funding ends on September 30, 1977 and, thereafter, the expectation is that these individuals would be encompassed by each respective State's existing public assistance programs. In that event, there is concern that the inordinate number of Indochinese refugees in Hawaii shall cause State expenditures to rise at an alarming rate and in a disproportionate amount to the other States.

The House bill, H.R. 7221, proposes to extend the Indochinese Refugee Assistance program for another year with 100 percent Federal funding, and two more additional years, to 1980, with a declining Federal financial contribution. Needless to say, we are all in favor of an extension of this refugee assistance program, and, therefore, were elated with the introduction of H.R. 7221 by Representatives Stark and Oberstar. Ideally, continued 100 percent Federal funding of this refugee program for three years is desirable and justifiable on the basis that few states, such as Hawaii, shall otherwise be compelled to assume a disproportionate share of the costs of a national program. The urgency of this is-

sue, of course, is being exacerbated by the President's recent authorization to admit an additional 15,000 Indochinese refugees. If the continued 100 percent Federal funding of the program for the next three years is not tactically possible under the present circumstances, your assistance is respectfully solicited to at least maintain the 100 percent Federal funding of employment services for these refugees in order to facilitate the development of their social and economic independence.

Contrary to the expectations of Congress, a complete assimilation of the Indochinese refugees was not possible within the span of two years. The United States has an obligation to ensure the successful conversion of these individuals to our American lifestyle, and this nationally initiated program should be undertaken through a national effort.

Your continued support of our efforts is appreciated.

With warm personal regards, I remain,

Yours very truly,

GEORGE R. ARIYOSHI.

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CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
*September 27, 1977.*

Hon. JOSHUA P. EILBERG,
*Chairman, Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law Subcommittee, Rayburn House Office Building.*

DEAR CHAIRMAN EILBERG: As you are no doubt aware, on Friday, September 30, the Indochinese Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 will expire.

The expiration of this federal program will result in a huge increase in the amount of funds that the state of Maryland must appropriate to continue the unfinished work of resettling the Indochinese in America. Presently, the state is reimbursed approximately $80,000 per month for financial, and medical assistance and social services provided to Indochinese refugees.

I urge that your subcommittee work to provide funds for the extension of the Indochinese resettlement program as soon as possible, so that a new, large burden is not placed on the states, some of whom will be hard put to find the additional funds needed.

I appreciate your time in consideration of this most pressing problem.

Yours sincerely,

NEWTON I. STEERS, Jr.

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CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
*Washington, D.C., September 30, 1977.*

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration Citizenship and International Law, Rayburn Building Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I wish to take this opportunity to express my personal concern about the status of the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program.

The existing program expires today, September 30. It is my understanding that continuation of this vitally needed program can be accomplished with separate authorizing legislation, with a continuing resolution, or with a Senate floor amendment to the House passed bill adjusting the status for Indochina refugees, H.R. 7769.

Since approximately one-third of these refugees are now residing in the State of California, this matter is of particular concern to me, as I represent California's 14th Congressional District.

In view of the financial hardship which would be placed on California and other states should the appropriate legislation not be quickly enacted, I am requesting your personal assistance in making every effort to continue the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN J. MCFALL.

96-725 O—78——14

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
*Washington, D.C., September 12, 1977.*

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR JOSH: I would like to respectfully request your timely consideration of H.R. 7221, amending the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 to extend the period during which refugee assistance may be provided.

The Act provides much-needed financial, medical and social services assistance to Indochinese refugees in the United States. The effects of this program were significantly felt in Hawaii, where there continues to be an increasing number of such refugees electing to resettle there. Nearly 2,000 of these individuals are currently on Hawaii's public assistance rolls, at a cost of over $2.5 million annually.

Should the program of federal funding end on September 30, 1977, as set forth in the present law, there is concern that the inordinate number of Indochinese refugees in Hawaii will cause State expenditures to rise at an alarming rate.

The urgency of this issue, of course, is exacerbated by the Administration's recent authorization to admit an additional 15,000 Indochinese refugees.

Contrary to the expectations of Congress, a complete assimilation of the refugees has not been possible within a span of two years. The United States has an obligation to ensure the successful conversion of these individuals to our American lifestyle. This nationally initiated program should be undertaken through a national effort.

Please accept my sincere appreciation for whatever favorable action you may take on this measure.

Aloha Pumehana,

DANIEL K. AKAKA, *Member of Congress.*

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CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
*Washington, D.C., August 18, 1977.*

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, Judiciary Committee, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR CHAIRMAN EILBERG: As you know, authorizations under the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act, are scheduled to expire on September 30, 1977. I would urge that this not be allowed to happen.

A large percentage of the Indochinese refugees have settled in a relatively small number of states. While we welcome these new citizens, and know they will make outstanding contributions to the future welfare of the states and country, many are currently in need of public assistance. It does not seem fair that this country, which as a matter of national policy opened its arms to these refugees from Communist regimes, should now turn its back on those states where the refugees have settled.

The sub-national financing of public assistance for refugees would place an unbearable burden on those jurisdictions left responsible.

There is legislation pending before your subcommittee which would remedy this situation by extending the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act. My own bill, H.R. 6802, is one which would fulfill this need. I feel certain, that given hearings, it will be the overwhelming decision of the House to extend the Act.

Due to the constraints of time, imposed by the approaching expiration date, it is necessary to ask not only for hearings, but that these hearings be held expeditiously when the House reconvenes on September 7.

Sincerely,

GLENN M. ANDERSON.

STATE OF MINNESOTA,
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR,
*St. Paul, Minn., September 16, 1977.*

Representative JOSHUA EILBERG,
*Chairman, House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE EILBERG: I am Chairman of the Coalition for the Effective Resettlement of the Indo-Chinese Refugees. This Coalition is made up of approximately 150 members representing 30 states, Governor's office, Health and Welfare departments, etc., and various religious, voluntary, and private agencies, including: United States Catholic Conference; Church World Service; Lutheran Immigration; American Council for Nationalities Service; and the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service. The Coalition has been active in 1977 attempting to respond to the needs of the more than 150,000 Indo-Chinese refugees who have been resettled in the United States.

I understand that your subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law will be holding hearings on September 27, 1977. As Chairman of the Coalition, I would like to be allowed to testify at these hearings and have other testimony given by members of the National Voluntary Agencies. I hope that this could be done and since the Administration is now supporting an extension of IRAP programs it is critical that it be done immediately.

Thank you very much for giving attention to this matter.

Very truly yours,

STANLEY B. BREEN, A.C.S.W.,
*Chairman, Coalition for the Effective Resettlement of the Indo-Chinese Refugees.*

[Attachment]

POSITION PAPER: CONTINUATION OF FEDERAL FUNDING FOR INDOCHINA REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

BACKGROUND

Beginning in May 1975, the United States experienced the largest and most rapid refugee resettlement effort in its history. Before the last refugee camp closed in January, nearly 130,000 Indochinese refugees had been brought to communities throughout the fifty states. Since that time, another 14,000 Indochinese parolees have come from third countries and some 5,000 new refugees are expected to arrive in the coming year.

With the arrival of several thousand Indochinese refugees in Spring 1975, Congress passed Public Law 94–23, establishing the Indochinese Migration and Refugee Assistance Program (IRAP). The IRAP program provided the capacity for voluntary agencies to resettle refugees from camp to community and provided 100% federal reimbursement to states through September 30, 1977, for the welfare costs of cash assistance, medical assistance, and social services rendered to Indochinese refugees who meet certain eligibility criteria. The proposed DHEW–SRS budget for fiscal year 1978 does not contain an appropriation request for the continuation of IRAP. This will have a significant negative impact upon the refugees and upon state and local units of government.

The Department of Health, Education and Welfare estimates that welfare, medical and social services would have cost state and local units of government $84.5 million in fiscal year 1977, had the IRAP funds not been available. It is anticipated that future state and local costs would be comparable.

The financial impact of the legislatively mandated September 30, 1977 cut-off will be considerably magnified in certain states because of the secondary migration which is occurring among the Indochinese. Families which were scattered during the initial resettlement are moving to new locations in search of family and friends, better jobs and a more congenial climate. The mobility of the population is already hampering resettlement efforts. This negative trend would be increased by the disparity among the states in welfare benefits, should the more uniform federal system be discontinued.

The impact upon the refugees themselves would be even more substantial. Currently, nearly 17,000 Indochinese families receive financial assistance under the IRAP program. Sixty to seventy percent of these families would not be eligible for federal assistance if IRAP were discontinued. For the most part, those who would be ineligible are large families with limited incomes who would be condemned to a life of extreme poverty. Many social insurance programs such as unemployment compensation, AFDCU, WIN and Social Security are not available to the refugees due to existing regulations or a lack of a sufficient work record to meet eligibility criteria.

Despite the problems which continue to plague the refugees, substantial progress in resettlement has been made. Eighty-seven percent of the refugees in the labor force were employed by the fall of 1976—up from 79 percent at the beginning of the year. From January of 1976 to August of 1976 household incomes increased significantly so that by last fall 41 percent of the refugees were receiving a total household income of more than $9,500 annually. Obviously, a substantial portion of the most skilled and industrious refugees has made a good and rapid adjustment.

Many other refugees will be able to make positive contributions to our society if they are provided with appropriate training and assistance in this initial period of the United States. The 13 percent unemployment figure (which is considerably higher than the national average) does not reflect the many single parents, unskilled veterans, and older workers who are not now in the labor force because they are receiving intensive language training and/or vocational training. For that portion of the refugee population which continues to receive public or voluntary assistance, there is no "quick fix" which will make them instantly independent. However, programs which include employment, language and social services—as have been recently begun in most of the states—do hold the promise of success in preventing long-term dependency.

There are currently an estimated 63 special Indochinese Training and Employment programs around the country. They are providing language and vocational skill training, career counseling, job placement, support services and placement follow-up services to needy refugees. In just a few months of operation, these programs have resulted in the placement of 3,060 in jobs and another 9,200 are in classroom or other training which should lead to employment. These programs are providing the training and retraining which will allow the unskilled or language-handicapped refugees to gain access to the job market. Since the programs are targeted towards current or potential Indochina welfare recipients, nearly all program participants are dependent upon IRAP funds to support themselves and their families while they are in training. Essential Social Services, many of which could not be provided with limited Title XX funds, are providing the transportation, day care, and counseling which insure the effectiveness of these programs.

In addition to the inevitable problems caused by lack of English fluency, lack of appropriate skills and training, cultural differences and limited financial resources, the integration of the Indochinese is impeded by an unnecessary legal handicap. The refugees were brought to this country as "parolees"—an immigration classification which leaves the Indochinese in a legal limbo without the rights and responsibilities of permanent residents and without the opportunity to become citizens. This status is discriminatory in that it excludes the Indochinese from federal employment and from professional licensure in many fields. It also prevents many refugees from being admitted to schools and from attaining in-state tuition. These factors, along with the emotional uncertainty induced in the refugees, are a serious barrier to adjustment in the United States. Without Congressional action, it will take nearly 30 year for all the Indochinese refugees to become permanent residents.

During that time the Immigration and Naturalization Service will be further hampered by a backlog of paperwork, and services to other aliens and parolees will be impaired.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to successfully complete the resettlement process, it is essential that the special financial, educational and support services be continued. At the same time, it is recognized that resettlement efforts cannot and should not continue indefinitely. A planned phase-out of special services is necessary to prevent either an unwanted institutionalization of specialized services or an unnecessary burden of unemployment and welfare falling upon the states and upon the refugees themselves.

It is therefore recommended that existing federal funding for cash assistance, medical assistance, social services, and employment and training programs be

continued over the next three years. It is also recommended that work requirements and sanctions be strengthened. Funding for these services should be phased out so that, by the end of the three years, Indochinese refugees will be eligible for services on the same basis as other U.S. residents. Funding for the intensive employment and training programs should be continued in order to insure effective use of all federal funds, and needy refugees should be made eligible for employment services under the WIN program. These goals would be accomplished by the timely passage of the extension legislation now pending in Congress, or which may be introduced by the Administration.

Legislation has also been introduced (S. 694 and H.R. 7769) which would allow the Indochinese to adjust their status from parolee to permanent resident alien without reference to the quota limitation. This simple measure will remove a serious obstacle in the path of the refugees and reduce congestion in the processing of immigration papers.

We therfore urge your full support of these measures. Both an extension of IRAP funding and an adjustment of immigration status are urgently needed in order to assure the successful integration of the Indochinese into American society.

[Attachment]

UPDATE: COALITION FOR THE EFFECTIVE RESETTLEMENT OF INDOCHINA REFUGEES, JUNE 14, 1977

The Coalition for the Effective Resettlement of Indochinese Refugees, consists of more than 130 representatives of state, local and voluntary organizations throughout the country who are dealing directly with the Indochinese. It was formed in response to an invitation from Governor Rudy Perpich (Minnesota) to a meeting held at the National Governor's Conference in Washington, D.C. on March 22, and 23, 1977. The Coalition represents all of the major voluntary agencies responsible for resettlement, the twenty eight states in which 80 percent of the Indochinese reside, as well as county and private agencies who are closely involved in resettlement activities.

At its initial meeting in Washington, the members of the Coalition agreed upon a policy statement which called for: a continuation of federal funding for ESL, vocational training, skill upgrading, job development, social services, medical assistance and cash assistance; a three-year phase down of funding; adjustment in immigration status; resettlement grants for new arrivals; and formation of a committee to develop a national refugee policy.

Since that time, the Standing Committee selected to carry on Coalition activities in accomplishing these goals has met several times to develop needed information. Standing Committee members have met with Frank Raines, Assistant Director for Domestic Policy for President Carter; James B. Cardwell, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration; David Hurwitz, Acting Commissioner for Assistance Payments; Philip Holman, Indochinese Refugee Task Force Director; the Association of Public Welfare Administrators and a number of key Congressmen and their aides. Chairman Stan Breen offered testimony to the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and International Law. Progress has been made in several areas of concern while other measures remain stalled in Congress.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

The HEW supplemental appropriation has been passed. It provides $300 per refugee child in elementary and secondary education, as well as $10.5 million for adult education. See the May 2, 1977 Federal Register for proposed rules for Adult Education grants and the June 3, 1977 Federal Register for proposed rules governing grants to state education agencies for elementary and secondary education. This is a one-year appropriation.

INDOCHINA REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Funding for cash, medical and social services, as well as employment and training grants is contained in several proposed extensions of the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act. The Standing Committee initially considered a proposal to phase out funding by changing eligibility criteria to eliminate certain classes of recipients. However, it soon became apparent that this mechanism would not be acceptable to those states (such as California and Pennsylvania) which have extensive General Relief Programs. In such states, refugees made categorically ineligible for IRAP would turn to local General Relief, funded through the property tax. Congressman Stark (D-California)

introduced legislation, H.R. 6513, which would pay 100 percent of social services and administrative costs, but would reduce the federal match for medical and cash assistance on a percentage basis in the second and third years, with the states picking up part of the cost. Since this would not be viable in those states which could not generate a state match, the Standing Committee sought a compromise.

The resulting bill, H.R. 7221, reduces the federal funding in the second and third years on a percentage basis but does not require a match (except for a small match for those recipients who were eligible for and placed on regular AFDC). During the phase-out period states could, at their option, compensate for reduced federal funds by supplementing them with state funds, reducing caseloads through placement and training, tightening eligibility, reducing grant levels, or a combination of measures. Following the Standing Committee meetings with Frank Raines, of the White House, and James Cardwell, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Secretary Califano has agreed to support extension in the form of a modification of the Stark compromise. This bill will probably be introduced by Senator Humphrey in the Senate. This is therefore the measure the Standing Committee recommends for passage.

Eligibility for WIN, the use of block grants for employment and training programs, and other concerns can all be resolved through HEW administrative rules once funding is provided. However, with the crowded Congressional calendar, it appears it will take a great deal of effort for us to have an authorization by September.

ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS

Because of the pending adjustment legislation, INS has indicated that it will not accept applications for adjustment from Indochinese until October. However, the Kennedy bill (S. 694) has not yet been passed in the Senate. The Fish bill (H. R. 2051) has been favorably reported out of the Refugee Subcommittee. While the Kennedy bill is a more flexible measure, rapid passage of both bills is essential—with differences to be worked out in conference committee.

RESETTLEMENT GRANTS

Legislation has passed which would provide resettlement grants for all refugees from all countries. While the funding appropriations is not yet adequate to meet this goal, the Coalition has won agreement on this important principle.

NATIONAL REFUGEE POLICY

Information from both HEW and Congress indicated that extensive legislation would not pass if it were tied to formation of a national Refugee Committee. This was therefore dropped from legislative proposals. However, several key HEW policymakers remain interested in this proposal. The Standing Committee will therefore pursue this separately from the consideration of extension legislation. The Coalition will, at its upcoming meeting, consider options for its continued activity.

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COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR,
*Harrisburg, Pa., September 19, 1977.*

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,
*Rayburn House Office Building,*
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR JOSH: As you know, the Indochina Migration an Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 (Public Law 94-23) is scheduled to expire September 30, 1977. This legislation has provided eligible refugees in Pennsylvania who needed assistance during their resettlement transition with medical, financial and social services. I am sure you will agree that we should not allow this assistance to stop before the goal of assimilating and integrating the Indochinese community into American society is completed. Good work has been done under this program. Like so many other immigrant Americans, the Indochinese have made a remarkable adjustment.

Pennsylvania has the third largest number of Indochinese refugees. From July 1976 to July 1977 we have provide over $2.9 million in medical, social and cash assistance. The present funding formula provides 100 percent Federal financial participation for these services. Should the program not be extended, Pennsylvania would immediately assume 45 percent of the Medical Assistance (including

mental health) and AFDC costs and 100 percent of the General Assistance and social services costs. We have already committed our total Title XX (social services title, Social Security Act) apportionment for the present fiscal year making it impossible to replace Public Law 94–23 services funds from this source.

In order to complete the task of assimilating the refugees into our society and to provide states with reasonable fiscal assistance, Is ask that you support continuation of the Inochinese Refugee Assistance Program. We recognize that the Federal government should not fund the program 100 percent indefinitely. The Humphrey-Stark proposal will allow adequate time for states to plan responsible fiscal involvement.

I ask for your support on the extension of the Indochinese Refugees Assistance Program and urge that you address it in a timely fashion in order that total Congressional and Executive action can be completed before the expiration of Public Law 94–23.

Sincerely,

MILTON J. SHAPP, *Governor.*

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[TELEGRAM]

SALEM, OREG.,
*September 22, 1977.*

Congressman PETER RODINO,
*House Office Building,*
*Washington, D.C.*

I strongly urge support to immediately grant funding and authorize extension of the Indo-Chinese refugee program. Extension of 100 percent Federal reimbursement for assistance medical and social services is essential to meet the special needs of these people. A phase out schedule should recognize that new refugees need special help for at least a 3-year period. The western States need your understanding and support since we are carrying a disproportionate share of the National responsibility to Indo-Chinese refugees.

ROBERT STRAUB, *Governor of Oregon.*

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STATE OF MINNESOTA,
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR,
*St. Paul, Minn., September 23, 1977.*

Representative JOSHUA EILBERG,
*Chairman, House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE EILBERG: I am sorry I cannot be present to testify at your hearings on September 27, 1977, but I had an important prior commitment. However, please be assured that I strongly support the Humphrey/Kennedy/Cranston/Stark legislation which provides for a three-year phase down of the Indo-Chinese Refugee Assistance Program. Continuation of this program is vital after September 30, as without it we cannot continue the very effective programs and services to the refugees in Minnesota.

Mr. Stanley B. Breen, Director of the Indo-Chinese Resettlement Office in Minnesota, will testify in behalf of my office and I look forward to a positive action by your sub-committee.

Very truly yours,

RUDY PERPICH, *Governor.*

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NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASSOCIATION,
*Washington, D.C., September 22, 1977.*

Representative PETER RODINO,
*Chairman, House Judiciary Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: As Chairman of the National Governors' Association Committee on Human Resources, I am writing to express my hope that action can be taken quickly to approve legislation to extend the Indochinese Migration and Refugee Assistance Program (Public Law 94–23) which expires September 30, 1977.

I understand that the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law will be considering the Administration's proposal Friday, September 23.

In order to avoid financial hardships for those states which have concentrations of Indochinese refugees, I would urge that legislation be considered that would extend federal funding for the additional costs of social services and special projects. While I recognize that there must be some limit on the duration of this special program, I believe that federal financial participation for the first year of the extension should remain at 100 percent with a subseequent phase-down.

I appreciate your interest in assuring equitable treatment of those refugees resettled in the United States.

Sincerely,

RICHARD F. KNEIP,
*Chairman, Committee on Human Resources.*

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TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES,
*Austin, Tex., October 7, 1977.*

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law, Congress of the United States, Rayburn Office Building, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR CONGRESSMAN EILBERG: Your humanitarian concern for the problems being faced by the Indochinese refugees in the United States is evidenced by your support of pending legislation to continue services to this group. The work of your committee is appreciated, not only by the refugees themselves, but by all of us who have been involved in the resettlement effort.

As you requested, I am submitting for your consideration information based on this agency's service to the refugees.

Texas has the second highest Indochinese refugee population in the United States, estimated currently at 20,000 individuals. Originally, only 5,449 were assigned to this state. The Texas climate and availability of jobs have been major factors in the continuing migration, particularly to the Dallas, Houston and Beaumont areas.

The Department of Human Resources statistics for September 1977 indicate that 689 cases, representing 2,230 people were receiving financial and medical assistance. I am certain that a major factor in the small percentage of refugees receiving assistance is directly attributable to the day care, training/employment services, medical and dental care, transportation, English as a second language and other services provided by the state through federal funding. During the period September 1, 1976, through August 31, 1977, 808 active financial cases were terminated, as the refugees moved toward self-sufficiency. The following quote, taken from the quarterly report made by the Dallas Regional Office on February 18, 1977, to the HEW Refugee Task Force, refers to the two special federally funded work-training projects in Houston and Dallas. These are operated jointly by the Texas Employment Commission, Texas Education Agency, and the Department of Human Resources (formerly the Texas Department of Public Welfare).

"'One of the major factors contributing to the initial success of the Region VI resettlement assistance as reflected in a 10% reduction in cash assistance cases in the region as of January 1, 1977, is the coordinated impact of the Texas State Welfare Department, Employment Services, Houston Community College, and Dallas Independent School District. The efforts of the various staff to coordinate service delivery, and with a minimum of bureaucratic layering, have been instrumental in fielding the statewide program. The State Department of Public Welfare is contributing over $1 million in Title XX services to the project grant program in the state, eight Vietnamese persons have been hired to provide services. Seven purchase of service contracts totaling $640,700 have been negotiated to provide services to 1,324 refugees. The Title XX related direct social services program funding level is currently projected at $825,850."

Texas has no general assistance program. Less than twenty-five percent of the needy refugees are eligible for Aid to Families with Dependent Children. Most do not qualify because they are intact families with the father in the home, or are single adults. However, these people are underemployed or unemployed and lack English language skills. Services to these individuals will cease unless funding is continued at one hundred percent, as Texas has no state matching funds, and no legal base for provision of this type program. If this group is unable to continue to participate in the various programs to aid them in becoming self-sufficient we face the reality of creating a hard-core low income population.

Unlike previous immigrant groups, the Indochinese people have no established community in the United States. They are undertaking the difficult task of resettling in a country whose culture is vastly different.

Programs and funding should be identical for these refugees here and those to be admitted. It is administratively inefficient to attempt to keep them separate by entry date.

The fifteen thousand refugees to be admitted in the near future will need some or all of the same services. The conditions in Laos may well bring in additional needy people. Yet our social services contracts are expiring and the specialized staff in the Department's statewide programs, many of whom are themselves Indochinese refugees, are in jobs which expire next month. Unless immediate action is taken to continue federal funding, the Indochinese program and staff who deliver these services will terminate.

I appreciate this opportunity to provide information about the Texas programs, and urge your immediate action in this critical situation.

Sincerely,

JEROME CHAPMAN.

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COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE,
*Harrisburg, Pa., April 1, 1977.*

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,
*U.S. House of Representatives, Rayburn House Office Building,*
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR CONGRESSMAN EILBERG: The Indo-China Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 (Public Law 94-23) is schedule to expire September 30, 1977. In an effort to assess the need for possible continuation of funding for a time limited period, an Ad Hoc work group met, in Washington, the week of March 21st. Attending the meeting were over a hundred people representing State Resettlement offices, HEW Officials, National Voluntary Agency Directors, Clergy, Welfare and Employment Offices, Volag Offices, Congressional Staff, and members of the Indo-Chinese community.

The participants emphatically outlined the need for continuation of resettlement services and programs, especially, related to language training, vocational services, mental health, medical care and income maintenance. To address these issues in a more concentrated, substantive manner, a Committee was formed and I have been asked to join. Hopefully, an acceptable recommenation for a National refugee policy will emerge from this Committee which will touch on a framework for a natural and planned phase-down of special Federal programs, and an adjustment of status to that of permanent residence will be made available to the refugees. The final product of this Committee will be shared with the White House, Congress and HEW for consideration.

In the coming months, if I can be of personal service to you or your staff on the Indo-China issue, please feel free to call. I will be in contact with your office shortly to share some demographic information relating to the programmatic and fiscal impact Pennsylvania will encounter should the Indo-China Migration and Refugee Assistance Act not be extended

Sincerely,

NORMAN V. LOURIE.

[Attachment]

EXPENDITURES FOR INDOCHINESE REFUGEES, 1976-77

| | Cash assistance | | Medical assistance | | Social services | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Expenditures | Persons | Expenditures | Estimated number of services | Expenditures | Cases |
| July 1976 | $105,463 | 1,561 | $10,786 | 218 | $38,130 | 73 |
| August 1976 | 114,233 | 1,665 | 15,750 | 338 | 17,833 | 42 |
| September 1976 | 115,364 | 1,702 | 33,210 | 402 | 1,246 | 9 |
| October 1976 | 118,940 | 1,709 | 44,206 | 425 | 94,901 | 215 |
| Nove ber 1976 | 117,319 | 1,714 | 21,995 | 322 | 79,106 | 173 |
| December 1976 | 121,305 | 1,727 | 20,417 | 384 | 9,678 | 64 |
| January 1977 | 120,823 | 1,735 | 14,532 | 425 | 48,144 | 153 |
| February 1977 | 125,842 | 1,797 | 16,167 | 428 | 29,471 | 35 |
| March 1977 | 132,033 | 1,900 | NA | NA | NA | NA |

INDOCHINESE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM

HOUSING

For the most part housing in Philadelphia has not presented a problem. At the end of last year we requested that the H.E.W. Refugee Task Force in this Region do a housing survey for the West Philadelphia area, since most of the Indochinese population in Philadelphia County live in that section of the city. The survey indicated that the Indochinese were well accepted in that area. More recently, however, reasonable housing has become difficult to find and if the Indochinese who reside in the suburban counties continue to move into Philadelphia we will have a proble.

SUBURBAN COUNTIES

Housing in surburan counties has presented a problem, due to very strict zoning laws, such as, no more than two to a bedroom and they must be of the same sex except in the cases of husband and wife and children under one year of age. This, of course, has created a great deal of problems, because the Indochinese families tend to be six and up.

In 1975 and the early part of 1976 when the refugees first arrived here, the sponsors (parishes, groups and individuals) had a difficult time finding housing for the larger families, but were able to do this through parish contacts or by housing the family in areas where there are large houses usually with an equally large rent. As sponsorship ended, the refugees who are working and striving towards independence have had a problem affording the high rents and as a result have had to move into less expensive housing. This has usually meant a move to Philadelphia.

NOTE: One problem we have started to experience is the reluctance on the part of landlords in accepting leases from Indochinese without a co-signee.

STATISTICS

*Employment, welfare, English as a second language and vocational training*

According to our January, 1977 figures there are presently 844 Indochinese in the Five-County Area. This comprises 176 families or units of single people (448 adults and 396 children). Of the 448 adults, it has been established that 333 of them are employable, 247 of those employable adults are employed. Of the 86 people who are employable but not employed at the present time, 52 are in vocational training; English as a Second Language (ESL) or Community College. The other 34 are a combination of people who have either just been laid-off or have no skills and/or no English.

At the moment we have 48 cases on cash assistance. If we discount the 52 people who are in training of some kind, our figures tally pretty much with the National figure of 10 percent unemployment among minority groups. This brings us to the question of language problems. The 34 individuals who are not employed and could be, (with the exception of the 4 individuals who were laid off), are the hard-core illiterates who so far, have not been able to make it. This is where we have to concentrate our efforts for ESL.

INTERPRETATION SERVICES

The need for interpretation services is growing less and less. Most people manage to get along for such tasks as hospital visits and welfare, etc. and if not, they usually have friends who can help.

CULTURAL PROBLEMS

On the whole the majority of the Indochinese refugees in the area have integrated very well. However, there are some cultural problems that are starting to manifest themselves now:

1. Some of the Indochinese living in West Philadelphia who did not have the benefits of sponsorship groups now have problems adjusting to apartment and city living. There have been complaints from landlords on heating being too high (90° F), children running around half-clothed, and houses being kept in a state of filth. After investigation we found that there is a cultural problem. Many of them never had stoves and other appliances and do not know how to

keep them clean. This is a problem that will have to be handled with great diplomacy. We have spoken to the health department.

2. The Vietnamese senior citizens are having a difficult time adjusting to the American society, many have isolated themselves and make no attempt to learn the language or to go out (some have not been out of the house in months). The problem seems to be that they feel they have lost their place in the family. they also feel they have lost the respect of younger family members. This isolation causes depression. Another aspect has been the constant flow of bad news from relatives in Vietnam. Many of the Vietnamese are finding it hard to deal with this situation.

The people who seem to be having the most difficult time with the culture regarding employment, are the professionals. Some of the doctors are taking the ECFMG exam for the second or third time and many worry about being able to practice medicine again. Other professional groups such as pharmacists and veterinarians are also finding it difficult to fulfill the necessary requirements to become certified and/or licensed in their fields.

It should be noted that we only have statistics on those individuals sponsored through Catholic Social Services, but since the agency sponsored at least half the population in the Five-County Area, it is a fair indication of the problems that the majority of the population are experiencing.

THESE ARE JUST ESTIMATES

The overall population in the Five-County Area is approximately 21-2500 Indochinese—we know of approximately 1700—Estimated number on welfare: 114 cases. We work with four other volunteer organizations—Nationalities Service Center, Jewish Family Services, Lutheran Family and Children Services, and International Resene Committee.

ALLENTOWN

There is a definite need for the continuation of funding.

Allentown has a CETA contract that will terminate in September 1977.

This contract provides instruction in the English language. It is recommended that the program should be directed to everyone, not just to wage earners, which is the present practice. The greatest need at present is to eliminate the language barrier.

It has been observed that the Vietnamese are an industrious people. That it is their sincere desire to become self-sufficient. Some refugees have purchased homes. Employment is not viewed as a big problem. A minimum number remain in the welfare system.

Complete integration is viewed as an obstacle that will take time to be resolved.

Allentown has received several requests to locate relatives that are believed to be among the 77,000 persons remaining in Thailand camps. It is permitted on a limited basis that relatives can be relocated with other members of their family. This appears to be logical since one of the cultural bases is a very strong desire for a unified family.

The Laurence Kansas Refugee Committee under the direction of Catholic Social Services of the Diocese of Kansas, has sent letters to sponsors in the U.S. alerting them and requesting their comments on the issue of relocating the 77,000 people remaining in Thailand camps.

Allentown reports that there is a definite need to continue funding. A significant number of cases are active and a large number of calls are being received for Social Services.

ALTOONA-JOHNSTOWN

In the Altoona Diocese a special school program (Continuing Basic Education for Adults) has been established. English as a second language is one of the subjects offered, because of this program, Altoona does not consider language to be a problem.

Altoona reports that additional funding is needed to satisfy and protect the people that have been relocated. The funds that have been supplied by the Diocese cannot continue (funds were used to employ people whose duties were to be of service to the relocattees).

It is recognized that the Vietnamese are a proud people. Their number one priority is to be able to "do for themselves", however at the present time caution

is urged before the relocater is to be termed self-sufficient. A number of the Vietnamese are victims of greedy, unscrupulous individuals. It is recommended that the Vietnamese be protected from these people.

Approximately 100 people have located in the Altoona Diocese. Approximately 20 people (relatives) have been relocated recently. The agency is receiving requests for service constantly. Continuing funds are needed.

ERIE

Erie reports that language and employment are to be considered the principal obstacle. The under-employed are recognized as another major problem.

Erie was instrumental in the placement of approximately 200 people. Catholic Social Services had employed CETA workers to administer to the needs of the Vietnamese. Funding for the CETA program has been discontinued. There is no special Vietnamese worker at the present time. It is felt that the relocater is ready to take care of himself. A number of relocattees have moved West because of the severe weather conditions.

In response to the relocating of the 70,000 people in Thailand, it was said that the past relocation program was a satisfying experience, and that Erie Diocese is ready to give any necessary help. However, it is feared that sponsorship is saturated.

We were informed that an International Catholic Migration Committee under the direction of Dr. Elizabeth Winiper is being formed to take care at any future relocation activity.

It was declared that funding should be continued. It should be remembered that the Vietnamese have been a moving population for the past 20 years.

GREENSBURG

Approximately 125 persons have been relocated in the Greensburg Diocese. The relocaters are serviced by a Vietnamese case worker and funded by the Dioceses.

A housing problem has not been experienced. Employment is not an acute problem. A minimum number of Vietnamese are welfare recipients. There is a language barrier. A cultural problem is also eminent. Exposure to the American way of life is a cultural shock. There is a difference in the method of living between the refugee that has been settled in the urban and the non-urban area.

In response for future placement of additional refugees it was not known if the sponsors had extended themselves. It is indicated that it is a Government responsibility for future placement.

There is a real need for continued Government funding to provide help for the displaced Vietnamese.

HARRISBURG

The Harrisburg Diocese has been extensively involved in the relocating project. Harrisburg Diocese project as all other Diocesan projects were originally funded through USCC.

Presently the Vietnamese service contracts are funded 90 percent by HEW and 10 percent by USCC through the Diocese.

Approximately 2,000 relocaters are receiving services from Harrisburg Catholic Social Services. There are several Vietnamese case workers among the staff of 30 people that are providing help.

Special classes for basic adult education are functioning in the public and parochial schools. Part of the Diocesan operation is to determine training needs for the displaced individual. An important segment of the program is the curriculum offered by the Vo-Tech Schools. Among the courses offered is English as a second language.

It has been very difficult (because of the privacy act) to determine the number of relocatees that are Welfare recipients. However after a concerted effort it is reliably reported that relatively few Vietnamese are welfare recipients.

It has been extremely difficult to have professional people declared eligible to practice (medical doctors, nurses, dentist) the tests for licensure are expensive, however, recently there has been on increased acceptance attitude by members of the medical profession for the Vietnamese medical person.

There are not too many self-employed Vietnamese in the Harrisburg Diocese. There have been small grocery stores established in neighborhoods. However very few operators have applied for small business loans.

Some of the needs for the immediate future are:

MH, MR Programs
Child Care Programs
Aid to the Elderly
Counseling Services

The grants that have been available are not adequate. There is a need for continued funding for the Vietnamese.

An organization known as the Vietnam Association is ready to apply for a grant to run the program (Vietnamese working for Vietnamese). The Harrisburg Catholic Charities endorses this project and is ready to offer them any needed assistance.

DIOCESE OF PITTSBURGH,
REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT OFFICE,
*Pittsburgh, Pa.*

[Attachment]

BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND A REPORT ON THE PROGRESS AND CONTINUING NEEDS OF THE REFUGEES

In May of 1975, the United States Government made a request to the United States Catholic Conference for assistance in a large effort to resettle the many Southeast Asian refugees whom they had brought to this country. The Southeast Asian Refugee Resettlement Office at the Diocese of Pittsburgh (SEARRO) was established in response to that request. The SEARRO has served the refugees continuously since May of 1975 in the various capacities demanded by the evolving situation, including:

Securing sponsorships for 500 refugees;

Acting as liaison between the sponsors and refugees to preserve the sponsorships;

Translating and interpreting;

Performing needs assessments on the refugees and setting assistance priorities;

Researching and evaluating community resources and support systems and acting as liaison and advocate for the refugees with these community resources;

Providing crash English language classes;

Providing counseling for the refugees to ease the problems of social, cultural, family, employment, and education transitions;

Assisting in educational and employment development, placement, and securing financial assistance, scholarships, etc.

As early as March of 1976, the SEARRO began taking over the case loads of the other Volags in the area which began to phase out and has now assumed the role of Resource Service Center for the entire Western Pennsylvania refugee population of about 2,000.

The following brief profile is drawn from the records which the SEARRO has maintained through its continuous close association with the refugees. It describes their successes, failures, and continuing needs. In August of 1976, the SEARRO made an in-depth survey of the 498 refugees under its sponsorship and learned: that 38.7 percent (181) were in the employable age bracket of 18 to 60 years; that only 16.3 percent (76) were actually employed and that of these 76 employed adults, 68 percent (52) were holding jobs far below the level of which their backgrounds had prepared them. In other words, of the total number of employable adults, over ¾ were unemployed or vastly underemployed.

Furthermore, the refugee family structures were significantly different from their American counterparts. Their families averaged almost 7 members and yet had an average gross income of only $6,845. per week. This contrasts with the medium income of $17,338. for a typical Pennsylvania family of the same size according to the *Pennsylvania Bulletin* Vol. 6, No. 46 (6–19–76) pp. 1373.

According to the same survey conducted by the RRO, the factors contributing to this desperate situation were as follows: 42.8 percent of the unemployed adults had little or no English language skills, 94.2 percent had no applicable job skills, 95 percent of them had to rely entirely upon public transportation, and 55.2 percent were in need of day care facilities to allow them to get out of the house for employment purposes. For those adults who were underemployed (28.9 percent of the employable total) 26.9 percent had little or no English language, 96 percent had to rely upon public transportation which significantly curtailed their mobility and availability for employment, 10.4 percent of them

needed day care facilities to avail themselves of the necessary mobility for better jobs, and 100 percent of them simply lacked appropriate employment opportunities for the foregone and other reasons.

Since August, 1976, when this survey was completed, the SEARRO has undertaken a 400+ percent increase in its case load and has discovered that the results of the survey are generalizable (with small adjustments), to the Western Pennsylvania refugee population as a whole (2,000 people). Also since August, almost all of the sponsorships for these families have phased out their direct cash assistance and the refugees have been forced to rely upon the public welfare system in large numbers.

In October, 1976, the SEARRO, under a special grant from HEW, began working intensely with those refugees who are receiving public assistance, making every effort to upgrade their employment potential. Serious attempts have been made to develop and enhance ESL opportunities for all the refugees. At least another year of special ESL opportunities will be needed for many of the refugees who come from low educational backgrounds if they are to have enough facility with English to give them a significant level of employment mobility. Twenty-three potential employable adults have been placed into Vo-Tech training, but approximately three times that number still require such training before they will have any technical skills. Many more need training to upgrade, update, verify, and recertify their employment skills.

Serious efforts have been made to locate financing for this required training through the existing student financial aid programs. But, this financing has been insufficient to handle the demand. Many of the refugees who are pursuing higher education to enhance their employment potential have been forced to incur large debts through the State and Federal student loan programs. Many others have had the avenues of employment upgrading education and training closed to them because they lack the minimum requirement of a high school diploma. For these people some special General Educational Development program is needed to accelerate their progress. Ordinary GED programs which require a great facility with English must be viewed as long-term programs for the refugees.

Job development is another area that needs more serious consideration. Efforts at job development, even for those refugees who have English and vocational skills, have been minimally successful because the funds needed for such effort have not been adequate to offset the forces of discrimination and national scarcity of jobs. Serious efforts have been made to find entry level and part-time employment for those who are in the process of upgrading their skills. But these efforts also require intensification.

The housing needs of the refugees are dependent to a large extent upon their economic viability. Most refugees were provided with adequate housing, arrangements in middle or upper-middle class neighborhoods and most often received rent subsidies from their sponsorships. Most of these financial arrangements have been gradually phased out over the past year which has forced the refugees to take greater responsibility (at some hardship) for their shelter costs. Some have been forced to relocate into lower income areas, rely on supplemental public cash assistance, or band together with other refugees or family members in order to share the rising costs of shelter. Of the refugees in the Greater Pittsburgh Area: 2 percent own their own homes, 50 percent of the family units rent, and 48 percent have grouped together to share shelter costs.

As the refugees attain an improved economic base and begin to become better informed as to the available housing resources, such as rent, subsidy, public housing, and federal mortgage subsidies, etc., many of the housing difficulties will be substantially lessened. Indeed, there has been a growing interest by many of the refugee family units in purchasing their own homes and many have been able to accumulate funds which will be used towards downpayment, assuming of course, no major catastrophes affect the families in the coming months.

Of some difficulty to many of the refugees has been their unfamiliarity with the rental lease and the language in which it is comprised. Many are unsure of their legal obligations in regards to such items as: repairs, maintenance, subleasing privileges, or prohibitions, the number of people who can live on the premises, rights and responsibilities of landlords and tenants. Others have experienced difficulty in communicating with their landlords, either due to their English language disability or for other reasons, and often avoidable disputes arise.

The general situation of the refugees has improved since August, 1976, but a great deal more remains to be done before the refugees can be abandoned to their

own resources with a reasonable expectation of success. From our experiences to date, in working first-hand and intensely with a wide range of refugees and refugee needs, find that it will be necessary to at least continue assistance at the present level for the immediate future. Gradually, this assistance can be reduced as more and more refugees acquire the prerequisites of self-support. The major continuing needs remain: English language training, vocational training, and job development.

Respectfully submitted.

GEORGE KOKIKO,
*Project Director.*

[Attachment]

SCRANTON

The Diocese of Scranton reports that there is a definite need for the continued funding of the Vietnam Relocation Program.

They list the following reasons:

1. English classes are still essential, although they have gained some proficiency in the language much more training is needed to enable them to advance to better jobs.
2. Job counseling is needed to help them up-grade their occupation in keeping with their ability.
3. A liaison person is needed for them to cope with the requirements of federal, state, and local agencies.
4. An interpreter and translator is needed especially for some older adults, cases of medical situations, interviews with news media and correspondence to refugees.
5. Great deal of counseling still has to be done with them around personal problems, community adjustments and American way of life.
6. There is still much they have to learn about community living. A socialization program which is now operating enables us to educate them as a group and also provide the opportunity for fellow Vietnamese support.

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COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE,
EASTERN PENNSYLVANIA PSYCHIATRIC INSTITUTE,
*Philadelphia, Pa., September 20, 197..*

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR CONGRESSMAN EILBERG: We believe that the Humphrey-Stark proposal for the continuation of funds to Indochinese refugees should be supported. Without a continuation of this federal effort, the physical, sociological and psychological problems of this refugee population will continue. Our personal concerns relate to the psychological well being of the refugees.

At a recent meeting of the Refugee Task Force called by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, it became clear from reports by the Directors of the NIMH Refugee programs that the present mental health needs of our refugee population are immense. Suicide attempts, severe depression, marital strife, acting-out adolescents, etc. are manifest. Both sociological and psychological literature would predict the occurrence of mental health problems in this refugee population at this point in time. It is, therefore, imperative that federal support be continued.

In the original Indochinese Migration and Refugee Assistance Act, special projects money was appropriated. Through the National Institute of Mental Health, five mental health projects have been initiated. However, this clearly is not a large enough program to meet the mental health needs of our Indochinese population.

New mental health projects that could be initiated with continued financial support would deal with alerting our present mental health delivery system, especially at the community level, to the needs, attitudes, and techniques involved in treating this refugee population. Since the refugee population has begun to appear at the doorsteps of our community mental health delivery system, it is necessary that this program, with special projects provisions, be supported and appropriated.

Since the problem is immense, we are suggesting strongly that the federal government continue its support. It is our view that this additional support will be money well spent and constitutes a saving. If these mental health problems are not dealt with, it could be anticipated that costs for such human services as: law enforcement, mental health, welfare, etc. will rise. What we are suggesting is preventive measures based on well-founded data, be taken presently to avoid problems in the future.

Sincerely,

BARRY MILLER, Ph. D.,
*Director, Bureau of Research and Training, Mental Health.*

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OFFICE OF THE MAYOR,
CITY OF SEATTLE,
*July 12, 1977.*

Congressman JOSHUA EILBERG,
*Rayburn House Office Building,*
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR CONGRESSMAN EILBERG: It has recently been brought to my attention by several social service professionals and other concerned citizens that the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 is due to expire on September 30, 1977. On April 26, 1977 Congressman Joel Pritchard co-sponsored the introduction of H.R. 6513 which I understand is now before your subcommittee for consideration.

As you know, H.R. 6513 calls for the 1975 Act to be amended to "extend the period during which refugee assistance may be provided" through 1980. The federal funds made available under the 1975 Act are a primary revenue source for important social service programs (i.e. employment, counseling, emergency income) serving Indochinese Refugees in the Seattle area. I am very concerned that these refugees will be faced with grave economic and social consequences should the present Act be allowed to expire.

I am therefore requesting that you please give this vital piece of legislation your prompt and positive consideration.

Sincerely,

WES UHLMAN, *Mayor.*

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BOARD OF SUPERVISORS,
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
*Washington, D.C., September 26, 1977.*

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law,*
*Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: As you will note from the attached copy of a letter to the Senate Appropriations Committee we strongly support the idea of Continuing Resolution to extend the Indochina Refugee Assistance Program (IRAP) under existing rules for one year.

We noted with approval during your hearing on September 23 that there is a question in the minds of some of your Subcommittee members as to the justice in dumping support costs for a nationally initiated program, based on a national foreign policy, on local governments. We hope this question will be explored more fully, and we hope the Administration and some Members of Congress and the Senate would come to realize that the Indochina Refugees are no less a national responsibility than the Cuban Refugees or any other group of refugees invited to this country as a manifestation of our national foreign policy.

We have asked for time to testify during your next hearing on IRAP. If it is not possible to schedule us, we ask you to bear in mind that some who have testified several times in House and Senate hearings, are willing to see a phase-out of Federal support beginning immediately or after fiscal year 1978. We cannot support such a Federal budget economy measure; but we are willing and able to help expand Federally supported efforts to train and equip refugees to make it on their own.

Thank you for your consideration of our position in your hearings.

Sincerely,

JOSEPH M. POLLARD,
*Legislative Coordinator.*

[Attachment]

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS,
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
*Washington, D.C., September 23, 1977.*

Hon. JOHN MCCLELLAN,
*Chairman, Senate Appropriations Committee. Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On behalf of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors and other California counties, this is to request that you introduce a Continuing Resolution in the Senate to extend the Indochina Refugee Assistance Program under existing rules. The program is scheduled to expire on September 30.

Recent hearings in the Senate Human Resources Committee and the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law have highlighted the need for continued assistance, as 35 percent of the refugees admitted since enactment of the program in 1975 are still receiving assistance. In addtion, new arrivals are currently being admitted, whose need for income assistance, social services, job development, and medical assistance is expected to be greater than that of earlier arrivals.

The hearings have also brought out great divergence of opinion as to the degree and duration of the needed assistance, as well as the fact that further study is required before the national policy is determined in this matter. One thing is urgently clear, however; *immediate* action is needed, and the various bills pending are unlikely to resolve the issue satisfactorily. For example, the Administration's proposal to immediately phase down the program would terminate Federal assistance completely for single persons and childless couples, as well as to families in which a parent is employed at wages too low to support the large families characteristic of some of our refugee population. In Los Angeles County, the phase down would add $4 million to the local taxpayers' burden.

We would like to see the Indochina Refugee Assistance Program continued under existing rules for at least one year, while the Congress, Administration, and State and local officials jointly gather information on the impact of proposed changes, which could then result in a reasonable national policy that will be both helpful to the refugees and fair to local taxpayers. A Continuing Resolution of at least six months would permit the necessary data gathering.

Attached is a copy of the Los Angeles County testimony on the issue.

Please call me if you wish further information.

Sincerely,

JOSEPH M. POLLARD,
*Legislative Coordinator.*

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COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO,
*Washington, D.C., September 14, 1977.*

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,
*Chairman, House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, Rayburn House Office Building, Washingotn, D.C.*

DEAR CHAIRMAN EILBERG: Our respective Boards of Supervisors have directed us to seek time before your Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law in the hearings on continuation of the Indochina Refugee Assistance Program (IRAP) which are expected to be held the week of September 26, 1977. Collectively, our Counties handle an IRAP case load of 4,063 cases involving 12,168 persons. Should the program terminate, the estimated annual cost to our four Counties would be about $7,210.00 in assistance payments and $1,450,000 in administrative costs, with a loss of about $1,450,000 for social services provided to the refugees.

We are extremely concerned that we be able to address your Subcommittee on this important matter. Therefore, we respectfully request that time be allotted for representatives of our four Counties to appear at the hearings. Should you need further information regarding this request, please contact Mr. Roger Honberger of the San Diego County Washington Office at 785-0560. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH M. POLLARD,
*Legislative Coordinator, County of Los Angeles,*
JERRY JAFFE,
*Office of the Director,*
*Human Services Agency, County of Orange.*
ROGER F. HORNBERGER,
*Washington Representative, County of San Diego.*
KENNETH W. WADE,
*Washington Representative, County of Alameda.*

96-725 O—78——15

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO,
*Washington, D.C., August 11, 1977.*

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR CHAIRMAN EILBERG: During your August 4 hearing on the admission of 15,000 additional Indochinese refugees, I was surprised to hear HEW Deputy Assistant Secretary Kenneth Levine state that the Administration has received no response from the States concerning the impact these additional refugees may have upon their public assistance and social services programs should the Indochina Refugee Assistance Program (IRAP) terminate on September 30, 1977. While there may have been no communications from State governments, Mr. Levine failed to mention the correspondence from the County of San Diego on this problem. I have enclosed two letters, one from Chairman Jim Bates of the San Diego County Board of Supervisors and the other from myself, sent to the President in response to his announcement concerning the additional refugees. Since Secretary Califano received copies of both of these, I find it surprising that Mr. Levine was not aware of them.

As stated in the letters, a phase-down of IRAP would be incongruous in light of the new admissions. By the same token, a phase-down cannot be justified with respect to the existing refugees because it assumes a more rapid assimilation than that which is taking place. As you mentioned in the hearings, the income of most of the refugees is still extremely low. At the same time, the number of Indochinese refugees on the welfare rolls is increasing. It is sensible to contemplate a phase-down of IRAP when the situation has progressed this slowly?

I urge that your Subcommittee take immediate action upon returning from the August recess to provide some form of continuation of IRAP. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke's refusal upon questioning by you to discount the possibility of future admissions in addition to the 15,000 refugees demonstrates the necessity for continuation of the program. I particularly urge that your Subcommittee report a measure that would provide 100 percent reimbursement to State and local governments until the assimilation of the Indochinese refugees has been successful.

Sincerely yours,

ROGER F. HONBERGER,
*Washington Representative.*

[Attachment]

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO,
*Washington, D.C., July 20, 1977.*

THE PRESIDENT,
*The White House,*
*Washington, D.C.*

MR. PRESIDENT: The Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program (IRAP) will expire on September 30, 1977. This program provides 100 percent Federal reimbursement to State and local governments for services provided to the refugees. Since the demand for these services continues to increase, it is imperative that the program be continued. This is especialy critical because of the imminent arrival of 15,000 new refugees.

Most proposals currently being considered for the extension of IRAP have contemplated a three-year phase-down, with a steady reduction in the Federal reimbursement level. However, a phase-down approach presupposes as assimilation of the Indochinese refugees into American society within the next three years. Yet, a recent GAO report (HRD–77–35) stated that, from December 1, 1975 to December 1, 1976, the percentage of Indochinese refugees receiving public assistance increased from 19 to 30 percent. The increase in California was from 31 to 46 percent. One could hardly conclude from these figures that assimilation of those refugees needing public assistance is occurring at a predictable rate.

The situation can only be aggravated by the admission of the new refugees. Since San Diego County has, in the past, attracted a disproportionate share of the refugees, it has been estimated that, in the absence of IRAP, this influx could cost the County Government as much as $227,000 in additional costs (raising the total costs to about $2 million). With over 80,000 more refugees encamped in various locations in Southeast Asia, there is a chance that these costs could go even higher in the event of future Federal decisions to admit more refugees.

At the present time, there is no reasonable basis for a determination that IRAP should terminate this year or anytime in the near future. The situation of the Indochinese refugees is too unpredictable to permit tampering with the program, which has proven adequate in the past. Therefore, IRAP should be continued at the existing level until events have shown that that is no longer necessary. The County of San Diego requests that you make such a recommendation to the Congress without further delay.

Sincerely yours,

ROGER F. HONBERGER, *Washington Representative.*

[Attachment]

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO,
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS,
*July 20, 1977.*

The PRESIDENT,
*The White House,*
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On May 16, 1977, Mr. Roger Honberger, San Diego County's Legislative Representative in Washington, sent to you a letter indicating the anticipated fiscal impact on this County of the scheduled termination of the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program (IRAP), and urging you to lend your efforts to a Congressional reauthorization of this program.

Although there are informal indications that you favor continuation of the IRAP Program, there has as yet been no formal communications of the Administration's posture relative to this issue. Because of this, because of the upcoming Congressional recess, and because of the rapidly approaching termination of the IRAP Program, I wish to add my comments to the earlier May 16 letter.

(1) The dialogue in Washington and elsewhere most frequently alludes to the essentially humanitarian nature of the IRAP Program; the efforts of the national church groups and voluntary agencies are founded upon this humanitarian concern.

Without a doubt, the IRAP Program does represent a humanitarian gesture in regard to which all Americans may take pride. But let us not forget that the Indochinese refugees, as would be the case with any other group of indigent persons, are eligible for and must receive public assistance if their circumstances so warrant. Apart from its symbolic value, therefore, IRAP represents an effort on the part of the federal government to distribute the cost of a federally-created public assistance burden equitably among the federal, state, and local governments.

My concern, which is shared by many state and local government officials in areas where Indochinese refugees have concentrated, is that this externally created burden—which results from a gesture of humanitarian good will on behalf of all Americans—will be forced upon a relatively small number of state and local taxpayers. As an example, the annualized local costs for Indochinese refugees currently on AFDC and General Assistance in San Diego County, should IRAP terminate, is estimated to be $1.7 million.

I must repeat that the burden of public assistance resulting from the immigration of Indochinese refugees to this country will remain, regardless of the future of the IRAP Program. The critical issue relates to the proper location of responsibility for funding this burden. I urge you most strongly to recognize the responsibility of the federal government in this matter. The commitment to the Indochinese refugees, as a national commitment, should be shared equitably among all of our citizens.

(2) On July 15, 1977, it was announced that you had authorized the entry into the U.S. of an additional 15,000 Indochinese refugees. If existing migration and caseload data may be extrapolated to this new group, San Diego stands to incur an additional $228,000 in local costs with the termination of IRAP. Such costs will be duplicated in Texas, Minnestota, Florida, and elsewhere. It would seem to me imprudent to speak of 'phasing down" the IRAP Program—let alone terminating it—until such time as it is known what will be the future of this additional group of refugees.

(3) There are currently three bills in the Congress, principally H.R. 7769 (Fish) which would enable Indochinese refugees to obtain permanent resident status.

While I am in sympathy with the intent of such legislation—to assist in the removal of obstacles to the assimilation of the Indochinese refugees into American society—my Department of Public Welfare staff inform me that such a

change in their status would make the refugee no longer eligible for IRAP assistance. Hence, all IRAP cases would be converted to regular AFDC and General Assistance even if IRAP were extended, thereby negating the fiscal relief to local and State governments which IRAP seeks to provide.

(4) If IRAP terminates, demands for social services for Indochinese refugees would seriously impact local Title XX programs. As you are aware, state and local governments are increasingly hard-pressed to stretch their Title XX dollars in such a way as to meet the social services needs of their citizens. Without IRAP, local officials would be forced with having to further cut back on services to other needy client groups, terminate services to the refugees, or significantly raise local taxes to make up the difference.

In summary, I urge you most strongly to lend your efforts to continue full federal funding for the public assistance costs of the Indochinese refugees.

Sincerely,

JIM BATES,
*Chairman, Board of Supervisors,*
*County of San Diego.*

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NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE
PUBLIC WELFARE ADMINISTRATORS
OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WELFARE ASSOCIATION,
*Washington, D.C., September 27, 1977.*

MEMBERS, HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE

On September 30, the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 will expire. Unless the Congress acts very soon to improve upon or continue the provisions of this Act, the federal commitment to assuring the proper resettlement of the Indochinese refugees will end before it has been fulfilled. The welfare of the large number of refugees who are as yet unprepared to make it on their own in our society will no longer be protected by the government which brought them here. And the public, voluntary, and private agencies that have been the mainstays of the resettlement effort so far will be forced to assume even greater responsibilities if resettlement is to continue.

The National Council of State Public Welfare Administrators is composed of the officials in each state, the three U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia charged with the responsibility for administering the public welfare programs which have helped to sustain thousands of refugees the past two years. In our view, to sharply curtail at this time the special federal support of these programs made possible by the 1975 Act will greatly strain the ability of state and local governments to help the refugees attain their independence. The Council firmly believes that the federal role in resettlement must be maintained and therefore offers for your consideration the following resolution:

Whereas, the goal of effective resettlement of Indochinese refugees in American society is yet to be fully achieved; and

Whereas, the continued involvement of federal government is essential to achieve the effective resettlement of our Indochinese refugee population.

Therefore be it *resolved*, That the National Council of State Public Welfare Administrators urges:

(1) A three year extension of the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975;

(2) The provision of special project funds available on a grant basis to deal with the generic factors, such as lack of adequate language and employment skills, which inhibit the achievement of self-sufficiency on the part of the Indochinese refugee population;

(3) Strengthened sanctions embodied in federal regulations covering cash assistance payments to Indochinese refugees to insure their compliance with the law;

(4) The passage of adjustment of status legislation, now before the Congress, to assist in the effective integration of the Indochinese refugee population into the economic, social, and eventually, political fabric of our society; and

(5) The establishment of a coherent and consistent national policy relating to refugees and immigrant resettlement in the United States.

Should it be impossible to enact favorable legislation in the short time remaining, we would strongly encourage the adoption of a continuing resolution which would extend the provisions currently in effect under the 1975 Act. This action would guarantee that refugees will continue to have their needs met while the Congress, the Administration, and interested groups work toward a more permanent and fitting solution to the resettlement problem.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

JOHN J. AFFLECK,
*Chairperson, and Director, Rhode Island Department of Social and Rehabilitative Services.*

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## APPENDIX 6

### NEWS ARTICLES

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 19, 1977]

### REFUGEES' GIFTS TO KIM BOOST HANOI ECONOMY

(By Vu Thuy Hoang)

Many staunchly anti-Communist Vietnamese refugees in the United States have lent a hand to the Communists in rebuilding their country recovering from three decades of war. The Communists have cheerfully collected foreign currencies the low-income refugees have sent to relatives in Vietnam, while always calling refugees "traitors."

In this erratic, uneasy cooperation between the two never-under-the-same-roof foes, each side pursues its own goal. The refugees want to help their cherished relatives alleviate misery under the Communist regime. The Communists want to accumulate foreign currencies that they desperately need for reconstruction.

The amount of money flowing from the refugees to their relatives is estimated at millions of dollars this year, and the Communists have conducted an elaborate and systematic drive to encourage the flow.

Vietnamese refugees are surprised at the relatively unsharp scissors Vietnamese censors have used against outgoing mail. Various letters implying harsh conditions under the new Communist rule in South Vietnam have reached the outside world. Some refugees believe that the Communists do not want to impose rigid control in the hope that the compassion-stirring letters might attract some money home.

According to refugees who recently escaped, Communist cadres often urge people to seek financial support from relatives overseas. "Write your sister and tell her to send money home," Vuong Si Thanh quoted a Communist cell leader as saying when handling him a letter from a Virginia resident. Thanh, 27, a native of a costal city 200 miles northeast of Saigon, arrived in the United States in March after having spent 19½ months under Communist rule.

"To encourage and urge relatives abroad to transfer money home is the duty of everyone," the Saigon newspaper Tin Sang said in article that was broadcast by the Communist radio in August. "We must not only advise overseas compatriots," the paper continued, "and create conditions for them to maintain sentimental links with their families and homeland, but must all help the government collect more foreign currencies to develop production and industrialize the country."

According to Tin Sang, persons receiving foreign currency are given a bonus that, depending on the currency, ranges from 25 to 70 percent over the official exchange rate.

A few privileges are also granted to some persons who distinguish themselves by bringing in much foreign currency. A widow was presented a medal of "national reconstruction" and given a special status as a middle-level cadre, enabling her to buy food and commodities at government stores, according to Le Kim Ngan, a former college professor who left Vietnam 11 months ago. The woman, Ngan said, receives monthly allowances from some of her children in Europe.

Partly at the encouragement of Communist authorities and partly because of severe economic conditions, letters from Vietnam often solicit money, medicines and clothes. The refugees' hearts soften when reading their relatives' discrete

portrayal of their rough life in the newly reunified nation, and they are eager to be of some help. "I'm lucky to have escaped from the Communist yoke and have started the new life here but I won't be happy, if I couldn't help my beloved relatives living in Saigon," said a former air force major, now a Maryland county employee.

Sending money, a practice banned by U.S. laws, is done openly by the Vietnamese community. Understandably, the refugees who do it do not want to be identified.

Until relations between the United States and Vietnam are established, money and clothes sent from here must find a zigzag path via the refugees' friends in countries with relations with Vietnam. France, with its large Vietnamese community and its long-time connections stemming from nearly a century of domination of the Southeast Asian nation, is the most common channel.

Canada, Australia, Japan and Hong Kong are other conduits. "I sent my wife and three small children $50 tentatively last year via Australia," said a Florida pizza parlor employee, formerly an army captain of the now-defunct American-supported government. "I'm going to send them $300 soon through an acquaintance in Hong Kong."

Almost every refugee family with relatives still living in Vietnam has sent money, according to a businesswoman with contacts in the 6,000-member Vietnamese community in Virginia.

As the refugees have become more established, the amount of money being sent is increasingly larger. A California woman, whose husband was a colonel, said she had sent $100 last year and $400 some months ago to her sister and three brothers in Hanoi, whom she has not seen for 23 years. She works in a beach hotel as a maid.

The sums involved may seem small in the eyes of Americans, but to Vietnamese receivers they are really big. The pizza shop employee's wife, a typist, exchanged her $50 into 120 Vietnamese piastres, or "as much as nearly three times her salary," he said. With the new bonus for foreign currency, the exchange ratio becomes higher. A 42-year-old refugee said that his brother, a middle-level government employee in Hanoi where the bonus has been in effect for years, converted $80 into 399 North Vietnamese piastres, "equivalent to his eight months' salary." A North Vietnamese piastre is reportedly worth 80 percent of a South Vietnamese one. More than a year following the official reunification, Vietnam still maintains different monetary units in the two parts of the country.

It is difficult to know the amount of dollars streaming from the refugees to their relatives in Vietnam through various channels. In 18 telephone calls to Vietnamese names chosen at random in Washington area phone books, seven persons said they have sent money, and two were reluctant to answer the question. The calls indicate that about one-third of the refugee households have supported their relatives in Vietnam.

Of 145,000 refugees in the United States, 30,682 are heads of households, according to a U.S. government report. If one-third of the families send their relatives $100 a year—a minimum sum the Vietnamese say they usually send—the annual amount would be about $1 million. From the disclosures by the interviewees, however, the figure may reach several million dollars this year.

Rumors circulate among the refugees that when their relatives are summoned to receive money, authorities ask questions about the senders. Other rumors said that the money receivers are "advised" by officials to deposit part of the money in saving accounts from which they can withdraw it only for important reasons.

Nguyen Cong Hoan, a defector from the Communist National Assembly last March, said in an interview that the Communists are temporarily permissive to the money receivers at this stage when they badly need foreign currency. But in the long run, he said, the regime will "never tolerate a privileged minority" who live on the support from persons whom the government calls traitors-in-exile.

Despite the rumors, many refugees continue sending money. "As long as my relatives receive my money, I feel I still have an obligation to send them a little sum at times. Affections and compassions must overcome politics in this case," a thoughtful refugee said pitifully.

[The author left South Vietnam in the 1975 evacuation.]

[From the New York Times, Sept. 20, 1977]

## Refugees Tell of Hardships and Fear in Vietnam That They Say Drove Them Away

(By Henry Kamm)

Manila, Sept. 15.—Now that southern Vietnam has become virtually impenetrable by foreigners and only the Hanoi Government's picture of life in the reunited country is presented to the world, the thousands of Vietnamese who have fled in small boats are the principal source of critical first-hand information about their country.

Their accounts of why they sought exile at great risk to their lives present a generally negative picture of Vietnam today, particularly in the provinces.

The reasons that were most often cited in conversations with hundreds of "boat people" over the last four months were political pressures, fear of being uprooted, unemployment and mounting hardships in material life.

With varying degrees of emphasis, all these reasons as well as more personal ones combined to create the despair that has driven thousands to throw themselves on the mercy of the South China Sea. All these factors, to be sure, existed under the American-supported regimes of South Vietnam. The critical differences, as perceived by the refugees, are that their intensity has heightened and that the conditions they deplore now seem to be irreversible.

### LANDED, THEN GAVE BIRTH

A woman in her 30's, who spent a week on a small craft that left Cam Ranh, a central coastal town, on Aug. 17 in the final days of pregnancy and who gave birth on the day she touched shore in the southern Philippines, described the life that she and her husband and their five children left.

Her husband was dismissed from his job as a high school teacher of philosopy two months after the Communist victory in 1975, presumably because he had been a supporter of former President Ngnyen Van Thieu. He was not given a job and spent the last two years raising corn and sweet potatoes on a plot owned by his wife.

His wife taught in elementary school until her departure. Like most of the teachers at her school, she was allowed to stay on the job under the new regime. This included even the principal, and only one teacher from the north joined the faculty. She is the only one, the woman said, in whose presence the other teachers disguise their political opinions. Among themselves, she said, the 30 or so longtime teachers made no secret of their negative attitude toward the new regime.

### POLITICS IN ALL COURSES

The teacher said she was given one month of political re-education followed by a month of instruction in the new teaching method. The essential difference, she said, was that politics rears its head in all subjects of instruction. As an example, she cited this mathematics problem:

"One Communist soldier kills 15 American imperialist soldiers and shoots down three imperialist planes in one day. How many soldiers and how many planes will he account for in five days?"

Adulation of Ho Chi Minh, the teacher said, is presented as the principal literary theme from the lowest grades up. His praises are sung in poems, prose and theatrical sketches. The older children, she said, occasionally wink and snigger or ask ironic questions.

Another woman teacher, from Can Tho in the Mekong Delta, reported that in her high school, disciplinary measures up to expulsion were frequently imposed upon students for such offenses.

The Cam Ranh teacher said that about every other day local Communist Party representatives came to her neighborhood and throughout Cam Ranh calling out the population for a political education meeting. One member from each household had to be present, she said.

The meetings were usually lectures, lasting two to two and a half hours and devoted to ideological and practical aspects of constructing a new Vietnam. The lecturers tended to be northerners, she said, and some of the audience tended to fall asleep.

GOOD FISH IS EXPORTED

From her salary, which she said was significantly lower in real terms than under the old regime, an appreciable deduction was made every month for what was called "social action," which was never defined. The tax she paid on her garden plot went up a hundredfold, the teacher said. She had to surrender all the corn and sweet potatoes her husband raised and buy 60 pounds of corn and additional potatoes this year just to meet taxes.

Rice, the staple of the Vietnamese diet, is in short supply, the teacher said, echoing refugee reports from all parts of the country. It is obtainable only in small quantity and at high prices, whereas in the past families bought it a sack at a time.

She said people now eat about a third of their previous quantities of rice and fill up with corn and sweet potatoes. Fish, the basic protein food of Vietnam, is rare, of lower quality and higher priced than before, she said, because the good fish is reserved for export. Canned milk, another staple, is hard to find and very expensive.

The teacher said that in Cam Ranh only food of local origin was available and that there were no longer products from other regions, even nearby. Only about one out of 10 shops remains open in the city, the woman said. Street food merchants, who traditionally prepare a large part of all food eaten in Vietnam, now tried to do their business as unobstrusively as possible to avoid taxes, the teacher said.

She said that her family and many in similar situations supplemented their earnings by selling the appliances and clothes that their previous earnings allowed them to acquire.

CLOTHING IS SIMPLER

Clothing is simpler now, she said, and women are rarely seen wearing the traditional ao dai. In school, she said, where ao dais had been the required dress, they are now frowned upon.

A shortage of gasoline has drastically reduced the number of cars and motor scooters on the streets, and bicycles have become the chief means of transport.

In the teacher's estimate, which coincides with that of the refugees in general but presumably reflects their strong political feelings, as many as 95 percent of the people, no matter what their political views before the Communist victory, are disappointed by their new life.

PARTICIPATION DEMANDED

From the broad range of conversations with refugees, the following common themes emerged:

The present political pressures are more keenly felt in comparison with those under the former Saigon regimes because the old regimes by and large accepted political apathy and persecuted only active opponents. Hanoi demands positive participation—in street and block organizations, youth and womens groups and obligatory attendance at meetings.

Unemployment is the lot of most men who held medium and high-level jobs in pre-Communist days, whether in government or in private business or with foreign, mainly American, organizations. Those who are at liberty spend their days doing odd jobs. Many former university students now barred because of their fathers' political or social background share this fate.

Uprooting in various forms haunts many. It may beon being sent to "re-education" camps, by all accounts labor camps in remote regions, where living conditions are harsh and where detention in most cases seems of indefinite duration. People are being pressed to go to work in so-called "new economic zones," jungle and mountain areas that must first be made ready for cultivation. Young men fear military draft in a country that more than two years after the end of the war keeps its army at wartime strength.

Vietnamese worry over widespread rumors that more such removals from the cities are coming and that the chief victims will be those now unemployed because of their past records.

Economic hardship is complained of by both city people and the other major group among the refugees, fishermen. They are numerous both because they own the means of escape and because, as private entrepreneurs who sold their catch at the price the market would bear, they have suffered great losses as the

new Government steadily increases the share of the catch they must sell to the Government for export at prices from a third to a fourth the market price.

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[From the New York Times, Sept. 20, 1977]

### 99 'Boat People' Fly to Safe Harbor in San Francisco

Bangkok, Thailand, Sept. 19—Ninety-nine Vietnamese who fled from their country in fishing vessels boarded a jumbo jet today for the last leg of their adventurous escapes, turning into reality President Carter's program to admit 7,000 "boat people" to the United States.

They were the first to leave under the program announced last July, which will bring to the United States 8,000 other Indochinese refugees, mainly Laotians and Cambodians.

The refugees, many of whom had never been on an airplane before, contained their emotions, as Vietnamese are trained to do from childhood. But the departure for San Francisco, with an overnight stop in Hong Kong, was not without laughter and tears.

"Now I am reincarnated," a young woman said at the foot of the gangway. "And to think that we have lost our country!" exclaimed a woman taking her two grandchildren to parents already in the United States and hiding her tears from them.

The new refugees differ from the more than 150,000 already in the United States, most of whom left at the time of the Communist takeover more than two years ago, in that they escaped at great risk to their lives and have experienced living under Vietnam's new regime.

#### WIDE SPAN OF AGES AND BACKGROUNDS

They span a wide range of ages, professions and backgrounds. They include fishermen, students, professors, large families and children without parents, former military men, physicians, a dog trainer, a couple aged 77 and 70 respectively, a seminary student and many babies.

The group includes many men who have experienced the "re-education camps" of the new regime. Dr. Nguyen Huynh Anh's re-education, after service as an army physician, consisted of eight political lectures in 18 months of digging sweet-potato fields near Tay Ninh, together with about 700 others who, like him, held the rank of captain.

Dr. Anh said that during the 18 months medicines were almost unavailable, illness, mainly intestinal, were widespread and deaths from lack of treatment frequent.

He said that his wife obtained his release through bribery, a practice that many refugees report remains widespread under Saigon's new bureaucracy. He said that few prisoners were released, but that most of them also bought their freedom.

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[From the Washington Post, Sept. 21, 1977]

### 113 Indochina Refugees Arrive

San Francisco, Sept. 20 (AP)—Mixing tears with smiles, 113 refugees from Indochina arrived here today, the vanguard of an expected 15,000 homeless Southeast Asians allowed to enter the United States under a new Carter administration program.

The plane that brought the refugees from Bangkok was met by representatives of a variety of government, religious and social-service groups. Many of the refugees boarded other flights in San Francisco with destinations scattered across the country where they will either join relatives or go to resettlement programs.

Most of the refugees are from Vietnam, but others are from Laos and Cambodia.

Attorney General Griffin Bell authorized the new immigration Aug. 11, after a State Department report said that some 80,000 persons were crowded into refugee camps in Thailand.

[From the Washington Post, Oct. 14, 1977]

## JAPAN RELUCTANTLY TAKES REFUGEES, PROVIDES FEW AMENITIES

(By William Chapman)

TOKYO—Japan's traditional reluctance to accept new waves of immigrants from abroad is undergoing a test as a growing number of Vietnamese refugees come drifting here in search of freedom and safety.

More than 1,100 refugees have found their way here through harrowing adventures at sea, and nearly 800 still live in limbo, temporary guests in makeshift homes improvised by religious organizations.

So far the Japanese government has not provided any housing or direct assistance for the refugees and has not permitted them to take jobs offered by private companies.

Moreover, the religious organizations complain that Japan erected cumbersome obstacles that delay even temporary landing permission for the "boat people" and thereby discourage ships from picking up other refugees at sea.

The government promised last month to study ways of providing better accommodations and job training for the refugees and agreed to address the touchy issue of permanent resettlement. A special Cabinet council appointed to work on those issues is still being organized.

Japanese officials say that assimilating foreigners is a difficult task for their country.

"We don't know what to do with these people," said Hiroyuki Yushita, a Foreign Ministry official. "It will take time. The Japanese society is a homogeneous society, and our living style is very difficult. Maybe we can accept them as guests, but how can they survive? It is not possible for them to accommodate very easily."

Japan has never been a hospitable place for foreign immigrants. Koreans, with a population of about 600,000, and several thousand Chinese form the only sizable ethnic groups.

The difficult Japanese language and other cultural barriers have been formidable deterrents. Officials contend that Japan is already overcrowded and hardly able to support new immigrants, and they pointed out the sagging economy has already caused growing unemployment.

Most of the Vietnamese live in 29 scattered locations and are well cared for by Caritas Japan, the Catholic welfare organization, the Japan Red Cross, and a Buddhist group, Risho Koseikai. They also receive about $3.40 a day from a special United Nations fund.

The reaction of the Japanese people to the refugees has been mixed. Some objected strongly to having refugee camps established in their areas. The mayor of one small city complained that a camp would ruin his area's tourist business. In other locations, residents have offered food, clothing, medicine and even television sets to the newcomers.

Religious leaders have begged the government to provide a single large staging area where the refugees could be together while they await permission to go into another country. A Japanese official said the request is still under consideration.

Judging from forms they fill out on their arrival, most of the refugees would prefer to go to another country. The United States and France, where many have relatives, are the first choices. Japan is occasionally listed as a third or fourth choice.

Most refugees arrived on freighters that rescued them on the high seas when their small crafts floundered or when their food and water ran out. Government regulations have not made it easy for them to be put ashore. A foreign ship cannot unload refugees here unless the country where it is owned has promised Japan it will accept them if no home is found for them here.

Some observers believe this policy has discouraged ship captains from lending assistance at sea. They contend the captains do not want to risk a costly delay in Japanese ports while the necessary guarantee is obtained from their home country.

One Catholic priest said that from interviews with his flock of Vietnamese refugees on Okinawa he determined that some ships were ignoring SOS calls from refugee boats. One group told him that three freighters stopped to give them food and water, but refused to take them aboard for the remaining journey to Japan.

The Foreign Ministry's Yushita disputed charges that Japan has taken an unusually hard position to discourage more refugees from coming here.

For one thing, he said, Japan has guaranteed other countries that it will receive refugees landing in their ports. This encourages Japanese ships to pick up the "boat people" because captains are assured they will not be tied up for long periods in foreign ports, he said.

Some other countries do not make such guarantees, he said. He cited groups of about 40 refugees picked up by ships from Malaysia, Greece and Liberia, countries that would not guarantee their responsibility. Denied permission to unload the refugees in Japanese ports, the ships finally unloaded them in Hong Kong and Africa, he said.

He also said that Japan recently had flown back from Singapore a large group of refugees brought there by a Japanese ship. Singapore would not let the refugees unload even temporarily, he said.

The Japanese Cabinet committee has indicated that it will be some time before new facilities are provided for the refugees already here. One official, Tadamasa Kuroki, acknowledged that housing was the most "urgent problem" and said the government hoped to provide a single home for about 300 persons expected to arrive in the coming weeks. No decisions have been made, however.

"We are thinking and discussing," he said.

Vocational training for the refugees is in a similar discussion stage. "First we must find out what they would like," he said.

The committee will also consider the long-range issue of permanent resettlement, Kuroki said.

"We cannot neglect that, and it is being discussed by our council," he added, "I do not expect a quick decision."

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[From the Washington Star, Oct. 18, 1977]

## 60,000 Refugees From Cambodia Living in Desperation Near Saigon

(By Horst Faas)

Hanoi—Some 60,000 Cambodians have been granted asylum in Vietnam in the past year and are living in desperate conditions on the outskirts of Saigon and in the provinces west of the former South Vietnamese capital, diplomatic sources in Hanoi say.

At least 16,000 of these refugees are trying to leave Vietnam and have asked the Hanoi office of the United Nations high commissioner for refugees for help.

Most of the refugees are reported to have been small traders, businessmen, manufacturers or employes in shops, business houses and manufacturing concerns.

Most are said to be from towns from which the entire population was moved forcibly to the countryside after the Communist takeover in 1975.

"The Vietnamese government has been looking after the Cambodian refugees despite its own food shortages and economic difficulties," one diplomat said. "The Cambodians are receiving rice rations that just keep them alive and are under the ration of 14 kilos (30.8 pounds) every Vietnamese gets per month."

The source also said the Cambodians are allowed to work as small businessmen and vendors.

"That means they can peddle their last belongings to stay alive," he said.

A diplomat from a nonaligned country who is stationed in Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital, reported during a visit to Hanoi that he and his colleagues know almost nothing about what is going on in the country.

"We have to live in a hotel in downtown Phnom Penh which we can never leave," he said. "The food is delivered to us from the outside. We cannot even go out on the pavement outside the hotel."

Western observers in Hanoi say they have practically no information about the situation along the Cambodian-Vietnamese frontier. Last August, some Vietnamese newspapers reported clashes along the border. But in a visit with a German tourist group to a province about 20 miles from the Cambodian frontier, this reporter could see no sign of military activity or preparedness.

Cambodia and Vietnam have full diplomatic relations, but diplomats in Vietnam say they believe the Vietnamese government has not returned any refugees to Cambodia.

"In this respect the Vietnamese have acted with more respect for basic human rights than some of the other Southeast Asian nations," one Western diplomat said.

He was referring to governments that have refused to admit refugees from the Indochinese countries.

Of the 16,000 Cambodian refugees who have asked the U.N. commissioner for help, 3,000 have received entry visas for France. Seventy have received West German visas, and U.N. officials believe West Germany may take 150 more. Belgium also will take 150.

"We have stacks of requests in our desks," said an official of the West German Embassy in Hanoi.

The exodus from Vietnam to France, which has received some 1,000 refugees from Indochina each month since the end of the Vietnam war in April 1975 came to a halt recently. The Vietnamese government canceled Air France's landing rights in Saigon—which the Communist regime calls Ho Chi Minh City—because of the French government's refusal to close its consulate there.

U.N. officials here hope the flights will resume soon.

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[From the Wall Street Journal, Oct. 27, 1977]

ORIENTAL INFLUENCE

*Vietnamese refugees sink roots in the United States 2 years after arrival*

IN LANCASTER, PA., THEY FIND JOBS, BASIC ACCEPTANCE; MODELS OF INDUSTRIOUSNESS

*The Disharmony at a dance*

(By John L. Moore)

LANCASTER, PA.—This Pennsylvania Dutch stronghold wasn't prepared for the influx of refugees who began arriving here two years ago, and the refugees weren't prepared for Lancaster.

The 600 refugees—Vietnamese along with some Cambodians and Laotians—arrived here mostly from a government resettlement camp at nearby Fort Indiantown Gap. Although they were only a fraction of the 150,000 Indochinese arriving in the U.S. that year, they were a sizable group to be absorbed by a city of 56,000.

Many Lancastrians grumbled that the city should take care of its own poor first. They feared that the Orientals would become beggars or worse, welfare recipients. Lancaster's Hispanic and black minorities grumbled about more competition for jobs. The public schools suddenly had to handle large numbers of non-English-speaking children.

For their part, the refugees expected to find an American city and people like they had seen in the movies. While Lancaster is picturesque (tourism is a leading business), it isn't a typical town, and it certainly isn't like the movies. The Pennsylvania Dutch, actually of German and Swiss descent, predominate in Lancaster County and the most conservative of these, the Amish and Mennonites, are a principal tourist attraction precisely because they are atypical. Bearded Amishmen and bonneted Amish women travel in horse-drawn buggies and disdain such modern conveniences as electricity.

INITIAL MYSTIFICATION

The refugees "didn't know who these people were" says Giang Le, who came to the U.S. eight years ago from Vietnam. Ung Xuong, one of the 1975 newcomers, recalls how mystified the Vietnamese were at what they found in Lancaster County.

But now, just two years later, most of the refugees have jobs, and some have saved enough money to buy modest homes or start small businesses. Although discord continues between Hispanic and Vietnamese groups, the refugees have generally been well accepted. Many Indochinese who initially relocated in Northern cities have since left for the warmer climates they generally prefer, but few have left Lancaster.

Indeed, so successful has the newcomers' adjustment been since their original shock that many are encouraging friends and relatives living elsewhere to move to Lancaster. Consequently, Lancaster's Indochinese population has swelled to about 900, one of the largest of any Northern city.

The basic industriousness of the newcomers, which sets well with the hard-working Germanic natives, is one of the keys to their success here. Vietnamese

refugees are making similarly good adjustments elsewhere as well, encountering problems only in the competition for jobs. James Lockhart, acting director of the Indochinese refugee assistance program for the U.S. Office of Education, says many fishermen among Vietnamese refugees settled in Louisiana, and the local fishermen "fear the refugees are going to take their jobs."

### LINGERING "CULTURE SHOCK"

Vuong Thuy, a Vietnamese emigrant a decade ago and now on the faculty at Philadelphia's Temple University, suggests that while the 1975 Vietnamese immigrants to the U.S. have generally made "fairly good adjustments, they're still suffering from culture shock." He says that most have jobs and are self-sufficient, but "I don't think they're happy." Mr. Thuy adds that it will be relatively easy for younger refugees to overcome their unhappiness eventually, but it "will be difficult for the older generation to overcome it; it's a question of time."

However happy they may or may not be, the Vietnamese in Lancaster have become a pervasive influence, some living in the agricultural countryside of Lancaster County, but most preferring the city, where they live in a number of working-class neighborhoods.

The Orientals have provided a cosmopolitan touch that is evident everywhere—on the roadside waiting for buses, in flea markets haggling with vendors, in shopping malls and in the historic city's Penn Square, helping square dancers celebrate a local Revolutionary War holiday.

As the Indochinese take root, so does some of their culture. They have opened several small specialty grocery stores, a restaurant, a Vietnamese-English newsletter and several churches.

### AVAILABILITY OF JOBS

Greatly helping the refugees' success here has been the availability of jobs in the area's bustling agricultural-industrial-tourist economy (the county's 3.4% unemployment rate in July was about half the national rate). The local schools also helped by gearing up quickly to teach the newcomers English and provide job training.

Friends of Chinh Ba Nguyen moved here last summer after spending two lean years in upstate Pennsylvania, where jobs were scarce. "Now they have good jobs down here," Mr. Chinh says, "and they seem very happy."

Other recent arrivals have come from as far away as Minnesota, Texas and California. That is just the beginning, says Tranhuy Duc Hanh, who has opened an Oriental food store here. "There are lots of Vietnamese people who will come here," he says, "because it's easy for them to get a job."

But those who don't speak English well can't be fussy about the kind of work they get. A former mathematics teacher works here as a warehouse clerk for a local dairy, for instance, and a former office worker inspects chicken carcasses at a local plant.

"When you ask them to stay late and work overtime, they're delighted," says William Good, president of Zephyr Aluminum Co. "They like the money," he adds, and they are "reasonably productive."

The refugees are also given high credit rating by the locals. First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Lancaster says it has provided mortgages for a number of Vietnamese families. "We have no qualms about lending to them at all," says William Glasmire, vice president.

Douglas Enck tells how his church helped a Vietnamese family find housing, then paid the rent for six months. "The money was given as a gift, not a loan," Mr. Enck says, but the refugees insisted on paying it back after they had earned enough money.

A number of Lancaster churches helped refugee families, Christians and Buddhists alike, set up housekeeping. One Buddhist family now is attending a local Church of the Brethren that sponsored the family. "They're Buddhists, but that doesn't make any difference to us," Says Caleb Bucher, a member of the congregation. "And it doesn't make any difference to them."

### GETTING ALONG FAMOUSLY

The Vietnamese have even adjusted to the most conservative of the local "plain folk"—and vice versa. In one case, a Vietnamese family of 10 has moved onto a farm owned by a family of Old Order Mennonites. Although the Mennonite

family travels in a horse-drawn buggy and disapproves of television, it allows the tenants to keep a TV set in their quarters and to use a car to get to their factory jobs. The families "get along famously," says Donald Sensenig, a Mennonite clergyman.

"If my family were suddenly plopped down in the middle of Vietnam," says Wilmer Hoover, Lancaster's police chief, "I'd have more trouble adjusting."

Eugene Madeira, director of the Lancaster School District's adult education center, says some 300 refugees have enrolled at the center in the past two years. "They've set an example, I think, of what a highly motivated people can do," he says.

Consider Nguyen The Thi, a middle-aged woman who speaks little English. Last spring, she opened the Nanking Oriental Restaurant in the northern part of town, employing her seven children as waitresses and busboys, her brother as manager and herself as cook.

### A DIFFERENT MENU

Offering such traditional Oriental items as eggrolls and won ton soup along with Vietnamese main courses, the Nanking quickly developed a following—mostly Vietnamese on weekends and mostly Americans during the week. "We Pennsylvania Dutch are known for our eating and overeating," says Police Chief Hoover. "It's good to have a different menu to choose from."

In another part of town, Mr. Hanh operates his Hong Ha Oriental Food Store, which opened a year ago to sell noodles, rice, soups, sauces and candies as well as Vietnamese-language magazines. Twice a week, the young Mr. Hanh goes to New York, Baltimore or Washington to buy fresh Oriental vegetables and fruits.

Refugees are also experimenting to see how their own vegetables grow in Lancaster's rich soil. Thao Letrung laments that only "skinny" plants grow from seeds her mother sent from Vietnam. but another family grew enough Oriental produce in its garden to sell the surplus to a Vietnamese grocer.

Just as the Germans once introduced such European vegetables as turnips and radishes to Pennsylvania, the Vietnamese have successfully grown an Oriental spinach with small, bitter-tasting leaves, a minty celery with thin stalks and a vine with large leaves used in salads.

If there has been any rough spot in the refugees' assimilation, it has been in relations with the local Hispanic community, which totals about 6,000 people. The initial reception of the Vietnamese was cordial, with Hispanics helping to find housing and jobs for refugees. "We know what it's like to come into a community and be unwelcome," says Carlos Graupera, administrator of the Spanish-American Civic Center here.

### RESENTMENTS BUILD UP

But the relationship went somewhat sour. The Puerto Ricans were displeased to see the Indochinese getting so much support from their sponsors, favorable publicity in the local news media, and financial aid from the government. "Deep down inside, they resented it that the Vietnamese people were immediately accepted," one Hispanic resident relates. The Spanish were also irked when the Indochinese began "getting the promotions" after "coming in and taking jobs they believe belong to them," says Patricia Rankin, who helps with a refugee fellow-up program at Millersville State College.

Last summer, when a factory fired a Spanish worker following a dispute with a Vietnamese, some Indochinese decided the time had come to promote harmony between the two groups. They sponsored a dance featuring Vietnamese, Spanish and American music. Several hundred Vietnamese and Spanish turned out, and mixed well. However, "when we played Vietnamese music, the Spanish wouldn't dance, and when we played Spanish music, the Vietnamese didn't dance," Mai-Anh Nguyen, the dance sponsor, says. "When we played American music, no one danced," she adds.

The rapid economic progress made by the Indochinese hasn't been lost on the Spanish. "These people are very industrious," observes Maria Torres, a stenographer for Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. She notes that within two years after fleeing Vietnam, many refugees have managed to buy homes and new cars. "We have a lot to learn from these people," she says.

## APPENDIX 7

### LETTERS RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INDOCHINESE REFUGEES

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
*Washington, D.C., July 12, 1977.*

The PRESIDENT,
*The White House,*
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I write today to propose that you take a bold new American initiative to ease the plight of refugees from Indochina.

As chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee charged with overseeing United States immigration and refugee policy, I have monitored closely the U.S. response to the rapidly worsening problems confronting these refugees.

Already the United States has permanently resettled nearly 150,000 of these persons. We continue to accept several hundred so-called "boat cases" per month.

Now, with the alarming reports of increasing numbers of these "boat cases"—refugees literally floating from one unwelcoming port to another—I believe it is imperative to end the haphazard, piece-meal approach which the U.S. has taken toward these refugees.

I propose, therefore, that you take the lead in convening the nations of the world for an International Conference on Indochinese Refugees.

Such a conference is necessary, I believe, because of the failure of the international community to respond adequately to the needs of the Indochinese refugees.

In particular, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has had little success in meeting this problem—as evidenced by the small percentage of Indochinese refugees who have been resettled in countries other than the United States.

Recognizing the inadequacy of the U.N. Commissioner's efforts, I believe that additional special steps must be taken. This need becomes even more apparent as we learn that several countries have refused to grant permanent asylum to the "boat cases"—which apparently are increasing at an alarming rate.

At the same time, vessels have refused to offer help to these boatloads of refugees in distress on the high seas.

The plight of these refugees, I suggest, is an international problem, and should be solved on the international level to the extent possible.

The conference I propose could develop a prompt, effective response to this problem. It could promote a greater international cooperation in responding to the humanitarian needs of the Indochinese refugees, and could result in additional resettlement opportunities and increased governmental contributions for their care in Thailand and other third countries.

There is ample precedent for a conference. In 1938, President Roosevelt convened the nations of the world for a conference in Evian-les-Bains, France, to deal with the more than 400,000 displaced persons from Nazi Germany and Austria.

Although the efforts of this conference were interrupted by World War II, it served as the model for the International Refugee Organization—a concept first advanced by President Truman—which performed in outstanding fashion to meet the massive refugee problems of the post World War II era.

As you move to implement any such international effort on behalf of the Indochinese refugees, Mr. President, you have my pledge of unstinting support.

Respectfully,

JOSHUA EILBERG.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
*Washington, July 15, 1977.*

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,
*U.S. House of Representatives,*
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR CONGRESSMAN: The President received your July 12th letter regarding Indochinese refugees and has asked that the National Security Council look into this matter. You should be receiving further response soon.

Sincerely,

FRANK MOORE,
*Assistant to the President for Congressional Liaison.*

THE WHITE HOUSE,
*Washington, January 12, 1978.*

Hon. JOSHUA EILBERG,
*House of Representatives,*
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR CONGRESSMAN EILBERG: Please consider this an interim response concerning the Administration's interest in your proposal that an international conference be convened to address the Indochinese refugee problem.

The State Department will be consulting the Congress on this issue. I understand from my staff members who met with you in December that we share a common concern in developing an adequate long-term, international response to the problem. We want to work with you in developing the best international mechanisms and forums toward this end.

The Department of State is under a time deadline to submit its legislative recommendations to the President. I trust the Department will therefore be consulting with you in the weeks ahead.

We also look forward to working with you as you prepare for your important hearings on the Indochinese refugees issue that are scheduled to be held toward the end of the month.

Sincerely,

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI.

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